ML20095E654

Proposed Tech Specs,Consisting of Change Request 95-07 Re ECCS Pump Testing

ML20095E654
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	12/08/1995
From:	SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20095E653	List: ML20095E654 RC-95-0212, Application for Amend to License NPF-12,consisting of Change Request 95-07 Re ECCS Pump Testing
References
NUDOCS 9512180070
Download: ML20095E654 (27)

Text

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4 Docunient Control Desk i

! AttachmentI i i

TSP 950007 ,

RC-95-0212 l

Pags 1 of1 l

l SCE&G -- Explanation of Technical Specification Change l for ECCS Pump Testing l

PAGE

• t Br Description of Change Reason for Change ti9 Index III 3.1.2.3 1 Deleted Deleted Pages 3/41-9 and 3/41-10.

3.1.2.4 3/41-7 4.1.2.2 1 Added new surveillance requirement To ensure operability ofcharging pumps ;

similar to revised TS 4.5.2.f(see below). in Modes 5 and 6.  ;

3/41-9 All 1 Deleted Follow guidance of NUREG 1431, Rev.1. j 3/4 1-10 All 1 Deleted Follow guidance of NUREG 1431, Rev.1. i i

3/4 4-34 3.4.9.3 1 Added new Action d to add action Follow guidance of NUREG 1431, Rev.1,  !

Action d statement to preclude mass addition Section 3.4.12.

transit x.

4 3.4.9.3 2 Renumbered action statements. Clericalchange.

Action e Note 3 Added note to permit reasonable time Follow guidance ofNUREG 1431, Rev.1,  ;

frame for pump swap operation Section 3.4.12. i 3/4 4-35 4.4.9.3.3 1 Added new surveillance to assure mass Follow guidance of NUREG 1431, Rev.1, '

addition transient will be unlikely. Section 3.4.12.

3/4 5-5 4.5.2.f 1 Revised section, remove specific Follow guidance ofNUREG 1431, Rev.1,  !

recirculation flow acceptance criteria. Section SR 3.5.2.4.

B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-2 1 Deleted bases for charging pumps. Due to deletion of associated  !

specification.

B 3/4 4-2 B 3/4.4.2 1 Deleted inaccurate statement. Statement is inaccurate.

B 3/4 4-14a B 3/4.4.9 1 Added bases for new surveillance that is Follow guidance ofNUREG 1431, Rev.1, intended to limit mass input capability. Section B 3/4.4.12.

9512100070 951200 PDR ADOCK 05000395 P -

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.I.NDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY............................................... 3/4 0-1 1

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin - Modes 1 and 2.......................... 3/4 1-1 i

Shutdown Margin - Modes 3, 4 and 5....................... 3/4 1-3 Moderator Temperature Coef ficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality...................... 3/4 1-6 l 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS Flow Path - Shutdown..................................... 3/4 1-7 l

Flow Paths - Operating................................... 3/4 1-8 I d)ckfeel - Charg i r.g P er; - Shutd:gr.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-9s

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.)cJeded Chrgi g 87 s - 0p:r: ting............................... 3/?1-10[

Borated Water Source - Shutdown.......................... 3/4 1-11 l Borated Water Sources - Operati ng. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-12 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Group Height............................. ............... 3/4 1-14 Position Indication Systems - Operating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-17 Position Indication System - Shutdown.................... 3/4 1-18 l Rod Drop Time............................................ 3/4 1-19 )

l Shutdown Rod Insertion Limi t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-20 l Control Rod Insertion Limits............................. 3/4 1-21 f

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SUMMER-UNIT 1 III Amendment No. 79

. 1 INDEX 1 1

i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE  ;

)

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3/4.0 APPLICABILITY ............................................ 3/40-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS -

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin - Modes i and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-1 l Shutdown Margin - Modes 3,4 and 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-6 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Flow Path - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-7 1 I

Flow Paths - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/41-8 l l

Deleted .................................................... 3/41-9 Dele ted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-10 1

Borated Water Source - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-11 Borated Water Sources - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-12 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Group Height . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-14 Position Indication Systems - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-17 Position Indication System - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-18 i Rod Drop Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-19

)

Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-20 )

Control Rod Insertion Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-21 l

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SUMMER-UNIT 1 III Amendment No. 79, l

. l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 80 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN t

LIMITING COISITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be source: FERA8LE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power a.

A flow path from the boric acid tanks via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid storage tank in i Specification 3.1.2.5a is OPERABLE,.or.

i b.

l The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging

! pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b is 0PERA8LE.

} APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

-i h ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an l OPERABLE emergency power soure,e, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE mINJIREMENTS 4.1.2.1.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power

operated or automatic) in the flow path that is' not locked, sealed, or othenvise secured in position, is in its correct position.

4.L2..l.'L MMws7.UTE OfEKMa*YV Df ~!h N RE@<Ed C W"f 4 y /sr SD<vskar 9.s.1f.

4 Sul#ER - UNIT 1 3/4 1-7

4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTElE 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS i

FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable ofbeing powered from an OPERABLE emergency power

. source:

a. A flow path from the boric acid tanks via either a boric acid I transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid storage tank m .

Specification 3.1.2.5a is OPERABLE, or i

b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the reTueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION: 1

\

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an j OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all aperations involving CORE i ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _. j 4.1.2.1.1 Atleast one of the above r uired flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE atleastonceper31 days verifying that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow pa that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise i secured in position, is in its correct position.

4.1.2.1.2 Demonstrate operability of the required charging pump per Surveillance 4.5.2.f.

SUMMER-UNIT 1 3/41-7 Amendment No.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTOOWN NLIMITING CONDITION'FOR OPERATION 3.1.2. One charging pump in the baron injection flow path required Specific on 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERA 8LE and capable of being powe from an ,

OPERABLE ency power source.  !

APPLICABILITY: ES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPE LE or capable of bei owered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, sus all operations i olving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.2.3.1 The above equired charging pump shall be strated OPERA 8LE by verifying, on rec ulation flow, a differential pressure ross the pump of greater tnan r equal to 2472 psig is developed when tes pursuant to Specificatio .0.5. I 4.1.2.3. All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERAB ump, shall demonstrated inoperable, at least once per 31 days, except the re or vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit brea secured in the open position.

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L SUW9ER - UNIT 1 3/4 1-9

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SUMMER -UNIT 1 3/41-9 Amendment No,

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS CHARGING PWF5 - OPERATING l

l \LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION /  !

3.1. 4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERA 8LE.

! APPLI LITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4#.

ACTION:

1 With only one rging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two e ing pumps to thin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT ST OPERABLE status and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN ivalent to at least 2 percent delta k/ at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in T SHUTDOWN within the following 6 rs; restore at least

two charging pumps to PERABLE status within the next days or be in COLD Sit lTDOWN within the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREPENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging s sha 1 be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation f1 a differe ial pressure across each pump of greater than or equal to 24 psig is deve when tasted pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 All charging s, except the above ired OPERA 8LE pumps, shall be demonstrated inoper e, at least once per 31 day whenever the tempera-ture of one_or more o the RCS cold legs is less than equal to 300'? by verifying that the tor circuit breakers have been secu d in the open position.

A num of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE wheneve the rature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal F.

ELE Y SupMER - UNIT 1 3/4'l-10

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I THIS PAGE DELETED i

SUMMER-UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 Amendment No.

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4

! REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

, OVERPRESSURE PROTECTIpW SYSTEMS {

l LIMITING M ITION FOR OPERATION 4

1 4

j 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall -

be OPERA 8LE:

i a. Two RHR relief valves with:

i 1. A lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig, and 1-

2. The associated RHR relief valve isolation valves open; or l

l b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of

greater than or equal to 2.7 square inches. - i i APPLICABILITY

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MODE 4 wnen the taperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to i

300*F MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

4 l ACTION: l i a. With one RNR relief valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve  ;

j to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or depressurize and vent the RCS l j

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through a greater than or equal to 2.7 sepaare inch vent within the nert 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

1 '

5. With both RHR relief valves inoperable, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> either:  ;

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1. Restore at least one RHR relief valve to OPERABLE status, or

2. Depmssurire and vent the RCS through a greater then or equal to 2.7 square inch vent.

c. In the event an IU5l relief valve or RCS vent is used to sitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Cassission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient the effect of the IUWt relief valves or vent on the trans.

isnt and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

e p. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

d. A^' N un~T mt M or r~u ere. can ary p ers n a ce= c puany s s*ssy e a eso*not.e of :nisecwisto iairo 7ve. A C.5 wuw s ~ win, n,, , , s is m,aras SUN 4ER - UNIT 1 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. PA L iLf n --, .

_.. _.. _. . . _ . ~ _ _ _ . _ ___._ _,_. _ _...._ _ _._. _ ...._.... _ ._ . _ . _

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[ REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. -

j OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS s

l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

]  :

i l 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall j be OPERABLE:

a. TwoRHR reliefvalveswith:

1. A lift setting ofless than or equal to 450 psig, and

{

2. The associated RHR relief valve isolation valves open; or i b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of l greater than or equal to 2.7 square inches.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 300*F, MODE 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.  ;

ACTION:

a. With one RHR relief valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or depressurize and vent the RCS ,

through a greater than or equal to 2.7 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

b. With both RHR relief valves inoperable, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> either:

1. Restore at least one RHR relief valve to OPERABLE status, or

2. - Depressurize and vent the RCS through a greater than or equal to 2.7 square inch vent.  ;

c. In the event an RHR relief valve or RCS vent is used to mitigate an '

RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commimiion pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within -

30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the RHR relief valves or vent on the trans.

ient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

d. In the event that two or more charging pumps are capable ofinjecting into the RCS, immediately initiate action to ensure a maximum of one '

charging pump is capable ofinjecting into the RCS*.

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. l

1. Two charging pumps may be capable ofinjocting into the RCS while swapping pumps, s15 mmutes.

SUMMER'-UNIT 1 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 26,125,

4 e JA >m -+- -. -- - A. +-#- J. _A2- , - - JE- m 5-- J-- - -A-- - - - - ,-- a- L REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SUR'/EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each RHR relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the RHR relief valve isolation valves (8701A, 87018, 8702A, and 87028) are open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the RHR relief valve is being used for overpressure protection,

b. Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.  :

c. Verification of the RHR relief valve'setpoint of at least one ,

RHR relief valve, at least once per 18 months on a rotating basis. l 4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

• when the vent is being used for' overpressure protection. i I

4. 4. 9.3. 3 A *r s.eur nso c,gp izg,,yg,,, famso s SNALL dd udA.n /rde j spurnet.a of s nos<.Tss. wru fMs ste.s Ar t.cssr ance Arx i

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Sten k.ett.s Ases secun,.cc w 7xa oMiv fosNAW.

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l Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, verify these valves open at least

, once per 31 days.

SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 4-35 Amendment No. 26

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTElg SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each RHR relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Ven*fying the RHR relief valve isolation valves (8701A,8701B, 8702A, and 8702B) are open atleast once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the RHR relief valve is being used for overpressure protection,

b. Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. I

c. Verification of the RHR relief valve setpoint of at least one i RHR relief valve, at least once per 18 months on a rotating basis.  !

1 4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent shall be verified to be o :en at least once per i 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

• when the vent is being used for overpressure protection.  ;

3 4.4.9.3.3 At least two charging pumps shall be verified incapable ofinjecting l into the RCS atleast once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel l head is removed, by verifyng that the motor circuit breakers are 1 securedin the open position.

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• Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, verify these valves open at least once per 31 days. ,

SUMMER -UNIT 1 3/4 4-35 Amendment No. 26,

1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that l the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and 3 that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no I I

evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection actuation and containment sump recirculation test signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:

a) Centrifugal charging pump fepfMe f. Ldd/p b) Residual heat removal pump

( f. "" >: 'fy ; th:t :::h :f th: f 11;.;ir.; p:. p- de,elep; e di"- -

d .".'.1 -

pressur irculation flow when tested pursuan cifica-By verifying tion 4.0.5:

each ECCS aump's developed 1. Centrifugal e pump > 24 i

lead atthe test flow pointfor .. e....-. 41

. i. u..._ ...-..-...i.,._

s ,

_ .oo. ~,.4 N --

greater than g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop or equal,to for the following ECCS throttle valves: l the required developed head 1. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking in accordance with operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems Specification 4.0.5. are required to be OPERABLE.

A 2. At least once per 18 months.

HPSI System Valve Number

a. 8996A

. b. 89968

c. 8996C

d. 8994A

e. 89948

f. 8994C

g. 8989A

h. 8989B

1. 8989C

j. 8991A

k. 8991B

1. 8991C SUt91ER - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 75

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visualinspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debns and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection actuation and containment sump recirculation test signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:

a) Centrifugalchargingpump b) Residualheat removalpump

f. By verifying each ECCS pump's developed head at the test flow point for that pump is greater than or equal to the required developed head in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

g. By verifying the correct 1 xmition of each mechanical position stop for the following ECCS t arottle valves:

1. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve waen the ECCS subsystems are required tobe OPERABLE.

2. Atleast once per18 months.

HPSI System Valve Number

a. 8996A

b. 8996B

c. 89960

d. 8994A

e. 8994B

f. 89940 g.' 8989A i

h. 8989B i

i. 89890 l 8991A l 1c. . 8991B

1. 89910 SUMMER-UNIT 1 3/45-5 AmendmentNo. 75, l l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS *

, BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k or as required Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum ' expected boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon condi-tions and is satisfied by 13269 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric 1 acid storage ing water tanks storage or 98631 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refuel-tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable i without single failure consideration on the basis of'the stable reactivity i condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injectio, system becomes inoperable. I OPERABLE and the ion u

for a maximum of one centrifugal chargin e

e utrement to ve arging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be 1 i that a mass addition e ow 275'F provides assurance single P ransient can be re he operation of a The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide the i required SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1 per. cent delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.

This condition is satisfied

_ by either 2000 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 23266 gallons of 2300 ppa borated water from the refueling water storage tank. l becauseTheofcontained discharge line water volume location limitsphysical and other include allowance for water not avail characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one baron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEM LIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimus SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) limit the potent.ial effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is

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required to detemine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with

ne control rod alignment and insertion limits.

SUP99ER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 6!, 75

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i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 'l; 1

BASES l

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon condi-tions and is satisfied by 13269 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage h nica or 98631 ga lons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refuel-ing water storage tank.

l With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORB ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the smgle injection system becomesinoperable.

l The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to required SHUTDOWN MARGIN of1 percent delta k/k or as reqm, provide thered b after xenon deca and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition is satisfied .

by either 2000 ons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 23266 lons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one boron igjection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

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SUMMER -UNIT 1 B 3/41-3 Amendment No. 67,75,

. .i REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizec pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being above lbs to relieve 420,000 its Safety per hourLimit of 2735 'psig. Each safety valve is designed of satr-*ed steam at the valve set int p .us 3% accumulation. The reliefcapacit; J4 single safety valve is ate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shu own. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides ever gressurization.g

....-----y..

g,.

pressure

,J..^

,. g y."i.

-- - . m y.

reliefcapability

y. ,0, Q y...L.. and willom prevent R

._=.....ym... .

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig.

The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maxunum surge rate resulting from a complete loss ofload assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss ofload) and also assuming no operation of the power operating relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings willbe performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelo a of operation i

assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SA t assumptions. l The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> periodic surveillance is suficient to wure that the parameter i is restored to within its limit following expected wusient operation. The  !

maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant  :

to control I;eactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

The pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. The may be used to depressurize the RCS when normal essurizerpr,PORVs sprayis and block valves ,

t unavailable. Operation of the air operated PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remote. y controlled motor-o perated block valve to capability should a relief valve become inoperable. provide The series a positive arrangement of shutoff f

the PORV and its associated block valve permit surveillance while at power.

- SUMMER. UNIT 1 B 3/4 4 2 Amendment No.//,129

._.__._.___.__.__.__.__.___.__.__._.____._.y REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I i

BASES <

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to arevent the RCS from bein pressurized aboveitsSafetyLimitof2735 psig. Eac2safetyvalveisdesigned g to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point p us 3% accumulation. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur durinc shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RH k loop connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent itCS over- i pressurization. l During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig.

The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss ofload assummg no reactor trip  ;

until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no l credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss ofload) and also assuming no operation of the power operating relief valves or steam dump valves.

1 Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER i

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the  ;

parameter is maintained within the normal steady state enveloy of operation l assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SA 1 assumptions. l The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The i maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum l number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant i to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

. The pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including l the design step load decrease with steam dump. The PORVs and block valves may be used to depressurize the RCS when normal pressurizer spray is unavailable. Operation of the air operated PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a  ;

remote y controlled motor-o wrated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief va: ve become inoperable. The series arrangement of the PORV and its associated block valve permit surveillance while at power.

1 SUMMER-UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2 AmendmentNo. 94,129, I

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, .g., .n,, . - - - _ _

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES I

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for '

which there is reason for concern of non-ductile failure, operating limits are I provided to assure compatibility of operation'with the fatigue analysis per- )

formed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements. l The OPERABILITY of two RHRSRVs or .an RCS vent opening of at least 2.7 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure tran-  !

sients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one l or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 3#F. Either RHRSRV j has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from onrpressurization  ;

when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the  !

secondary water temperature of the steam-generator less than or equal to 50*F l above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of an HPSI pump and its j injection into a water solid RCS.

1. E Lloess+* T***' N' A M^ * *

• JM A # ' *#" #"*f b 0' ##'0E of iage.rapc toro **E RC b, Anm TMc SvavEd/ANc.s Acqvnesesy7 +a v6Aufy p r tsA s r n J o c4Atw av6-Pe*<ps AA.E Of*s ous 'htArEC 70 gg tAlpfgggy ggg pr scssr opc6 /Ett 31 Day 3 , W Nile T4e AC3 is sww 3ao s z pov,g l A ssortsacc. 'TRA T A M A Ss"- A D D !r>ost "TR^ u si c ur u p o c Asticanw gy, \

A sw&LG KHtt Suc'Dod AEL is r \/AL.WE .

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SUP9tER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-14a Amendment No.5:

l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of non-ductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis per- i formed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two RHRSRVs or an RCS vent opening of at least .

2.7 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from >ressure tran- l sients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR ? art 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 300*F. Either RHRSRV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50'F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of an HPSI pump and its 4 injectioninto a water solid RCS.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS, and the Surveillance Requirement to verify at least two charging pumps aredemonstrated to be INOPERABLE at least once per 31 days, while the RCS is below 300*F, provides assurance that a mass addition  ;

transient can be mitigated by a single RHR suction relief valve.

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l SUMMER-UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-14a Amendment No. 53,

Attachment H TSP 950007 RC-95-0212 Page 1 of 3 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR REVISING THE SPECIFICATION FOR ECCS PUMP TESTING IN THE l

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .

Description of Amendment Recuest South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) proposes to revise the Virgil C. -

Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Technical Specifications (TS) pages 3/4 4-34, 3/4 -

4-35, and 3/4 5-5; and delete pages 3/41-9 and 3/41-10. Additionally, several Bases pages require revision resulting from the proposed changes and other reviews. - This change is consistent with the guidance of the Westinghouse Standardized Technical Specifications (STS).

The proposed changes are:

> To r.dd a Surveillance Requirement for Boration flow path 4.1.2.2 to ensure ope. ability of the required charging pump in Modes 5 and 6.

> To delete Pages 3/41-9 and 3/41-10 from the Reactivity Control Systems  !

section. This change conforms with NUREG 1431, Rev.1, Section 3/4.1.

> To add an action statement to Specification 3/4.4.9.3 that is intended to preclude mass addition transients from occurring at low temperatures as a result ofinadvertent SI actuation or makeup from a second charging pump.  ;

This Action Statement is similar to one in NUREG 1431, Rev.1, Section 3.4.9.3.- i

> To add a note that permits for a short time, two charging pumps to be capable ofinjection during a pump swap operation.

> To provide a Surveillance Requirement to Specification 3/4.4.9.3 that will demonstrate that a mass ad > ion transient is unlikely and provide assurance that the number ofpumps required to be inoperable is maintained. This requirement is similar to one that was previously located in 4.1.2.3.2 and 4.1.2.4.2.

> To revise the Surveillance Requirement for ECCS Subsystems 4.5.2.f. The current requirement is too restrictive and may not indicate actual pump performance due to the testing methodology, l

> To delete a paragraph from the Bases Section B 3/4.1 which discusses the I reason for a maximum of one operable charging pump below 300*F. The specifications that are associated with this Bases paragraph are being deleted.

> To delete an inaccurate statement for Bases Section B 3/4.4.2. This statement i' indicates that there are diverse methods of mitigating low temperature overpressure (LTOP) transients.

> To add the basis for the new Surveillance Requirement associated with Specification 3.4.9.3. This basis is very similar to the paragraph being deleted on page B 3/4.1-3.

Document Centrol D:sk '

AttachmentII

. TSP 950007 RC-95-0212 Page 2 of3 i I

Safety Evaluation 1

The design function of the ECCS is to provide borated water to the RCS quickly j enough and in sufficient quantity to prevent significant damage to the reactor core in the event of an accident. The borated water provides both for core cooling (short and  !

long term) and for adding negative reactivity to prevent the core from staying or '

becoming critical. The ECCS pumps are required to inject a minimum flow rate into the RCS at a specific pressure to mitigate the accident consequences. The accidents of concern are:

> Loss ofCoolant Accident

> Rod Ejection

> Loss ofSecondary Coolant

> Steam Generator Tube Rupture Periodic testing of the ECCS pumps should detect early signs of pump degradation and is a requirement of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,'

Article IWP. This testing is performed by measuring pump performance at a reference flow point. The surveillance requirements are specified in the Inservice  ;

Testing Program which is based on Section XI of the Code and Generic Letter 89-04.

The proposed change will not alter or invalidate the surveillance requirements, but will permit the following enhancements in testing:

> Residual Heat Removal Pumps will be tested at a substantial flow rate vs. the original Technical Specification requirement of minimum flow.

> Centrifugal Charging Pumps will be tested at minimum flow during normal plant operation and at a substantial flow rate during each Refueling Outage vs. the original Technical Specification requirement of minimum flow.

The proposed change will not alter or invalidate the surveillance requirements, but will permit testing the pumps at a value more representative of pump parameters required for accident mitigation without duplication of testing efforts.

The deletion of the Reactivity Control System Specifications (Charging Pumps -

- Operating and Charging Pump - Shutdown) does not impact the availability of the l charging pumps to mitigate a design basis accident. The safety related functions of '

the charging pumps are addressed in the ECCS Subsystems Section of the Technical Specifications.

The need to limit overpressure conditions while shutdown ensures the pressure temperature limits of the RCS system are not exceeded. The low temperature overpressure system is capable of mitigating a mass addition transient resulting ,

from the inedvertent operation of a charging /SI pump, or an energy addition )

resulting from the inadvertent startup of a RCP. The LTOP system will assure the J pressure temperature limits are not exceeded.

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Docum:nt Central Desk  !

Attachm:ntII

. TSP 950007 1 RC-95-0212 .

i Page 3 of3 i i

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In order to provide this assurance, provisions were made to preserve the design ,

capabilities of the LTOP System. By maintaining a maximum of one charging capable ofinjection into the RCS, below 300*F, the capacity of one RHR suction relief  ;

valve will not be challenged by a mass addition transient. The surveillance was  ;

moved from the Reactivity Control Systems section to the RCS section to assure this i design assumption is maintained. The immediate initiation of actions provides I assurance that requirements are met in the event that two or more charging pumps are discovered capable of RCS injection while in Mode 4 (below 300'F), Mode 5, and Mode 6 (with the reactor vessel head on).

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Document Centr:1 Desk l AttachmentIII i TSP 950007 RC-95-0212 Page 1 of3

'SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR REVISING THE SPECIFICATION FOR  !

ECCS PUMP TESTING IN THE VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i

. Description of Amendment Reauest I 1

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) proposes to revise the Virgil C.

Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Technical Specifications (TS) pages 3/4 4-34,3/4  ;

4-35, and 3/4 5-5;- and delete pages 3/41-9 and 3/41-10. Additionally, several Bases pages require revision resulting from the proposed changes and other reviews. This change is consistent with the guidance of the Westinghouse Standardized Technical . .

Specifications (STS).

The proposed changes are:

l

> To add a Surveillance Requirement for Boration flow path 4.1.2.2 to ensure operability oNhe required charging pump in Modes 5 and 6.  :

> To delete Pages 3/41-9 and 3/41-10 from the Reactivity Control Systems section. This change conforms with NUREG 1431, Rev.1, Section 3/4.1.

> To add an action statement to Specification 3/4.4.9.3 that is intended to -

preclude mass addition transients from occurring at low temperatures as a  :

result ofinadvertent SI actuation or makeup from a second charging pump.

This Action Statement is similar to one in NUREG 1431, Rev.1, Section ]

3.4.9.3.

> To add a note that permits for a short time, two charging pumps to be capable l ofinjection during a pump swap operation. I

> To provide a Surveillance Requirement to Specificuion 3/4.4.9.3 that will demonstrate that a mass addition transient is uni.ikely and provide assurance i that the number of pumps required to be inoperable is maintained. This j requirement is similar to one that was previously located in 4.1.2.3.2 and  !

4.1.2.4.2.

> To revise the Surveillance Requirement for ECCS Subsystems 4.5.2.f. The current requirement is too restrictive and may not indicate actual pump performance due to the testing methodology.

> To delete a paragraph from the Bases Section B 3/4.1 which discusses the reason for a maximum of one operable charging pump below 300*F. The specifications that are associated with this Bases paragraph are being deleted.

> To delete an inaccurate statement for Bases Section B 3/4.4.2. This statement indicates that there are diverse methods of mitigating low temperature overpressure (LTOP) transients.

> To add the basis for the new Surveillance Requirement associated with  !

Specification 3.4.9.3. This basis is very similar to the paragraph being deleted !

on page B 3/4.1-3.

AttachmentIII i TSP 950007 RC-95-0212 Page 2 0f 3 Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination SCE&G has evaluated the propcsed changes to the VCSNS's TS described above against the Significant Hazards Criteria of10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that these changes do not involve any significant hazards for the following reasons:

1. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is not significantlyincreased.

The implementation of the above described TS changes will have no impact on the probability of an accident occurring. The testing of the ECCS pumps at a more appropriate point on their characteristic curve is not a precursor to an ,

accident. There is no hardware, software, or testing methodology change j proposed that would decrease confidence in the reliability of these .

systems / components.

l The proposed revision to the ECCS Pump testing surveillance will allow greater i

- flexibility for testing and will provide more useful information about the performance capabilities of those pumps.

The deletion of the Reactivity Contro1 System Specifications (Charging Pumps -

Operating and Charging Pump - Shutdown) will have no impact on the capability of the Charging /SI pumps to perform their design function. The additionalAction Statement and Surveillance for low temperature overpressure (LTOP) assure that safety analyses remain valid and initial conditions are not changed. The additional Surveillance Requirement for Boration Systems assures that one charging pu np will be operable during Modes 5 and 6.

2. The proposed license amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This proposed TS change does not involve any changes to station hardware, software, or operating practices. The changes do provide for a revision to the testing methodology used in demonstrating the capability of the ECCS pumps.

This methodology will test the ECCS pumps at a point on the pump's characteristic curve that will more reliably indicate the pump's continued operability at or near the parameters the pump would be required to providt during a postulated accident.

The deletion of the Reactivity Control System Specifications (Charging Pumps - i Operating and Charging Pump - Shutdown) will not provide additional challenges to the capability of the plant to meet normal operational needs or i mitigate the conditions of a design basis accident. The ECCS Subsystems TS l provides similar surveillance requirements to insure continued operability of the Charging /SI pumps. The LTOP TS will now provide requirements to assure that design assumptions are not challenged and RCS integrity is maintained.

~

Docum:nt C:ntr:1 Desk Attachm:ntIII TSP 950007 RC-95-0212 Page 3 of 3 i Therefore, as the above described change has no impact on plant performance, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident being created as a result of this change is negligible.

3. The proposed license amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. l The change in testing philosophy for ECCS pumps should bring an increase in margin of safety, since testing will be conducted at reference flow points closer tc actual pump parameters for accident conditions. For the Residual Heat Removni Pumps this will be conducted quarterly and for the centrifugal charging pumps, they will be tested quarterly on minimum flow and each refueling outage at substantial flow per the Inservice Testing Program.  ;

1 The surveillance requirements ofTS 3/4.1.2.3 and TS 3/4.1.2.4 are essentially the  !

same to those in 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 (ECCS Subsystems), and the deletion of these requirements will have no adverse impact on margin of safety. The addition of the Action Statement and Surveillance Requirement to 3/4.4.9.3 (Overpressure Protective Systems) provide additional requirements to supplement those above ,

to assure RCS integrity is maintained for all operational modes. The addition of l the Surveillance Requirement to 3/4.1.2.1 will provide assurance that reactivity 1 control can be maintained for Modes 5 and 6 through the charging system flow path.

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