ML20097D313
| ML20097D313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1996 |
| From: | WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20097D310 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9602120301 | |
| Download: ML20097D313 (2) | |
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Attachmsnt to WO 96-0026 Page 1 of 2 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4 9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION
' The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
(1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on K, of no greater than 0.95 is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling.
operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
When determining compliance with action statement requirements, addition to the RCS of borated water with a concentration greater than or equal to the minimum required RWST concentration shall not be considered to be a positive reactivity change.
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures Inst sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products.
This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment b ing penetration closure and OPERA _BILITY a ' : ~ tre@ containment will be(minimlie@ -
ye sur that_ a_rojeest of rad L;C f C-i:55 i;, qqn The OPERABILITY and closure restn"ctions are sumcmiit to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
The OPERABILITY of this system ensures the containment purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
INSERT B Equivalent isolation methods for the emergency personnel escape lock and containment wall penetrations ensure releases from containment are prevented for credible accident scenarios. The isolation techniques must be approved by an engineering evaluation and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, pressure tight seal capable of maintaining the integrity of the penetrations and airlock to restrict the release of radioactive material from a fuel element rupture.
WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 74, l
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9602120301 960208 PDR ADOCK 05000482 P
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.. Attachment to WO 96-0026 Page'2 of 2 4
INSFJtT
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l Both - containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS, provided one airlock door is capable of, being. closed and the water level in the refueling pool is naintained as required.
Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the containment during movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS, 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to close the airlock following an evacuation that would occur in the event of a fuel handling accident, and 3) -. any obstructions (e.g.,
cables and hoses) that could prevent rapid closure of an open airlock can be quickly.
i removed.
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