ML20107K060
| ML20107K060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1984 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Rehm T NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20107J952 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-671 CAL, NUDOCS 8502280130 | |
| Download: ML20107K060 (2) | |
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([ FPS July 6, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Thomas A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations FROM:
'f, Office of the Executive Director for Operations A. Bert Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator i
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY INCIDENT Enclosed is a fact sheet regarding the incident that we discussed by telephone on July 6, 1984.
The.information is current as of 12:00 noon that date.
Should you have any additional questions please call.
We will keep you informed of any significant findings, conclusions, or changes.
$h A. Bert Davis Deputy Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
J. G. Keppler J. A. Hind C. E. Norelius l
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DATA SHLET Callattay Incident of July 4, 1984 1.
At 3:10 p.m. on July 4,1984, the control room operators received Control Room Ventilation and Containment Purge i. solation signals which were caused (ultimately) by opened power supply breakers for certain process radiation monitors.
The licensee determined that these breakers were physically opened and had not tripped per design.
The breakers (120 volt, hoksehold type) are located along a highly trafficked path.
A " wise remark" was heard on the plant intercom system shortly before or after the incident which stated " Happy 4th of July, UE."
2.
The licensee immediately reset the breakers which cleared the isolation signals.
They also increased the frequency of security patrols in the area and, later, took other more stringent specific protective actions (10 CFR 73.21 Information).
They notified the NRC Operations Center at 5:58 p.m. on July 4,1984.
3.
Additional actions have included:
A Region III (Chicago) Physical Security Inspector was dispatched to a.
the site on July 5,1984 to monitor the licensee's investigation.
b.
Region 111 notified NRR and the Information Assessment Team (NMSS).
Determined that licensee's actions need include a thorough c.
investigation to determine most probable cause and that the results be provided for. NRC review and acceptance prior to taking the reactor critical. A Confirmatory Action Letter to that effect was issued July 6, 1984.
d.
A licensee manager and an investigative specialist from their security contractor have been assigned full time to the investigation.
The local FBI has been contacted for advisory assistance.
e.
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f.
Fingerprints have been taken.
g.
On the order of 60 interviews have been scheduled.
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JUl. 0 61934 Docket No. 50-483 Union Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell Vice President - Nuclear Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MD 63166 Gentlemen:
This refers to a 10 CFR 50.72 reportable event which occurred at 1510 CDT on July 4, 1984.
Control room ventilation and containment purge isolation signals were initiated due to a loss of power to three process radiation monitors.
Further investigation by your staff revealed manually opened, rather than tripped, power supply breakers in the 120V distribution panel which supplies the radiation monitors.
Based on discussions between you and Mr. C. E. Norelius of my staff, it is our understanding that prior to the Plant Manager's approval to take the reactor critical, you will:
(1) conduct a thorough investigation of this event to deter-mine the most probable causes; and (2) provide for NRC review and acceptance, the results of your investigation and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.
Please let us know imediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above.
Sincerely, NO c6 w fJamesG.Keppler Regional Administrator cc:
W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear Construction S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager Quality Assurance DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII J. Axelrad, IE B. Youngblood, NRR J. Hind, P.III Region IV K. Drey Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri Public Service Commission nrJ2A9Q hd O UV ' -/