ML20096B446

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Forwards Revised FSAR Sections 1.10 & 6.2,Tables 1.11-1, 6.2-16,6.2-25 & Figures 5.4-8,6.2-28 & 6.2-45 Re Containment Isolation.Changes Will Be Incorporated Into FSAR Amend 8
ML20096B446
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/28/1984
From: Mittl R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8409040146
Download: ML20096B446 (64)
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Text

... _ _ _ _ _

O PS G Company Pubhc Serwce Electnc and Gas 80 Park Plaza, Newar k, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570. Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti Gcneral Managcr Nuclear Assurance and Retyilation August 28, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Pursuant to discussions with L.

Ruth, Containment Systems Branch, on July 2 ar.d 12, 1984, FSAR Sections 1.10 and 6.2, Tables 1.11-1, 6.2-16 and 6.2-25, Figures 5.4-8, 6.2-28 and 6.2-45, and Question 480.14 have been revised and are at-tached for your use.

These changes will be incorporated into Amendment 8.

Very truly yours, 8

JES:gs Attachment C

D.

H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Program Manager W. H.

Bateman g

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

[ t t The Energy People 8409040146 840828 PDR ADOCK 05000354 A

PDR

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1 BCGS FSAR 4/04 j

Responsg b

Essential systems are those critical to the immediate mitigation cf the consequences of a LOCA.

Also identified as essenstal are those systems that could be useful, although not critical, in citGhating an accident that results in containment isolation.

Essential systems are not automatically isolated by accident cignals.

N:nessential systems are those that are not required or used in the mitigation of an accident that results in containment icolation.

All nonessential systems are automatically isolated

d ::nn:t 5; r::;;;;d L, LL.

by the containment isolation signal'ie et!!! preeente

-:;::ste- -h!!: th: :::ident =ic==1 J%gsr/ A Essential and nonessential systems are identified in Tchle 6.2-16.

j Diverse parameters are sensed for the initiation of automatic isolation of nonessential systems penetrating primary i

c;ntainment.

See Section 6.2.4 for a discussion of containment icolation signal sensed parameter diversity.

As required for post-accident situations, each nonessential penetration, except instrument lines, has two isolation barriers in series that meet the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56, or 57, as clarified by SRP Section 6.2.4.

Isolation is automatic with no credit taken for operator action.

All sanual valves are sealed closed so as to qualify as an isolation barrier.

Each automatic l

isolation valve in a nonessential penetration receives independent isolation signals, derived.from diverse parameters.

Th2 design of the controls for automatic containment isolation cre such that the resetting of the isolation signals will not i

rc0 ult in the automatic reopening of containment isolation volves.

Reopening of containment isolation valves will require daliberate operator action on a valve-by-valve basis.

Ganged reopening of containment isolation valves is not used.

Isolation volves in the RNR process sampling line, reactor water sample line, BPCI and RCIC suction and steam supply line, and the TIP system ball valve are being modified to reflect this criteria.

These modifications will be incorporated into the HCGS design prior to fuel load Tha primary contalment isolation logic setpoint pressure is 2.0 psig.

This pressure is far enough above the maximum espected pressure inside containment during normal operation that inadvertent containment isolation does not occur during normal operation from instrument drift fluctuations due to the accuracy Cf the pressure sensor.

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f <.( t ,,_.,,______,_.___,___.,____,,_r.. 4/Go NC38 FSAs ykaLE 1.11-1 (cont) Fags 32 of 29f f FSAR Seattental semeary Where specitte eBF Description of R&amenand amp gI critsria alt ier-- ^---'=a= mactian

6. 2. 2.6 6.2.2 21 3.e (see 23 the secondary containment for the esternal design pressere of the h ry containaset tornado depresesrisatten le etracture ehem14 provide am not deetgaed with any mergin above the mestema espected adequate mergin shows the esternal pressure as stated aestems espected esternal ir. Regulatory seide 1.16.

processe. 6.2.4.5 6.2.4 l 11.6.g I taev 28 mettef wolves used me leola-meltet valve setpelat te not l tion valves eheeld have a greater than 1.5 times the conta1 ament design pressure. reliee setpotat greater then 1.5 times the centa1 ament j ldesign pressere. { I l11.6.4 GME I an emelonere or leak-tight vatwo nesseet the conta1=- housing has not been designes. sent and piping between the k containment and the stret waive, when both walves are located outside primary conta1 ament, abould he enclosed in a leak-tight or centrolled leakage i f;bSerb bm 4.2.5.1 6 2.5 11.4 j Following a IOCA, repreeeu?l-Pressere increase des to main ee = 4 steam loolatter valve (ASIv3 satica of the containment !aleakage atter a tact will should be limited to lese reesit in represserisation of than 545 et containment more than Set of the contair.- j design presence. ment design pressere. I

6. 5.1. 2 6.5.1 II
  • seeign et inetsumentation for comp 11ence with the minimum 1..tr atat - r.g.tre nt.

..F at here cleen,e.t.a. for the cast eyeten are i to the golde1&nes et segularecy dioceseed la Table 6.5-e o t seide 1.52 and to the recom-and tor the revs erotems ir. I } mendations of Amsz aset as Table 6.4-5 e m ried in ser Table 6.5.1-1. 4 &ameen..: 6 i i J l A 1 am tenet l n.i ..e. ..-e. g N C' M ..m. .ee. .a.. w z.. k4. i e 'E b. s=, A.. 4 A.

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<<. k< '.. S. - .ses as d} k __.an. n .y 3 .._ J S.... o A ... g-t $, <1 u p M f p --*el.. ..m. .D.* N 8188 8 -.9 jy ~.. _ _ - -.... NCGS FSAR 1/84 l water seal for at least 30 days. The ECCS and RCIC jockey pumps can be used to maintain pressure and to provide makeup or to fill up the feedwater system piping in the,.nlihely event that e !!:0 brrri...... 2- .w. ch.ek o. i.. -- ;;;;;; gr,; p;;;;;j-- p =;;nt:ir -S

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b. Deleted High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine steam > i c. supply - The drain pot line is maintained full of water by condensation on the turbine steam supply line. i l Chilled water from and to drywell coolers - The lines d. in the reactor building are seismically analyzed with a vertical rise from the containment penetration of i approximately O feet. I RWCU supply - The lines in the primary containment are i e. j Seismic Category I and form a loop whose vertical leg 1 is approximately 49 feet. i RCIC turbine steam supply - This is similar to b. f. above. Main steam line drain - The line to the isolation valve j g. is Seismic Category I. Steam would condense in the line and form a water seal during normal operation. i Closure of the inboard and outboard isolation valves upon receipt of a containment isolation signal and the water seal provide a barrier to bypass leakage. t I h. Drywell floor drain and drywell equipment drain sump discharges - The lines to the isolation valves are Seismic Category 1, and the sump water acts as an l effective water seal, i Reactor ausiliaries coolant system (RACS) supply and i. return - There are seismically analyzed lines in the j l ausiliary building, with a vertical leg approximately 6-feet long that forms a water seal. j i } j. Deleted I L i 6.2-37 Amendment 4 i <,,,r-n~ a--,. - ~ ~ __..nn,,. n ,_,,,n.- -n- HCGS FSAR In addition to the third isolation valve, there are isolation and reactor valves on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) core isolation cooling (RCIC) discharge lines, and on the reactor cater cleanup system (RWCU) return lines that connect to the feedwater lines between the outside containment isolation valves Those isolation valves can be i cnd the. third isolation valves. l closed by operator action from the main control room. l \\ See Section 5.4.9 for a further discussion of the design of the main steam lines and the feedwater lines. Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Suetion 6.2.4.3.1.3 Line i e The residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line penetrates primary containment and taps into one of the two recirculation loops. Isolation is provided by two normally closed motor-operated ger valves, which are maintained closed by One containment isolation valve i o containment isolation signal. is located inside primary containment, and the second valve is j located outside primary containment. Thi; d;;ign i; cen;;;; tiv - l G ee it 4;;; nwi ;;h: :::dit !:: the 2;; ey; tea .iny. cles.J-dy.sh e.;;ide pr 4==ry ~at-i- -t r f 1 Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Return l 6.2.4.3.1.4 Lines 88 Cmac4 4o 8Mt C" " ko i TheRHRshutdowncoolingretuhlinespenetratetheprimary l containment and di;;h::; i-t% th4 ;ischarge side of each d s Each l recirculation loop, which inj::t. _i ;;tly i telthe RPV. line is isolated by a single, normally closed, motor-operated i

-: -trinr at primary containment isolation valve th t ;;;;iv::

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1 6.2.4.3.1.5 Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant i

Injection and Core Spray Discharge Linem i

4 T'he RNR low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) and the tore spray dJacharge lines penetrate the primary containment and discharge etrectly into the RFV.

Each line is isolated by a e4egte, AJg normally closed, motor-operated containment isolation valve Otet p,.;m.,3

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In addition, there is a HPCI line which discharges into the RPV i

by way oE one of the two core spray lines downstream of the j

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containment isolation valve on that core spray line.

is isolated by a normally closed motor-operated gate valvg.j.;tifia 05e l

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6.2.4.3.1.6 Mi l.

Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Lines 3

l 1

The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core j

isolation cooling (RCIC) steam supply lines have two major j

containment isolation valves in series that are normally open, located inside and outside of the primary containment.

The third l

j containment isolation valve on these lines is a 2-inch, normally closed globe valve, on a 1-inch bypass line around the inside major containment isolation valve.

These valves do not receive a l

containment isolation signal when a LOCA is detected.

This permits these ESF systems to function during a LOCA.

However, l

these valves automatically close when a break is detected in the portion of the steam supply line outside primary containment of l

the respective system.

C.2.4.3.1.7 Reactor Water Cleanup System Line i

Reactor water processed through the RWCU system is taken out of i

containment from the reactor recirculatic.) loops.

The RWCU line Is provodeel with a hytoss line. for-4est;n ise/sf ed h an si! ep ermind o fs.'t.</osed, g /s he v)a lWc rash +n s ta.4/e. c.heek valve.

purposes. The sc lines e.re.

6.2-47 4

4

l NCGS FSAR outside primary containment that closes on a containment isolation signal.

6.2.6.3.1.13 Post-Accident Liquid Sampling System I

E.

l There are seven post-accident sampling lines that penetrate the primary containment.

Only one of the seven forms part of the RCFB as well.

See Section 6.2.4.3.2.16 for a discussion of the containment isolation provisions for these lines.

t 6.2.4.3.1.14 Instrument Lines j

The instrument lines that pene'trate the primary containment and form part of the RCFB are designed to optimize their monitoring j

function and to minini'se uncontrolled releases of radioactivity l

j to the environment.

These instrument lines have a flow restriction orifice inside the primary containment and an excess flow check valve outside the primary containment for automatic containment isolation in the event of an instrument line break.

If an instrument line develops a leak of 1.5 to 2.5 gym outside j

j containment, the resultant differential pressure of 3 to 10 psi l

t across the excess flow check valve will cause the check valve to i

close automatically.

If an excess flow check valve fails to l

close when required, the restriction orifice and the main flow path through the valve have a resistance.to flow at least equivalent to a sharp-edged orifice of 0.250 inches in diameter.

Each valve is also provided with two limit switches that operate lights that indicate valve position and a solenoid valve for remote reset.

The capability for remote operation has not been l

provided since there is no remote indication of failure of a specific line.

j js (Znsuf b $i~

i i

4.2.4.3.1.X Conclusion on um. 55 i

(

l

}

To ensure protection against the consequences of accidents l

involving the release of radioactive material, piping systems i

that form the RCFB are shown to have adequate isolation

{

capabilities on a case-by-case basis.

In all cases, a minimum of two barriers are shown to protect against the release of radioactive materials.

i f

l In addition to meeting the isolation requirements stated in GDC 55, the pressure-retaining components that comprise the RCFB

~

[

are designed to meet other requirements that aintaise the 4

i 6.2-49 I

a

NCGS FSAR

)

be reliable boundaries against containment leakage, and that the system is maintained by visually checking for leaks during normal instrument calibrations.

Thd instrument lines that sense suppression pool water level have o remote manual valve for isolation.

Their design is justified on the "other defined basis' because system reliability is greater with a single isolation valve and because these systems are closed systems outside containment that can accommodate a single f ailure without loss of system re!iability as a boundary cgainst containment leakage.

6.2.4.3.2.22 Conclusion on GDC 56 4

To ensure protection against the consequences of accidents involving release of significant amounts of radioactive materials, fluid lines that penetrate the primaty contai'nment i

have been demonstrated to provide isolation capabilities on a case-by-case basis in accordance with GDC 56.

In addition to meeting isolation requirements, the pressure-retaining components of these systems are designed to the same quality standards as the containment.

i 6.2.4.3.3 Evaluation Against GDC 57 6.2.4.3.3.1 Chilled Water System Lines and Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling System Lines The chilled water and the reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RACS) lines are closed systems inside primary containment.

However, greater' safety is achieved by meeting the requirements Cf GDC 56.

Therefore, two redundant motor-operated isolation valves that isolate on a containment isolation signal, one inside and one outside primary containment, are provided.

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/

5. 5. t ? *.1 -

Control Rod Drive Lines 8

The CRD system has multiple, insert and, withdraw lines, that penetrate the primary containment.

if 6.2-60

1 l

NCGS FSAR b

jb The classification of these lines le quality group 3, and they are designed in accordance with ASME SepV Code,Section III, Class 2.

The basis upon which the CRD insert and withdraw lines are designed is commensurate witht the safety importenet of maintaining the pressure integrity of these lines.

5

,2 It has been an accepted practice not to provide automatic V

isolation valves for the CRD insert and withdraw lines in order j

to preclude any posible failure of the scram function.

The lines can be isolated by the solenoid valves provided on the j

n hydraulic control units (NCOs) that are located outside the N

i primary containment.

The lines that estend outside the prisery containment are 1 inch or smaller and terminate in systems that are designed to prevent outleakage.

The solenoid valves are normally closed, but they open upon rod movement and during

i 1 reactor scram.

In addition, a ball check valve located in the l

CRD flange housing automatically seals the insert line if there i

is a break.

Finally, manual shutoff valves are provided outside j

the primary containment.

l j

6.'2.4. 3 3. 2.

De.161 6.2.4.3.4 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guides 1

l 4.2.4.3.4.1 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11) i e

l Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11) is 1

discussed in Section 1.8.11.

1

)

j 6.2.4.3.4.2 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.141 t

i Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.141 is discussed in l

.isction 1.8.1.141.

l

+,

Regulatory Guide 1.141 is not a requirement for NCGS.

However, our assessment is that the other defined bases for complying with i

GDC S4, SS, 56, and 57 that were implemented on HCGS meet Regulatory Guide 1.141 requirements.

4.2.4.3.4.3 Failure Mode and Effects Analyses i

i A single failure can be defined as a failure of a component in any safety system that results in a loss or reduction of the 4.2-41 1

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Active cystem's capability to perform its safety function.

mechcnical components are defined in Regulatory Guide 1.48 as components that must perform a mechanical motion during the -

coursegof accomplishing a system. safety function.

Appendix A to i

t 10 CRF 50 requires that electrical _ systems be designed aga ns pacoive single failures as well as active single failures.

Scctions 3.1 and 15.9 describe the implementation of these requirements as well as the requirements of GDC 17, 21, 35, 41, 44, 54,. 55, 56, and 57.

l 6.2.4.3.5 Evaluation of Other Defined Bases Wh:n the reliability of an' ESF system is increased oy using only c:o containment isolation valve, a closed system outside primary containment is used.as a second isolation barrier to acccamodate o cingle active failure.

In the case of a single failure, the c1ccGd system accommodates the failure by baine an extention of-es tho contairs.ent.

Table 6.2-29fidentifies those penetrations isolated with only a single isolation valve.

Figures 6.2-45, 6.2-46, 6.2-47, and 6.2-48 show the limits of the extended All manual valves at the system boundary, gg Nntoinment boundary.

int valves, test valves, and drain valves, arefunder administrative w

  • N

.:ontrol to assure the integrity of the extended containment -

boundary.

Isolation provisions for the extended contain==nt 26 boundaries are identified in Tsble 6.2-M Table 6.2-uFaiso ovoluates the ability of check valves and safety / relief valves to maintain the extended containment boundary.

All extended contain-ment boundaries are Quality Group B (i.e.

ASME B&PV Code Class 2 piping), Seismic Category I, and designed to temperature and proosure ratings at least equal to that of. the containment as idsntified in Figures 6. 2-45 through 6.2-48.

Missile protection for plant systems and structures is discussed in Section 3.5.

i 6.2.4.3.5.1 Conclusion on other Defined Basas l

1 Whcn greater safety is ensured by using a single primary containment isolation valve, a dependable closed system outside primary centainment is provided to act as a second barrier against the release of radioactive materials.

j 6.2-62 Amendment 2 l

ll

HCGS FSAR setpoint is ' greater than 1.5 times the containment design pressure.

For relief valve PSV-F097, shown on Figure 5.4-13, the; relief setpoint is less than 1.5 times the containment design pressure.

Npvertheless, this is acceptable since valve F097 discharges into the suppression pool.

Any increase in valve backpressure due to an increase in suppression chamber pressure resulting from an accident will tend to better seat the valve, thus enhancing its containment isolation capabilities.

C nser y C 6.2.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENT Following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), hydrogen gas may be generated within tile primary containment as a result of the following processes:

Metal-water reaction involving the Zircaloy fuel a.

cladding and the reactor coolant b.

Radiolytic decomposition of water in the reactor vessel and the suppression pool (oxygen also evolves in this procets)

Corrosion of metals and paints in the primary c.

containment.

To preclude the possibility of a combustible mixture of hydrogen end oxygen accumulating in the primary containment, the~

containment atmosphere is inerted with nitrogen gas before power cperation of the reactor.

To ensure that the hydrogen and oxygen concentration in the primary containment is maintained below the lower flammability limit given in Regulatory Guide 1.7, the following features are provided:

a.

A containment hydrogen recombiner system b.

A hydrogen / oxygen analyzer system (BOAS),

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.;**1 eet i

eeie i

11 11 illId] l l l l

ll;.l

,1 lit si JI I

i 1

1 1

I I

I I

I 1

1 1 gig ill sisit I 1

,g.

~8.1l 11.11.11.1} }111 11.11511.111.11 l

a.

j. s ~2 2

i I

jj in s

1 11 11 i!!!

3!l

,1 411

[1l 1

1 Il lil

! !L!!!

~

.!iliil

+ 1,y i

i"i y

a 1l I

I II II

))

111!(jjj i

!HQ

~

il

!q

,j l

8III I

Is s

d iial.!i!!!11!!

111111

,,3 Lill!II!!!!I t!!!!!!I

____.g..

,___,..,,._,,_,,_,.,,,___,_,,_m.,,_,,,,

.__,_,_,__,,,,__.y,_,,..,m.-_,

t e

=*

Page 28 of 32 NCSS - FSAR TABLE 6.2-16 a

m (1).

Valve type:

- 8L

-Ball Butterfly-8F Check valve CK Gate valve GT Globe G8 PSV Pressure reitef Stop check SCK Safety relief-SRV Explosive (shear)

XP i

Excess flow check XV s

Ball check CLCK Hydralic control unit NCU Restriction orifice F0 j

(2)

See Figure 6.248. Numbers in this coltaan refer to details in the figure.

(3)

AC-operated valves required for isolation functions are powered from the AC standby power buses. DC-operated isolation valves are powered from the station batteries.

(4)

Normal valve position (open or closed) is the position during normal power operation of the reactor.

. (5)

Table of isolation signal codes:

A - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L2 8 - Main Steam Line - High Radiation l

C.

Not used D - Main Steam Line - High Flow E - Main Turbine Inlet - Low Steam Pressure (Run hode)

F - Main Condenser - Low Vacum (Main Stop Valve Greater than 905 Open)

G - Majn Steam Line Tunnel - High Temperature H - Orywell Hi $ Pressure f

! _- Reactor Bu'lding High Radiation l

l J - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L3 K - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L1 l

L - Reactor Water Cleanup System - Area High Tmperature in the i

system's equipment compartment i

i M - Reactor Water Cleanup System - Area High Differential Temperature across the system's equipment compartment ventilation duch N - Reactor Water Cleanup System - High Differential Flow between the systes influent and effluent piping outside the drywell 0 - Standby Liquid Control System Operating P - Reactor Water Cleanup - High Temperature at Outlet of Nonregenerative Heat Exchanger Amendment 4, 6/84 T1002775

___--_-----_-o-,--

e,,-n.e-o

__,,,,e w wo w ~-w~ n ow

-nw-~w-m eenvw wwn w mm s -o w m m n-m*ww v s

.............. ~ - -. - - -. -. ~... ~......

..,. - ~.... ~ ~. -..

.. y... -

i Page 29 of 32 NCES - FSAR I.

TABLE 6.2-16-[(Cont'd)

W*

(1)

Power source:

Channels t'

Electrical Separation Sowse:

A - Class IE electrical channel 8 - Class 1E electrical channel C - Class 1E electrical channel D - Class 1E electrical channel W - Reactor protection system (RPS) electrical separation channel i

X - RPS electrical separation channel Y - RPS electrical separation channel Z - RPS electrical separation channel N - Non-Class 1E For explanation of electrical separation channels, refer to Section 8.1.

(7)

Remarks:

a.

in steam isolation va ve e iresthat both solenoid pilots be deenergized to close alve Accoulstor air pressure plus spring act together to closettalve(when both pilots are deenergized. Voltage failure /at.ortly one pilot does not cause valve closure. The valvefare* designed to fully close in less than 10 seconds, but in no less than 3 seconds.

A separate pressure interlock closes the valveg_JL.- enwpea high b.

4 reactor pressure.

c.

Separate HPCI systes isolation provisions valve [

l' on exhaust pressure high, area temperature high, steam pressure low, land steen flow high, d.

Separate RCIC system isolation provisions ise4 valve 7 on exhaust pressure high, area temperature high, steam pressure low,Jend staan flow high.

f'

e. lass.a Valves F3 "^^7 x P^ ""L)iw4ete on HPCI system steam line i

pressure =;r, x: 47,, ;11 pr;n_r; ti;5

t. w e 4 %.o t.V p W C b d (-

e.

f.

";.'... ;%;;. Or "*" :y.0; eJ.;.. r. 5-. in un.

1we

_p l

  • r;:7*"-? ";h, ;;;.; pc;n.

12., Z:pt;= f 5 if;t.

Vek ctsses on mc. a,9 (k.% % %e. press dre. l&

l ewwL.depONy/ess9/f h:,

I l

i T1002775 Amendment 6, 6/84 E

y [ f}&png, /10 A)}o&NW $ &tC fed /.y in d cs N M

.}

yhj/g G.2 34 h hbd! S icd 6**

HCGS - FSAR Page 30 of 32

'l

}

TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

L Valvehoselon HPCI system high discharge flow.

g.

h.

Valve closes on RCIC system high discharge flow.

f 1.

Valve

-J^41, "".'?, "12",,

4 "1:1 closefon RHR system

^

high discharge flow.

Valves [!! "^?!. ""?! ;';;;3 closes on core spray system high discharge i

j.

flow.

k.

This penetration is a noundary between the drywell and the l

suppression chamber.

It is not a path from the primary containment to the environment.

Delde.1 1.

ne ;=nr:::;a :. a...if t.:..... c. ; = :t.nt<--

<-m it e -

=:0 by tt; ees.t..;.-..' tydr:;;= r;;4ia;r ;;:t=.

m.

Sealed penetration n.

Relief valve set pressure - 410 psig I

o.

Relief valve set pressure - 68 psig I

p.

Relief valve set pressure - 495 psig

]l q.

Relief valve set pressure - 500 psig l

r.

Locked closed valve s.

System defined as essential per the definition in HCGS' response to NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2 t.

System defined as nonessential per the definition in HCGS' response to NUREG-0737. Item II.E.4.2 m,___:gne.1 e, a. ens #sita_.,.p.,_Res W, c :s,9.u, l e, asc. met i

.. s i mur........ _

u.

y..gg Penetration P-22 and P-220 share primary containment isolation provisions. l i

v.

Penetration P-70 and J-202 share primary containment isolation provisions. l w.

Manual override of the isolation signal is provided to enable the operator x.

to change the post-accident position.of the valve.

i' M M 8dtil k 4r>8dd 43 pod e4 MA, $[V g(;g V

PU I& Y di M O.

c,o nta'.n m a nb i

  • W ed win.o yd w e.

e4so n:s a. gg,,,,.

i 7

IFO Pr f Ameneent 6. 6/84 ma. Egyd M s.,gt tag $svt..p.3 d tfi y a, p.3 3,3g,r. r,: ~ 3b T1002775 6b. Mr.e

i

. ~. -. +.-. E. f.;. 3. - - -..,.

.,.j. ". :.,.

" Page 31 of 32 NCSS - FSAR 3,

TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

(8)

P&I, f' published as FSAR figures depicting the penetration configuration.

=

Note Fieures A

5.1-3, Sh 1 5.1-3 Sh 2 6.7-1 8

5.1-3 Sh 1 5.4-8 5.4-17 6.3-1 C

5.4-13. Sh 1 0

5.4-13. Sh 1 5.4-13 Sh 2 E

6.3-7 6.3-1 F

6.3-1 6

9.2-14. Sh 2 H

5.4-17 I

5.4-8 J

5.1-3, Sh 1 K

5.4-2, Sh 1 L

9.3-8 M

6.2-29 6.2-30 N

9.3-7 Sh 1 1

9.3-7. Sh 3 0

9.3-3 P

9.3-11, Sh 1 Q

9.2-17 R

9.5-32 S

4.6-6 T

6.3-1 5.4-13, Sh 1 5.4-8 f

U 6.3-7 V

6.2-41 g

W 9.1-5, Sh 2 X

9.3-5 Sh 1 Y

5.1-4 Sh 1 l

Z Deleted l

AA 6.2-29 88 11.5-3, Sh 1 CC 9.3-5. Sh 2 00 5.4-13, Sh 2 EE 5.4-2. Sh 1 j

l 9.3-5 FF 6.3-1 6.2-41 GE 5.1-3, Sh 1 5.1-3, Sh 2 Amendment 6, 6/84 T1002775

3 Page M of 32 mss - rSu TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

(9)

Post-Accidentvalveposition(openorclosed)isthepositionduringthe initial 10 minutes after an accident.

t10) Shutdown valve position (open or closed) is the position beyond the initial 10 minutes after an accident.

(11) The ESF System designation is applied to primary containment penetrations that are a part of an ESF System and where that part of the system provides or aids a function that is characteristic of an ESF Systen. Although re-activity control systems are not usually characterized as being ESF Systems, in this table reactivity control system penetrations are given the ESF system designation.

6z) newe/ inte.k noruk incose/ h:heden i

  • C suki cA wre, %

d e.

indo carh/

twr>, aoless hidi.N e>Uwwa.

(/3) 7&e >ske is cAa./

A,

te,n de imnoa /

in:/:dm

,fom

,tk m n con W m m-(/4) piede is Ll  % ~ / M s M.

(IS) 7Ae ak c4we

,/rxes a

b>&cdx of Me aka

r. M c p H ;/ex Ahu m vaIt eAwa 4,a afwir u7 C4 par &

nkeaeh<h,ee/,O M

/o exennse i e (n) 7A<.

n/a.as. m **g, G7)

  1. m k m aJ in. h h m cap A }/, u g *ed in T1002775 Mt /:eb'/2 Cadd/ /tWr/ M Oh #3KJ4dAmendment 6, s/84 l

l' IC/83 BCGS PSAR

[.

Pge l of 2 TABLS 6.2-25

\\

PENETRATIONS USING A CLOSED SYSTEM OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINDENT AS A SECOND ISOLATION BARRIER e

Containment Justification (l)

Penetration Line Isolated Number

=A l

ash Gi..;dwa C= ling-Return

' A, O l

Cese C p: ay te Resetar i

P-5A. 53

_A ME'we 74.6Are C=lant

'l thru SP W ct a=

"> '8 d i

b V4c,Udm 6kLeeNdack Bwh HPCI Pump Suction a, c

,l P-202 BPCI Minimum Return a, c.,

l P-203

, HPCI & RCIC Vacuum Breaker a,J P-204 Network I207 V ad.v J m S ty 4 4r We4,o w t 6mCb

=2, 4 d a, c.

l RCIC Pump Suction P-208 a jc.

l

, RCIC Minimum Return P-209 P-211A thru 211D RHR Pump Suction a j c.,

l RHR Suppression Pool Cooling a, c.

I l

P-212A, 2128

& System Test Vac.a.am srotkv N0-4ru G twx.h

= 0 ; ; 1 1 e '. e C o p p r e ; ; i e n r e e l-a,cy l

P-213A, 2138 l

a

, RHR to Suppression Pool Spray 1

P-214A, 2148 Header l

Core Spray Pump Suction a,C l

P-216A thru 216D

, Core Spray Test to Suppression a, c.

l I

P-217A, 2173 Pool b

P-228, J-209, J-217, Suppression Pool Nater Level J-219 Amendment 2

10/83 BCGS FSAR TABLE 6.2-25 (Cont'd)

Page 2 of 2 l

1 Notess (13 Justifications:

A single isolation valve is used because the system provides or aids the emergency passage of fluids a.

The addition int.o and out of primary containment.

of a second containment isolation valve decreases the reliability of the system by providing an additional source of actdve failure.

A single isolation valva is used because a second isolation valve would not' add to the dependability b.

These instrument of the containment boundary.

To add lines are a reliable containment boundary.

a second containment isolation valve would lengthen the containment boundary without a subsequent increase in the dependability of the containment boundary.

C."Tho hv M Og.

s JpecSSion pos{

..s a{MjS eamer50 so %<.+ % y<:mc3 cm%m+

awes.pher( cannov im p:nye vp w h vqtw.

i i

d.

M m k4:en prouts; ens hl-44 shted M bc}.aean %h:nmwf pewkhns, "comme P.co), f-aot, P- ?of f-2G A, onJ. P 213 9, l

k i

can be. shown 4* pras:4.

io6lalian J

con 4,enmov{ iso lJ;on re h A n4 pn m erg l

on e.[kendw. -t= co.es/Ar:y l

vues, ets,

-the_ vac.usm ben.ke-ndek as e 63,J s ts4em.

I Amendment 2 1

I

  • "*-'*-m wy,--

i

\\'

FRIMARY (ReclEtoop, CONTAINMENT 1-eCMV 4425 5

1 1

y

==

c, r,

a sc vte7 sc vtes i

e

  • e 74

?

74

~~~

sc.vo7s sc.vo7 sc.vtes 1

P i sc.v303 d

L l P3 l 1

r fac v302 a'[sc viss a

L LJ

] f8C v186 J

L 1 F DETAll 3 mPsennen GENERATING STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPo#T RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION LINE I

FIGURE L33B iSEE LEGEND) eMaaT 3 or de AMENOMENT 4.0444 l

a e

4 s

e.

i PRIMARY RPV (RECIRC. LOOP)

CONTAINMENT 4....

l

' CLOSEO SYSTEM 9+

e mu

=::

BC V074 SC V014 SC V013

\\

-O

r lP4Al BC V346

)

I BC.V118 J

9 r

l BC V386 d

b l f8C.V172 U

d k

sC.vi7e i

g DETAll4 LwtAmoN VALVES P-4h 9 46

=
=

i aca.e [

ec.to 14 Ylit TEST / DRAIN VALVIS g(,,,g g3 yggo P4A P 48 gg., y gg g ygg7 SC 172 V1GB GC.170 V171 l

SC V344 V334 SC.V354 V335 i

l OC V074 V183 MOPE CREEK 08MERAfuse STATION

-J PulAL SAPITY ASIALYS08 REPGAT u '.M RHR 94UTDOWN E

u COOLING RETURN LINES

- =: ' ::::

Pleunt SSB iSEE LEGEW eMeET 4 OP e AS$(NOMENT 4.08/04 l

l - --

i PRIMARY MPV CONTAINMENT l

r=

sEe.;,

i

=

= n::

I TO MNett

. CLOSED SYSTEM t'

-r4e eCm 9

A q

a MI NOTE BE V001 SE V002 BE V003 9

a r,

v, i

sE V079 BE V000 A"A i

r v

g l P4A l BE.V078 9

r

> BE V077 d

k 1

F BE V072 d b SE V070 y

TEST / DRAIN VALVES 1

P k BE V069 P6A BE V070 V000 V078 V077

-W674-V001 J

P4A sC.v173 V177 v320 V321 v44e v076 y

P48 BC.V174 V173 V324 V325 v4GD V075 P4C 3C.V175 V179 V363 V354 V434 V182 ISOLATION VALVES P40 BC V176 V100 V332 V333 vt22" V181 P4A BE V003 Voo?.

VO72 P4A BC V004 VO66 V t19 CONTAINMENT PRIMARY P48 BC V018 Vol7 Vl2O P4C SC V113 )( ll 4 V121 OR

~~-~~~~~~--~~~~~~-}

i P40 l BC V101 V lO2, Vl22 i

P44l 1

l RN CLOSED SYSTEM 0

@ BE V007 4

  • M

......................f

-pq-4

^

=

l' BE V006 SE V006 9

r, r-

.a

  • ' ' " '" BE V075 8 E,V07 6_,,,,,j

" ~ ' BJ V001 I

BJ-VOIS BE V074 BE V071

NOTE, w,

2

.a 2

M V017 9

P "SE5073 stV0es d

k NoesCnEEK l f OENERATING STATION SE V007 PINAL SAFETY ANALYSl3 REPORT d

k DETAIL 5 MHR LOW PRESSURE LJ COOLANT INJECTION AND NOTE:

COME SPRAY DISCHRGE LINE FOUNO ON CORE SPAAY N AI C(1SatLEGEND)

SYSTEM ONLY*

SHEET 5OP48 AMENOMENT 4. 08/94 i

e

_.,n.,_..__.___,,_,_,.n.

,__,.,~.av,_

i e

g.

t % 5 lana L aes PRIMARY M

CONTAINMENT r1 1

P i AE V041 i

AS v042 1 r N N. @N s s.

?

As.vt2e As.voss As.v040 l

\\

l IAsvots As.vt2s d

k d

l P.12l f As.v127 1 fA8V019 s

6 J

L lf j

LJ l}

DETAll 9 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FINALSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

\\

MAIN STEAM DftAIN LINE l

i FMRI 8J 38

.(SEE LEGEND)

SHEET 9 0F 48 AMENDMENT 8.06/54_

g

?O

> sne PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 6

f.

4..

i I

~

o.

j~

i g

4:1 I

i e'!

I PW i

_/

i-i IP 213Al g

a d

._..._....._Y_..

_ Y_ _..._......

f I

d B

.A i

  • A I -1...,A l cto o,Y, Tau I
  • J

a -i &

I i

I I

.>c -l

-ck;

,e,,,..,

.cn-,,

BOV253 BCV295 DETAll 27 Hope cassit OENERATING STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REP 0nf RHR RELIEF TO SUPPRESSION CHAMSER LINES iSEE LEGENO)

Plows,s.2 m AMENOMENT G 06M SHEET 2 OF S

-.,------,---.,,,,,,,.,---.--------,..---.n,.,-,.,,,,,,.---,n-,__,..,-_-.,--,..,.---,,_,-,.-.,-...,------,-m----,.-..,--.n.-

i

.o

'e O

s T

0, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT RPy 4

T

> c

=

i Go-vos:

so-Psi-isc A es voes

]

Go vaso Gavns asvnt NOTE g

6 r=

.pc i

GS v001 GS-PW 1Sl2 A GS Voe8 v233 GS v232 Gavnt l

1 fNOTE i

i l

q MOMN VAWES f

l ISOLATION VALVES 74gg gg l

P4A [ GS v002 GS v004 G4. PIN %52)

P48 [ GS vest GB Voe8 68-P54 15 2 2 2 ' --

Go vori esa-9523n P-asA l os vos os voro so.esv ssz z _....

Pass l onvoes "tET vALvEl P4A OS v231 GS v230 GSvDS MOPECASSE esseenATINe STAtlees l*

(Sage as v237 co v238 es.vset FIABAL SAPSTY AfeALYSBS REPORT 6P

,a vAtvis P4B 08v233 Os v232 GSvne CHILLER WATER SYSTEM LINES P,3sA es.v235 es v234 es vses i

CfSWf L!Ottel THIS IS A T85T TAP ON P 3SA AND P,333 5 34 OP 4 l

AMENOtetNT 4.0844_

l

'Jdh l

llit

, I ll l

JW g

l=

t i!I"""*"1!!li {lNif l'cIF$1' t

O <1 O i g,.................,,......g&

a

_. 6_

f

{p!-..-.., i 9 %

5 o

i am

_s. ~y:

s.o.:'). P !

4

-q l

. :, =... :

I

.g..@ )

thi IJ

. hei;IT h

, lhi%

l T-c.

-w; g, ;p g_ p 'g y

lj.!d, : --tim =.-E.i. E====ri.!.=M.I*g y

[

-- +

f

'~

g h,!

--- W i $c i

.3

., Y..... ::,

yA;$

P N

~

T h tPi kkn

%mm sg l ptd ?% k

, e,. g pg i

h

,NI\\

y

=

4 !rb.g 6

QM-~

i-i i

i

OI

//

l

'0 D

T'

}

I I

1 C

la i

)I,

.......= M i

etes d.* I $ E~m P

, ~- l g -.g_m i

j l

t

,7[

Q

~3 >

..)F '

L-

.I i

hil*j h

L~".! L'..I.

l

~

,- f I.,-

I g

. r-*It h~h l,

l q.. 11g...

.; v, i--

4 I

T-hbi!!!'F.d"' (h

--,qgr

~g.

.,;<g, r f

,r-g

!.ie'i:;l.~~!.!!.!!~~!.!.!..?.??/:!!!?~i : :

T3.i.%..T.he'"

-M -

?

/

i F

.t.

%,(
=~ :~ ~:* * *** '

ta;g gt).:

al J

i Y

ik-k e

4e

)%

s p y

i g-R Rb p.L The

,$ I P

r r

.ll WAy (M-o i

l

,,-n

AUG.:1 '84 02 6 8 7 9 6 t

10/83

'BCGS FSAR 00ESTION 480.14 (SECTICE 6.2.3)

Provide the following additional information related to potential bypass leakage pathe given in Table 6.2-15.

For each air or water seal demonstrate that a sufficient inventon of the fluid is available to saintain the seal 30 days following onset of a LOCA.

i Note that the suppression pool cannot be considered aDes water seal.

for the Technical Specifications that will verify the assumptions used in the analyses.

For each path where water seals eliminate the potential l

for bypass leakage, provide a sketch to show the b.

location of the water seal relative to the systes 4

isolation valves.

a

RESPONSE

ECGS does consider the suppression pool to be an effective water i

The suppression pool is a reliable source of water that seal.

an provide the required separation between the primaryThe suppression containment staosphere and the environs.
Thus, chamber's struc$ ural design is discussed in Section 3.8.2.

we have considered it to be a water seal as indicated in i

l Section 6.2.3.

Below is g item by ites discussion of the ability of the air and water seal barriers identified in Table 6.2-15 to maintain

{

For those sufficient inventory for 30 days following a IACA. valves mainta i

verify that there is sufficient inventory for 30 days assuming leakage rates of 10 al/h per inch of nominal valve diameter,Except for BPCI

+

unless otherwise indicated below (Reference 1).

valves FD-V017 and FD-V003, RCIC valves FC-V021 a

}

Those valves water seal are 10 CFR 50 Appendiz J, Type C tested.

that are not Type C tested will be identified in the technical specifications as requiring periodic leakage testing in order to ensure the esistence of the water seal.

Main Steam - A positive air seal is saintained through the operation of the NSIV sealing system as discussed in Section 6.7.

i Foodwater Line - There is sufficient water inventory for a 30-day

-' tS la ;;r 19 ^* rirl rIn -

r;t:

seal.- i la; e le q?_ ?^^3 r" " M 00?.

Figure 480.14-1 is di r rt r f;r ::! ::

provided to show the location of the water seal relativ N. sas, e4me, g ck.) p%pc em W. osel

+ y wth. m ki9 sk.Jld 4 be. necesseg, Amendment 2

  • 480.14-1

]

I

.

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