ML20101G637

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Fax Message Re T&C Tech Spec for Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation
ML20101G637
Person / Time
Site: 05200001
Issue date: 06/09/1992
From: Chambers J, Fox J
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Peter Hearn, Poslusny C
NRC
References
NUDOCS 9206260206
Download: ML20101G637 (23)
v • d • e


Text

- - - _ - - _ -

'] ' JUN 09 '92, 06:44At1 G E ffJCLEAR BLDG J P.1/23 ],

GEAbderEurgy en saJ s /9/ 9 > ABWR,.

g yay Date 6/s/9r To Pa%meam Fax No. -

chef Po slu swq Thispageplus 22 page(s)

From da ek Fox /Jobe Chadevs u.coe.,82 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Phone (408) 925 4 8 2A FAX (408) 925-1193 or (408) 925--1687 Subject 14 z Teek. es u . % c edar ~h % \n%

Message imcso xa hwa bt Tscr sr<cs r* Tut fbas Com.v.aur h rea Erruuwnna 6tatuw ,

Su[ Wine (utu hRoPomb Muf T $. Fee. MS Eccb Acts 4Tt-AI ,

Aufs D C. t 5 At.%A~c t*4 W Wita b fLi/L "UIL btt ob W(

~

7{ 'T 5 ig $0L n oN .2. 3 , CO t wN *to O.CEWJ 5 d@yM ARD huAML Dr.\ce6ul CH WCK SDFtt $xW'We* WLhtf CN M L 744 k(.e J. .s 3r!l< T-C "T' C . u y 4 G (i m t u t, t NOTE'J %'.O teOM A Ab Lh G t C t_u - tU Cd9 Am N Ftir';4:xG Oet&E56a b.Wr 45f5 N t.  : <'

wc 2 *"J v h,wac f;,uje.6 *Ir5 T;t47 ML Nud $oeM- Ot4T' 92062 PDR 2h O hh ppg01 g ff A g (A 6 / W

.JUN 09 '92 06: 44Af1 G E tOCLEAR BLDG J P.2/23 Priftary Containant Isointicti Instnmntation 3.3.6.1 DRAFT 3.3 INSTRUME! NATION 3.3.6.1 Prbm c~mirme Tecutien_IPEILInstn::nentatitn LCO 3.3.6.1 The Primary Contsinment Isolation instnmentation, digital trip logic and actuation logic for each Function in Tables 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3. 6.1-2 and 3.3. 6.1-3 shall be OPEMliLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Tables 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 and 3.3.6.1-3.

ACTICUS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _;ry- E-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Seperate Condition entry is allowed for each Pri: nary Containrent Isolation Function COtDITION REQUIFED ACTICN CCt2LETION TIFE A. One instru mnt trip A.1 LUTE-channel inoperable for LCO 3.0.4 is not Prinary Containm nt applicable.

Isolation functions in -- --

Table 3.3.6.1-1. Place instnrent I hour trip channel in bypass or trip.

ED A.2 Restore instrument Prior to trip channel to entering FODE 2 OPERABLE status. 'following ner.

FDCE . 5 antry, i

B. Two instnraent trip B.1 Place one instrument 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channels inoperable for trip channel in Prir.iry Containment bypass and the other Isolation functions in in trip.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

En B.2 Rectore one Prior to Instrument trip cocpletion of channel to OPERABLE the next status. CWNZL FUNCTICNAL TEST i

ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-1 6/4/ 92 10:10 AM l 3 _ . . . . . .

. m M R T-M M t m _ _ _ _ --_________r' ^ M 2-- t2:42 c!. rn-

- ..,, . s

}

JLN 09 '92 06:44AM G E NXLEAR BLDG J P.3/23 Prirary Contaiment Isolation Instru"tantation ,

' 3.3.6.1

[ .

DREFT -

C. Three or nere C.1 Enter the Condition Innediately instrunent trip referenced in Table channels inoperable for 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 Prinary Contaircent or 3.3.6.1-3 fv the Isolation functions in function.

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

l One or ccre instruent trip channels inoperable for Prirary Containrent Isolation' '

functions in Table

3. 3. 6.1-2.

l Required Actions and

! associated Cmpletion Tines of Condition A or 3 not ret.

l D, One actuatior icgic D1 Place (or verify) I hour channel intperable for actuation logic any Prirvry Contaircent channel in Isolathn functions bypass / trip (other than MSIV condition.

Isolation) in' Table 3 . 3 . 6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 cr R Q, 3.3.6.1-3.

D.2 Restore channel to 31 days OPEPABLE state.s.

(continued)

ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-2 6/4/92 10:10 AM n at ne-an:es,

__________-__ _c c -m - e :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -4 4e et .__ _rn n-_-__ __ _ -- s

JUN 09 '92 Oti 45N1 G E f(UCLEAR BLDG J P.4/23

, Pri: nary Centaircent Isolation Instrunentation

. 3.3.6.1 dbl 4FT -

CODITICN PIOU PID ACTIOt1 COMPLETIO: TIME E. Two actuation logic E.1 Enter the Condition Innediately channels inoperable for referenced in Table any PrLeary Centain.ent 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.f.1-2 Isolation function or 3.3.6.1-3 for the (Other than MSIV function, isolation) in Table 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 or 3.3.6.1-3..

2 Regaired Acciens and associated Cenpletion Tines of Condition D not : net for any Prirary COntain: rent Isolation function (other than MSIV isolaticn).

F. One actuation locric F.1.1 Place c.%nne] in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> dwmel incpetable for bypass.

M3IV isolation functions in Table MD 3.3.6.1-1 or 3,3.6.1-3.

F.1.2 Restore channel to 7 days CPEP,AELE status.

(continued)

AIFG STS 3.3.6.1-3 6/4/92 10:10 AM

. - . , - m.-n anu ~ r r e n. ..

-. ,. - . . se-. z.: -,,a,- o s . .- . ,co. .-

JLH 09 '91 06:45AM G E NUCLEAR ELEG J P.5/E3

. . Pri:: vary Contaircent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

CC?OITION FEQUIFED ACTICti COMPLETICt1 TIE G. Required Actions and G.1.1 Place inoperable 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> associated Cccpletion MSIV isolation Times of Condition F actuation icgic not ::et . channel fn trip.

CE G 1.2 Ferform SR 3.3.6.1.2 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on OPEPABLE MSIV isolation actuation E Icgic channels.

Onc.e per 7 days thereafter E.C.

G.2 Restore incperable 31 dys from channel to CGEPA3LE discovery of status, inoperable actuation'icgic channel for MSIV isolation function H. Two actuation logic H.1 Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channels incperable for bypass and the other any SSIV isolation in trip.

function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 or 3.3.6.1-3. Mr H.2 Restore one channel 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to CPEPJGII status.

I. Required Actions and 1.1 Enter the Condition I:rnadiotely associated Completion referenced in Table Times of Condition G 3.3.6.1-1 or or H not tret for any 3.3.6.1-3 for the MSIV isolation function, function.

(continued)

ASWR STS 3.3.6.1-4 6/4/92 10: 10 AM

_ . _ _ _ . . _ - . . _ . - - - . U?I m:' m" .- _ .. 3 : "< :A m -... ? 0 L .

JLt1 09 '92- 06145At1 G E tIUCLEAR BLDG J P.6'23 Primary Contairmnt Isolation Instrutnentation

. 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

CCNDITICN FEQUIRED ACTICN CCNPLETION TUG J. As required by Required J.1 Isolate associated 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Action C.1 or I.1 and nain steam line(s) referenced in Table (MSL).

3.3.6.1-1 or 3.3.6.1-3.

2 i

J.2.1 Ee in 10DE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ALC J.2.2 Be in FODE 4, 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> K. As required by Required K.1 Be in > DOE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i A0; ion C.1 or I.1 and  !

referenced in "'able 3.3.6.1-1.

I. , As required by Fequ3 red L1 4 Isolate the affected .1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> A: tion C.1, E.1 cr I.1 line (s) .

and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 or 3.3.6.1-3, M. As required by Required M.1 Be in MODI 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Action C.1, E 1 cr !.1 and referenced in Table RR 3.3.6.I-1, 3.3,6.1-2 or 3.3.6.1-3. '

M.2 Be in FDDE 4. 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> G

1' l

Required Actions and associated Completion Tim s of Candition K or L not u t.

1 (continued) l i

ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-5 6/4/92 10:10 AM nen w a n:e9- c5-09-9: n:4a Au -roc

JLt1 09 '92 06145ft1 G E tOCLEAR ELDG J P.7/23 Prirary Contairnent -Isolatien Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 DRATT -

CCtCITION REQUIFED ACTION CCW LETION TIME N. As required by Required N.1 Declare the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Action C.1 or E.1 and associated Standby referenced in Table 'iquid Control (SLC) 3.3.6.1-2. subsystem (s) inoperable.

2 N.2 Isolate the P.eactor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 Water Cleanup (RWCU)

System.

O. As required by Required 0.3 Initiate action to Lmmediately 4

letien C.1 or E.1 and restore channel to referenced in Table OPEFABLE status.

3.3.6.1-1, 3

O.2 Initiate action to Irrediately I '

isolate the ?}2 shutdow. cooling d

System, I

l l

l l

ABNR STS 3.3.6,1-6 6/4/92 10:10 AM.

F F OM ' 4 P ? - 3 ',51 ( 9 7_ , 05-09-9^ 0? 40 AM- P07

JUri 09 '92 068 2GA!1 G E fiUCLEAR BLDG J P.8/E3 l

Primary Containment Isolation Instrunentation 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

SURVEII.IRCE REQUIREENTS ,

SURVEILLMCE FTEQUENCY

_----_------------_______'--NOTES--------------------- -- ---

1. Refer to Tables 3.3.6.1-1, 3.3.6.1-2 and 3.3.6.1-3 to determine which SRs shall be perforned for each Primary Containment Isolation function.
2. A channel may be placed in an inoperable or bypass status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for required surveillance testing.

SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CFR0;EL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perfcrm CFRR;EL FUNCTIOtiAL TEST of [31] days actuation logic channels.

SR 3.3.6.1.3 ------------ ------NCTIE----- -

Radiation detectors may be excluded.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of [92] days instrumer,t trip logic channels.

SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CRM NEL CALIEFATION. [92] days SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perfom CHANNEL CALIBRATION. [18) :nonths SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perfom ICGIC SYSTO! FUNCTIONAL TEST. (18) renths SR 3.3.6.1.7 --

NOTE Radiation detectors may be excluded.

Demonstrate the ISOLATICU SYSTEM RESPONSE [18} nonths on TIIE is within li. Tits. a STAGGERED-TEST BASIS ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-7 6/4/92 10: 10 AM n u ;ce-9:5:ee ec. m : c t : .; e e rce - - --

JUN 09 ?92 06:4641 G E IUCLE M BLDG J P.9/23 9

Primary Containnen IsolatJon Instntmentation 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, Trip and Actuation Logic (All Functions in this table have 4 required instru~.ent trip channels configuned in 2-out-of-4 logic)

~

Ftm0710N Af PJ ICADLE CONDITIONS $URVEILI.ANCE AL'JWOLE MDCES RITERENCED REQUIREMENTS VALUE.

FROM RrQUIRED A0TICW C.1 E.1 or I.1 d

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Lew Low Low, level 1
a. Primary containment 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 h( ) inches I n oint.iun (ROW / ENOW) SR 3.3.6.1.2 ER 3.3.6.1,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3,3. 6.1. *1
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level--Low Low.. Laval 1.5
a. Hair St.eam Line 1,2,3 J sR 3,3,g.1.1 y [ ] inches leolation SR 3.3.6.1.2

$R 3,3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6,1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 3, Reactor Vesaal Water Level--Low Low, Level 2

a. Primary containment 1.2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1  ;! ( ) inches Isolation (DW FP ER 3.3.6,1.2 Samp. ling) SR 3,3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7
b. RHOU System Isolation 1,2,3,4,$ L SR 3.3.6.1.1 ) [ ] inches SR 3.3.G.1.2 l SR 3.3,6.1.3 .;

SR 3,3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

{

j SR 3.3.6.1,1 1

ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-8 6/4/92 5:11 PM rrem_ p - m ,rs- en. 2 e - , 16 w r.w

~ TUN 09 '92 -06:46AM G E f0 CLEAR BLDG J P.10/23

. Pri:mry Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

FUNCTION AIPLICABLE CONDITIONS $7RVEILLANCE ALLOWABLI.

HODES RETEPINCEO REQUIREMENTS VALUE FROM F.EQ0!PtD ACTION C l.i 5

E.1 c.r I.1 4 Esacter Vessel Water k val--Low, Level 3

a. "rimary Containment 1.2.3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 ( ) inches laolation (DW Sump SR 3.3,6.1.2 Drains / FCS/ ATIP) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5

$R 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3,3,6.1.1

b. Shutdown Cooling 3,4,5 o $R 3.3.6.1.1  :: [ 1-inches Syst em Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 sa 3.3.6.1.1
c. Gupptematon Pool 1,2,3 L' SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 ( j inches cleanup syatam SR 3.3.6.1.2 Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.3 ER 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7
5. Reactor $ team Doaa Pressure--High
a. Shutdown Cooling 1. 2. 3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 $ (1$0] psig System IsolatAcn SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR J 3.'.6.1.5 SR -3.3.6.1.6
b. RWCU System Isolation 1,2,3 L ER 3.?.6.1.1 5 [150) peig (RPV Road Spray Only) $n 3.3.6.1.2 S4 3.3.6.1.3 l

$R 3.3~6.1.5 l

sR 3.3.s,1.6

)

ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-9 6/4/92 5:11 PM

, _ .~. . , 2 %t . >i D ' 'n% C t ' .. . . . - ;h;9:%. M G ? DL. LT) - - - - - - -

JUN 09 '92 06:47AM G E IOCLEAR BLDG J F,11/23 i *

. Prifrary Containment- Isolation Instnntentation 3.3.6.1 DRP)JT -

I"JNCTION AIPLICABLE CONDITIONT. SORVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE H30ES MTERENCED REQUIRDENTS VALLT 5 FROM

MQUIRED i

A0 TION C.1, E.1 or I.1 4 6. Drywell Pressure--Righ

a. Primary Cet.tainment 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 $[ ] peig Isciation (DW FP SR 3.3.6.1.2 Sampling / DW Sump SR 3.3.6.1.3-Drains / RCW/ ENCW/ SR 3.3.6.1.5 FCS/ ATIP) SR- 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

. b. Suwpression Fool 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 $( ) pelg Cleanup System SR 3.3.6.1.2

" solation SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.$

SR 3.3.6.1.6

7. Main Steam Line Preasure--Low
a. Main Steam Line i K SR 3,3.6.1.1 2 (837] psig

, Isolation SR 3.3.6.1,2 SR 3.3,6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

8. hin Steam Line 'A' Flow--Eigh
a. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 J 3R. 3 .3. 6.1.1 5 [140) 4 Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3,3.6.1.5 SR - 3.3.6.1.6 tR 3.3,6.1.7
9. Main Steam Lit.e 'B' Flow--Bigh
a. Main Steam Line 1,2,3 J' SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 (140) %

Isolation CR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 GR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.1 MXR STS 3,3.6.1-10 6/4/92 5:11 PM

. _ . . .- . . We .W n " L ' - . ~ . C H i~ ' " J ? N' - U1- - - - -

JLt1 09 '92 06:.rAr1 G E tOCLEAR BLDG J P.12/23 Prinary Contain: Tent Isolation Instrummtation

.  ;.3.6.1 DRAFT TWCTICN APPLICABLE CCNDITIONS SURVEI!J.ANCE AL14%*AB12

>f>0 L S PJJERENCED DIQUIRF.MENTS VALQE 1".%CM REQUIRED A0TIcN C.1.

E.1 or.I.1 10 Main Staam Lite 'C' Flon--Eigh

a. Main Steam Line 1,2.3 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 s (140] 6 Isolation SR 3 . 3 . 6.1. 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 ER 3,3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6 1.7
11. Main Steam Line 'D' Flow--High
a. Main steam Line 1,2,3 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 [140) %

Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.0 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3 , 3 . 6 .1 '. 6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

12. Cor.dansar Vacuum--Lcw
a. Main Steam Line 1.2.3 J $R 3.3.6.1.1 2 ( ) inches Isolation $R 3.3.6.1.2 Hg vacuum SR 3,3.6.1,3  !

SR 3.3.6,1.5 3R 3.3.6.1.6

13. Main Steam Tunnel Ambier.t Tr.mporature--Eigh A. Main Steam 1.ine 1,2.3 J ~ SR 3.3.6.1.1 s[ ] 4' Isolation SR 3.3,6.1.2 ER 3.3.C.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 sn 3.3.6.1.6
b. Rwc0 System Isolation 1.2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 s( ) *r CR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3

$R 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1,6 ABWR STS 3.3.6.1-11 6/4/92 5:11 PM neu 4 03-ne : = e- y-:o m v:4e e t-

JLN 09 '92 06147Ar1 G E tO' LEAR ELDG J P.13/23 Prinary Containment Isolation Instrmentation -

3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

F'JNCTION AP P LICABl.E CONDITIONS SURVETLIANCE ALLOWABLE HODES REFERENCED RICUIREMENTS VALUE FROH REQUIRED A0 TION C.1, E.1 or I.2 14 Hair. Steam Turbine Area Arrhient Terparature--Eigh

a. Main $ team Line 1.2.3 J SR 3.3.4.1.1 5[ ] *T Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5

$R 3.3.6.1.6 15 Main $ team Line Radiation--Bigh

a. Main steam Line 1,2,3 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 [3x Normal Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.2 Background]

SR 3.3.6.1.3

$R 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3,3.6.1.6

16. RCIC Steam Line Flow--High
a. RCIC System Isolat).on 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 6 [300% Normal

$R 3.3.6.1.2 Flow]

SR 3.3.6.1.3

$R 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR -3.3.6.1.7 17 RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure--Low

a. RCIC System Isolation 1,2,3 L CR 3.3.6.1.1 2 (60) psig CR 3.3.6.1.2 SR .3.3.6.1.3 SR 3 ,3 , 6 .1 ~. 5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7
18. RCIC Room Anbient .fertparature--Eigh
a. RC C $ystem Isolation 1,2,3 L $R 3..? . 6.1.1 5[ ] *F SR 3.3.6.1,2 SR.3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 ASWR STS 3.3.6.1-12 6/4/92 5:11 PM

~

. neu 4c.M :=,:e_en , . . _

os :-u

E s an . , .

ri,

. _ . . . , . . . , ~ .

JUN 09 '92 06WAri G E f RJCLEAP -BLDG ,J P,1&23 t

, Prinuu:y Containment Isolation Instruuntat. ion

~

. 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

- ~ ~ .- ____.-.-. - ...-___ --

FUNCTION APPLICABLE CCNDITIONS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWASLE MODES RE7ERENCED REQUIRIMENTS VALUE PRON REQUIRED ACTION C.1, E.1 or I.1 l 19. FXR 'A' Room Ambient Temperature--Eigh

a. Shutdown Cooling 1. 2, 3 L SP 3.3.6.1.1 5 ! } 'T System 'A' Isolation SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1,5 )

$R 3.3.6.1.6 l

20. R2R 'B' Room Achient Temperature--Bigh l

l l

a. Shutdown Cooling 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 [ ] 'T i system 'B' Isolation SR 3 . 3 . 6 .1. 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 f

l 21. RER 'C' Room Ambient Temperature--Eigh

a. Shutdown Cooling 1.2,3 L sR 3. 3 . 6.1.1 5 [ ] *T j System 'C' Isolation SR 3.3.6.1,2 l $R 3.1.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6,1,6
22. RWCU System Differential Maas Tiow--Bigh l a, RWCU System Isolation 1,2,3 L SR 3,3,6.1,1 s[ ] gpa 1

$R 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR .3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6.

$R 3.3.6.1.7

23. PWCU Regenatative Heat Exchanger Area Ambient Temperature--Righ
a. RWCU Sys*.am Isolation 1,2,3 L . SR 3.3.6.1.1 5( ) *F SR 3. 3 . 6.1.2 BR 3.3.6.1.3

$R 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 AshR STS 3.3.6,1-13 6/4/92 5:11 FM y,.._1fs.n,.=:en, s- .t11

- ; : = ,m , i u .

JLt1 09 '92 06:49AM G E TOCLEAR BLDG J P.15/23 Prinary Centainmnt- Isolation Instnanentation 3.3.6.1 DRRET -

. . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ , , _ _ ___ y _ _ _ _

FUNCTION APPLICABLE CONLITIONS SORVEILIANCE ALLOWABLE M00E$ REFERENCED REQUIREMENTS VALUE TADA REQUIRED ACTIoM c,2, E.1 or 2.1

24. RWOU Non Reger.orative Beat Exchanger Area Amblant Temperature--Eigh
4. KWCO System Isolation 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 5( ) *F LR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 M, RWOU Valve Room Teteperature--Bigh
a. RWCU System Isolation 1,2,3 L FR 3.3.6.1.1 C( j *F SR 3.3.6.1.2

$R ') . 3 . 6 .1. 3 CR 3. 3 . 6.1.5 SR 2.3.4.1.6 i

l t

l l

I

.8 23TR STS 3.3.6.1-14 6/4/92 5:11 PM F r cu 4 ee-:m en os-en-9: or :4r e r : c.

.~ . . . . - . . . . . . _ . . _ . _ , _ . - . - , - . , - . . . . _ . _ _ , -- . . _ . . . . _., _ ,, _ . . . . . .

JUN 09 '92 06: 43Ar1 G E NUCLEAR BLDG J P.16'23 Pritrary Contain: rent Isciation Instru~entation 3.3.6.1

~

DRRFT -

Table 3.3.6.1-2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, Trip and Actuation Logic (Other than 4 channel, 2-out-of-4 1cgic) l _ . _ _ _ -

FUNCTION APPLICABLE CONDITIONS SORVEILI.ANCE ALLOWABLE HODES REFERENCED P.CQQIREMSWTS VALUE

, TROM REQUIRED ACTION C.1, E.1 or I.1

1. RCIC Turbine Exhaust
:laphraga Frass ure--Bigh i (4 channela out-of-7 Ir. board / 1-out-of-2 Outboard)
a. RCIC Syste:a Isolation 1, 2, 3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 5[ ] paig  ;

SR 3.3.6.1,2 i 2

ER 3. 3. 6.1. 3

S *. 3.3.6.1.5 l SR 3.3.6.1.6 l
2. ANCU Non-Regenerative Beat Exchanger Shell Outlet Terymrature--Righ (1 channel)

I

a. RWCU System Isolation 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 5( ) *F SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 i

$R 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1,6

3. Loir conductivity Wasta (LCW) S'.uep Drain Line Radiation--Eigh (1 channel)
a. LCW Systeun Isolation- 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.4.?.1 5 [ ] X normal Sump Drain Line SR 3.3.G.I.2 background i

SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

4. High Conductivity Waste (HCW) Sump Drain Line Radiation--Eigh (1 char.nel)
a. BCW System Isolutica- 1,2,3 L $R 3.3.6.1.1 5[ ] X norcal

$urp Drain Line SR 3.3.6.1.2 background AR 3.3.6.1.3 FR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 S. Standby Liquid Control Subayatem A/B Initiation (2 chunale out-of-1 for each SLC Fump)

a. RDCU System Isolation 1. 2 N SR 3.3.6.1.2 N/A SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6
EG STS 3.3.6.1-15 6/4/92 5
12 PM n ur .s c r -m m r e -: -n n e . o et rie

JUti 09 '92 06:4BAM G C f0 CLEAR BLDG J P.17/23 i PriInary CCntain. Tnt Isolation Instrtmentation

. 3.3.6.1 DREPT -

Table 3.3.6.1-3 Primary Containment Isolation Manual Actuation Logic TUNCTION APPLICABLE CO!'DITIONS SURVIILIANCE ALLOWABLE WDES RITEP.INCED REQOIR1MENTS VALUE FRCM REQUIPID AOTION C.1, E.1 or I.1

1. Manual Full Isolation (All M5IVs)
a. Division i 1,2,3 J sa 3.3.6.1.2 N/A
b. Division 2 CR 3.3.6.1.6
c. Division 3
d. Division 4
2. Manual Primary Containment Isciation
a. Division 1 1.2.3 L SR 3.3.6.1.2 N/A
b. Division 2 SR 3,3.6.1.6
c. Division 3
3. bnual ItCIC Isolation a, Divleion 1 (Inboard) 1,2,3 L SR 3.3.C.1.2 N/A
b. Division 2 (Outboard) SR 3.3,6.1.6

.._...._.7___... _

i I

l

\

i 1E m STS 3.3.6.1-16 6/4/92 5:50 PM L . ._ . _ . .. . V u 48- M ! ^3 7 _ ._ _ . ._ . :+ n - 1: _. "_A : vi. , a ;c - _. ,

- ~ . - - . - _-- -

JUN 09 '92 06:48A!1 G E fELEAR BLDG J P.18/23

+

Prinary Containment Isolation Instrunentation B 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

Abbreviated Discussion of AEWR Rates - P ri m* rv Containment laciation System Instrumentation The ABWR Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) utill:es instrumentation and logic common and/or similar to the RPS and ECCS actuation instrumentation systems. The system uses digitally multiplexed instrument channels and associated digital trip logic to make setpoint exceedence determinations l and associated divisional actuation logic to make decisions I regarding, and actually affect, appropriate isolation l actions. Four separate instrument divisionn are used to monitor the required variables for determining the need for isolation of various primary containment penetrations, with some exceptions that must be treated slightly differently.

These exceptions are RCIC turbine exhaust pressure, Standby  ;

Liquid Control (SLC) pump running status, RWCU j nonregenerative heat exchanger (NRHX) shell side outlet  !

temperature, and high and low conductivity waste (HCW/LCW) sump drain line radiation, whose particular treatment is i discussed later. The LCO has therefore been written to handle standard four channel $'~'rumentation separately from the noted exceptions.

Four :hannel instrumentation that functions in the standard two-out-of-four mode utill es four separate logic channels to perform the required trip determination. This occurs within the divisional Digital Trip Modules (DTMs). Each divisional DTM receives input from the instrumentation in that same division for each variable monitored. For analog variables the DTMs make the trip /no-trip decision by comparing a digiti:ed analog value against a setpoint and initiating a trip condition for that variable if the setpoint is exceeded.

In cases where the trip determination is made by the tonitoring element itself (e.g. pressure ' switch) the DTM

_.mply passes on the signal in the form of a trip /no-trip output. The output of the four divisicnal-DTMs (a trip /no-trip condition) for each var:1ble is then routed to the appropriate primary containment isolation actuation logic.

For the noted exceptions,.the instrument output is routed directly to the individual subsystem logic, as appropriate.

Each DTM has a division-of-sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the -

actuation logic at the associated Trip Logic Units (TLUs) or Safety System Logic Units (SLUs). Thus, each TLU or SLU, when a division-of-sensors bypass is in effect, will be making its trip decision on a two out of three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division-of-sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

At the actuation logic ctage, the MSIVs are handled uniquely from the remaindet-of the PCIS. The actuation logic for ABXR STS B 3.3. 6,1-1 6: 43 PM 6/5/92 l

nw mmm cmm ene ry _ __

- - ' " x - '

l , L w 3Afl G E N A EAP u y P.19'23 Primary Contain:mnt isolation Instrurentation DN$$ "

B 3.3.6.1 l

MSIVs is similar to that reactor scram and is, used by the RPS for initiating in fact, handled by the (TLUs). For the MSIVs, same modules divisional TLUs (shared with RPS),the trip decision .

is made by four all four divisionel instrumentation channels.each receiving input from The MSIV actuation The two out logic usestrip of four strictly logic four channel instrument decision in put.

each TLU on a per variable basis exceedence setpoint issuch thus made thatif by a division-of-is required to initiate a trip outputinthetwo instrument a e divisions for the TLU sees the outputs frcm all four DTMs, at TLU, Since tsch simultaneously.of logic should sense and initiate a required tripall four divis A two cut corresponding Outputof four trip in a TLU causes a trip in its Logic Unit (OLU). It then in theinitiates a reactor power circuits thatisolation by trippinis this trip that g lead drivers OLU sends output energize the MSIV solenoids.

eight Each each (The respectively associated

  1. 1 with the #2 and 43 MSIV ,

solenoidssign are a total of 64 load drivers, solenoid is fcr the test mode).There arrangement grouped in a series-parallel such that each load driver group energizes either the overall The #2 or arrangement the #3 MSIV solenoid for one el eight of MSIVs.

th groupings is such that of OLU outputs and oad driver channels and the (TLus and associated OLUs)a trip of any two actuation logic cause all e:ght MSIVs#3 solenoids of every MSIV to de-energiwill cause both the #

ze, and thus (four inboard, four outboard) to close.

switches, There are also four divisional manual MSIV i solation isolation by closing all eight MSIVsany .

a fulltwo reactorof which will affect antuated a half-isolation condition v resultsde-energite ually a se solenoids is de-energ4 zed for each MS (or.s of two are actuated together a fal? tsolate 5), and when any two MSIV isolation accults. The manual circuits tnat function dArectly intc:

energize the MSIV solenoids..upts power in the upstream of the load driver groups and is complet This occurs f rom the associated automatic MSIV actuatioely separate also hardwired and therefore not n logic. They are multiplexing system. Each of thereliant on the plant switch so that the MSIV isolation logic revertsone i.e , tttheyat a cantime, be such bypassed,four thdt TLUs ha will still resultthe tripping of any two of two the out ofremaini three three, trip switches suchin a f ll isolation. Each OLU has test and u ng TLUs that with and without causing a half isolation conditionthe 1 mad drivers can be de energizing of one of two MSIV solenoids) ,

(i.e., '

r ABWR STS B 3.3.6.1-2 6:43 PM 6/5/92 w.,

.a ee. -,. m,e. ae a

L -

n-.x --- ~

JUN 09 '92 06:49At1 G E f ocLtpp DLDG J ^

P.19/23

~

Prirary Containment Isolataon Instrucentstion D 3.3.6.1 bbk$

MSIVs is similar to that used by the RPS for initiating reactor (TLUs). scram and is, in fact, handled by the same modules Fcr the MSIVs, the divisional TLUs (shared with RPS), trip each decision is madeinput by four all four divisional nstrumentation channels. The MSIVfrom i receiving

~

actuation logic uses strictly fotr channel instrument input.

The two out of four trip logic decision (or two out of three if a division-of-sensors each TLU on a per variable bypass basis is in effect) such that is thus made by setpoint exceedence is required to in initiate two instrument divisions a trip output for the at the TLU. same variable Since each TLU sees the outputs from all four DTMs, all four divisions of logic should sense and initiate a required trip simultaneously.

A two out of four trip in a TLU cr'ses a trip in its corresponding Output Logic Unit (OLU). It is this trip that then initiates a reactor isolation by tripping load orivers in the power circuits that energize the MSIV solenoids. Each OLU sends output signals to a total of sixteen load drivers, eight each associated with the #2 and #3 MSIV solenoids, respectively (The #1 solenoid is for the test mode). There are a total of 64 load drivr-rs, grouped in a series-parallel arrangement such that each load driver group energizes either the #2 or the #3 MSIV solenoid for one of the eight MSIVs.

The overall arrangement of OLU outputs and load driver groupings is such that channels (TLUs a trip of any two actuation logic and the and associated OLUs) will cause both the #2

  1. 3 solenoids of every MSIV to de-energize, and thus cause all eight MSIVs (four inboard, four outboard) to close.

There are also switches, any two fourofdivisional which will manual affectMSIV isolation a full reactor isolation by closing all cight MSIVs.

The four switches each de-energize a separate path such that when individually actuated a half-isolation condition results (one of two solenoids is de-energized for each MSIV), and when any two are actuated together a full isolation results.

MSIV isolation function directly interrupts powerThe manaal in the circuits that energize the MSIV solenoids. This occurs upstream of the load driver groups and is completely separate from the associated automatic MSIV actuation logic. They are also hardwired multiplexing and therefore not reliant on the plant system. Each of the four TLUs has a bypass switch so that they can be bypassed, one at a time, such that the i.e.,

MSIV isolation logic reverts to two out of three, the tripping of any two of the three remaining TLUs will still result in a full isolation.

Each OLU has test and trip switches such that the load drivers can be tested both with and without causing a half isolation condition (i.e., '

de-energizing of c > of two MSIV solenoids).

ABWR STS B 3.2.4.1-2 6: 43 PM 6/5/92 FF"M .', ?-129160'

. i ___ _.__ i C i?Am-2'

- . - - . .- _~ -. , .- -. ,

JUN @ '92 06:494t1 G E NUCLEAR BLDG J P.20?23

^

' ~

DRAFT -

All other PCIS actuation logic differs from the MSIV actuation logic described above. It is essentially the same as the ECCS actuation logic (LCO 3.3.5.2) and.is thus handled in a like fashion. The two out of four trip decision for the remainder of the PCIS is made by the divisional SLUs (some of which are common to ECCS), which are arranged in-redundant pairs for each of the three divisions. Each SLU receives the aporopriate variable input (tripped / not-tripped) from each of the four divisions of DTMs and then_ performs the required two out of four initiation logic determination. For multi-variable inputs the decision to isolate the af fected line(s) is made on a per variable basis such that, for the four channel variables, setpoint exceedence in two instrument divisions for the same variable is required to initiate an actuation signal. This trip determination occurs simultaneously in both SLUs in a given division for an  !

affected subsystem or line and at essentially the same time j in affected subsystems or lines of other divisions. In all )

cases, a trip in both of the SLUs of a divisional / subsystem )

pair is required to cause the desired isolation (s) to take ~

place. Thus, at the output stage, the logic is two out of j two on an individual output ecmmand basis, i Instrument channel trip inputs from the variables that do not use standard two-out-of-four logic are routed directly to both SLUs in the appropriate divisional pair (s), each of which performs its own trip determination for the associated variable. RCIC turbine exhaust pressure is sensed by four instrument channels, two each in Divisions 1 and 2, respectively. A one-out-of-two trip logic is used in each division to generate a divisional RCIC isolation signal to affect inboard (Div. 1) and/or outboard (Div. 2) valve closure. There are two SLC pump running inputs, one for each SLC pump, Each SLC pump status signal goes to the SLUs of both Divisions 1 and 2, where, respectively, an inboard and outboard RWCU isolation signal is generated. If either SLC pump is sensed as running, both an -inboard and an outboard RWCU isolation is affected. RWCU NREX shell (cooling water-side) outlet temperature is sensed by a single instrument channel which is then an input to the SLUs of both Divisions 1 and 2, again generating an inboard and outboard RWCU isolation signal, respectively. On a sensed high temperature in the monitored flow path, both an inboard and an outboard RWCU isolation is effected. Both HCW and LCW sump drain line radiation is sensed by a single instrument channel on each line. Each instrument channel is then an input to the SLUs of both Divisions 1 and 2, again generating both an inboard and outboard isolation signal, respectively, for the associated drain line (LCW or HCW) . On sensed high radiation in the monitored flow path, both an inboard and an outboard isolation of that-particular flow path is effected.

ABWR STS B 3.3.6.1-3 6:43 PM 6/5/92

,_. . .- .. . -n ot m_ m ;te, m -c m n:a m r:0

JUN 09 '92 06:5041 G E NUCLEAR BLLG J P.2 D23

^

Primary Centainment Isolation Instrunentation

.. B 3.3.6.1 DRAFT -

The cctcal PCIS instrumentation for ibWR is very similar to that in recent BWR designs with est otially the same variables providing trip input. A' hough the equipment that performs the actual logic differs com past BWR designs, the system is effective.ly the same in .ow it functions and with regards to technical specifications. However, the LCO is written borrowing to a degree from how digital systems are treated in the CE and B&W ITS products. LCO 3.3.6.1 deals with the actual instrumentation, the associated logic that performs the setpoint exceedence determination at the DTM level (" trip togic"), and the automatic and manual logic performed at the TLU/SLU level (" actuation logic").

INSTRUMENTATION AND INSTRUMENT TRIP LOGIC OPERABILITY of instruments and instrument trip channels, including setpoints, is handled in ABWR in a fashion very similar to how it was done for past BWRs. The LCO uses the familiar instrument table (caly now there are actually two tables) where setpoint values, Applicability requirements and Required Surveillances are specified. However, the tables are now arranged by "ariable, to reflect the fact that the same instrumentation is used to supply isolation signals to multiple lines / subsystems. For those variables that are monitored by four instrument channels, all four are required to be OPERABLE (see Table 3.3.6'1-1).. However, with one instrument trip channel out of service, the channel (or division of sensors) can be bypassed and the logic automatically reverts to two out of three in all corresponding subsystem actuation logic. Alternately, the channel could be tripped, which effectively results in a one out of three logic. Either is an acceptable long-term condition at the instrument trip channel-level as there would still be sufficient redundancy at-the automatic-actuation

, logic and manual actuation levels.

The intent of the-Required Action is to-assure adequate protection but without forcing an unneeded shutdown to repair equipment thpt might not be readily. accessible during operation. Of course, most repairs are likely to be simple card or other electronic-subassembly replacements that.can be done.on-line with theLaffected division of' sensors in bypass'.

In such cases, restoration should be done as soon as practicable. With two channels out, one is bypassed.and the other tripped, resulting effectively in an-one out of two configuration for the-remaining channels. This situation is acceptable for a shorter dura

  • ion. With three or'more channels out, immediate ac'i a is required,.as either a trip has already been inftlated mise the-instrumentation and associated logic is-no lon9'. .pable of automatically initiating a trip. For vat.c.cles monitored by other than a standard two-out-of-four instrument channel, all channels i

1.

ABWP STS B 3.3.6.1-4 6:43 PM -6/5/92

_ ,_. *P NEFiUli._ _ _ _ PTM.,E MlL._N L , , _ _

JtJ4 09 '92 r~151r41 G C lOCLE(R ELDG J P.22/23

+ -

Primary Containment Isolation Instrunentation

,, B 3.3.0.1 DRRET -

must be OPERABLE or else more immediate action is required, since such logic 14 not amenable to having channels out of service for extended period.

Failure to meet Raquired Actions would generally necessitate manually performing a required iteration that under the deyraded conditions would no longer occur automatically (e.g. icolating the af fectea J ine (s)), or by placing the plant in an cFerating mode, or conditions, where the PC15 function is no unger required. Such actions for ABWR mimic very

.losely those specified in the BWR/6 ITS.

ACTUATI0tt LOGIC OPERABILITY of the actuation logic portion of the PCIS must be handled differently, depending on whether the MSIVs are involved. This is due to the fact that-MSIV isolation essentially uses a two-out-of-four logic with all four divisions while all other PCIS functions are essentially two-cut-of-two on a per division basis. The actuation logic also includes the manual isciation funct'on (Table 3 3.6.1-3).

M$1Vs If one MSIV actuation logic channel la out of service it can be placed in bypass, such that the MSIV isolation function is operating in two out of three logic, and must then be restored within the next seven days. However, most rey pirs are expected to be simpl) replacements and thus restoration would be expected to be made in a much shorter time interval.

Should restoration not be made within the allowable time interval, continuation with the channel in bypass (i.e. in two out of three logic) is allowed for up to a cumulative total of 31 days (from time of discovery of inoperebility) provided the three remaining OPERABLE MSIV actuation logic channels are surveilled more frequently to assure their continued operability. Alternatively, the inoperable channel could be taken out of bypass and tripped, placing tho MSIV isolation function in a one out of three logic 4 sffectively increasing the reliability of the isolation _ function, if

. demanded. -Thus, continued operation it jur!1fied, but only for a limited time as this condition also esuld be more susceptible to inadvertent--isolat Mns. In any case, tho-inoperable channel would have to ue restored to OPERABLE status within 31 days.

With two actuation logic channels-(msraal or' automatic) inoperable redundancy is significantil reduced end- ~

1 restoration to OPERABI.E status. is ' required much more expeditiousl-y. Individual MSIV actuatien devices, such as load _ drivers:and p;;9t valve solenoids, are an integral part of the MSIV isolat on function end are specifically covered by the required sur/9111ance testing. Heyever, their ABXR ST$ B 3.3.0,1-5 6: 43 PM '6/5/92 non m-m w wonn ev w m rn ,

JUN 09 '92 066W1 G C ffALCAR DLDG J P.23/23

. . Primary Contalment Isolation Instrumntation B 3.3.6.1 DRAFT operability was not singled out within the prcposed

, Conditions as they are fail-safe, de-energize to operate devices whose f ailure would cause a t rip, or partial trip, in their respective channe](s). Failures of these devices would be treated by declaring the associated actuation logic channel inoperable and proceeding accordingly.

Other P C T fs

With one output logic channel in a given subsystem pair out oi service, the channel is put in the trip / bypass state and the logic reverte to one-out-of-one based on the status of the remaining 1cgic channel. In many cases trip / bypass will occur automatically as a result of system self testing, if a fault is detected. If a logic channel is determined to be inoperable, it must be verified to be in the trip / bypass state (or placed there), resulting in a one-out-of-one logic.

This state results in a more reliable logic configuration for isolation, but is also more prone to inadvertent isolations.

Therefore, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status within 31 days. As most repairs are expected to be simple, restoration would be expected to be made as coon as practicable. For plant availability reasons, it would be in the operator's best interest to restore operability and return to a two out of two logic configuration as quickly as possible given the increased probability of inadvertent actuation in a one out of one configuration. With both output logic channels inoperable, corrective action and/or manually affecting the desired automatic function would be required immediately.

Failure to meet Required Actions would generally necessitate manually performing a required iteration that under the degraded conditions would no longer occur automatically

(e.g. isolating the af fected line (s)), or by placing the plant l

in an operating mode, or conditions, where the PCIS function i no longer required. Such actions for ABWR mimic pary closely those specified in the BWR/6 ITS.

The Surveillance Requirements for PCIS instrumentation are virtually identical to those in the BWR/6 ITS. Minor modifications are made to reflect minor design differences, however, the intent is the same regarding scope and content.

On-line testing of the automatic and manual isolation actuation logic, including testing-of the final actuators, isf required on a monthly basis. LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL testing of the PCIS (including MSIVs) will-be combined testing of-both instrumentation and associated trip logic as well as isolation actuation logic.

ABWR ST3 B 3.3.6.1-6 6:43 PM- 6/5/92 run 4es m m a - tw on4e a m

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20101G637&oldid=2775251"