Text

Applicant Exhibit A-EP-19,consisting of 840416 Testimony on Emergency Planning Contention 11 & PRC Rept Effect of Shadow Evacuation on Time to Evacuate Catawba Station Emergency Planning Zone
	ML20099J389
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	05/23/1984
From:	Broome L, Casper M, Edmonds R, Glover R, Kulash W, Potter T; DUKE POWER CO., MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC, PLANNING RESEARCH CORP., PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	OL-A-EP-019, OL-A-EP-19, NUDOCS 8411290030
	Download: ML20099J389 (67)
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In the Matter of

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DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.

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Docket Nos. 50-413

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50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,

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Units 1 and 2)

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APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 Duke Power Company (Robert F. Edmonds, Jr.

Mark A.

Casper, R.

Michael Glover)

Thomas E.

Potter Walter M. Kulash Mecklenburg County (Lewis Wayne Broome)

U.S.IluCLEAR ECULATORY COM

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TESTIMONY OF DUKE POWER. COMPANY 2

(ROBERT F.

EDMONDS, JR.,

MARK A. CASPER,

'3

'AND R.1 MICHAEL GLOVER) 4 ON~ EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 5'

Background :Information on Mr. Edmonds 6-Q.

PLEASE' STATE YOUR NAME AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.

7 A.

My name is Robert F.

Edmonds,. Jr.

I am employed as 3'

8 Senior Engineer, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church 9

Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.

10 Q.

WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT WORK 11-EXPERIENCE?

s 12 A.

Please see my current resume, which is attacned-to 13

- this testimony as Attachment A.

(RE) 14

.Q.

ARE-YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY 15 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (PLUME EPZ) FOR THE CATAWBA e

16 NUCLdAR. STATION?

(

_ l'7 A.

Yes. (RE)

I

~

18 Q.

ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE POPULATION DATA FOR THE 19

. CATAWBA PLUME EPZ AND-THE AREA SURROUNDING THE PLUME 20 EPZ?

{

21

.A.

Yes. (RE) i l-22 Q.

WHAT IN YOUR BACKGROUND. QUALIFIES YOU TO DISCUSS i.

23 POPULATION STUDIES?

l l

24 A.

In my present job, I am responsible ' for ~ an 25 Environmental Engineering group whose duties include

(

.26 power plant siting.

Power plant siting requires 271 population data. (RE)

~

~ t 1

Q.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

2 A.

'I am testifying on the population data for the 3

Catawba plume EPZ and the surrounding areas in 4

connection with Emergency Planning Contention 11.

5 (RE) 6 EPC-ll Testimony of Mr. Edmonds

'7 Q.

WHAT IS-THE 1980 POPULATION WITHIN 10 MILES OF 8

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION AND WHAT WAS THE SOURCE?

9 A.

Based on.a detailed study using the 1980 census, the 10 population within 10 miles of Catawba was 78,769.

11 (RE) 12 Q.

WHAT IS THE PERMANENT 1980 POPULATION OF 2, 5,

AND 10 13 MILES FROM THE CATAWBA STATION?

14 A.

The 1980 population within 2 miles of Catawba is 537, 15 between 2 and 5 miles is 10,540, and be tween 5 and 10 16 miles is 67,692.

The cumulative population at 2, 5,

17 and 10 miles is 537, 11,077, and 78,769 respectively.

18 (RE) 19 Q.

WHAT WAS THE 1980 PERMANENT POPULATION OF THE CATAWBA 20 NUCLEAR STATION EPZ, TOTAL AND BY COUNTY?

. 21 A.

Again based on the 1980 census 93,483 people were

' 22 residents of the Catawba EPZ.

Of this number, 2672 23' were Gaston county residents, 5724 were Mecklenburg 24 and 85,087 were York County residents. (RE) 25 Q.

WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE EPZ FOR 1985,

- 26 THE PROJECTED DATE OF COdMERCIAL OPERATION?

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A.

Based on growth trends, field surveys and building 2

' permits. issues since the 1980 census, it is estimated 3

that the population of the EPZ in 1985-will be about 4

104,700. (RE) 5 Q.

HOW MANY OCCUPIED DWELLINGS ARE IN THE EPZ?

6 A.

Based on the 1980 census statistics, there were 7

31,737 occupied dwellings in the Catawba EPZ. (RE) 8 Q..

WHAT WAS THE 1980 POPULATION WITHIN 50 MILES OF 9

CATAWBA?

10 A..

Based on 1980 census data, the 1980 population within 11 50 miles of Catawba was 1,405,256, for an average 12 density within 50 miles of Catawba of 179 people per 13 square mile. (RE) 14 Q.

WHAT IS THE 1980 AND PROJECTED 2020 CUMULATIVE 15 POPULATION AND DENSITY AT 5, 10, 20, and 30 MILES?

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1 A..

The 5, 10, 20, and 30 mile cumulative population and 2

density at Catawba are as followa:. ('RE) 3 CUMU LhTIVE POPULATION DEgSITY 4

PgPULATION3 PERSONS /mi 5

MILES 1980 2020 1980 2020 6~

0-5 11,077 22,377 141 285*

7 0-10 78,769 94,436 251 301 8

0-20 526,532 712,164 419 567 9

0-30 814,686 1,120,996 288 396

-10' l.

Trip points per Regulatory Guide 4.7 11 2.

Source 1980 census 12 3.

Source Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR (RE) 13' Q.

WHAT IS THE' TRANSIENT POPULATICN WITHIN THE EPZ?

14 A.

Based on recreation studies by Duke and personal 15 contacts by Duke employees and James Carroll, York 16 county Director of Emergency Preparedness (deceased)'

17 there was a transient population of approximately 18 89,699 in 1982, which includes recreation and 19 industry. (RE)

~20. Q.

WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM. EXPECTED TRANSIENT POPULATION 21 WITHIN 2, 5, and 10 MILES OF THE STATION?

l 22 A.

The anticipated maximum transient population at 2, 5,

i 23 and 10 miles is:

at 0-2 miles --6,206; at 2-5 miles

[

24

- 31,298; and at 5-10 miles - 52,200. (RE) 25-Q.

WHAT IS THE POPULATION OF SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE, 26'

DEFINED AS BEING SOUTH OF US_74 AND WEST OF NC 16?

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Based on the-1980' census, the population of southwest

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2 Charlotte. is approximately 124,000. (RE) 3 Q.-

-WHAT IS THE.SPECIAL FACILITIES POPULATION WITHIN THE' 4-EPZ?

4 5

A.

The special' facility (Schools, Nursing Homes, 6

Hospitals,-Day Care Centers, Penal Institutions) 7

. population within the EPZ is 36,231. (RE)

.8 Q.

WHAT IS THE REGISTERED POPULATION OF SCHOOLS WITHIN 9

THE.EPZ?

10 A.

The enrollment of schools in the EPZ is spproximately.

11

-25,310.'(RE) i' 12 Q.

HAVE THE AREAS IN THE EPZ OF APPROXIMATELY ONE SQUARE 13 MILE OR GREATER THAT HAVE A POPULATION DENSITY OF i

14

. GREATER.THAN 2000 PER SQUARE MILE BEEN IDENTIFIED,

~

15 AND IF SO, WHAT WERE THESE AREAS?

16 A.

Such a study has been performed.

Parts of the cities 17 of Rock Hill, Fort Mill, and Clover were found.to 18 have areas of about one square mile and larger within l

19 their town limits with a population density greater 20 than 2000 per. square mile.. York, South Carolina.was 21-checked in detail and was found to have no areas with 22

a. density greater than 2000 per square mile.

All

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p 23 other. areas in the EPZ were eliminated based on a

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12 4 previous study of the 1980 population distribution.

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25 (RE) j

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9 1 Q.

WHAT IS THE 1980 POPULATION AND DENSITY FROM 5 TO 30 12 MILES IN THE NORTH THROUGH EAST SECTORS?

3 lA.

.These numbers are shown in a table titled " Catawba 4

Nuclear Station 1980 Population and Population 5_

Density, 5-30 miles, North through East Sectors,'"

6 attached to Duke's letter to the Board dated August.

7 25, 1983. (RE) 8 Q.

WHAT IS THE PERMANENT, TRANSIENT, AND SPECIAL 9

FACILITT POPULATION OF THE VARIOUS ZONES WITHIN THE 10

EPZ, i.e.,

A-O, A-1, B-1, ETC.?

11 A.

The populations previously identified are distributed 12 into the various zones as follows: (RE) 13 PERMANENT TRANSIENT y

SPECIAL FACIL{TY 14 ZONE POPULATION POPULATION POPULATION 15 A-0 720 G,206 0

16 A-1

.529 10,187 0

17 A-2 4,838 4,073 2,862 18 B-1 2,631 2,588 24 19 B-2 9,771 46,826 3,094 20 C-1 6,161 16,827' 1,544 21 C-2 44,964 0

21,031 l

22 D-1 1,414 109 0

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23 D-2.

9,169 0

4,023 l

24 E-1 429 0

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25 E-2 4,957 0

2,820-l 26 F-1 2,573 1,582 364 27 F-2 2,655 650 0

28 F-3 2,672 651 469 29 -Total EPZ 93,483 89,699 36,231 30

-1.

Includes-individuals that may also be included in i

311 Permanen t Popula tion. column. (RE) i

~

1

'Q.

.ARE THERE ANY NUCLEAR PLANTS EITHER OPERATING OR 2'

UNDER CONSTRUCTION WHICH ' HAVE PERMANENT POPULATION 3

CONCENTRATIONS SIMILAR TO OR GREATER THAN CATAWBA 4

,t FROM 10 TO 20 MILES FROM THE PLANT?

5 A.

Yes. (RE) 6 Q.

WHAT ARE SOME OF THEM7 7

A.-

A sampling of these. plants with Catawba as a 8

comparison is as follows: (RE) 9

. Largest Population Sector 1980 10 Station Population in 10-20 Mile Ring Sector a

11 Catawba 140,455 NE 12 Quad Cities 216,916 SW 13 Turkey Point (1978)

-184,900 NNW 14 Salem (1967) 187,000 N

15 Enrico Fermi 95,716 NNE 16 Surry 160,000 SE 17 Indian Point 176,083 SSW 18 Peach Bottom 115,720 N

19 Ginna 401,191 WSW 20 Shoreham 145,025 WSW 21 Davis Besse 419,223 WNW 22 Fort Calhoun 160,998

'S 23 Sequoyah 115,955 SW 24 Three Mile Island 98,600 NW r-25 Byron 143,554 NE 26 Limerick 124,311 ESE j

27 Waterford 236,347 NNW 28 EPC-ll Testimony of Mr. Glover 29 Q.

CONTENTION 11 ASSERTS THAT ALL OR PART OF SOUTHWEST 30 CHARLOTTE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE lO-MILE EPZ FOR 31 CATAWBA, BECAUSE OF POPULATION IN SOUTHWEST 32 CHARLOTTE, THE LOCAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, AND 33

-THE ANTICIPATED FLOW OF EVACUEES THROUGH EVACUATION 34 ROUTES IN CHARLOTTE.

IN YOUR OPINION, MR. GLOVER, 35 SHOULD THIS AREA BE INCLUDED IN THE CATAWBA EPZ?

WHY 36

.OR WHY NOT?

i 1

1 A.

In my opinion Charlotte shoul'd not. be a part of the-

-2

- Ca tawba plume EPZ..

My reasons are. twofold.

3 Statements in NUREG-0396 and NUF.EG-0654 seem to -

4 address the.very issue here in this case..

Also, an 5

emergency plan'already exists for Charlotte and-has 6

been' used to evacuate residents for actual 7

eme rgen cies. (RMG) 8 NUREG-0396 -- In NUREG-0396, Appendix 1, p.

52, 9

the NRC and EPA Task Force that evaluated the 10 necessary distance for the plume exposure. pathway 11 made a summary statement as to the importance or the 12 necessity of. planning outside of 10 miles.

It says,

.13 "Therefore, although protective actions may be 14 required for individuals located in areas further

-15 than 10 miles from the reactor, for an atmospheric 16 release the actual measures used and how rapidly or.

-17 efficiently they are implemented will not strongly 18 influence the number of projected early health 19-effects." (RMG)'

4 12 0 ~

Also, in NUREG-0654 on p.

12, the considerations 21 of the NRC/ EPA Task Force that established the plume 22 exposure pathway EPZ at "about 10 miles". are shown.

- 23 Item "d" of that list states " detailed planning 24 within 10' miles would provide a substantial base for-

~ 25 expansion of response efforts in the event that this 26.-

provided necessary."

Regulators have in essence

.. -.. approved "ad hoc" planning outside the 10 mile area 2

based on the capabilities available and in place for

'3 the area inside 10 miles.

Further, the regulators 4:

seem to anticipate that if resources are established

.5 within-10 miles that a " tie" of some sort exists to 6

those outside the zone if the.need arises to 7

facilitate this "ad hoc" planning.

When' I read that 8

statement and had reviewed the City of Charlotte All 9

Hazards Plan, I realized that the City of Charlotte's 10 "All Hazards Plan" addresses the need for a

" tie" to

'll resources and a way of facilitating "ad hoc" 12 planning.(RMG)

'13 In the case of the Catawba area and specifically 14 Charlotte, local planners h' ave taken the planning 15 process one step further than envisioned in the minds 16 of those who wrote NUREG-0654 and 0396, and rather 17' than waiting to react on an "ad hoc" basis, they have

'18 developed the city of Charlotte All-Hazards Plan to L

19 deal with an event affecting this area.

The " tie" L

20 l~

contemplated-to the resources that would be used in j-21 l

Charlotte to protect residents is the All-Hazards 22 Plan.

In addition to the " tie," the plan provides, 23 the Charlotte /Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office 24 is a " tie" to resources outside the EPZ, in that it 25 serves as a coordinating agency for both city and i'

26 coun ty resources.

Therefore, if necessary, without l-I l

a. U 1:

extension of the existing plume exposure:EPZ in the

-- 2 _

direction of Charlotte, protective action can be

-3 implemented for residents outside the EPZ.

The 4

existence of the "All Hazards Plan" and the 5

Charlotte /Mecklenberg Managemens Office (a joint-6 City-County agency) gives me confidence that the EPZ 7

is properly c nfigured in relation to local emergency 8

response needs and capabilities and that item "d"

of 9

p. 12, NUREG-0654 has been adequately addressed in 10 the Charlotte area.(RMG) 11 Background Information on Mr. Casper 12 Q..

PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT..

13 A.

My name is Mark A.

Casper.

My business address is 14 Duke Power Company, 422 ' South Church Street, 15 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242. (MC) 16 Q.

WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT POSITION WITH DUKE POWER 17 COMPANY?

18

.A.

I am a meteorologist for the Design Engineering 19 Department of Duke Power Company.

In this position I-l 20.

conduct'various meteorological analyses associated 21 with Duke Power Company's fossil and nuclear 22 generation facilities.

My professional

2 3 -

qualifications are attached to this testimony as

- 24 Attachment A.

(MC) 25 EPC-11 Testimony of Mr. Casper 26-Q.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TESTIMONY?

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A 1

A.'

_This testimony puts:into perspective'the 2.

' meteorological conditions in the area of Catawba 3

Nuclear Station so that1 the meteorology question in 4

Palmetto. Alliance.and CESG's Emergency Planning 5

. Contention 11 can be rationally resolved. (MC) 6' Q..

WHAT ARE THE WIND DIRECTION FREQUENCIES FROM CATAWBA-7 TO THE CHARLOTTE AREA?~

8

.A.

Using meteorological data gathered at Catawba at the 9

10 meter level from the most. representative time 10 period (December 17, 1975 through December 16, 1977)

- 11 the wind direction frequencies from the west-12 southwest, southwest, and south-southwest sectors are 13 5.2, 13.5, and 13.9 percent respectively ('three 22.5 14 degree sectors).

If one were to consider joint 15 frequencies with only stable atmospheric conditions 16-(Pasquill Stability Classes E, F, and G) these wind 17

' direction frequencies become 2.4, 5.5, and 6.3-l' 18 percent respectively. 'The total three sector (67.5

~

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- 19.

degree) frequencies become 32.6 percent for all 20 stability classes and 14.2 percent for stable cases.

y 21 (MC).

22 Q.

WOULD YOU CALL THE SOUTH-SOUTHWEST DIRECTION THE i.

?

-23 PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION?

24 A.

In the strict definition of prevailing wind 25 direction, yes.

However, a meteorologist will not L

26 only look at the section with the highest percentage

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of; winds, he/she would also consider the other w

2 sectors with'high frequencies of winds.

For 3

instance, the Piedmont area is generally known to 4-have bimodal prevailing winds, that is prevailing 5

wind d'irections from both the southwest and northeast 6

sectors.

During the fall months especially, the 7

predominant wind direction in the Piedmont region is 8

from the northeast. (MC) 9 Q.-

IS THE PREVAILING WIND PHENOMENON UNIQUE TO THE 10 CATAWBA AREA?

11 A.

No.

All sites have a prevailing wind direction.

If 12 one were to look at annual surface wind roses in the 13 Climatic Atlas of the United States, most of the 14 stations have prevailing winds with greater 15~

frequencies than the Diedmont area.

The prevailing 16 wind direction is attributed to various factors.

17 These factors include the channelling of wind by 18 surrounding terrain and the effects of land-sea 19 interface.

In absence of these effects, the wind l

20 direction in the mid-latitudes is due tx> migratory 21.

high and low pressure systems or synoptic scale 22 meteorological phenomena. (MC) 1 Q.

I AM LOOKING AT MR. EDMONDS' PART OF THE TESTIMONY

l1 2

LISTING ~THE LARGEST POPULATION SECTOR IN A 10 20 MILE 3

-RING BY' STATION (P. 6).

DO ANY OF THESE LARGEST 4.

POPULATION SECTORS COINCIDE WITH THE PREVAILING WIND 5

DIRECTION?

6 A.

'Yes.

The Indian Point plants' largest population

.7-sector (10-20 miles) is also the sector into which

-8 the prevailing wind direction blows, 13.5% of the 9

time, based on January 1971 to December 1971 data.

10 Also the Surry plant's largest population sector.

11 (10-20 miles) is also 8.7% of the time, based on 12 November 1967 to December 1969 data.

Enrico Fermi 13 and Peach Bottom have similar situations with wind 14 direction frequencies of 8.8% and 8.5%, respectively, 15 into the largest population sector (10-20 miles).

16 Although not " prevailing wind directions," these 17 frequencies represent sectors with greater 18 frequencies than that given by a uniferm wind 19 distribution. (MC) 20 Q._

ARE WIND DIRECTION SHIFTS A PART OF THE METEOROLOGY r

21 OF THE AREA?

4 22 A.

Yes.

The wind direction will shif t' over time.

23 Generally the shift is gradual.

During very low wind 24 speed conditions, there is a meandering of the wind i _-

25 direction,~usually over a wide range, but never a 26 complete wind reversal (180 degree) unless there is E

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1 some kind of orographic or sea-breeze effect.

The 2

other case of sudden wind direction change is the 3

passage of a-frontal. system, but in' terms of a 4

direction revetsal of a plume, the direction change 5

'is moot.

The plume is traveling with its initial air

'6-mass.

Fronts in the ideal sense may be considered as

.7 separating walls in the moving air streams through 8

which the air. particles cannot move but which must 9

move along at the same speed as the normal component 10 of-the air particles.

For example, if one imagines a 11 continuous plume before frontal passage, it is 12 traveling.in one direction with the air mass.

As the 1

13 front pas'ses, the plume ex'iting its source 'would 14 follow the wind direction of-the new air mass, 15 however, the previously emitted plume would still be 16 going in the same general direction ofsthe old air 17 mass.'(MC) 18 Q.

.DOES A PREVAILING WIND ~ DIRECTION HAVE AN IMPACT ON 19 THE RESULTS OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT (DBA) 20 ANALYSIS?

21-A.

The wind direction frequencies are figured into the 22 DBA analysis. (MC) 23 Q.

HOW DOES THE PREVAILING WIND AFFECT THE RESULTS OF A 24 SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS?

4

_ _, _ _.. _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - - ' ~ - "

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- 1 A.

In the-case of the Staff's severe accident analysis 2

(CRAC Code), the consequences are the same in terms 3.

of deaths, cancer, economic loss,.etc., but the 4

probability of the event happening varies with wind

.5 direction. frequencies.

For~ example, if the 6

probability of a consequence is one in a million 7

.under a uniform wind direction distribution, under a 8

prevailing wind direction that occurs twice as 9

frequently as uniform wind direction, the consequence 10 probability is two in a million.

Conversely, if the 11 wind direction frequency is half the uniform 12 frequency, the probability of the consequence is' 13 one-half in a million. (MC) 14 Q.

WHAT IS THE URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFECT?

15 A.

The urban heat island effect is the characteristic 16 warmth of an urban area due to the man-made local 17 weather modifications on the natural radiation-18 balance, obstacles to the wind, water vapor balance,.

19.

and the generation of heat in the urban area. (MC) 20 There are several dispersion characteristics in 21 an urban area.

Urban areas tend to have much lower 22 inversion frequencies than the surrounding rural

'23 areas.

This would mean that there are less instances 24 of. stable conditions in an urban area, therefore, 25 dispersion is greater..

Second, the surface roughness 26 (mechanical dispersion) increases dramatically as a I

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F a:

I 1

TESTIMONY OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY-2 (LEWIS WAYNE BROOME) ON 3

EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 4

-Q.

EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 ARGUES THAT SOME 5

PART OF SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE (ILLUSTRATED BY AN 6

EXAMPLE OF THE ~ BOUNDARIES OF HIGHWAYS 74 AND 16) 7

'SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE EPZ.

WHERE IS THE EPZ IN 8

MECKLENBURG COUNTY DISCUSSED IN THE MECKLENBURG 9

' COUNTY EMERGENCY RESPONSE' PLAN 7

'10 A.

Part 3,Section IV.B and Part'3, figure 4 and Annex I 11 to the N.C.

State Plan.

12 Q.

DID YOU DISCUSS WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY. OFFICIALS THE 13 POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING ALTERNATE EPZ BOUNDARIES

'l4 WITHIN THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE?

15 A.

This has been discussed, but there has been nothing 16 in writing.

Options were looked at.

No alternate 17 EPZ was defined.

18 Q.

AS PAR AS YOU KNOW, IS DUKE POWER COMPANY OR YOUR 19 OFFICE PROPOSING OR RECOMMENDING THE EXPANSION OF 20 THAT EPZ?

21 A.

Speaking for the Emergency Management 'Of fice, -we have 22 made no such recommendation.

23 Q.

DO YOU BELIEVE THE 10-MILE EPZ IS ADEQUATE TO-PROTECT 24 THE CITIZENS OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY LIVING WITHIN THAT 25

_EPZ?

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e 11 A.

' Based' on the standards ' tha t local government-have to 2

go by with regard to_ planning for.nuclearfpower 3

plants, the term about' ten miles -- we would consider l

-4 that to be adequate especially.in view of the NRC 5

investigation which preceded the decision to set the 6

EPZ radius at about ten miles.

7 Q.-

WOULD YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL-TRAFFIC CONTROL SUPPORT 8

IN THE AREA OF CHARLOTTE TO AID IN THE EVACUATION OF 9

EPZ RESIDENTS THROUGH. CHARLOTTE?

4 10 A.

Yes, we would.

If necessary, we would call in

~11-additional resources from the Charlotte police

-12~

depa rtment to assist us in traffic management.-

13-Q.

ASSUMING.THAT THE EPZ IS-NOT EXPANDED, IF A. SITUATION 14 AROSE WHERE THERE WAS SOME POSSIBLE NEED TO TAKE' a-15 PROTECTIVE ACTION WITH REPECT TO PEOPLE IN SOUTHWEST-

~16 -

CHARLOTTE, DO YOU HAVE ANY EXISTING MECHANISM FOR-i 17 DOING THAT?

18-A.

Yes, we could utilize the All Hazards Plan, whichLis 19 a combined Charlotte-Mecklenburg plan that addresses l

20 protective actions people could take and that city 21 and county resources could implement.

There is 22

' enough flexibility built into both the All Hazards j.

23' Plan and the basic emergency plan for 'the Catawba 24 Nuclear Station and the supporting documents that 25 will be developed out of this office so-that you can 26 take the concept of operation that applies for a 10-f 7

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mile EPZ and expand it to 11' miles, 12 miles,:15 2

miles.. The concept stays the same and the 3

flexibility is lthere to expand the area -of response,

'4 if-needed.

You're dealing with the same 5

o rga n iza tio'ns, the same departments, the same' people,

'6 you're just increasingEthe numbers in order to cope

-7 with 60,000 or 80,000 or 100,000.

So, the concept 8

remains the same and you would just would call in 9

additional people and identify additional resources.

10 You would look at mutual aid, which would be 11 available from the surrounding counties.

There's a 12 fallacy in people thinking that you cannot expand on.

13 something once you have identified something.

' 14 '

Q.

IS THE CITY OF. CHARLOTTE ~ALREADY= INVOLVED THROUGH THE 15 CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG JOINT EMERGENCY PLANNING AGENCY 16 IN PLANNING FOR THE PARTS OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY i

17 ALREADY--IN THE EPZ?

18 A.

That's correct.

~

I 19 Q.

SO YOU DON'T HAVE TO BRING IN ANY NEW COORDINATING 20 MECHANISM IN ORDER TO TAKE PROTECTIVE ACTION?

21 A.

Absolutely not.

It's in place.

22 Q.

HAS THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG JOINT EMERGENCY f

23 PLANNING AGENCY PREVIOUSLY DONE PLANNING AND WRITTEN

24 PROCEDURES FOR'AT LEAST ONE OTHER NUCLEAR POWER 25' PLANT?

L t

E s

. 1 A.

~ Tha t 's correct.

Developing procedures for. Catawba 2

has involved looking at a different geographic area 3

.than McGuire.

We ' ve looked at dif ferent problems and 4

different resources, but the basic concept has 5

remained the same.

The basic concept is to ensure to 6

the maximum extent possible the protection of the 7

public.

8-Q.

WOULD YOU AGREE THAT AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 9

CALLING AN AREA PART OF THE EPZ AND NOT CALLING IT 10 PART OF THE EPZ IS SIMPLY THAT YOU DON'T HAVE FIXED 11 SIRENS IN THE PART THAT IS NOT PART OF THE EPZ?

.12 A.

Well, that's one element.

I guess the primary thing 13

-that a lot of people would look at is that inside the 14 lO-mile EPZ, the magic line that is drawn, you are 15 very, very specific with regard to function.

Outside 16 that, the specificity is not there, but the concept 17 is there and the flexibility to expand on.that is 18 there.

You've got a very detailed, well-identified 19 plan ~for the 10-mile EPZ which looks at, for-example, 20 day-care centers and schools and hospitals and 21 prisons and evacuation routes and this type of thing.

22 Outside that 10-mile EPZ, you don't need to identify 23' these matters in the specific terms that you do 24 inside that, but that is not to say that you can't 25 expand on it because you are dealing with a concept.

.h 1 -. Q.

WHEN YOU;SAY EXPAND ON IT, DO YOU MEAN' EXPAND ON IT 2

'IF THE OCCASION ARISES OR EXPAND ON IT THROUGH I.

3

-ADVANCE PLANNING?

.: 4 A.

I think if the' situation were to arise, if i

5 regulations dictated it, or if the request from the 6.

city mandated. it,' you could expand it.

It could be 7

any number of things.

8 Q.

ASSUMING THAT THERE WERE NO SIHENS, HOW WOULD YOU GO 9-ABOUT ALERTING RESIDENTS IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE OF 10-

-THE NEED TO TURN ON THEIR RADICS OR' TELEVISION SETS?

- 11' A.

First of all, you would go in and activate the 12.

Emergency Broadcasting System, which most cases and' 13 studies indicate would catch the majority of the 14-people.

In addition"to that you would take specific n

15 law enforcement units and other emergency vehicles to

' 16 '

patrol' those areas down there and make the

'17

. announcement with the siren, etc., to turn on their ili 18 radio-and television and listen for instructions that 19 will be broadcast.

20

~Q.

IF'YOU WERE GOING TO USE SOME KIND OF POLICE OR 21 EMERGENCY VEHICLES TO-DRIVE THROUGH NEIGHBORHOODS IN 22~

THE SOUTHWEST PART OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE, WOULD 23 THEY KNOW'WHERE TO GO?

/

24 A.

If you are talking about outside the 10-mile EPZ

'25 there would be some minor logistics problems until.

26-there is some coordfaation and we could identify who L

I

n;

s.,

.' 1 isLgoing to be doing what_in an EOC environment.

4 2

Once that logistica problem has been clarified we 3

could assign specific emergency teams to specified 4

affected areas.

5.Q.'

THE ALL HAZARDS PLAN THAT YOU ALREADY HAVE IN PLACE 6

IS NOT' SPECIFIC TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES-AT 7

. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, IS IT?

8 A.

All' Hazards is just tha t -- all hazards.

It just so 9

happens that an accident at a nuclear power plant 10' represents a potential hazard for the community.

11' Q.

HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHAT AREAS SHOULD BE ALERTED 12 AN EMERGENCY?

13 A.

Currently,-the All Hazards Plan identifies 14 evacuations by voting precincts.

That is something 15 that will have to be looked at because there is a 16.

great-deal of the public out there that does not know 17 what voting precinct they are in.

Perhaps the best 18 way to look at an evacuation for a situation would be 19 to look at it within the context that occurred in the 20 chemical fire emergency response this office recent 21 was involved in.

Law enforcement were sent in there 22 with the sirens and PA systems.

We did that.

We had 23 the flexibility there because we expanded the zone 24 and we changed direction of'the zone on several 25 occasions.

However, the function of the law 26 enforcement, i.e., warning and notifying the public, a

k a

4-

-. I was carried out in such a manner that it didn't cause

~2

_any undue concern on the part of the population in 3

there.. In addition to that, when it was identified

'4 or. learned that X number of people did not have 5'

transportation, _the11aw enforcement relayed back to 6

us via radio in their cars that transportation was 7

needed.

We called.in city buses, and from that 8-standpoint, that operation went well.

9' O.

PLEASE DESCRIBE BRIEFLY WHAT HAPPENED.WITH THE PEOPLE 10 WHO WERE EVACUATED IN THE CASE OF THAT CHEMICAL FIRE.

11 A.

They were transported to a shelter location. TWe had

.12 to change shelter locations because of the wind 13 conditions and wind shifts.

We extended the 14 evacuation zone several times during the fire.

A lot 15 of people did not have transportation.

City buses 16 ran into the area and picked up the-people who did 17

-not have transportation and transported those people 18 to a shelter.

We fed the people in the morning and 19 we had suf ficient shelter staf f, we had suf ficient

(

20 people associated with the medical community to 21 provide service if it was needed.

The majority of j.

22 the departments were city departments but we had 23~

certain county departments there that assisted in the 24 operation.

There were some logistics problems, and 25 procedural problems, but nothing that would have an l

l 26-adverse effect on the general safety of the public l

I-I i

E s.

1

' and for - the most part the plan was implemented and it 2

addressed the problems and was carried out in a very 3

good manner.

4 Q.

-HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE EVACUATED?

5 A.

Somewhere around 3,000 people.

We had a little over 6

2,000 people to show up at shelters.

We don't know 7.

h, ow many people went to friends or relatives.

8 Normally, when you look at that many people in a 9

shelter you can probably add maybe another 20 or 30 10 percent to account for those people who go to 11 relatives' home, because tha t's common in an 12-evacuation.

13 Q.

HOW LARGE AN AREA WAS INVOLVED IN THAT CHEMICAL FIRE?

14 A.

Somewhere in the neighborhood of 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 15 square miles.

_16 Q.

DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ANY OTHER CHANGES THAT NEED TO 17 BE MADE IN THE ALL HAZARDS PLAN TO ADAPT IT TO THE 18 CONTINGENCY OF TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION WITHIN 19 CHARLOTTE?

20 A.

I don't think so.

I think there was a little bit of 21 a problem associated with shelters but that has been 22 addressed.

We have simplified the shelter activation 23 procedure to assure resources have been identified gk 24 for shelter startup.

J

a, ' '

c 1. Q.

ASSUMING THAT.YOU ASKED THE POLICE AND OTHER-

~2

' EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNITS, SUCH-AS CITY AND VOLUNTEER 3

FIREMEN,-TO NOTIFY THE-PEOPLE.IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE 4

TO TURN ON THEIR RADIO'OR TELEVISION TO THE EMERGENCY

.. 5 BROADCAST STATION, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK THIS 6

ALERTING PROCESS WOULD TAKE?

7-A.

I would say about 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months , depending on resource 8

capability.

Actually resources would be increased 9

with the time factor.

The dispatchers or whoever i<a 10 in command could look at what the resources are, who 11-patrols the area and make the determination about the 12 most capable units to patrol there to ensure proper 13 coverage of that specific area.

14 Q.

DO YOU HAVE AN ESTIMATE AS TO HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE 15 TO EVACUATE THE AREA DESCRIBED BY THE BOARD'S EXAMPLE 16 OF HIGHWAYS 74 AND 167 17 A.-

I would determine that you are looking at probably 18 around 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

19 Q.

DOES THAT INCLUDE THE ALERTING PROCESS THAT WE 20 DESCRIBED BEFORE?

21 A.

From the time the alerting process 'was instituted 22 until the time the last person who was going to leave 23' was out of the area, I would say you would be looking 24 at about 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months , under normal weather conditions.

4

[

25 Q.

WOULD THAT INCLUDE PERSONS WHO COULD BE MOVED FROM 26 HOSPITALS?

i-

U

, 1 A.

Well, the hospital population might or.might not be

'2 moved.' It would depend on: the recommendation' of 'the

.3-medical community with regard to whether it would be 4

safer for the patient to remain at'.the. facility as-5 opposed Eto trying to transport that individual..

6 Those specifics, we would leave those to the experts 7

in that field or attending physicians, the staff 8-doctors and things of this nature, to make that 9

. determination.

10 Q.

COULD YOU GET TRANSPORTATION TO THE HOSPITAL FOR 11 THOSE HHO NEEDED IT AND COULD NOT MOVE 7 12-A.~

There would be some delay, but yes, transporta tion 13 would be available.

14 Q.

WOULD THAT ADD TO THE OVERALL 7-HOUR ESTIMATE OR DO 15 YOU THINK THAT THAT, TOO, COULD BE ACCOMMODATED 16 WITHIN THE 7 HOURS?

17 A.'

I think probably within the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

You would be 18 looking at specific resources there-as opposed to 19 general resources.

20 Q.

IS THERE ANY HOSPITAL IN THAT AREA THAT WE ARE 21 TALKING ABOUT?

22 A.

Yes, there would be one hospital, Charlotte Memorial 23 Hospital and Medical Center.

24 Q.

IS THAT 4 SIZABLE' HOSPITAL IN TERMS OF PATIENT 25 POPULATION 7

fy 4

i.

1 A.

Very much so.

It is one of the largest, probably the

'2 largest ' hospital from a bed standpoint in North 3

Carolina.-

4 Q.

DOES IT HAVE ITS OWN EMERGENCY PLAN 7 5

A.

_They have' an internal emergency response plan that is 6

required for continued accreditation, and they 7

exercise it at least annually.

8 Q,

ARE YOU REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THEY COULD GET THOSE 9

PATIENTS THAT CAN BE MOVED READY TO BE MOVED IN GOOD 10 ORDER PROMPTLY?

11 A.

Oh, I think so.

Like I say, it's a hospital and 12 medical center which means that they have-a lot of 13 trainees there, a lot of staff there, so I th' ink they 14 would be fairly capable of activating their plan, 15 bringing in a lot of resources such as buses and 16 taking the necessary action for developing and 17 setting people ready to move.

18 Q.

ARE THERE ANY OTHER SPECIAL FACILITIES IN THAT AREA 19 THAT YOU CARE TO MENTION 7 20

~A.

Well, there are numerous day care centers.

I know l

21 that there are schools, both private and public,.the 22 hospital and rest homes.

A city fire department is 23 located in there.

7. _

(

's.

- l' Q.

ARE YOU SATISFIED THAT FOR THE PEOPLE IN SOUTHWEST

-2 CHARLOTTE, ROUGHLY WITHIN THOSE APPROXIMATE 3

i BOUNDARIES.THAT-WERE USED AS AN EXAMPLE, EVA CUATION -

4 COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN ABOUT 7 HOURS?

5 A.

I think so.

I'-think'that with the resource 6

capability that is present in Charlotte-Mecklenburg 7

County, plus what you could call in from the 8

surrounding counties that would get here in_less than 9

the period of time that we spoke of, that it could be 10 done'.

You could get them out of the area.

I would' 11 note that you've got a basic document and you've got 12 some basic concepts in place and I think the elements 13 of. continuity of operations and command and control 14 functions eliminate a lot of the' problems and a lot-15 of the rumors.

These elements give people more 16 confidence when you tell them to do something that 17

.they are going' to do it, and for that reason, I think 18 that the majority of the people would listen to us

'19 and that we couldf evacuate that number of people 20-within the time frame that was referenced with very a

21 little problem.

22 Q.

HAS MECKLENBURG COUNTY EVER HAD TO MOVE A LARGE 23 NUMBER OF PEOPLE OUT OF ANY AREA IN. CHARLOTTE?

24 A.

The largest popula tion that we have ever had to 25-evacuate was during the chemical fire.

- -. -.- - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

r----

- 4 13 -

11-Q.

ARE YOU. FAMILIAR WITH ANY OTHER EVACUATIONS IN OTHER 2

CITIES WHERE YOU MIGHT-HAVE HAD TO MOVE SOME 3

. COMPARABLE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE?

4 A.

Well, yes,-there was an incident that occurred a year 5

and a half or two years ago in Missasaugus County, 6

which is right outside of Toronto, Canada.

They 7

evacuated nearly a quarter of a million people in 8-about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

There were no disabling automobile-4 9

accidents and there'were no serious injuries on the 10 pa rt of the evacuation people, and they got out of 11 the area.. I think it speaks well for the people, and 12 I think it negates the panic factor.

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.l'

' TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E.

POTTER =

2?

. ON -EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 3

0 Background Information

~

-4 LQ.

PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

5 A '.

My name' is Thomas E. -- Potter.

My business address'is t'.

O ?gf,.

6-Pickard-Lowe & Garrick, Inc.,.1200 Eighteenth Street,

'7, N.W.,-Washington, D.C.

v.

10 8

Q.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

9 A.-

The' purpose of this testimony ia_ to compare the results I

of assessments of accident-related radi$ tion dose

- 10' l-11 performed for the Catawba plant to the results of 12 comparable generic studies in NUREG-0396 which were used

_J, 13 to support the-establishment of a Plume Exposure. Pathway i

[

Ll4 Emergency Planning Zone (plume EPZ)1 radius of about'lO

15 ' '

miles.

Such a comparison shows whether features 16 specific to-the' Catawba plant or site affect the

= ' 0%

17' validity of the plume EPZ distance of.about 10 miles aus -

J 18 9 applied to Ca tawba.

~

b 19

'Q.

WHA IS YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND ~AND RELEVANT JOB 20 EXPERIENCE?

l

[

2 'l ' -A..

I have, had a major role in preparing reactor accident 2

probabilistic risk assessments for six dif ferent nuclear e

4,

' 23 facilities.

These facilities were Oyster Creek,12 ion 1 24 and-2, Midland 1 and 2, Shoreham, Seabrook 1 and 2, and 25.4

- Indian Point 2 and 3.

I have also performed ~oth.er g

26 analyses, suchlas one to determine the importance of 27 source term release severity assumptions on radiological J

t

'l

/

,I.

4

'w, e

- E

I

[it

~'

-3 s

1~ ~

dose a.s a function of distance and release conditions.

2-

^Please_see'also my current resume,'which is attachedito' 3

this testimony as Attachment A.

.4-EPC -11 Testimony 55 Q.

.ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PLUME EPZ ESTABLISHED FOR THE

6 -

CATAWBA NUCLEAR' STATION 7

'7 A.-

Yes.

-8' Q.

HOW DID YdU ACQUIRE THIS FAMILIARITY?

9 A.

I have-studied the maps of the current plume EPZ and in't'ervenors' proposed plume EPZ supplied by Applicants.

11 These maps.were attached as exhibits to the Applicants' 12 November 3,~1983 filing with the Licensing Board and 13 their' January 12, _1984 filing with the Appeal Board.-

I-14 have also studied NUREG-0396, which contains background -

t 15 mad $ rial that went into the establishment of the plume

-16 EPZ radius at "about 10 miles."

17 Q.

DID YOU PREPARE A REPORT AS A RESULT OF THIS' WORK?

18 A.-

Yes.

My report is attached to this testimony as 19 Attachment B and is part of my testimony.-

20 Q.

PLEASE. SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THE CONSIDERATIONS FORMING THE 21 BASIS FOR SELECTING 10 MILES AS A PLUME EPZ DISTANCE AND 22 DESCRIBE HOW'YOUR TESTIMONY RELATES TO THESE 23 CONSIDERATIONS.

E.

> 1 A.

The; basis for a plume EPZ of about 10 miles was 2

developed in NUREG-0396, and is stated most succinctly 3'

in NUREG-0654:

4 "The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume

5 exposure EPZ was based primarily-on the 6

following considerations:

7

.a.

projected doses from the traditional 8

design basis accidents would not exceed 9

Protection Action '.uide levels outside the 10 zone [the Prott.:.4ve Action Guide is

11 defined by the EPA as the projected dose 12 to individuals =in the population which 13 warrants taking protective action; see

~14-Manual of Protective Action Guides and 15 Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,

-16 EPA-520/1-75-001, Sept. 1975];

17 b.

projected doses from most core melt 18 sequences would not exceed Protective 19 Action Guide levels outside the zone; 20 c.

for the worst core melt sequences, c

21 immediate life threatening doses would 22-generally not occur outside the zone; and 23 d.

detailed planning within 10 miles would 24 provide a substantial base for' expansion 25 of response efforts in the event that this 26 proved necessary.

l.

27 My testimony addresses the first three of these four l

28 considerations and whether they are supported by 29 analyses specific for Catawba.

30 Q.

PLEASE SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THE METHODOLOGY YOU USED IN 31 YOUR ASSESSMENTS.

32 A.

The approach used for testing consideration "a,"

33 identified in my previous answer, was different from 34 that used for considerations "b," and "c."

The Catawba

+- --.

,,n--n.

.n.,

c

- ~4 -

11

- FSAR contains results of assessments of doses from 2

-design basis accidents that can be. direct 1h Lextrapolated

.3 to a distance' of 10 miles, so little analysis was 4

' required.

5 For considerations "b," and "c," also identified.in

-6.

. my previous answer,. the probabilistic approach used ~in-7 the NUREG-0396 analyses was followed in this study.

8-This approach resulted in estimatesL of the probabilities 9

of exceeding.certain selected doses at different 10 distances.

Tne. overall probability depends upon the-11

- probability of a core melt accident, the probability of i-12 ea ch. of the ' types of release (release categories) that 13 might. occur given a core melt accident, and the 14 probability that meteorological conditions, given a 15 certain type of release,.libit atmospheric dispersion 16 sufficiently to produce a dose exceeding the dose of

-17' interest at the distance of interest.

For.this analysis 18 I.used PWR release categories from the. Reactor-Safety 19 Study to represent core' melt releases from the Catawba 20 plant.

Available data indicate the Catawba core melt 21 spectrum would be less severe than that 'calcula ted for

.22 the Reactor Safety Study, but these data are not 23' comprehensive enough to permit complete quantification.

7-7.-

t

~

.( #

.k 4

5-

..i w

_l' In' practice, the analysis consisted of numerous

<.j.

2l (100 to -300) separate mathematical simulatiens of.

3 radiation ' dose consequences from each release category.

4 Because the intent of the analysis is to determine the

,i.

5 zones.in.which planning for protective action is needed, 6-it was assumed in these simulations that no protective -

7-

-action is taken for twen'ty-four hours after the passage

. 8 of ~ airborne released material.

Each simula tion was 9

- based. upon meteorological conditions determined by a 10 randomly selected release time (month, day, and hour).

11 Meteorological conditions for that release time were'

'12:

extracted from a one-year meteorological data -base in zl3 hour-by-hour forma t.

Meteorological conditions were 14 permitted to change during release transport as 15' determined by hour-t.o-hour changes in the meteorology 16-da ta base.

My analysis used meteorological da ta 17 collected at the Catawba site.

i 18 The results in-Tables 2 and 3 of my study-are total i'.

hj 19 absolute (i.e.,

overall) probabilities.

In the NUREG-p

}

-20 0396 analyses, results are expressed conditional on core l-c21 melt.

That is, the core melt is a given and its low L

i=

12 2 i-probability is not included in the estimate of

- 23~

proba bili ty.

(The low probability of a core melt 24 accident-is discussed separately in NUREG-0396. )

~ 25 Translation from one form of expression to the other is 9

l

-t w

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- -, e v.eg g.c,f.y--erog.,-w-rw,-,,,,--y y---

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. straightforward and the discussion of my results and 2

conclusions includes probabilities expressed in the 3'

NUREG-0396 convention.

These Catawba-specific 4

probabilities were then compared with those arr' ved at i

5 in NUREG-0396.

6 Q.

HAVE YOU' COMPLETED YOUR' REPORT?

7 A.

Yes, it is Attachment B to my testimony.

8 Q.

IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR CONCLUSION CONTAINED IN YOUR 9

REPORT?

10" A.

Yes.

11

'Q.-

DO-YOU ADOPT THIS REPORT AS YOUR TESTIMONY FOR USE IN 12 THIS PROCEEDING?

13 A.

Yes.

14 Q.

WHAT CONCLUSION DID YOU REACH?

15' A.

Analyses related 'to the first three considera tions- (a, 16 b, and'c, identified above) are included in NUREG-0396.

,17 -

Plant-specific and site-specific analyses performed in 18 the course of licensing various nuclear power plants 19 support the conclusion'that projected doses from 20 traditional design basis accidents would not exceed 21 upper Protective Action Guide doses beyond the 10-mile 22-zone even based on assumption of poor d'spersion i

23 conditions.

Summaries of these analyses are included in

(-

+

3 s

q r 1

NUREG-0396.

Data in the Catawba FSAR indicate that the 2

conclusion applies Eto Catawba as well. -See Catawba 3

FSAR, Chapter 15.

4 The analyses I conducted also_ establish that there 5

is no significant difference between the probabilities F

6 of exceeding' Protective Action Guide doses or life 7

threatening doses beyond 10 miles at Catawba and the 8

comparable probabilities calculated in the generic _ core 9

, melt accident analyses contained in NUREG-0396.

These 10 probabilities were factors in the decision to establish 11 a 10-mile plume EPZ.

Thus, projected doses from most 12 core melt sequences would not exceed the EPA's 13 Protective Action Guide levels outside the Catawba plume 14-EPZ.

For the worst case core melt sequences, immediate 15 life threatening doses would generally not occur outside 16 the Catawba plume EPZ.

This is also consistent with the 17 generic analyses in NUREG-0396.

18 Thus, I conclude that the plume EPZ boundary for 19 the Catawba facility has been properly determined in 20 relation to radiological considerations in the basis for 21 determination of plume EPZ size.

Allowance for such 22 site-specific factors as local meteorological conditions 23 and the design of the Catawba facility does not af fect t

. - _ _ -... -, _ - _ _ -, - _,, ~,.., _ _,, -.,.., -, _ - _ _ _. -. _ -... - - -.. _,_

C i-i

.D'

< the valid'ity of. these considerations, and therefore'does

.- 2 not. justify extending ~the boundary of the plume EPZ'in 6-3 any; direction.

en 3

0 0

v 6

F l

om

-c 1

TESTIMONY'OF' WALTER;M.,KULASH ON 2

. EMERGENCY PLANNING-CONTENTION'll-

'3 Background Information 4. 12 PLEASE STATE YOUR. FULL NAME'AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

r-S A..

My. naam is Walter M.

Kulash.

My business address is y

~6 PRC Engineering, 1500' Planning Research Drive, 7,

McLean, Virginia.

-8 Q..

_PLEASE STATE YOUR JOB = TITLE.

9 A.

Associate Vice-President, PRC Engineering.

10 Q.

PLEASE: DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND 11 RELEVANT JOB EXPERIENCE.

J12 A.

My educational background and professional experience y 13 is summarized in the resume included as Attachment A 14 to my testimony.

4 15 Q.

ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE RESPONSE? PLANS IN SUPPORT.

}

16 OF THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION?

i

[

17 A.

I am familiar with those parts of the North Carolina.

.h 18 and South Carolina plans, and the. York County, Gaston 19 County, and Mecklenburg County plans, that deal with

(

20

. evacuation routes and the transportation of-21 individuals without vehicles, i

22 Q.

HOW DID YOU ACQUIRE THAT FAMILIARITY?

I 23 A.

I a ttended meetings with representa tives of the 24 various jurisdictions in which evacuation routes in 25 North and South Carolina were discussed, and I have

?

s

m 7

1 read those portions of the North Carolina plan, the 2

South Carolina plan, and the county plans, which deal 3

specifically with evacuation.

4 Q.

HAVE YOU READ THE CESG/ PALMETTO ALLIANCE CONTENTIONS 5"

DEALING WITH EMERGENCY PLANNING THAT HAVE BEEN 6

ACCEPTED AS ISSUES IN THIS PROCEEDING?

7 A.

I have read those contentions that deal with 8

avacuation and the evacuation time study -- that is, 9

Contentions 11, 14, and 15.

10 EPC 11 Testimony 11 Q.

EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 ARGUES THAT SOME 12 PARTS OF SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE SHOULD BE INCLUDED' IN 13 THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE.

14 AS AN EXAMPLE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT HIGHWAYS 74 AND 15 16 IN SOUTHWEST CHARLOTTE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE PLUME 16 EXPOSURE EPZ BOUNDARY LINES.

DID YOU DISCUSS WITH 17 DUKE POWER COMPANY AND APPROPRIATE LOCAL OFFICIALS 18 THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING ALTERNATIVE EPZ 19 BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE?

20 A.

Yes.

The issue of alternative EPZ boundaries which i

21 would include part of southwest Charlotte was i-22 discussed.

As a result of these discussions, PRC 23 performed two studies relating to evacuation of areas 24 beyond the EPZ as presently defined.

One of these 25 studies, entitled "Ef fect of ' Shadow' Evacuation on 26 the Time to Evacuate the Catawba Nuclear Station 5

U;

. u 3.

s 1;

EPZ," evaluated the effect on EPZ evacuation traffic

)2 flow, of voluntary evacuation of the entire Charlotte 3

area.

In this-analysis, we-tested various 4

combinations of ' voluntary evacuation percentages and 5

notification times.

A copy. of this study.it included as Attabhment B to my testimony on Contention 11.

6' 7

In addition, PRC considered evacuation times for 8-2 expanded,EPZ's:

first, the southwest third of 9

Charlotte, - encompassing an area. out to 17 miles from 10 the Catawba plant-and second, the entire. city of 11 Charlotte, extending 20-25 miles from Catawba.

This 12 study entitled." Catawba Nuclear Station Evacuation 13 Analysis / Evacuation Time Estimate for the City of 14 Charlotte," is. included as Attachment C to my 15 testimony on contention 11.

16 Q.

DO YC0 ADOPT ATTACHMENTS B AND C AS PART OF YOUR g

17 TESTIMONY FOR USE IN THIS PROCEEDING 7.

h 18 A.

I do.

19~ Q.

WHAT WERE THE^ FINDINGS IN THE VOLUllTARY EVACUATION t

20 STUDY?

21 A.

Voluntary evacuation could, under certain conditions, 22 hinder EPZ evacuation traffic on one route by 30 1

23' mi nu'te s.

Such delay would' occur only if more than

. l2 4 50% of the total Charlotte population chose to y

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, 1 evacuate, and if such population prepared to evacuate i

2 within 30 minutes of'the time required by the EPZ 3

population.

4 Q.

WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS IN THE EXPANDED EPZ STUDY?

5 A.

For the southwest third of Charlotte, extending to 4

6 approximately 17 miles from the Catawba Nuclear 7

Station, an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , 15 minutes is

^

8 es tima ted.

The critical determinant of this time is 9-notification time and not traffic congestion.

In 10 other words, any traffic congestion on evacuation

.11 routes has dissipated by the time that all of the.

12 population in the expanded EPZ is notified and 13 prepared.

' 14 For the entire city of Charlotte, extending to 20-25 15 miles from the Catawba Nuclear Station, an evacuation 16 time of approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months is estimated.

I t

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c-

-> 1-plume travels from rural to urban areas, thereby 2

increasing dispersion even further.

Third, there

.3 tends to be a circulation cell where a plume entering 4

the urban area would rise away from ground level.

5 (MC) 6 Q.

WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE THAT CHARLOTTE WOULD GIVE RISE 7

TO AN URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFFECT?

Si A.

Yes. (MC) 9 Q.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE PIEDMONT REGION HAS AN USUAL 10 AMOUNT OF RAINFALL?

11 A.

No, it is average for the southeastern United States, 12 even below average.

Coastal and mountain regions 13 tend to have greater precipitation amounts.

14 Therefore since the Piedmont region is neither 15 coastal nor mountain, the rainfall amounts tend to be 16 minimum for the southeastern United States. (MC)

E

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TEPC 11:

_Edmonds Attachment A' RESUME ROBERT F. EDMONOS, JR.

PERSONAL:

'Home Address: Routei4,Bo'x624-P r

Charlotte, NC 28214 Telephone:

(704) 392-4531 (Home)

(704)373-8105(Office)

Age: 36 Height:

6,' 0 "

' Weight:

150 lbs.

FORMAL EDUCATION:

Clemson University: BSCE 1968 Clemson Uriiversity:

colorado State University:MS Water Resources Engineering 1970 Engineering 1971-1972 (Part-Time) Graduate work in Enviro

)

A)DITIONAL TilAINING:

Engineering Economics - Duke Power Company Management Development - Duke Power Company Effective Management - Duke Power Company PROFESSIONAL JNVOLVIMENT: Registered Professional Engineer - North Carolina 7578 Registered Professional En Member - ASCE, ANS (Local)gineer - South Carolina 6086

. WPCF Member - Electric Power Research Institute A h

d Environmental Control Systems Member - MIT Energy Lab Technical Comittee on Environmental x\\

Management Member - ANS Standards Comittee 2.9 - Nuclear Pow Supply

[

Member-UtilityWaterActGroup(UWAG)PolicyCommittee WORK DERIENCE:

~

FROM TO, E

PROGRAM COMPANY 3/82 Present Senior Engineer Civil / Environmental Duke Power 4 "

In charge of groups responsible for Environmental Engineering. Fire P

~oatings and Roofing.

Duties included power plant siting, air and water qual-1ty studies, obtaining air and water permits, physical and mathematical m t

as well as ' developing roofing and coating systems i

vised 12-14 engineers and technicians.

Super l

l>

1

_._,_2..._._

... 3 r-

.e-4 y's Q

Robert F. Edmonds, Jr.

Page 2

~

FROM[

TO TE PROGRAM C PANY 8/75 2/82 4

Supervising Design Environmental Duke Power Engineer Section Supervised environmental engineering group responsible for environmenta described above.

x 12/74' 7/75' Assistant Design Staff Engineer Duke Power Engineer Assistant to Chief Engineer, Civil / Environmental Division, responsible foi-recruiting, training, and administrative duties for 200-person division.

10/72 11/74 Assistant Design Environmental Duke Power Engineer / Engineer Section Associate l

environmental assessment and thermal mddeling. Respons 8/70 9/72 Lieutenant Minuteman USAF Responsible for Combat Targeting Team involved in targeting and alignmen minuteman missiles.

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EPC 11

'Cacpar Attachm3nt MARK 1'. CASPER \\

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS-DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT DUKE POWER COMPANY i-I-. have been a Meteorologist with Duke Power Company,, Design Engineering-Departetent, Civil / Environmental ~' Section, since January 1981.

I, received a BS degree in Meteorology from the University of Michigan in 1979.

While an undergraduate, I participated in a

. study of the environmental impact of the once through cooling-s systems and subsequent. emissions.of wasta heat and moisture into tho' atmosphere at the Cook and Palisades Nuclear Power Plants on Lake Michigan.

My responsibilities included the processing and analysis of the meteorological data acquired near the plants '..

I entered the graduate program at the University of Michigan in 1979, and was awarded an MS degree in Meteorology in 1980.

In addition to continuing my assoc'istion with the Cook and Palisades

project, I

participated in the solar and meteorological 3

a measurement program conducted at the University of Michigan under contract by the Solar Energy Research Institute.

I was also a teaching assistant for a senior level meteorological synoptic lab class.

C/1360746 6

4/13/84~

t s

I

w I accepted my present position in January 1981.

In this position I conduct various - meteorological analyses. associated with Duke Power Company's electric generation operations.at all facilities, both nuclear and fossil.

Such meteorological aspects typically involve (a) diffusion applications involving estimates of atmospheric transport / diffusion of pollutants related to both coal-fired and nuclear electric generation including the development-of transport / diffusion models for nuclear emergency response, and ' (b) synoptic applications involving estimates of specialized short-term weather forecasts.

Diffusion applications also involve the transport / diffusion of excess water vapor associated with cooling tower and cooling pond releases.

I am a member of the American Meteorological Society, the Air Pollution Control Association, and the Utility Air Regulatory Group's Atmospheric Modeling Committee.

i I

i s-C/1360746 7

4/13/84 i

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~

Potter Attachm2nt A :

NAME 1

THOIMS E. POTTER

' EDUCATION M.S., Environmental-Science (Radiological Health), University of

.Micnigan, 1972.

.B.S., Chemistry, University >of Pittsburgh,.1963.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE ~

1973-Present Consultant, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.

. Consultant on health and safety aspects of. nuclear power.

probabilistic analyses of off-site consequences of power reactorPerforming

. accidents as part.of full-scope probabilistic risk assessments for x

! nuclear power plants.

Performing environmental. dose assessments for

. nuclear power plant safety analysis, environmental reports and operat or environmental monitoring programs and interpretatio reports.

pc and effluent analysis programs. (Participated in des of the CRACIT code, a computer program for probabilistic assessment of comparison study of reactor accident consequence asse i.

4 Participated in a comprehensive assessment of off-site radiation from the Three Mile Island accident.

1972-1973 Consultant to Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, University of Michigan Consultant in radiological health aspects of nuclear power.

radiological nealth section of safety analysis reports and environmental Prepared

. monitoring programs and evaluatea data from those programs.

mathematical model to predict radiation doses from nuclear power plantDevelop

' ef fluents.

1963-1970 Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (t4UMEC).

License administrator, plutonium fuel facility health and safety supervisor.

s License administrator, plutonium fuel facility health and safety supervisor.

Provided radiological safety review of major facility-t modifications.

performed by others to prepare AEC special nuclear materials j

L

_ byproduct license applications.

Served as corporate contact with AEC in matters related to licensing.

protection program for a plutonium fuels fabrication facility and ho cell facility.

Instituted personnel monitoring programs using thermoluminescent dosimetry and breatning-zone aerosol sampling in 1967 o

I I

75220341184 4

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_ RESUME - TH014AS E. POTTER

.PAGE 2

- Served as secretary of a plant safety committee which inspected all operations-and reviewed detailed written procedures for operators.

Served as member of a corporate safety committee which determined

- corporate policy regarding health 'and safety matters.

REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Consideration of Source Term in Relation to Emergency Planning Requirements," presented to the Workshop of Technical Factors Relating Impacts from Reactor Releases to Emergency Planning, Bethesda, Maryland, January 12-13, 1982.

Garrick, B. J., S. Kaplan, G. Apostolakis, D. C. Iden, K. Woodard and T. E. Potter, " Seminar: Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Nuclear Power 1

Plants," PLG-0141, July 1980.

Garrick, B.

J., S. Kaplan, G. E. Apostolakis, D. C. Bley, and T. E. Potter, " Seminar: Probabilistic Risk Assessment as Applied to Nuclear Power Plants," PLG-0124, March 1980.

Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Modification of the Reactor Safety Study Consequences Computer Program (CRAC) to Include Plume Trajectories,"

presented to the 1979 ANS 25th Winter Meeting, San Francisco, California, November 11-15, 1979.

Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, " Assessment of Noble Gas Releases from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident," presented to the 1979 ANS 25th Winter Meeting, San Francisco, California, November 11-15, 1979.

Garrick, B. J., S. Kaplan, P. P. Bient arz, K. Woodard, D. C. Iden, H. F. Perla, W. Dickter, C. L. Cate, T. E. Potter, R. J. Duphily, i

T. R. Robbins, D. C. Bley, and S. Ahmed, "0PSA, Oyster Creek Probabilistic Safety Analysis," (Executive Summary, Main Report, Appendixes), PLG-0100 DRAFT, August 1979.

Woodard, K., and T. E. Potter, "Probabilistic Prediction of X/Q for Routine Intermittent Gaseous Releases," Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Vol. 26, June 1977.

I

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75220041184

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O EPC 11 Potter Attachment B s

k RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE CATAW8A PLUE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE DISTANCE 9

by Thomas E. Potter s

1 r

I Pickard, Lowe and Garrick Inc.

Washington, D.C.

April 13,1984

s 1.0 Introduction The basis _ for a plume exposure'EPZ of about 10 miles was developed in NUREG-0396 (Reference 1), and is stated most succinctly in NUREG-0654 (Reference 2):

"The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume exposure EPZ was based primarily on the following considerations:

t projected doses from the traditional design basis accidents would a.

not exceed Protection Action Guide level's outside the zone; i

b.

projected doses from most core melt sequences would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; for the worst core melt sequences, immediate If fe threatening doses c.

would generally not occur outside the zone; d.

detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.

s The NRC/ EPA Task Force concluded that it would be unlikely that any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond tne plume exposure EPZ. Also, the plume exposure EPZ is of sufficient size for actions within this zone to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the

[

event of a worst case core melt accident."

Analyses related to the first three considerations are included in NUREG-0396.

Plant-specific and site-specific analyses performed in the course of licensing support the conclusion that projected doses from traditional design basis accidents would not exceed upper Protective 1

7510D041384

y Action Guide doses beyond the 10-mile zone even based on assumption of poor dispersion conditions. Summaries of these analyses are included in NUREG-0396. Data in the Catawba FSAR indicate that the conclusion applies to Catawba as well (Reference 3).

Generic analyses included.in NUREG-0396 support considerations b and c.

These analyses consist of estimates of the probability (given a core melt release) that specified doses would be exceeded versus distance. Because the analysis was intended to show whether emergency response was appropriate. it was assumed for the analysis that people took no emergency response for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and were shielded only to the extent they would be in the course of normal activities. The results (NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11 and 1-13) showed that the probability given core melt release of exceeding the lower Protective Action Guide levels (I rem whole body, S rem thyroid) was less than about 0.3 beyond 10 miles and the corresponding probability of exceeding the upper PAG 1evels (5 rem whole body 25 rem thyroid) was somewhat lower. The'results also showed that the probability, given melt release, of exceeding If fe threatening doses (200 rem whole body) at the 10-mile EPZ was low, about 0.03, and declined rapidly at greater distances.

In this discussion "Iffe threatening dose" should be interpreted to be the dose above which the probability of fatality from the acute radiation syndrome begins to be significant.

These generic analyses were based on core melt release characteristics and release frequencies developed for PWR reactors in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) and meteorology data collected for the six sites analyzed in RSS (Reference 4).

This study is designed to determine whether features peculiar to Catawba would affect considerations b and c, thereby affecting the selection of 10 miles 'as an appropriate plume patnway EPZ distance.

This was achieved-by calculating the probability, conditional on core melt release, of exceeding PAG and If fe threatening doses comparable to probabilities from

}

NUREG-0396 generic studies except for use of meteorology data from the Catawba site.

2 75100040484

E 9

The analysis described provides an estimate of exceeding a specified doses at a specified distance in any direction. Because the area in question in this contention is limited to a sector about 45 degrees in width, the probability of exceeding the specified doses in the contested

(.

area is lower. The analysis was extended to obtain an estimate of probability of exceeding the specified doses at a specified distance in the contested area.

2.0 Methodolony The first objective of this study is an assessment of the probability of exceeding specified doses from core melt releases. The methodology followed in this study was the same as that used for the generic study described in NUREG-0396, and is described briefly here. Minor departures from NUREG-0396 methodology are noted.

The doses calculated result from exposure to radiation emitted by airborne radioactive material during transport past the receptor or from exposure to radiation emitted by radioactive material inhaled during transport past the receptor or from radiation emitted by radioactive material deposited on surfaces during transport past the receptor. The doses calculated include the sum of the three components.

6 The probability depends upon the characteristics and probabilities of all l

core melt releases in the spectrum and upon exposure conditions assumed l

for the hypothetical stationary receptor.

i The important exposure condition assumptions are the magnitude of dose reductions afforded by structures and the duration of exposure to radiation from radioactive materials deposited on surfaces during passage of the airborne material. The probability can also depend strongly upon l

.the liklinood of different meteorological conditions during and following a release.

These conditions determine the extent of atmospheric l

dispersion of released material.

Comon variations in' meteorological l

conditions can result in large variations in dose.

l l

l 3

l 75100040484

r In this analysis exposure conditions were assumed to be constant throughout. To be ' consistent with assumptions used in NUREG-0396, it was assumed that no emergency response occurs for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following passage of afrborne material and that doses are reduced only to the extent that would be expected in the course of normal activities.

That is, no dose reduction was assumed for inhalation dose and factors of 0.75 and 0.33 were applied 'to the direct doses from airborne material and material deposited on surfaces.

The spectrum of core melt releases is represented by a set of release categories. Each release category is a release for which important characteristics are calculated explicitly. The important characteristics include the release magnitude for various isotope groups (expressed as a fraction of core inventory), the time between the initiating event and release to the atmosphere, release duration, hetght, heat content, and warning time prior to release.

Tne probability of each release category is calculated by adding the calculated probabilities of all accident sequences tnat would lead to a release similar in characteristics.

The release category spectrum fully reflects the entire core melt release spectrum wnile keeping the numoer of discrete releases manageable for analytical purposes.

Tne influence of variable meteorological conditions on the probability of exceeding specified doses is determined by performing a large' number of computer simulattons of each release category with a randomly selected release start time (month, day; and hour) for each simulation.

Meteorological data for the corresponding time are selected from a one-year hourly data base.

Sequential hourly measurements are used to calculate trajectory and concentration changes during transport downwind.

The approacn permits simulation of the effects of changing meteorological conditions on transport and dispersion along the trajectory. The number of simulations for each release category ranges from 100 to 300 to assure adequate sampling from the range of meteorological conditfons.

Lf fe tnreatening doses more than a few miles 4

75100040484

h from-the plant can occur only for the most severe release categories and, even then, only in unitkely meteorological conditions. The larger number of simulations is usually reserved for the most severe release categories to assure adequate sampling of these meteorological scenarios.

The probability, conditional on occurrence of the release category, of exceeding a specified dose at a specified distance is simply the number of simulations producing that result divided by the number of simulations made for the release category. The absolute probability of exceeding the specified dose at the specified distance is the probability, conditional on release, times the probability of occurrence of the release category.

The total absolute probabfif ty of exceeding the specified dose at the specified distance is the sum of the absolute probabilities of all release categories.

V Results in NUREG-0396 are expressed conditional on core melt release.

This is the total absolute probability divided by the probability of core,

melt. The expression of results conditional on core melt release reflects the fact that such release categories range from minor to severe and reflect the finding that minor release categories are the most likely.. For purposes of illustration, assume that it is found that life threatening doses at 10 miles occur only for a severe release category and that the probability conditional on release category of exceeding the dose at 10 miles is 0.08.

Then assume that it is found that only 10 percent of the core melt releases fall into this severe category.

That is the same as saying that the probability of a severe release, conditional on a core melt release, is 0.1.

In this illustration then, the probability of exceeding a life threatening dose at 10 miles, given a core melt release, is 0.08 x 0.1 = 0.008.

The CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences) computer model was used in the NUREG-0396 probabilistic dose analysis.

It was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Reactor Safety Study (Reference 4). The CRAC code was the first developed to perform a e

5 75100040484 O

r; 4

comprehensive probabilistic assessment of consequences of a severe reactor accident.

It included simulation of plume rise, wet and dry deposition, and changes in meteorological conditions (except for wind direction) during transport downwind.

A modified version of CRAC called CRACIT (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences Including Trajectories) was used for this analysis.

The major improvement in CRACIT relevant to its application in this analysis is the incorporation of variable wind direction (Other substantial differences between CRAC and CRACIT are related to m of dispersion at deep river valley and coastal sites and modeling of' evacuation trajectories, but those differences are not relevant to this analysis.)

Minor improvements were also made in the dispersion model to better simulate limitation of dispersion by a stable layer aloft, buoya penetration of the stable layer alof t, and effects of buildings on suppression of buoyant plume liftoff in high wind speed situations.The CRACIT code has been used in full-scope probabilistic risk assessments for reactors at six sites and has been used in several oth applications.

Another derivative of CRAC, called CRAC2, is very similar to CRAC in dispersion model and is also commonly used in accident cor.:cquence assessment.

Comparisons of results from CRAC, CRAC2, and CRACIT exercised on benchmark problems have shown only small differences in probabilistic distribution of dose and health effects even though results for individual simulations occasionally varied markedly (Reference 5)

Details of the tnree codes are described in the PRA Proce (Reference 6).

In this study, CRACIT was selected based upon its more realistic treatment of atmospheric dispersion.

But CRAC2 was used for one run for release category PWR-2 to examine whether modeling code differences affect the estimates of probabilities of exceeding PAG or life l

i 75100040484 6

fhreatening doses in the range of.10 to 20' miles.

Estimated probabilities from the two codes varied by less than-20 percent.

Therefore, it may be concluded that model differences do not affect'the

~

results of this study.

3 3.0 Data The meteorological data.used in this analysis was a one-year data base of sequential hourly measurements from the Catawba site meteorological

~

monitoring program towers.

The data were collected during the period December 17, 1976 through December 16, 1977 and submitted as part of a two-year data base in the Catawba FSAR. Wind speed and direction data collected at the 10 meter level were used in this analysis.

Atmospheric -

stability classification was based on the vertical temperature difference measured between the 40 meter and 10 meter levels. The period of record selected for use in tnis analysis was recommended by the utility meteorologist as a representative period during which recovery of data was high (Reference 7).

Certain characteristics of the dispersion meteorology at the Catawba site were noted in the NRC Final Environmental Statement (Reference 8).

These characteristics are reflected in the data base used in this analysis. Winds blow from the south-southwest and southwest sectors approximately 27 percent of the time and wind speeds during stanle conditions are low.

Release enaracteristics and probabilities for the spectrum of core melt releases for typical light water reactors were developed as part of-the Reactor Safety Study (Reference 4). One set of release categories was developed for Surry, the model PWR, and one set was developed for Peach Bottom, the model BWR.

Characteristics for these PWR core melt release categories are shown in Table 1.

No comprehensive assessments of core melt release characteristics or probabilities for the Catawba plant are available and performance of such an assessment is beyond the scope of this limited. study.

Available studies for plants similar to Catawba were reviewed to determine the most appropriate set of release categories 7

75100040484

b

.'3-

'. g 2

r (References 9,10, and 11). lThese studies indicate that the core melt release spectrum ~ for Catawoa'would be less severe than that calculated tha RSS but the studies are not comprehensive enough to permit comtlete quantification. 'Tnerefore, RSS PWR releases and probabilities

.in this study.

l d

4.0 Results and Conclusions The probability of exceeding Protective Action Guide Doses (1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid) and life-threatening dose (200 rem whole body) was computed for three distances--10,12 and 16 miles. The'RSS PWR release categories and probabilities were used with meteorology data from the F

Catawba site. Results expressed as total absolute probabilities are shown in Table 2.

Results from the NUREG-0396 analyses are included for comparison.

Inspection of-Table 2 shows that results from the Catawba analysis are quite similar to those from NUREG-0396.

The results clearly show that the probability of exceeding Protective Action' Guide doses is very low and the probability of exceeding life threatening doses is substantially lower.

f The lcw probability of occurrence of a core melt accident is an important component of the low probabilities in Table.2 wnich are based on a core i

melt accident probability of 6 x 10-5 per reactor year. Although there l'

i is considerable. uncertainty in the estimate of core melt probability, I

l recent probabilistic risk assessments which include estimates of uncertainty indicate that the probability of core melt is low even

{'

considering the uncertainty-(Reference 12).

The experience of operating

[.

power reactors in the free world also indicates that the probability of I'

- core melt is low.

Approximately 1600 reactor-years of operation have

- been accumulated to date (Reference 13).

8

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The'absolut' e probabilities can be expressed as probabilities conditional on core melt release by dividing them by the probability of a~ core melt accident, the sum of relerse category probabilities in Table 1, 6 x 10~

per reactor. year.

This shows that even if a core melt iccident should occur it is likely that' Protective Action Guide doses j

would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles.

The probability of exceeding these doses'is about 0.25 given a core melt accident.

y It also shows that even if a core melt accident should occur the probability of exceeding a

' life threatening dose beyond 10 miles is very low, about-0.03.

The analysis described above estimates the probability of exceeding d

' n any direction at the specified distances.

i Because the area in contention in this case is limited to a sector approximately 45 degrees

> in width the p' obability of' exceeding doses at specified distances in r

the contested area is lower than indicated in Table 2.

Analysis limited to the sectors of interest results in probabilities approximately 30 percent of those in Table 2.

This finding is consistent with the-observation that wind blows in the direction sectors of interes percent of the Ime.

The probability of exceeding Protective Action Guide doses 'and life threatening doses for distances of 10,'12 an' d 16 miles in the zone in contention are shown in Table 3.

These absolute probabilities can be translated to probabilities conditional on a core melt accident by dividing by the core melt accident probability.This snows that even if a core melt accident occurred, the probability'of exceeding Protective Action Guide doses in the zone in contention would be low, about 0.1 and that the probability of exceeding a If fe threatening dose in the zone in cont'ention would be very low, about 0 01 These findings lead to the conclusion that the considerations based on

,NUREG-0396' generic core melt accident analyses that were factors in the 4

decision to establish a 10-mile plume pathway Emergency Planning Zone ar supported as well by a similar analysis performed for the Catawba plant at the Catawba site:

L I

'e Projected dose's from most core melt sequences would not exceed PAG 1evels outside the zone.

j.

75100041384 9

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e - For the worst case core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone.

These findings also lead to the conclusion that even if a core melt accident should occur, the probability of requiring protective action in the zone in contention is low (about 0.1) and the' probability of exceeding life threatening doses in the zone in contention without protective action is very low (about 0,01).

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S4RetART OF RSS RELEASE CATEGORIES FOR PWR CORE MELT RELEASE 5a i

Release Prutability flee of Duration Warning Elevation Energy of -

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Category per release of release Time of release

release Fraction of core leventory released

Reactor-yr ihr.)

(hr.)

feeters)

(10' Rtu/hr)

Me-Kr 1

Cs-Rb Te-Sb Sa-$r Ru' La' 8

I PWR-l

,9 10'#

2.5

0. 5 1.0 25 20 and $208

-6 0.g 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.05 0.4 3 10~3 i

.PWR-2 8a10 2.5

' O. 5 1.0 0

170 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.06 0.02 4:10'3 I

PWR-3

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0. 8 0.2 0,2

0. 3 0.C2 0.03 3:10~3 I

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0.03 9:10' 5:10' 1410' 6:10. 4:10

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P46 6al0'I 12.0 10.0 1.0 0

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bA 10-m elevation is used in place of zero representing the of$oint of a potential contafrument break. Asqr fapact on the results would be slight and conservative.

4 Chackground on the isotope groups and release mechanisms is presented in the Reactor Safety Study Appendia VII (USNRS,1975).

k 80rganic lodine is conbtned with elemental lodine in the consequence calculations.

j is relatively small for all large release categories.

Any error is negilgible since the release fraction of organic lodine 9

' Includes Re, Rh, Co, Me, Tc.

IIncludes Y. La, 2r, Nb, Ce, Pr Nd, $. Po, As, Co.

1 9 Accident sequences within the PWR-1 category have tuo distinct energy releases that affect consequences.

with a probability of 4 a 10-1 per reactor-year agd an energy of release of 20 m 10-6 stu/hr; and PWR-IB, with a probability of 5 a 10-1 perThe PW l

i reactor-year and an energy of release of 520 m 10* 8tu/hr.

1 I

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4 1

+

v TABLE 2 PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING SPECIFIED DOSES VERS WASH-1400 PWR RELEASES - NO EMERGENCY RESPONS a

ORGAN DOSE PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING DOSE (PER REACTOR Y (REM) 10 MILES 12 MILES CATAWBAb 16 MILES NUREG-0396C CATAWBA NUREG-0396 CATAWBA NUREG-0396 WHOLE BODY 1 (PAG) 1.5E-05d 1.8E-05 1.4E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.4E-05 THYROID 5 (PAG) 1.5E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.6E-05 1.4E-05 1.4E WHOLE BODY 2 00 1.7E-06 1.8E-06 1.4E-06 1.3E-06 4.8E-07 2.4E-07 1

abased on core melt prooability of 6E-05 per reactor year.

See Table 1.

b atawba site meteorology.

C cBased on data from NUREG-0396, Figures1-11, 1-13.

d robability numbers should be interpreted as follows:

P 11.0E-05 = 1 in 100,000 1.0E-06 = 1 in 1,000,000per reactor year 1.0E-07 = 1 -in 10,000,000per reactor year per reactor year l

7516D041384 12

o e

TABLE 3 PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING SPECIFIED DOSES VERSUS DISTANCE IN CA ZONE IN CONTENTION WASH-1400 PWR RELEASES - NO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR 24 HOURSa ORGAN DOSE-PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING DOSE (PER REACTOR YEAR)

(REM) 10 MILES 12 MILES 16 MILES WHOLE BODY 1 (PAG) 4.5E-06b 4.2E-06 4.2E-06 THYROID 5 (PAG) 4.5E-06 4.2E-06

-4.2E WHOLE BODY 200 5.1E-07 4.2E-07 1.4E-07 abased on core melt probability of 6E-05 per reactor year. See Table 1.

-Catawba site meteorology.

bProbability numbers should be interpreted as follows:

1.0E-05 = 1 in 100,000 per reactor year 1.0E-06 = 1 in 1,000,000 per reactor year 1.0E-07 = 1 in 10,000,000 per reactor year 13 7516D041384

~$

. REFERENCES

+.

~

1.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local

-Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 and EPA 520/l-78-016, December 1978, 2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness in Sepport of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-1 (Revision 1).. November 1980.~

^

3.

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.

4.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,"

Appendix VI, October 1975.

~

5.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, " International Comparison Study on Reactor Consequence Modeling," September 1983.

6.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "PRA Procedures Guide,"

NUREG/CR-2300, January 1983.

7.

~ Personal telephone communication between T. Edward Fenstermacher-(PLG) and Mark Casper (duke),1/26/84.

8.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2,"

Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, NUREG-0921, January 1983.

14 l 7510D041384

- ~-- - -... -.- -

. 9.

Carlson, David D., et al, Sandia National Laboratories, " Reactor Safety Stu(y Methodology Applications Program: Sequoyah #1 PWR Power Plant,"'NUREG/CR.-1659,1 of 4, February 1981.

r

10. Gieseke, J.

A., et al, Battelle Columbus Laboratories, "Radionuclide Release Under Specific LWR Accident Conditions -- Volume IV PWR, Ice Condenser Containment Desgn," December 20,1983 (Draft).

11. Duke PowerCompany, "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station," Revision 9, submitted to NRC under cover letter dated October 20, 1983.

12. Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., "Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment," PLG-0300, December 1983.

- 13. McGraw Hill, Inc., Nucleonics Week, March 22, 1984.

.I t

1 I,

i i

15 t

i o

7510D041384 l

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(:

b EPC 11-Kulash Attcchmsnt A I

m WALTER KULASH Associate Vice President

' Education -

North Carolina State University, E.S., Industrial Engineering University of North Carolina, M.S., Business Administration Northwestern University, Candidate for Doctor of Civil Engineer-ing in Transportation and Systems Analysis 1

Previous.

Kurt Salmon Associates, Management. Consultants, 1965-1968.

Positions Staff Consultant Northwestern University Transportation Center,1970. - Research Assistant l.

Experience Emergency Management Planning.- ' Directed the independent evac-uation time assessments for the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) at the Seabrook and Zion Nuclear Power Plants. The methodology developed for these assessments has been incorporated into the FEMA regulatory guide NUREG 0654.

Directed evacuation feasibility studies for three nuclear power plant sites for Duke Power and arranged for appropriate technology transfer to facilitate Duke Power staff to independently assess.'

alternative emergency scenarios.. Currently, project manager for:

the emergency response and preparedness plan development in.

northeastern Ohio.

This planning effort includes basic plan preparation, resource assessment, training, and development of standard operating procedures.

Management. Directed a study to develop a TSM plan for the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Central Business District. Included in the pian are improvements to vehicular traffic, transit, pedestrian travel, and parking. Responsible for management of multimodal.

transportation studies in various U.S. and foreign locations. Man-aged regional PRC Voorhees office in Buffalo, New York.

Multimodal TransDortation Planning. Conducted a study of multi-L modal passenger travel improvement in the Cross Florida Transit Corridor Study.

Performed internal circulation planning, com--

6 munity impact, and facility staging for planned new towns; internal L..

. circulation, transit, pedestrian, and parking planning for univer -

sity/ medical complexes; and transportation master plans - for various small cities. Managed Maryland Statewide Aviation Study, with surveys of air passengers and cargo, projection -of ground access requirements, and modeling of airport access.

l-Transit Planning.- Conducted study of bus priority treatments for Caracas, Venezuela; analysis of rapid transit alternatives in l

l

d s

c Kulash, Continued Buffalo, New York. Was project manager for Buffalo Station Areas Impact Study, involving neighborhood impact and access require-ments for twelve rapid transit stations. Conducted rapid transit patronage estimation and community forum presentation of patron-age impacts in Buffalo, and ridership and scheduling impacts of reduced fares for the elderly in Chicago. Developed short-range transit alternatives to meet community needs in Pittsburgh. Eval-uated short-and :nedium-range bus priority measures, in Cleve-land, and transit improvement alternatives for a transit-dependent semi-rural area in Geauga County, Ohio; and the new town of Audubon,' New York. Integrated Buffalo rapid transit station into a high-activity medical center.

Traffic Planning and Engineering.

bus priority treatments in Caracas. Incorporated traffic flow with Developed areawide traffic improvement plans (TOPICS) in Buffalo, New York, and New Brunswick, New Jersey.

- Conducted numerous traffic impact studies for new communities, industrial parks, and shopping centers, and presented court testimony on impact of Interstate Highway facilities on site access.and market areas, projected arterial street volumes, and on community impact of a Planned Unit Development.

Affiliations American Society of Civil Engineers Institute of Transportation Engineers i:

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' EPC 11 KULASH ATTACHMENT B l

Prepared for Duke Power Company 4

Effect of " Shadow" Evacuation on the Time to Evacuate the Catawba Nuclear Station EPZ Prepared by PRC Engineering 1500 Planning Research Drive McLean, Virginia 22102 February 1984 l

l 4

I

1 1

EFFECT OF " SHADOW" EVACUATION ON THE TIME TO EVACUA

.z THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EPZ

(

P

'I Prepared for Duke Power Company e

.3 Prepared by PRC Engineering 1500 Planning Research Drive McLean, VA 22102 February 1984

t s

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Exhibits.

iii EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1 STUDY OBJECTIVES 1

ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 3

ASSUMPTIONS' USED Departure Time Distribution 3

Evacuation Routes 4

Highway Capacities 4

. Population Assignment 7

Vehicles Per Evacuees 7

Fraction of Population Evacuating 7

Traffic Control 8

8 SIMULATION RESULTS g

CONCLUSION 9

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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit g

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Summary of Evacuation Traffic Flows

.2 2.

. Departure Time Distributions for Evacuees 5

3 Evacuation Routes 6

4 Delay to EPZ Residents Evacuating Yia I-77 Northbound 9

D iii

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a EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Four main roads leading out of the Catawba EPZ pass through the Charlotte metropolitan area: 'I-77, US 521, NC 160, and NC 49.

If some or all of the.

Charlotte area population were to voluntarily evacuate because of an emergency at

. the Catawba Nuclear Station, severe congestion could occur in the downtown area and on main roads leading north and east from the City. If one assumes the average Charlotte evacuee leaves home an hour later than the average EPZ evacuee, the congestion in the Charlotte area does not delay anyone from leaving the EPZ. If one assumes that the Charlotte evacuees depart only half an hour af ter the EPZ evacuees, there would still be no impediment to evacuating the EPZ on three of the four routes. On the fourth route, I-77, backups could extend into the EPZ if 70 percent or more of the Charlotte area residents were to evacuate and if no mitigating traffic control actions were taken. In that case, if 70 to 80 percent of the Charlotte residents evacuated voluntarily, some EPZ evacuees using I-77 northbound would be delayed up to half-hour. Total time to evacuate the EPZ would, however, remain at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . If 100 percent of the Charlotte residents evacuated voluntarily, the EPZ evacuees using I-77 would be delayed I hour, delaying completion of the entire EPZ evacuation by 30 minutes.

j.

STUDY OBJECTIVES In April of 1983, PRC Engineering used computer modeling to estimate the time required to evacuate the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) surround-ing-Duke Power's Catawba Nuclear Station.

The results 'of that analysis are summarized in Exhibit i. Those estimates were based on the assumption that evacuees could exit the EPZ unimpeded by traffic congestion outside the EPZ.-

Subsequently, Duke asked us to determine whether voluntary evacuation of people living outside the EPZ in the Charlotte area could create enough traffic congestion to delay traffic leaving the EPZ.

This report describes our analysis of that question and presents our findings.

g 1

~

4 EXHIBIT 1.

SUMMARY

OF EVACUATION TRAFFIC FLOWS (4/83 PRC Study) 1 Routes Out Population Vehicles Evacuation time Maximum of EPZ Carried Carried (Hours)I

I-77 NB 10,298 4,428 SC 901

3: 25 13,556 5,829 3:30 Lyle Boulevard 4,459 1,917 3:25 US 21 SB 15,897 6,835 4:00 SC 322 5,284 2,272 3:25 US 321 2,281 980 3:25 SC5 WB 1,763 758 3:25 SC-161 WB 2,468 1,061 3:25 I-77 SB 8,079 3,473 3:45 YC 150 1,470 632 3:25 SC 55 1,286 552 3:25 US 321 NB 3,275 1,408 3:25 NC 247 NB 1,068 459 3:25 NC 279 4,529 1,947 3:25

US 521 1,525 655 3:25

NC 49 2,213 951 3:25 SC 160 EB 4,926 2,118 3:25

NC 160 NB 1,721 740 3:25 l}

Routes leading to Charlotte area 1 Winter weekday, daytime, normal driving conditions 2

_ _. _. _,.... _.,. _, _. _. _. _. _. _ _... _ _ _... _ _ ~ _

[

~

ANALYS5 PROCEDURES e

~ The analysis was conducted using the same traffic simulation model, QUEUE, in the-original evacuation study.

Except as noted in the next section, the underlying assumptions were also unchanged.

The analysis proceeded in the 1

L following steps:

1.

Develop a deDarture time distribution.' an estimate of the fraction of the population leaving home in each time intervai-after the evacu-ation has been announced.

2.

Identify the evacuation routes.

away from Catawba Nuclear Station.These are the. main roads heading

. As part of this step, the intersections are identified where people get on'to the routes.

3.

Determine Highway Capacities for each segment (between consecu-

~ tive intersections) of the evacuation routes. -

4.

Assian the population to the routes. In this' step, each person in the study area is assigned to the evacuation route and intersection that provide him the most direct exit from the area.

6.

Estimate the number of vehicles per evacuee 7.

Estimate for each area the fraction of the population that evacuates o

8.

l Determine recommended traffic control actions such as expressway ramp closings, traffic redirection, etc.

i 9.

l Conduct the simulation using PRC Engineering's QUEUE model. The model simulates the flow of vehicles over the evacuation routes and determines when all the evacuation traffic on each route has left the t

The model takes into account the fact that evacuees leave -

area.

home at different times and that highway capacity is limited.

For e

each time period and each intersection, the model-determines the length of the traffic queue waiting to get through the intersection.

10.

Examine the cueue lengths to determine when the backups on each route no longer extend into the EPZ.

('

- ASSUMPTIONS USED j.

~

l Our analysis consisted of a series of simulations made with different assumptions.

l The assumptions we varied were 'the fraction of the non-EP2 population that l-3

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evacuates voluntarily and the time at which those people leave home.

4 The other assumptions were the_ same in all the simulations.

Departure Time Distribution For EPZ residents, we used the sa'me departure curve as in our April That curve, shown graphically in Exhibit 2, indicates that half the evacuee home within I hour and 10 minutes after the start of evacuatio 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months and 10 minutes of the start.

The derivation of this ~ departure time

. distribution is discussed at length in our earlier report.

Charlotte area evacuees would leave later and more gradually than the EPZ evacuees, for two reasons.

First, since there will be no siren sounding or other.

. government efforts to notify Charlotte residents of the emergency, people in Char:otte will become aware of the situation more slowly than people in the Second, once aware of the situation they are likely to more fully ascertain t to evacuate.

That is, their decision will involve more extensive information gathering and attempts at confirming the need to evacuate.

The effect of the later,:more gradual departure of Charlotte residents is to reduce the cong experienced by EPZ evacuees.

In fact, it could be that EPZ evacuation would be complete before congestion outside the EPZ becomes significant.

Since the amount of this lag between the Charlotte area evacuation and the EP evacuation is unknown, we conducted two sets of simulations, one using an assu lag of I hour'and the other set u&g an assumed lag of 30 minutes.

Evacuation Routes Exhibit 3 shows the evacuation routes used in this study. Only routes used EPZ and Charlotte evacuees were modeled; congestion on routes use Charlotte evacuees would not affect EPZ evacuation times.

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Departure Time Distributions for Evacuees 100 0

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- -* Charlotte Voluntary Evacuees-1 Hour Lag Cases l

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As the routes indicate, all evacuees are assumed to travel radially away from the power plant until they are at least 25 miles away. Since govern ~ ment officials will be recommending evacuation out to only ten miles or less, and since many evacuees will know of friends, relatives, or hotels in the Charlotte area, it is unlikely that all evacuees will travel to the 25-mile mark. If they do not, congestion on the segments further from the EPZ will be less than our simulation predicts.

Highway Capacities Following generally accepted traffic engineering practice, we assumed that ex-pressways carry 1,800 vehicles per lane per hour and other roads 1,200 vehicles per lane _ per hour. (Expressway ramps are assigned an intermediate capacity of 1,500 vehicles per hour.) These capacities do not reflect the delays caused by congestion at the modeled intersections; that delay is computed separately by the QUEUE model.

Population Assignment As noted earlier, each potential evacuee is assigned to the most direct route that will take him 25 miles away from the power plant. If preliminary simulation shows that our initial assignments give congestion that is much worse on one of two parallel routes than on the other, the population assignments are adjusted to reflect drivers' preference for the less congested route.

Vehicles Per Evacuees We assumed 0.43 vehicles per evacuee (2.33 people per vehicle), the same as in the earlier study. That figure was developed using household auto ownership for EPZ

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l residents. Since cities normally have fewer cars per household than rural areas, it is likely that the average number of vehicles used by Charlotte evacuees would be less than for EPZ evacuees. If the vehicles per evacuee were adjusted downward to account for this, the result would be less highway congestion than our simulation predicts.

7

_ _. _ ~_. _. _ ~.

Fraction of Pooulation Evacuatine All simulation runs evacuated 100 percent of the EPZ residents and' a portion of the

~

Charlotte area residents. ' The fraction of the Charlotte residents choosing to evacuate was varied between 40 to 100 percent.

The fact that _we did not simulate cases with~less than 40 percent of Charlotte residents evacuating does not mean that we expect at least 40 percent to evacuate voluntarily. Forty percent was the smallest value tried because it did not produce congestion that delayed people from leaving the EPZ. Therefore, it is clear that smaller numbers of Charlotte evacuees would also not delay the EPZ evacuees.

Traffic Control As in our earlier studies, traffic is allowed to ficw normally with a minimum of special controls.

No special traffic control-measures were assumed to be used outside the EPZ.

SIMULATION RESULTS The simulations showed that, even if everyone in the Charlotte area evacuated, the traffic backups would.not extend into the EPZ on routes US 521, NC 160, and NC 49. For the remaining route out of the EPZ into Charlotte, I-77, the simulation i

predicted backup into the EPZ under certain conditions. If backups occurred, they

-would delay the time that the last EPZ residents using I-77 northbound would leave the EPZ.

I I

We used the QUEUE model to estimate the delay to EPZ evacuees for several different scenarios.

(

Exhibit 4 summarizes the cases studied and the associated delay. As noted in the discussion of assumptions, the simulations overestimate the l

delay because they use a high estimate of Charlotte residents' auto ownership, keep all evacuees on the evacuation route until they are 25 miles from the power plant, and assume no special traffic control. To mitigate the congestion delaying EPZ l

3

V evacuees on I-77, the ramps onto I-77 northbound could be closed by the police at the first three exits north of the EPZ, giving EPZ residents exclusive use of that segment of I-77. (Voluntary evacuees who would otherwise use those ramps would have to use US 521 and Nations Ford, both which are parallel to.I-77 for a few miles.)

EXHIBIT 4. DELAY TO EPZ RESIDENTS EVACUATING VIA I-77 NORTHBOUND Fraction of Charlotte Area Residents If Charlotte Depatures If Charlotte Depatures Voluntarily Evacuating Lag EPZ Departures Lag EPZ Departures (Shown in Percent) by One-Half Hour by one Hour 60 No Delay No Delay 70 15 Minutes No Delay 80 30 Minutes No Delay 90 45 Minutes No Delay 100 1 Hour No Delay Note that our April 1983 report showed that all evacuees using I-77 northbound could be out of the EPZ 30 minutes before the evacuation was complete on one other route. Therefore, an extra 30 minutes on I-77 would not change the time to evacuate the entire EPZ.

In the case producing a delay of I hour, the time to evacuate the entire EPZ would be increased by 30 minutes.

CONCLUSION Voluntary evacuation could delay EPZ evacuation on just one route and only und very unfavorable assumptions about the extent and timing of the voluntary evacuation.

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_EPC ll KULASH ATTACHMENT C Catawba Nuclear Station Evacuation Analysis l

Evacuation Time Estimate l

for the City of Charlotte l

l l

l i

l PRC Engineering 1500 Planning Research Drive McLean, Virginia 22102 April,1984 A

TABLE OF CONTENTS ESEt

SUMMARY

OF THE METHOD FOR ESTIMATING EVACUATION TIMES..

1 THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED.

1 DEPARTURE CURVES FOR CHARLOTTE 2

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS 9

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SUMMARY

OF THE METHOD FOR ESTIMATING EVACUATION TIMES The estimates of evacuation time for the City of Charlotte in combination with the I

10-mile EPZ surrounding the Catawba Nuclear Power Station are based on 1980 population data.

The methodology used in the derivation of these evacuation time estimates is the same as that used for the EPZ around the plant site.

Specifically, for each population segment, a series of discrete action steps is identified and the '

completion time for each step is estimated. The advantage of this method is that time is estimated for each individual step of the evacuation sequence rather than for the entire evacuation as a single activity. Thus, an erroneous assumption about the time required for a particular step has only a very limited effect on the overall results.

The key sequence of events in an evacuation of the City of Charlotte is as follows:

Notification of the area population that an evacuation is recom-e mended Propagation of the alert information throughout the City population e

The departure from work and return home of the work force prior to e

i evacuation Preparation for an evacuation including assembly of family members e

and collection of essentials l

l e

Driving out of the area i

THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED The analyses described in this technical memorandum relate to the evacuation of l

the City of Charlotte. The parameters used in estabilshing the boundaries for the area, the determination of the population to be considered, and the distance to be traversed to exit the area, are as follows:

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in addition to the basic EPZ (nominal 10-mile radi e

Catawba plant) the area considered for evacuation includes the area within the city limits of Charlotte.

entire population is to be moved to a poin e

i plant.. This distance consideration applies only to northeast sector of the area that encompasses the City of Charlotte.

The population between not within the City limits and the 30-m e

People between the 10-mile EPZ and the ci i

The 1980 p in the City of Charlotte - is estimated e

at 314,447.g opulation one mile rings and 22.5 degree sector was e

detailed maps and the available geographic subdivisions of the U Census data.

e A separate analysis has been conducted for a southeast subarea nearer to the Catawba plant. This subarea is bounded by routes 16 L

east and north and by the City limits on the south and west.

The population within this area is estimated to be 124,000.I DEPARTURE CURVES FOR CHARLOTTE Assumptions 1.

It can be expected that 25 percent of all househol radio or television in use during daytime hours.fs will have either hours about 65 percent of all households will have radio or televis in use.

_ During evening

2..

It is assumed that about 5 percent of the households will have bo radio and television in use simultaneously.

U.S. Census,1980.

Nielsen Research,1982. Arbitron Survey,1981.

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. It is expected that 90 percent of all listeners are tuned to local rad

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4.

It is assumed that' all-local stations would relay the evacuation (EBS). recommendations transmitted over the Emergency Broadcast t

5.

The following relevant statistics were obtained from the 1980 U.S.

Census for the Charlotte metropolitan area:

Average persons per households = 2.76 a.

b.

Total number of households = 226,200 Family households = 143,400 c.

d.

l Non-family households = 8,400 Female householders and one person households = 74,400 i

e.

f.

Civilian labor force = 347,900 Economic participation rate = 54.5 percent Total metropolitan population = 637,218 g.

h.

Percent of City of Charlotte no-worker households = 8.5 1.

Percent of City of Charlotte 2+ worker households = 60.0 J.

Percent of City of Charlotte 1-worker households = 31.5 6.

It is assumed that 50 percent of the households have no one at ho during the day time.

7.

Based on limited data from the Radio Advertising Bureau it is assumed that in 50 percent of the work places in the City there is at least one worker that has a radio turned on.

t 8.

Based on U.S. Census datal a small percentage of all business estabilshments have by far the largest numbers of employees.

i on the assumption that the larger the number of employees the Based.

greater the likelihood that one worker has a radio turned on, it is estimated that the 50 percent of workplaces noted above employ 69 percent of the labor force.

Percentane of Population Within Immediate Reach of EBS Households - During the day, approximately 25 percent of household to radio and the same percentage are watching television.

With the assumptions 3

that 5 percentage of the households have both radio and television on number of " tuned in" households is 47.5 percent. Of this total, it is assume I

County and City Data Book,1983.

.3 l

only 90 percent are tuned to local stations; i.e., about-43 percent. Therefore, 43 percent of the households.would be reachable directly via EBS messages to' advise the resident., of an alert status or the need to evacuate.

.It is assumed that 50 percent of the ' households would have no one at home. These' are primarily multiple wage earner households. ' The remaining 7 percent of the households with persons at home would not be directly reachable through the EBS message broadcast.

1 Workers -It has been assumed that at abou. 50 percent of the work places one or more employees will be turned in to a radio and will be immediately apprised of an alert condition through an EBS message.

It is also assumed that an alerted 4

employee will pass the information to all co-workers within a period of 30 minutes.

Because of the increased probability that a worker in a large estabishment will have a radio turned on, it is estimated that 69 percent of the work force will be notified in this way.

It is expected therefore that 69 percent of the work force will be alerted within

.30 minutes following the EBS message broadcast.

I Information Dissemination to Non-Alerted Workers and Households It is estimated that 43 percent of family households would be alerted directly ~

through the EBS messages. It is expected that these households will attempt to contact the family wage-earner (s) at their place of work. Although the telephone system' may be stressed beyond capacity, it is expected that an additional 13 percent of the non-alerted workers will be notified through direct or indirect calls from' alerted persons from households that were tuned to either radio or television.

"Nrect telephone contact" means that a household member speaks.

directly to the wage earner at work. " Indirect telephone contact" means that a household member speaks with someone other than the wage earner at his place of l'

l

7 x

j '-

t$ -

(*r-N.

~' work. This process of notification would leav-dout 18 percent of the w 3

not alerted. There is a threshold level of time in which mem

,a

.interwt with members of the community at large. These thresholds 4

normal breaks in the workday at lunch, at the end of the day,' and intermittent business contacts during'the day. On average, therefore, this threshold is assumed to be about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . - It is within this time frame.that the

.18 percent of the work force would be notified of an alert condition.

4 a

'In addition to this EBS information dissemination, the existing Protective R Plan ^ for All Hanrds for the City of Charlotte contains provisions for pu alerting via mobile units and aerial units. The mobile units are largely base five stations and can therefore be mobilized immediately. The helicopter un expected to be mobilized within a time period of 30 minutes.

A summary of the EBS notification tree is shown in Exhibit I for a daytim evacuation.

j n

Estimated Time When Population is Alerted 3

For purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that the plant condition I

to the decision to evacuate the EPZ (approximate 10-mile radius area) a of Charlette simultaneously. The estabilshed alerting system within the EPZ expected to provide notification to the public largely within 15 minutes, and with p

an expected notification time of 45 minutes within which the entire EPZ populat i

is alerted.

This notification process is based upon prompt EBS broadcasting appropriate messages to the public.

With the inclusion of the City of Charlotte in an evacuation decision, the EBS messages to be broadcast would reflect this decision and appropriately alert the City population to prepare to evacuate.

Those households in the City that are tuned in to an EBS station would be alerted within about 5 minutes.

For purposes

'of this study it was assumed th t these households would be alerted within a

15 minutes, to allow for the opportunity to list-' O := message far a second t s

.t t,

-.m ; D I

4 i

i.

4 4

Exhibit 1. EBS Notification Tree i

l i

I, i

8.

L 1

m WO8bEEft5 4m Tunedto 48%

tT%

ESS ESSet Not et M

Famsey 85% from N

og 2* worter 3%

l Tot from Homes A8* ted E

]

'. wo,,

3,,%

,to,o,,,ome Alerted

. im ot T WOR.KERS Coming Home in og i

i 8800 Alerted

.4g 24%

unIII Luncti 4%

Not at hFM tm 1

ESS et or End of Der MK 36% freen W%

5%

p6ot et Homeor 1 wo,her Tel from Home Not Tunes Homes i

11%

Home to EDS feet Alerted 29%

Not et 33%

e%

'33%

/

Home Not at Femede or

. Not Alerted.

Homeor until Lunch 4%

% Head-or End of Day Alerted 4%

' Not Tuned MM8 1

meist warmer Not Tuned to EDS in l

Coming Home i

I 1

i I

I i

i.

w-At those places of work and business where a worker has a radio turn more workers would be alerted within about 5 minutes, similarly as with noted above. To allow for some confirmation, a time period of about 15 minutes has been assumed for purposes of this analysis.

The dissemination of the aler' Information throughout the work place to all employees and patron t

require 30 minutes, with appropriate allowance for notification of ma the work place, confirmatory action and actual alerting of the employee The spread of information from this basic group (comprised of ab the households and 69 percent of the workers) can be expected to inv

" word-of-mouth" dissemination.

ve With a significant attempt to contact relatives and public. places to confirm the alert information, the phone system overloaded. It is likely, however, that some notification of workers via will take place by calls from household members that were alerte home via the EBS broadcast.

Based upon the estimate that 43 percent of the --

I households will be alerted by the first EBS message, an estimated workers may become alerted through telephone contact from home. It that this could take place within about. 30 minutes following the recei information by the household members.

The remaining 18 percent of the work force are estimated to receive information over a period ending 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months following the initial broadcas

~ EBS system.

At the household level there may be an estimated seven percent of the L

units where people are at home but have not received the broadcast inf L

This percentage of households would become alerted, if not notified o the time that the wage earner returned home from his place of work A summary of notification times is shown belows p

l 7

y e--~rm-+..

,-v, e,,p

,-,,ner---

,,*-,,e ev,,,--m.---,

vwE e.-,+,

.e.,,-e-,4-.e,=,ew-,

_ -,re e ~ w %

.w,4,.#--..--w,ws-.-

-,---we..

=

4 Time Following Percentage of Beginning of Population

' Notification Process.

Alerted 15 minutes' 28 45 minutes 72

'180 minutes 100 EVACUATION ROUTES The evacuation routes selected for the time estimate analyses are.the major thoroughfare facilities through the City and that provide a logical pattern of travel in the northerly, northeasterly, and easterly direction. A summary of the routes is listed below:

Route Capacity Interstate 77 3,600 N.C.51 1,200-Interstate 85 -

3,600 N.C.27 2,400 U.S.21 1,200 N.C.29 2,400 N.C.I15 1,200 N.C.16 NB 1,200 -

N.C. 49 1,200 N.C. 84 1,200

~

U.S. 74 2,400 These primary routes constitute the exit constraint on capacity. Within the City,.

the overall road. capacity is by major orders of magnitude greater than the -

available exit capacity. This capacity availability within the City allows for shifts

. In queueing patterns from those estimated to occur on the major facilities, but those internal dynamics of route changes by evacuees do not alter the limiting-capacity of the major exit routes.

1 i

l 8

+

9-

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS' The results of the evacuation time estimate analyses for. the C presented in two segments:

are Time Estimate to Evacuate the entire City of Charlotte o

Time Estimate to Evacuate the Southeast Sector-of the C o

Charlotte Evacuation Time for the Entire City of Charlotte As noted earlier, the evacuation time estimate includes the ev EPZ (10-mile area around the plant) plus the entire City of Charlo e

scenario selected for this analysis is_ a typical weekday.

The The analysis results show that the overall evacuation of the City would involve a time period of about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months .

The evacuation time is primarily controlled by the exit capacity of the roadway system.' Although no 1

the population is a key factor in initiating the evacuation process th the number of evacuees diminishes the impact on overall evacuatio e magnitude of notification process.

n time of the For example, if the rate of notification of the public was slower than that outlined,in earlier sections of this memorand the evacuation time wocid be altered, since the change would onl shorter route congestion time but'not an overall increase in evac y produce a Similarly, a more rapid rate of notification would increase congest would not have a significant effect on overall evacuation time.

e, but j

The analysis results are shown below, by major route. It should i

significant time differences between routes would be more clos e t at actual evacuation through relatively simple and readily implementab as the evacuation of the City is approaching completion.

ns 1

1 f

g 9

4 -

Rggte,.

i Evacuation Time e

I-77 9 hrs. 30 min.

I-85

-8 hrs. 30 min.

U.S. 21 10 hrs.

N.C.16 NB 5 hrs.15 min.

. N.C. 27 7 hrs. 45 min.

. N.C. 29 8 hrs. 30 min.

N.C. 51 11 hrs. 45 min.

U.S. 74 11 hrs. 45 min.

N.C.16 SB 6 hrs.15 min.

N.C.115 8 hrs.15 min.

N.C. 49 9 hrs.

This analysis is a time estimate, not a local preparedness plan.

Therefore, it does not include an in-depth review of the operational and other issues that p

required to thoroughly prepare for such an evacuation.

4 The results indicate that an evacuation of the City of Charlotte could completed within a time frame of about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months .

Evacuation Time of the Southeast Sector of the City of Charlotte The time to evacuate the EPZ and the southeastern third of Ch 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and 15 minutes. Unlike the more massive evac evacuation would not produce congestion that would extend beyond the time for the last evacuees.

Therefore, the evacuation time is simply the time required to warn the last evacuee (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) plus the time for that evacuee complete the other steps in the evacuation (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ,15 minutes). T i

steps include the time to drive out of the area, but no delay due to traffic

- congestion.

i ~

10

- - -.. - -.. -..

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