ML20107G913
| ML20107G913 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1984 |
| From: | Jens W DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 EF2-72006, NUDOCS 8411080314 | |
| Download: ML20107G913 (7) | |
Text
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, Cayne H. Jens
%m Premwn Nuclear OperatKms Omo Highway Edison =Mr"-
November 1, 1984 EF2-72006 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. B.
J. Youngblood Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
References:
1.
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 2.
Detroit Edison to NRC Letter, " Action Plan for Completing NRC Open Items Related to PRMS and PASS", EF2-70036 dated October 31, 1984.
3.
USNRC Region III Inspection Report No. 50-341/84-27, dated August 10, 1984.
Subject:
Clarification of Position Regarding NUREG-0737 Postaccident Sampling and Monitoring capabilities
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
The reference (3) inspection report contains several items identified by the NRC Region III Facilities Radiation Protection Section which require clarification by Detroit Edison and your review and concurrence.
These items, which relate to NUREG-0737 postaccident sampling and monitoring capabilities, are discussed in the attached Enclosures, as follows:
- a. : Sampling and Analysis of Plant i
Effluents
- b. : Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor
- c. : Postaccident Sampling capability Other items contained in the Inspection Report, relating to postaccident sampling and monitoring capabilities, are addressed in the referenced (3) letter submitted to NRC Region III.
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i Mr. B. J.'Youngblood
'EF2-72006 November 1,-1984 Page 2 1
If you have any'further questions please contact Mr. 0. K. Earle (313) 586-4211.
Sincerely, m
A S W
Enclosures
-cc Mr.
P. M. Byron Mr. C. Gill Mr.
L. Heuter F
Mr. M. D. Lynch.
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US?lRC, Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
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Mr. B.
J. Youngblood-EF2-72006 November 1, 1984 Page 3 bcct F.
E. Agosti R. L. Andersen J. P. Bobba L.
P. Bregni W. F. Colbert R.
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Earle l
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J. Fahrner l
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Holland R.
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Lenart E.
Lusis P. A.
Marquardt W. W. McNeil T. D.
Phillips M.
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R. J. Salmon L. E. Schuerman A. A. Shoudy G. M. Trahey R. A. Vance i
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E. Wegele NOC Approval Control - ARMS Coding O. K. Earle (Bethesda Of fice)
Secretary's Office NRR Chron File 9
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SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS OF iPLANT EFFLUENTS
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'NRC COMMENT'
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NRC Region III made.cotxsents: s
- tarding the following items in Reference (3),-relating to the.aspling and analysis of plant effluents - for' post-accident release pathways, which should be referred to NRR-for review (see Open Item 84-05-10):
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--(l) - application'of NUREG - 0737 design basis. shielding source tera -
'(100)aci/cc of = gaseous radioiodine and particulates, deposited on -
Sampling Media, 30 minutes sampling time, average gamma energy
.(E) of 0.5 MeV);
f('2). automatic' vent - fan trip function for 'the Reactor Building exhaust -
plenum mooitor;-
(3) ' demonstration of isokinetic representative ~ sampling capabilities
- with regards to' post-accident sampling of radioactive' iodines and 3 particulates;-
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'(4)Ysamplelineheat tracing to accosusodate post-accident gaseous
~Icf$1uent. conditions; and (5) empiric 1tdetermination or use of sample line loss correction factors for iodines and particulates.
2.-
CLARIFICATION 3
There are five gaseous effluent release pathways at the Fermi'2 Plant
.which include:
(1) ;Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust; (2)"Turbinei Building Ventilation Exhaust;
.w (3) Service Building Ventilation Exhaust;
.(4) Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum; and (5) Standby Gas Treatment Syctem, (SGTS).
The Radw se Bb'ilding Ventilation Exhaust' and the Turbine Building.
. Ventilation Exhaust will trip and' isolate on a high ' radiation signal, s
- hence post-accident sampling will not be required for these pathways.
See - FSAR Sections 11.4.2.8.2.6, 11.4.2.8.2.7, and ' Detroit Edison
[$InstrumentDrawingNo. 61721-2181-1 for details. and design.*
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l' The Service Building Ventilation' Exhaust monitor detects activity which.imay occur-from contaminated equipment that may be worked on in the machine shop. Post-accident source terms (design basis) can. not occur for this effluent pathway. The gaseous activity in the exhaust'is normally expected to be below detectable levels. In
- addition, a high radiation alarm will initiate a trip of the Service Building Ventilation fans and automatically close the isolation
' dampers, therefore, post-accident sampling will not be needed for
.this pathway.' -See FSAR Section 11.4.2.8.2.8 and Detroit Edison Ins trument Drawing No. 61721-2181-1 for details and design.*
The Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Plenum has two process streams which discharge via this pathway, which are:
(1) Off-Gas, and (2)
Reactor Building Vent. The Off-Gas monitor detects activity which is attributed-to fission product gasses produced in the reactor and transported in the steam through the turbine to the condenser. Since a turbine trip will occur post-accident, this process stream will not contain significant' activity. See FSAR Section 11.4.2.8.2.2 and DECO Instrument Drawing No. 61721-2181-1. The reactor building vent process stream contains ' activity vented. from the drywell and fuel pool vent (the fuel pool vent monitors are upstream of the reactor building vent monitors). Both th'e Reactor Building Ventilation monitors and the fuel pool vent monitors start the SGTS, close the primary containment vent valves,_ trip and isolate the Reactor Building Vent system, isolate the control center, and initiate emergency recirculation upon-a high-high radiation alarm. Hence these effluent streams are routed to the SGTS post-accident. See FSAE Section 11.4.2.8.2.4, 11.4.2.8.2.11,
' DECO Instrument Drawings 61721-2181-1, and 41721-2610-17 for details-and des ign'.*
Therefore, post-accident. sampling is not required for
,the Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Plenum.
' 3.
CONCLUSION The NRC comments regarding the capability for post-accident sampling and analysis of the effluent pathways are applicable only to the SGTS for the Detroit Edison Fermi 2 Plant design.
- Drawings are attached to ec copies of letter for inforuation.
4 24 EF2-72006 CONTAINMENT HICH-RANGE RADIATION MONITOR
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1.-
NR.C COMMENT-The NRC Region III made the comment in Reference (3) regarding certification of calibration of each Containment Area High Radiation Monitor System (CAHRMS) detector in the decade of range between 102 R/HR and 103 R/HR, which should be referred to NRR for review (see
. Open Item 84-05-06).
^
2.
CLARIFICATION l
Detroit Edison has certified the CAHRMS for each detector at two points, 10 R/HR and 50 R/HR. The detectors'were not certified at 103 R/HR. A type test was performed by General Atomics at ranges in excess of 106 R/HR.
Detroit Edison has performed an in-situ source calibration for each detector, at two points, 1 R/HR and 10 R/HR.
Futhermore, Detroit Edison has performed an in-situ electronic calibration for the CAHRMs using electronic signal substitution for all range decades (100-108 R/HR). These calibrations' are considered by Detroit Edison to be adequate to demonstrate the capability of the
- CAHRMs to qualitatively indicate core damage during and following a postulated design-basis accident.
3.
CONCLUSION The above measurements should assure functional capability of the detector. An in place test at 103 R/HR is not consistent with ALARA considerations. Currently Detroit. Edison has no plans for a 103 R/HR certification and requests NRR concurrence with this position.
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EF2-72006 Enclocure 3
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POSTACCIDENT-SAMPLING CAPABILITY 1.*
NRC.COM, MENT
/
~ In Reference (3), NRC Region III made comments to be referred to NRR c
7 or review regarding the possible.need for sample line heat tracing f
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and determination of sample line loss' correction factors for Codines
, and particulates for the. Post Accident' Sampling System (PASS)
'i s containment 'atmospheref sample line' (see Open Item 84-05-07).
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. CLARIFICATION Detroit Edi hn has noted _ the NRC Region III comments relating-to-containment atmosphere sample line heat tracing and sample line loss correction : factors.for iodine,and particulates.'.The PASS provides the
'd capability 3to.promptly obtain reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples, which are needed to determine the' extent of core
. damage, during and following an accident in which there-is core
' degradation..
The Detroit'. Edison procedure for. determining core damage is based upon
. the assay of I-131 -and Cs-137 in liquid samples and of noble gases in containment atmosphere samples. Quantitative assay of airborne radioactive particulates and. airborne radioiodines in containment atmosphere samples is' not required by procedure in order to determine -
l the extent of core damage. The NRC staff has-previously reviewed the-
-PASS design'and interim procedures, see SER, Supplement No. 2, Page 22-1:and Supplement No. 3,-Page 22-3.
13.
CONCLUSION.
The NRC Region III' concerns regarding containment atmosphere sample
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line heat tracing and determination of sample line loss correction factors for iodine and particulates are not considered applicable to the specific design and procedures of the Fermi 2 PASS. Detroit
- Edison's position is that no further modifications or evaluations are
-required and that the containment atmosphere sample line will be used
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only.for obtaining noble gas samples for confirmation of liquid sample results and qualitative ~ assessment of core damage.
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