ML20094R359
| ML20094R359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1995 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Public Service Electric & Gas Co, Atlantic City Electric Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094R363 | List: |
| References | |
| NPF-57-A-089 NUDOCS 9512040374 | |
| Download: ML20094R359 (6) | |
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4 UNITED STATES 4
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
WASHINGTON, D.C. - "1
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-354 j
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION j
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
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Amendment No.89 License No. NPF-57 i
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric
& Gas Company (PSE&G) dated March 31, 1994, and supplemented by letters dated August 29,.and October 16, 1995, complies with the 1
standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized l
by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Consiission's regulations set i
forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; L
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common
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i defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 89, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into the license.
PSE&G shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical i
Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
9512040374 951130 i-PDR ADOCK 05000354 i
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. 3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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[JohnF.Stc1z, Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 30, 1995 A
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. -The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 8 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 8 3/4 5-3 4
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i I 6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continvid) 7 l
ACTION: (Continued)
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1.
With the HPCI system inoperable, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next-12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s200 psig.within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
With the HPCI system inoperable and either one LPCI subsystem or i
one CSS subsystem inoperable, restore the HPCI system to operable i
status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or restore the LPCI subsystem / CSS subsystem 4
to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN 1
within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to i'
s 200 psig in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
d.
For the ADS:
1 1.
With one of the above required ADS valves inoperable, provided the i
HPCI system, the core spray system and the LPCI system are j
OPERABLE, restore the inoperable ADS valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 a
l hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s100 psig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
l 2.
With two or more of the above required ADS valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s100 psig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
l' With a CSS and/or LPCI header AP instrumentation channel inoperable, e.
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restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or
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determine the ECCS header AP locally at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; otherwise, declare the associated ECCS subsystem inoperable, j
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f.
The discharge line " keep filled" alarm instrumentation associated with a LPCI and/or CSS subsystem (s) may be in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for required surveillance testing
subsystem serviced by the affected " keep filled" system remains OPERABLE; otherwise, perform Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.a.1.a.
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g.
In the event an ECCS system is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total l
accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
This includes testing of the " Reactor Coolant System Interface Valves 1
Leakage Pressure Monitors" associated with LPCI and CSS in accordance with Surveillance 4.4.3.2.3 j
HOPE CREEK 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.IIe O l
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES ECCS-OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued)
With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CSS and LPCI systems.
In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating prensures on a reactor low water level condition. The HPCI out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system.
If any one LPCI subsystem or one CSS subsystem is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI system, the inoperable LPCI subsystem / CSS subsystem or the HPCI system mustabe restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
In this condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) and the remaining low pressure ECCS subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in reduced ECCS capability to perform its intended safety function. Since both a high pressure system (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is required to restore either the HPCI system or the LPCI/ CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor to be in HOT SHUTDOWN with vessel pressure not less than 200 psig. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.
Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatically causes selected safety-relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F.
ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psig. This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.
ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves although the safety analysis only takes credit for four valves.
It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out-of-service for up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability.
HOPE CREEK B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 69, 89 l
e EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES 3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is aeallable to the HPCI, CSS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA.
This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to pemit recirculation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.
Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable. This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200*F.+
Since pressure suppression is not required below 212*F, the minimum l
water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus a safety margin for conservatism.
See Special Test Exception 3.10.8.
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HOPE CREEK B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. #, 89 l
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