ML20106C649

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Proposed TS 3.3.4.(B) Re Contents of Sodium Hydroxide Tank
ML20106C649
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/28/1992
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20106C647 List:
References
NUDOCS 9210060279
Download: ML20106C649 (3)


Text

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PROPOSED TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CllANGES 9210060279 920928 PDR ADOCK 05000313 P

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- (I) The engineered safety features _ valves associated wi t.h each of the

- above systems shall be operable'or locked in the'ES posit. ion.

3.3.2 In addition to 3.3.1 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operabic when the reactor coolant system is above 350F and irradiated 1

fuel is in the core:

(A) Two out of three high pressure injection (makeup) pumps shall be maintained operable,-powered from independent essential buses, to provide redundant and independent flow paths.

(B) Engineered safety features valves associated with 3.3.2.a above shall be operable or locked in the ES position.

3.3.3 In addition to 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operable when the reactor coolant system is above 800 psig:

(A) The two core flooding tanks shall cach contain an indicated minimum of 13 1 0.4 feet (1040 1 30 ft') of borated water at 600 1 25 psig.

(B) Core flooding tank baron concentration shall not be less than 2270 ppm boron.

(C) The electrically operated discharge valves from the core flood tanks shall be open and breakers locked open and tagged.

(D) One of the two pressure instrument channels and one of the two level instrument channels per core flood tank shall be operable.

3.3.4 The reactor shall not be made critical unless the following equipment in addition to 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 above is operabic.

(A) Two reactor building spray pumps and their associated

  • pray nozzle headers and two trains of reactor building emergency cooling.

The.two reactor butlding spray pumps sha11 he powered from operable independent emergency buses and. the two_ - reactor building emergency cooling trains shall be powered from operable independent emergency buses.

(B) The sodium hydroxide tank-shall contain an indicated.

33.2 1 1.8 ft. of 18 wt % solution sodium hydroxide (C) All manual valves in the_ main discharge-lines of the sodium hydroxide tanks shall be locked open.

Amendment No. /f>,#,J/J,45, 37 w

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'370,100 gallons of borated water are suppliad for emergency core cooling and reactor bu.ilding spray in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

This amount fulfills requirements for emergency core cooling. Approximately 16,000 gallons l

of borated water are required to reach cold shutdown.

The original nominal borated water storage tank capacity of 380,000 gallons is based on refueling volume requirements.

lleaters maintain the borated water supply at a temperature to prevent crystallization and local freezing of the boric acid. The boron concentration is set at a value that will maintain the core at least 1 percent Ak/k subcritical at 70 F without any control rods in the core.

The concentration for 1% Ak/k subcriticality is 1609 ppm boron in the core, while the minimum value specified in the borated water storage tank is 2270 ppm boron.

Specification 3.3.2 assures that above 350 F two high pressure injection pumps are also available to provide injection water as the energy of the reactor coolant system is increased.

Specification 3.3.3 assures that above 800 psig both core flooding tanks are operational.

Since their design pressure is 600 1 25 psig, they are not brought into the operational state until 800 psig to prevent spurious injection of borated water.

Both core flooding tanks are specified as a single core flood tant has insufficient inventory to reflood the core.(1)

Specification 3.3.4 assures that prior to going critical the redundant train of reactor building emergency cooling and spray train are operable.

The spray system utilizes common suction lines with the low pressure injection system.

If i single train of equipment is removed from either system, the other train must be assured to be operable in each system.

Reference 6 provides an assessment of the impact of level indicator instrument error on the allowed NaOH tank level variation.

Note that the indicated level variation of 33.2 1 1.8 feet includes an allowance for instrument loop error.

l When the reactor is critical, maintenance is allowed per Specification 3.3.5.

Operability of the specified components shall be based on the results of testing as required by Technical Specification 4.5.

The maintenance period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is acceptable if the operability of equipment redundant to that removed from service is demonstrated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to removal.

Exceptions to Specification 3.3.6 permit continued operation for seven days if one of two BWST level instrument channels is operable or if either the pressure or level instrument channel in the CFT instrument channel is operable.

In the event that the need for emergency core cooling should occur, functioning of one train (one high pressure injection pump, one low pressure injection pump, and both core flooding tanks) will protect the core and in the event of a main coolant loop severance, limit the peak clad temperature to less than 2200oF and the metal-water reaction to that representing less than 1 percent of the clad.

The service water system consists of two independent but interconnected, full capacity, 100% redundant systems, to ensure continuous heat removal.(4)

One service water pump is required for normal operation. The normal operating requirements are greater than the emergency requirements following a loss-of-coolant accident.

Amendment No. JAD,JfE, 39 REVISED BY NRC LETlER DATED:

9/31/91; 7/16/92 l

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