ML20107F036

Provides Preliminary Comments,Analysis & Recommendations Re Adequacy of Design,Const & Operation & Compliance W/Federal Regulations & Industry Stds.Util 841008 Program Plan Should Be Rejected

ML20107F036
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/26/1984
From:	Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	Harold Denton, Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20107F039	List: ML20107F036
References
NUDOCS 8411050201
Download: ML20107F036 (18)

Text

.. - - _ _

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E GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 4

1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 202 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)232-8550 q

October 26, 1984 0

Mr. Harold R. Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

.Mr.'Darrell Eisenhut Director Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D.C.

20555 Re:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (Nos. 50-445 and 50-446)

Texas Utilities Generating Company Program Plan, October 8, 1984

Dear Mr. Denton and Mr. Eisenhut:

This letter serves as preliminary comments, analysis and recommen-dations of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and the Citizens Association for Sound Energy'(CASE) regarding the adequacy of design, construction and operation of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) and the compliance of CPSES with federal regulations and industry standards.

It is clear to us, and we believe should be to the NRC and the public, that the Comanche Peak plant is the victim of a comprehen-sive quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) breakdown.

Since the scope of the Technical Review Team (TRT) is limited, it is understandable why Texas Utilities Generating Company's (TUGCo) response is equally narrow.

Such an approach is extremely imprudent by both the agency and applicant, at thf2 sneture.

Based on our review of the October Nr > to/

applicant, we.make the following rea.ur.c.- x_ proposal by TUGCo or 1ons:

1.

Reject the October 8, 1984, proposal (Revision O) as submitted.

2.

Require TUGCo to hire an independent contractor to develop and implement any subsequently approved re-inspection or corrective action proposal.

8411050201 841026 8#!

PDR ADOCK 05000445 A

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-Mr.JHarbd'R.Denton'.

Mr.lDarrellfEisenhut y

iOctober. 26, 1984

Page:Two.

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c 3..

Require TUGCo's response to include.a " vertical slice"

're-inspection program of at least three safety systems.yj 4..

Expan'dLthe NRC's'TRT's' efforts to include'those expanded items in Section II'of this-letter, including a total-in-spection and~ documentation. review of either one major safety: system or one separate area of the plant (similar

to ' the major Diesel-Generator Building inspection at the

-Midland nuclear power plant.in October, 1982).

s5.

Expand-the official agency ~ review of.the adequacy of TUGCo's response effortJto include a review by a panel of former employees.

At this time, we remain 1 skeptical of the plan being provided by TUGCo

to-allay legitimate.NRC and public concerns about the safety of'the CPSES project.

I.

-BACKGROUND ~

Comanche [ Peak Steam Electric Station is a two-unit power reactor under' construction near Glen Rose, Texas.

It is owned by a consor-Jtium of six. utility 1 companies.- Texas Utilities. Electric Company

.(TUEC),fthrough its subsidiary TUGCo',, retains responsibility for design, construction and operation.

The. plant.has.been-plagued by;a lengthy history of allegations of.

inadequate-design, improper construction,'and a flawed QC program.

These allegations have come to'the attention'of the NRC primarily through.the citizens-intervenor organization, however,.throughout the

.ceven to.eight years of construction, employees have independently l:

contacted the NRC;to' report design andiconstruction deficiencies.

The project-has undergone a. number..of special NRC inspection icfforts, as wellLasithe-regulatory program.

The plant has notLyet received an cperating license.

There are l

currently two ongoingLlicensing' dockets, both actively involved in.

l.

- F9.arings. =

L

-In: March, 1984, GAP announcedian independent investigation-of-

,p

'CPSES; ' GAP filed an emergency request pursuant to:10 C.F.R.

2.206 i.

requestingfan'immediate stop work order, an independent audit of the

. project, and' a major investigation by the Office. of Investigations

~

l'

. (OI)., Thatzrequest was subsequently granted in part and denied'in part.

~

AIA siEilar request is pending in' front of the Licensing Board (ASLB or Board)fboth in the' technical contentions docket (Docket 1) and r

the: harassment-and intimidation docket'(Docket 2).

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Mr.1H5roldiB.1Denton.

Mr.LDarrell:Eisenhut.

V

' October 26, 1984

-Page.Three s

OnLMarch 12,,1984, William J.1Dircks, Executive Director-for-LOperations (EDO) announced the reorganization of NRC resources for-LthelWaterford III:and CPSES projects.

This reorganization was'to-coordinatefall. agency actions on these~ projects under one office--

.the Office of the Director of the: Division of Licensing.

The stated

-purposeLofLthis unusual organization was to resolve the remaining issues'before the staff could.make the licensing decision.

.fThe' initial'. focus of this coordinated " task force" approach, i

Lused previously1at'Diablo-Canyon,.was to " expeditiously" resolve all Lexisting and-new issues "so as not.to delay the licensing decisions."

{

(Marchil2,"1984, Memorandum to John T. Collins, et al., from William J.>Dircks,'EDO, re: Completion of Outstanding: Regulatory Actions on Comanche-Peak and Waterford.)

=In early-April, a coordinated team of NRC management officials, inspectors 1and investigators arrivea on the CPSES site to conduct a preliminary review of the adequacy of construction at the project.

1The report of this effort was issued July. 13, 1984.

On September 18, 1984,. a second report was issued which high-

^

-lighted some of the issues which had 'been identified by the TRT in

its-inspection and review effort conducted during July-and August,

11984,

'On October 8, 1984, TUGCo responded to the findings of the TRT.

~

'by1 announcing:the establishment of a' Comanche, Peak, Response Team

'.(CPRT).and a complimentary l response' effort to the NRC's findings.

'On Oc'tober 19, 1984, a meeting was-held in Bethesda to discuss ftheLTUGCo response to-the TRT findings.

(That meeting was completed Lat a second meeting on October 23.)

Additionally, on October'19, 1984, the NRC staff submitted to

the;ASLB its projected schedule ~for completion of outstanding ASLB

-issues.: EAlthough-the ASLB schedule outlines the schedule for the

~

= items necessary'for resolution before the'ASLB, it'does not incor-L porate 'all items requiring 'NRC review, inspection and. resolution

~

prior.to licensing. -

(Those additional items, or a timetable for

, resolution, are:notJaddressed in the staff ~ submittal.)

l L

Following.the release of the latest schedule, the original in-

-atructions from Mr. Dircks, EDO, to his staff, that is, the expedi-itious resolution of open issues to meet the utilities' timetable, teems' inappropriate; l

. Outlined below are what GAP and-intervenor CASE believe to be l:

a.more? prudent and regulatory-efficient approach.

i 0

L

.3

+

Mr.sHnrold B.c-Dunton Mr.2Dal;rell'Eisenhut e

. October 26,c1984 Page'FourL

'II.=

PROPOSED NRC ACTIONS The following outline is submitted as a proposed modification to.the ongoing 'TRT efforts: (see Attachment A) l'.

Expanded-field inspection effort "Whole system" or." vertical slice" approach; a.

b.

.As-built inspection with final design paper;.

-c.

Audit of documentation to field to vault for tin-process construction.

W 2..' Incorporation of source review ia.. - Appointment.of allegations source response

. coordinator; b.-

Field visits by allegation sources; Review panel for former employees.

c.-

3.

cAllegations recruiting program; a.

Establishment'and promotion of information

- " hot line;"

b.

Publication of a sum.aary of unanswered questions to the workforce; Establishment of an NRC interview program; c.

d..

Structured " debriefing" program.

III ~.

MODIFICATION IN THE-CPSES RESPONSE TO THE TRT The current proposed Revision O of the Program Plan and Issue-Specific: Action Plan'(" Program Plan") has several fundamental

' flaws in its structure, scope and methodology.

Essentially, we

~

believe that TUGCo needs to completely revamp the programmatic basis and philosophical approach upon which the Program Plan is' based.

=

These flaws are. summarized below:

No organization independence.

Inherent conflict of interest of personnel involved in the' Senior Review Team, review team members, issue leaders, etc.

s 4

b

?Mr. -iH2ri>1d B'. Denton

Mr.2Darrell Eisenhut' October. 26, l1984:

-Page Five Fundamentally inadequate program objectives.

and principles.

Inadequate.and unacceptable' program processes and'QA (methodology).

Insufficient program-record plans and tracking systems.

. Overly-narrow and restricted scope.

Because'of the overall-inadequacy and fundamental, flaws of the TUGCo Lproposal, we do not think;it.is a prudent expansion of our efforts

~to provide a;line-by-line analysis of this revision.

We will, how-ever,: delineate our principle objections and recommendations below.

1.

Any analysis:or re-inspections which are responsive to the TRT's' findings should be done by an independent contractor.

This~ contractor should be chosen according to all of the criteria for independence.

Those criteria are outlined infa February 1, 1982, letter from Chairman Palladino.

to Congressmen Dingell and Ottinger.

The three elements necessary;are:

a.

Competence: " Competence must be based on knowledge of and experience with the matters under review."

~

b.

Independence:

" Independence means that the individ-uals or companies. selected must be able to provide an objective, dispassionate technical judgment pro-vided solely on the basis.of technical merit.

In-

-dependence also means that the design verification program must be conducted by companies or.individ-uals not previously involved with the-activities they will now be reviewing."

~

c.

Integrity:

"Their integrity must be such that they

- are regarded as respectable companies or individuals."

We have. reviewed the independence criteria as it has been cpplied by the NRC.to the indepenvent contractors at the Diablo Canyon, Midland and Zimmer nuclear power plants in preparation for this res-3ponse.

There is no question, given that criteria, that Ebasco, Inc.--

-avidently selected by'TUGCo to perform the independent review--does not qualify to perform an independent audit or analysis of Comanche

[

Peak problems under any of the three criteria.

First, we do not find that Ebasco is competent.

We draw the cttention'of the NRC to its own recent findings about the significant L

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L' lMrb Harold'B5JDenton-

~

Mrb-Darrell Eisenhut-V

< October 26, 1984.

Page Sixf LQA~ breakdown at the Waterford nuclear power-plant.. In the September,

.1984,; Supplement to the Safety Evaluation-Report-(SSER No. 7), on.

page 15h the.NRC-made.the following conclusion in the summary of a.

. review..of1350 allegations:

2.: ' Quality.Assurancefactivities during most of construction werel principally. delegated to

.the major. contractor, EBASCO, by the utility.

- The lack offa fully-staffed and effective utility QA' program, along with EBASCO's failure to fully carry out the QA.responsi-

'bilities delegated to;them, led to quality problems during construction.

/ Documentation available to both GAP' investigators and the NRC.

" clearly :indicatesf that Ebasco was,willing--and in. fact. did--shortcut Lcompliance of its work to federalfregulations.

LWe'also' understand that Ebasco-is currently under investigation by OI for its activities at Waterford nuclear power plant.

LHowever, it is.not necessary to leave. Comanche Peak to make general. assessments about Ebasco's lack-of-competence.

Both TUGCo and=the"NRC are well aware of the-lengthy trail of misjudgments made by,Ebasco's lead employee on the' Comanche Peak site. 'Perhaps the

' most: notable incident currently.in front of all. parties is the liner

~

~

plate l mishap. -(This incident is described in-detail in a CASE

-pleading, September.27, 1984,~ CASE's' Evidence of a Ouality Assurance Breakdown.).

Mr.IThomas Brandt, senior ~Ebasco employee, has attempted since the-issue came.to'the attention'of.the:ASLB,,to explain the

. basis forzhis personal conclusion that the stainless steel liner

't plates are installed in an indeterminate condition.

This position

<by the senior Ebasco. employee-is-evidence under-both the integrity end competence.section. - It is indicative of the same type of sloppy attitude that has led'the Waterford NRC team to reach its conclusions

.about'Ebasco.

'Second,.Ebasco simply does not meet the-independence standard.

i Ebasco personnel have been involved in'every aspect of'the construc-

-tion, inspection, litigation-and re-evaluation of the Comanche Peak 1 project.

'Even if Ebasco! brought in personnel who have had.no previous

' involvement withLthe' project, the company would not have any cor-

-porate independence.

I We hope that TUGCo has recognized that. organizational inde-

pendence is' impossible for Ebasco to achieve.

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!Mr. Harold B..-Denton Mr..Darrell Eisenhut v

october-26, 1984-Page Seven:

Finally, the history of Comanche Peak's Department of Labor record:and its'Waterford. evaluation are full-of Ebasco's demon-strated lacklof integrity.

We draw the attention of the NRC once again1to the Secretary of Labor's finding that Thomas Brandt was not credible in his testimony about the termination of Charles Atchison.' '(See the Secretary of Labor's Decision, Atchison v.-

. Brown & Root, June 10 1983, pg.

.)

We hope that TUGCo has the foresight to voluntarily withdraw LEbasco as its nominee'and resubmit a set of three. nominees to the agency for their selection.2/

i In choosing the ccmpanies to nominate for this independent're-view,.we request that the. utility be required to adhere to both the independence. criteria _(discussed above) and the.following process

-recommendations:

1.

Dofnot " hire" any contractor until the NRC has the opportunity to review the nomination for compe-tence, integrity and independence.

- l2.

Arrange for the public.(intervenors, former employees,: lay persons) to' comment on the selection prior to entering into-any contract.

'^

' 3.

Be prepared to have the contract for the indepen-dent contractor publicly'available.

Our, specific ~ recommendations regarding the contract of the

-. independent auditor-are noted below:

- 1.

The independent contractor should be responsible directly-to the NRC, submitting all interim and final product simultaneously with TUGCo'and the NRC.

2.

The independent contractor should do a histori-cal assessment of TUGCo's prior work.

3.

The contract should ensure that,. once hired, TUGCo cannot. dismiss the independent contractor from the project without prior notice to the NRC

- 2/This process of nomination, selection and a public meeting on the selection'was used at Midland, Zimmer, Diablo Canyon and LaSalle

.(partial HVAC audit).

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7, Mr. HErold B'..D:nton'

Mr. Darrell'Eisenhut' October 26,-1984 J Page Eight and an NRC-sponsored public meeting to-jus-

~tify the' decision.'

4.

The-. contract.should-require that each auditor subcontract any services for which its direct personnel are not qualified.

5.

The' contract should require that the proposed methodology be disclosed:.specifically selec-tion criteria and size of the samples for inspections and testing.

6.

The contract should require.the auditors to provide calculations demonstrating that it is

.possible'to_ adequately complete its work during-the proposed timeframe.

7.

The contract should require the auditor to support its proposed methodology through references to established professional codes (i.e., ASIM, ASME, ANSI, AWS, etc.).

8.-

The contract ehould require all auditors to report all safety-related information directly to the NRC.

9.-

The employees and auditors should demonstrate that the personnelLassigned to the project are free from conflicts of' interest.

10.

The'~ auditors must recommend corrective action,

.and then control its implementation.

. We are extremely alarmed that TUGCo has provided such sketchy details about the persons or organizations that will be performing the detailed review of the Comanche' Peak deficiencies.

' We request that first the NRC delineate in writing to TUGCo what..it expects.in a nomination of a third-party / independent re-review?to respond to the findings of the TRT.(including instructions to TUGCo to:not-hire a contractor without NRC approval).

~

2.

Inherent conflict of interest of personnel involved in the Senior Review Team, review team members, issue leaders, etc.

This item'is, in actuality, dealt with through the independence section above.

However, any analysis of the TUGCo Program Plan would be incomplete without pointing out that the Plan, as submitted,

c iMr. H2rold B'. Denton tMr. Darrell.Eisenhut;

.; October 26,E1984 L '-

iPage'Nine.

4

'contains as the Senior Review Team, issue' leaders, and team members,

<the very people? charged by the.allegers with. causing the problems a

~in the first-place.

a v

~.This.flawDis-incredulous.

In. reality,gthe situation without modification, results in the-ffollowing typical' scenario:

. Inspector "A" identifies problems on the Comanche Peak ~ site with System X.to Supervisor "B."

Supervisor "B" and Manager "C"-prevent' Inspector "A" from pursuing his concerns.

Inspector "A," believing he has been harassed:and' intimidated, either quits or is fired and reports his concerns to the NRC-TRT.

The TRT substantiates Inspector'"A's" concerns and requires TUGCo to respond to those concerns.

TUGCo assigns Supervisor "B" and Manager "C" to~ resolve the

~

. concerns-initially. raised to them by the alleger.

Obviously,-the supervisor.and management were neither capable;

nor willing_to solve tlie problems in the first place.

They are

'certainly-even.more incapable of now-indicting their own previous

decisions and lack of action.

4

~Any credible response must be done by an independent team.

(See_ Item-1 above.)

3.

Fundamentally inadequate program objectives and principles.

The three sections o'f the Program Plan describe TUGCo's ob-

_jectives (SII) and principles (SIII).

/

JIn SII,-Program Plan Objectives, TUGCo states that it is

'"commited to the safe, reliable, and1 efficient design, construction Land operation of CPSES...."

We think this' initial statement is illustrative.

TUGCo is commited under'the law to a code of federal Lregulationsland industry standards.

In the past, TUGCo has ignored the:former commitment and embarked on an uncharted journey while

. paying lip service to-the latter commitment.

No.one questions.the intent of TUGCo to ultimately safely

~ operate the Comanche Peak project.

That commitment, however, must

._be--to the unique programs and proce'sses which'it agreed to through its ' FSAR ~ commitments.

-The fiveJobjectives outlined in %II are the correct broad-goals.

Unfortunately, the Program Plan Project is not capable of,

Lfulfilling those objectives.

i

.Mr. HErold~B". Denton Mr.:Darrell Eisenhut-

Oc'tober 26,11984-Page-Ten'Section III,. Program Plan Principles, uses ten basic elements

_-for each question. raised by the NRC.

These are listed below, with

-the primary f, law of.each category beside it.

-1.-

Specific Questions

- Is limited _to only those identified by the NRC TRT.

.2.

Expanded Reviews

- Provides for expanded sample size which can erase the problem.

3.

Generic Implications

- Only a " forward look"/

' horizontal approach as opposed to assessment of systematic implications 4.

' Thorough Reviews

- Potentially'a " Rube Gold-berg" search for an acceptable, instead of legitimate answer.

5.

Root Cause

- Does not concede that breakdowns in the implemen-tation of the system inher-ently indicate a defective system.

6.

Corrective Action

- Lack of comprehensiveness.

First, TUGCo.nhould receive centralized and controlled NRC approval for corrective action.

7.

Collective Significance-A totally useless category in its present form; only potential use is internal management tool 8.

Future Occurrences

- Must be controlled by inde-pendent auditing firm.

9.

Personnel Training /

- All personnel doing any work Qualifications on this project must be in-dependently qualified for tasks, since the qualifica-tions of personnel involved, or the procedures they were qualified to originally may have been totally inadequate.

~

m

- -Mr. Hnrold B. Denton

-Mr. Darrell Eisenhut October. 26, 1984 Page Eleven 10.

Records

- Narrative format too com-plicated.

Any data sub-mitted to the NRC must also be publicly available, not only "NRC auditable."

4.. -Inadequate and Unacceptable Program Processes and Quality Assurance (Methodology).

Section IV, Program Process (pages 11 through 15) and Attach-ments 1-4 of SV, are the extent of the detailed implementing pro-cedures offered by TUGCo.

The abbreviated " bullets" of TUGCo's plan do not provide the level of detail necessary for the public (or the NRC) to have any confidence in the'TUGCo Program Plan.

We.suggest.that Section V be completely rewritten, utilizing a subcontractor with experience in development and implementation of' program processes.

If TUGCo does bring in a consultant to re-develop this section, we would request permission to provide them comments on the reorganization prior to submission to the NRC.

As a guideline, we include the following list of inadequacies:

1.

' Program has no organizational independence.

(See pages 4 through 9).

2.

Program does not include any assumption or accep-tance of error as a serious possibility; in other words, the approach is backwards.

For example, a concern substantiated by the TRT and submitted to TUGCo for evaluation and resolution, should be approached from the " ground up."

The response team (or independent reviewer) must first gather the appropriate standards and procedures used, review cnd audit the processes followed by design and construction, iden-tify deficiencies in the craft and QA accomplishment of their tasks from a historical documentation perspective and, finnaly, cudit the as-built condition of the system or component against a final design document.

Then, once the cause of the as-built deficiency has been identified, evaluated and tracked for similar discrepancies, the cafety significance of the item can.be separately evaluated.

The reverse process--identification of the safety significance, has the very real potential of failing to diagnose a multitude of

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_~._-.__----

Mr. Harold ID. Dent:n

=

Mr. Darrell-Eisenhut-October 26, 1984 a-

'Page Twelve generic causes necessary to understanding the QA/QC breakdown, 9

Quality Assurance / Quality Control Program g.

The QA/QC program for this effort should be a completely

~

-seperate function.

Their program and, procedures should be submitted.

to the NRC prior to the start of any program.

Currently the QA ef-i i._, fdKt forftheir response is to come from the existing QA program., _f~

r

.If that were actually implemented Mr. Antonio Vega would not only wear the hat.of,the Senior Review Team in which he is going to

-audit and review his own work as both a team leader and an issue

. leader, he will also head up the QA effort to audit his own work e

-while wearing the other three hats.

5.

Insufficient Program Record Plans and Tracking Systems l

~All audit records should be disclosed simultaneously to the public, the ASLB and the utility company.

These records should

. include any and all basis-including calculations and judgments which the TRT was'given by TUGCo, as welleas all data described in the." Project Working Files Section."

^(ye,e pg. 13) e

+

More specifically, the record format described in Attach-

[

ment 2 and 3 should be revised from a narrative form to a ona page (with continuations,if necessary) form.

(We have found that the format used by the TERA Corporation for the Midland IDVCP project was particularly useful and flexible.)

e The narrative approach is simply too subjective, very dif-ficult to work with, and unreliable. As currently proposed,'almost each line item of the Action Plan Format includes an interjection of opinion, conjecture and, ultimately, inaccuracies.

P Program Process Steps

to the implementing steps is in chronological L

order.

Our own analysis of the Comanche Peak problems lead us to

.believe that change in the order of tasks is more sensible.

4 We. propose that Step Eight, Identification of Root Cause

.and-PotentialGeneric.fmplications, follow Step Four.

Further, we propose that additional steps to review as-built verses final de-cign be included after Step Eight.

We resist the Motion that any rework or corrective action can be taken by TUGCO or any of its contractors prior to any resoi lution of,the concerns itself being approved'by the NRC.

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1 Mr. Enrold D. Denton Jir. Darrell Eisenhut g

. October-26, 1984 Page Thirteen Finally,5we strongly object to the TUGC0 plans to not

-forward the new information to the NRC until after it is a_cok.

plated work project.

4 6.

Overly Narrow and Restricted Scope Due to schedule constraints on intervenors who were required to submit' several motions last week, as well as attend NRC meetings with the new.TRT management and the late receipt of the TUGO5

~

~

Program Plan, ion. We anticipate submitting this item within the nextthis letter will to this sect two days under separate cover.

VII. Conclusion The evidence of noncompliances, improprieties, QA breakdowns' imprudence and massive construction failures repeatedly misrepresentations, falso statements, waste, corporate meets the general NRC and Region IV criteria for suspension of a construction permit or the denial of an operating license.

In recent months Comanche Peak hds been the subject of re-peated revelations and ac,cusations of construction flaws, coverups, and negligence.

The evidence already on the record is indicative of a significant failure on the part of TUGCo to demonstrate respect for~the-nuclear power it hopes to generate, or the agency which reg-

!ulates its activities.

TUGCo has taken repeated risks with its stockholders' in-vestments, its corporate credibility and its regulatory image.

In each of these risks it has lost.

It is too much to expect citizens L

- to accept TUGCo's arrogant disregard for the publics health and

}

safety.

[

GAP recognizes the steps forward by the NRC--establishing a special team to review Comanche Peak's problems and the request for an independent audit, however, this must only be the beginning.

(

l TUGOD has numerous problems to worry about, and it is.

l clearly not in its own best interest to put the strictest pos-cible construction on the regulations under which they have agreed l

to build this nuclear facility.

It is for just this reason that the nuclear industry is regulated, but even regulation, fines, extensive i

public mistrust, and corporate embarrasment have not humhand Texas l

Utilities.

If Comanche Peak is ever going to be a safe nuclear fa-

[

cility, someone else is going to have to put their professional cred-ibility on the line.

This independent auditor, paid by TUGCo, must i

j be given strict guidelines for accountability and responsibility in crder to justify its hard line recommendations.

1 v..

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- - - - - ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~

a

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i Mr. EnrOld R. D:nt:n Mr. Darrell Eisenhut

5.

October-26, 1984 Page Fourteen i

l GAP hopes that both the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula--

tion and the' Region IV office of the NRC will give serious consid-eration to GAP's concerns and recommendations set forth above,and implement a system whereby there is a truly independent system of auditing the extensive problems with the Comanche Peak plant.

Sincerely

\\

copy to service list Billie Pirner Garde

.f Director, Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government 6

e e

a

Atttchm5nt A' i

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRT REORGANIZATION

,.IOur recommendations incorporate the best of the various Nuclear Regulatory. Commission -(NRC) inspection and review programs which the Government Accountability Project (G4P) has worked with since 1980.

We believe that with successful Laplementation of the current Techni-cal Review Team (TRT) plans along with the modifications described below,the NRC should be able to ascertain the actual condition of Comanche Peak, resolve all pending allegations, require the appro-priate utility review ~or reinspection program, and provide assurance that all concerns of the workforce have been found by the NRC now instead of on the eve of licensing. 1/

1.

Expanded Fir'.d Inspection Effort

'We have previously explained this item in our September 26 letter to Darrell Eisenhut regarding the inadecuacies of the TRT effort.to date.

In short, our concern is that the TRT effort will only pursue allegations.

We know that the NRC's concept for these special inspection efforts is to follow an allegation until it is confirmid or substantiated and then turn it over to the utility for such things.

as " root cause evaluation," etc.

Such an effort is incomplete when the objective of the special inspection effort is to dett *nine" root cause."

Admittedly there is a large number of allegations and allegers at Comanche Peak.

However, it is not acceptable for the agency to depend upon the willingness of plant workers to indepen-dently report all significant violations.

Such an attitude would be dangerously optimistic.

We also recognize that the NRC does not have unlimited

-resources.- Therefore we suggest that the agency conduct either a "whole building" or " vertical slice" inspection as a means of deter-mining the validity of the projects-design and construction status.

We suggest that such an inspection be conducted of an crea or system that is completed.

This will enable the NRC to check the accuracy of the final design documents.

Such an inspection must, 4

of course, be unannounced if it is going to have any legitimacy.

IAs the NRC well knows it.is an unfortunate, but predictable phenomena that members of a nuclear plant workforce wait until the last possible minute before making their concerns about plant safety known.

This is a result of a combination of factors-including the belief that the problem will be resolved before start-up and fear of losing their job.

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'Further we propose'that the QA TRT personnel conduct a r..

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documentation audit of a sample of construction work in progress. To assess.the extent that documentation problems invalidate ongoing con-struction.andfinspection work.

2.

Incorporation of Source Review Our recommendations. in.this area stens.from our dis-appointment about how the TRT effort has failed te utilize the know-

~1edgeable members of the workforce who brought the problems to the a*.tention of the NRC.

(See also September 26, 1984 letter to Darrell Eisenhut from Billie Garde).

We suggest that the TRT appoint a coordinator to deal specifically with the allegers in order to both utilize their ex-perience and expertise'to the fullest extent.

Further, the coor-dinator would insure that the NRC inspection is of the same defi-ciencies the alleger identified.

We have found in the past that taking the allegers on the site one of the best ways to take' advantage of the level of detail.

and assistance which they can provide.

That approach would be parti-cularly helpful at Comanche Peak, especially among those personnel with experience in documentation.

Finally, we propose that the NRC establish a methodology

-which provides equal time (including preparation time) to the allegers to review the responses proposed by TUGCO to-the TRT. findings.

This could best be accomplished through the establish-ment of a review panel' composed of members of the public, former CPSES. employees, intervenors and any experts which were retained by L

the intervenors to review the adequacy of the resolutions proposed by TUGCO.

This process would institutionalize much of the time l

consuming effort of recontacting the various members of the public or allegers for thwar comments on a particular response.- Further,,it would provide a process in which the NRC staff - rather than a single representative - could direct questions at the intervenors or allegers who raised the concerns.

These types of meetings have been going on,

informally at plants where there are allegations and disputes over resolutions, however these types of meetings have rarely been institu-tionalized.

If'such a procedure is considered GAP will provide the mechanism for setting up the meetings, contacting the appropri-

-cts group of allegers, and insuring that the personnel have the ques-L tions and materials necessary to adequately prepare for the meeting.

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Obviously such meetings would, by financial necessity, have to be held in Texas.

By efficiency we expect that the meeting, would be broken ~down by either discipline or by particular systems

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(i.e. problems in start-up, documentation deficiencies ) -

3.

. Allegation Recruitment Program LGAP has been inundated with requests for help by alle-gers and intervenors at nuclear power plants accross the country.

The primary reason cited for contacting us for help in investigating prob-less is a deep distrust in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

i We have determined that this distrust among intervenors stems from a history of broken promises by the agency officials, un-professional and often rude treatment,.by the agency. lawyers, and blatant agency-industry "hobenobbing" on.technicql issues and legal arguments.

Intervenors soon learn

• thalt the agen'cy' is rarel'y on the side of the public.

Workers who contact us, however, usually have 'either' little or no prior experience'with.the NRC or have only 'hea'rd" that I

the agency can not be trusted.

Most workers (except those in Region IV) have no pre-detarmined attitude against the NRC.

They think that the agency wants to make sure a plant is safe and the rules are followed, they turn to GAP as a way to get their concerns to the agency.

Our program for flushing out allegations has been tre-mandously successful at almost every. plant.

We believe a similar pro-gram should be adopted by the agency as part of final agency re-view at each plant to preclude last minute allegation crises.

We sug-gest that Comanche Peak be.the place'to start.

Outlined below are the steps we think should be taken at this time at Comanche Peak plant to preclude a deluge of allegations throughout the remainder of the. plant construction.

1.

Establishment of an NRC " hotline" for Comanche Peak workers to report their concerns.

2.

An on-site NRC information program in which the TRT, its purposes, and the conditions of confidentiality are explained 3.

Publication and availability of the TRT's unanswered i

questions to those members of the workforce who can supply the answers.

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Establishment of a separate NRC exit interview and in-i'

-formation sheet for all departing employees, explain-

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ing their Department of Labor' rights and their rights land obligations under the law to report problems.

. GAP will be glad to provide a copy of the form we use

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during our major investigations) 5..

A-structural " debriefing" program which is conducted by-skilled' interviewers as opposed to technical in-spectors.

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GAP representatives will be glad to meet with any or all members of the TRT to discuss in more detail any of our proposals des-cribed in this attachment.

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