ML20094P167
| ML20094P167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1992 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094P163 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9204070261 | |
| Download: ML20094P167 (26) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. . - . . - - - . _ - - . -- - - - .. _- .- .-.- .....- -- - _. e , t ATTACHMENT B t PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NPF 37 AND NPF 66 Revision to: 3/4.7.5 B3/4.7.5 Y s 1 9204070262 920333 : l'- hDR ADOCK 05000454 PDR L ZNLD/1645/19 L =- -- .-. .
.- PLANT SYSTEMS 1/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION __
The. 3.7.5 =Two indepeneent- ultimate heat sink / (UHS)-cooW 9-tower 4- shall be OPERABLE with I / Y
- a. A
- i m water. level in each of the VHS cooling tower basins of 673-75-feet-Mean-See-4cevel-{HSL) (50&h af /eas? 5 0 */. ,
- b. -With-only-Unit <-1-operatin9r-fans-0A,- 0B, OEr.and-OF-are-required ,
-be-OPERAB LE r-Wi th -onl y- Un i t o pe ra t i n g ,-f a ns-0Cr ODr0Gra nd-OH-
-are required-to-be-ORERABLE.- With-both-Un44s 1,-and-2-operatingra-
--fans-wi th -powe r-s ump H ed - f rom-eec h-un i t- a re - requi red-to-be-OPE RAB tf-
-{totel-of-6-f ansW p fcfal af 4 fans OPERA B LE (hlgh Sf te d by
- c. Two OPERABLE essential service water makeup pumps, [
- d. An essential service water pump discharge temperature of less than or equal to 80*F eith 4:: th= 4 fens-cunniop-in-high :peedt- or less than or equal tohF with all fans a OPERrunning in high speed, 94" A BLE Two OPEMBLE UHS c o o kng (, w s,. $a s ln lus/ swlh.htsy
- f. The National Weather Service (NWS) does not forecast the Rock River f level to exceed 702.0 feet MSL, ..
/
- g. Rock River water level greater tnan 670.6 feet MSL, and i h. The National Weather Service (hNS) has not issued a tornado watch that includes the Byron Site Area.
APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTION: d /c as / 50 */. a. With coolingatower water levelrestore basin, of less the than yate'r 472.75 feet-MSt--4504-in level to 073.75-4est "SL-in eitherf each UHS cooling tower basin within 6 hours or be in HOT STANOBY with-l in the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours. Ui th --Or.: Of the fr: cent f .1 It o f 4 pplicaM e ::-tiaatAon li-ted-I b.
.dbeve-4eepereW+r f storef:r:d in thf ans to OPERABLE status within the '!:ted 72 huurs or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and l COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
l V:fh .,4 5 fans OPCNBLE 3 wdk:n I hear ver;[j Ykt 6 OPE k ABLE kns art l k ca.p a.ble ,f k s ;g pow cr e./ b3 f b t ir respec f%c. a mtegen eg dicstl 3tntesters, l ?-N rr 4ans-+r+-aego4+ed- to-bc ru nn i ng - dttt4ng-4M.r-eoo446g t cwe r pi: r f e rmance-tv tity;-
--howevev-the-essential ;crdce-wate&ptsp dischtege-temperature-must-be-main.--
Meinett at icn i.han v. e4wal iv ---98% l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-13 I Amendment No.Y
) , . PLANT SYSTEMS \ LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION (Continued L ACT10N(Continued) g
- c. With one essential service water makeup pump inoperableywithin -
72 hours either: A
- 1) Restore the inoperable essential service water makeup pump to OPERABLE 4TATUS, or s+s:tus A
- 2) Varify that the mne train deep wall pump is OPERABLE with 4ts-UHS cooling towcr basin levels > 82L Continue to verify ba 14 vel is.> B2% every two hours ~and restore the inoperablNsinM f'"l' "' essential service water makeup pump to OPERABLE 4TATUS within
^7 days. ("Thiscanbeextendedto14daysforEssentIaPt4*ia5
.. Service Water Hakeup pump inspection and extended maintenance during the tise when at least one unit is in%de-5 or 6.) tlc .
g g 4* s pen:im .F3r.:b tten..o.4.,.. .t.yN.m. Mo be. y b ' * " P '"" # ) 3) t>therwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHU1DOWN within the following 3 hours.
- d. With the essential service water pump discharge water temperiture not meeting the above requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Riff ace *M ( nnd A ( e- -Deleted-
- f. With Rock River water level forecasted by NWS to exceed 702.0 feet MSL:
- 1) Within one hour verify that both deep well pumps are OPERABLE with both UHS cooling tower basin levels > 82% and at least once every 2 hours thereaf ter, verify both basiii levels are > 83. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applica51e. f
- 2) With one deep well pump inoperable restore both deep well pumps to OPERABLE status with both basin levels > 85 before the Rock River leywl exceeds 702 feet HSL or* within~72 hours, whichever comes first and follow provisions of ACTION f.1).
- 3) Othervise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, g.
Vith Rock River water level at or below 670.6 feet MSL within one hour verify Rock Riser level ano flow, and:
- 1) If Rock River level > 664.7 f eet MSL and flow > 700 cfs verify Rock River level > 664.7 feet MSL and flow > 700 cfI every 12 hours there-after. The provisions of Specification,3.0.4 are not applicable.
- 2) If Rock River level < 664.7 feet MSL or flow < 700 cfs, within
~
one hour: BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-14 Amendment No. i
- i. ..
o , I InsertA
- e. 1) With one UHS cooling tower basin level switch inoperable:
a) Restore the level switch :n OPERABLE status within 72 hours or verify both basin levels are n 02% within the next hour and every 2 hours thereafter. The provisions of Specification 3.0,4 are not upplicable. b) Otherwise bo in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- 2) With both UHS cooling tower basin level switcl"ss inoperable:
a) Restore one level switch to OPERABLE status within 1 hour and follow the provisions of 4.7.5.e.1 above, or verify both basin levels are > 02% within the next hour and every 2 hours thereafter. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. b) Otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 0 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- 3) With any UHS cooling tower basin level switch inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification G.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the inoperability and the plans for restoring the switch (es) to OPER ABLE status.
P ZNLD/1645/23
o
- PpNTSYSTEMS
, LIMITIW1 CONDITION FOR OPERATION, (Continued) ,
ACTION (Continued), a) Verify that both deep well pumos are OPERABLE with both UHS cooling tower basin levels > 83 and at least once every 2 hours thereafter, verify 60th basin levels are > 82L The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not appTicable. b) With one deep well pump inoperable, within 72 hours restore both deep well pumps to OPERABLE status with both basin levels
> 82% and follow provisions of ACTION g.2)a),
c) Otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours and at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. h) With a tornado watch issued by NWS that includes Byron site area:
- 1) Within one hour verify that both deep. well pumps are OPERA 3LE with both UHS cooling tower basin levels > 82% and at least once every 2 hours .thereaftne, verify botS basin levels > 82%.
The provisions of 5pecification 3.0.4 are not applicable?
- 2) With one deep well pump inoperable, within 30 minutes take action to restore both deep well pumps to OPERABLE status with both basin Invels > 82% and at least once every 2 hours thereafter, verify ~both basin levels > 82%.
- 3) Otherwise be in HOT STMDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-14a Amendment No. 32
PLANT SYSTEMS
~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-@nt4etted)-- _ l 4.7.5 The UHS shall be determined OPERAB!.E at least on.:e per:
- a. 24 hours by verifying the water level in each UHS cooling tower basin to be great.er than or equal to 6Md5-feet EL. -f50%h- 50 %,
- b. 24 hours by verifying the essential service water pump discharge water temperature is within its limit,
- c. 24 hours by verifying that the Roci. River water level is within its limits,
- d. 31 days by starting from the control room each UHS cooling tower fan that is required to be OPERABLE and not already in operation g and operating each of those fans or at least 15 minutes b A:A spe J
- e. 31 days by
- 1) Verifying that the fuel supply for each diesel powered essential service water sakeup pump is at least 36% of the fuei supply tank volume,
- 2) Starting the diesel from ambient conditions on a-54edated-low basin level test signal and operating the diesel powered pemp forkat Ieut30 minutes, .
3) Verifying)that automatic in theeachflowvalve (manual, path is in its power correctoperated, position,or st le nd
- 4) Startingnachdeepwellpumpandoperatingitfor{15 minutes and verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or auto-matic) in the flow path is in its correct position, 18 unW Ly perf mtr3 a cH A Nue t. c.Ausenion one s of A.
bE ***b U R S c ..hny f.~ e.c Lasin fe w sw;4 el,,, ,
- f. -9 92 days by verifying that a drain sample of diesel fuol from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM 04057-1981, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTH-D975-1977 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment,
- h. 18 months by subjecting each diesel that powers an essential service water makeup pump to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service and by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,-+ne-
- 1. 18 months by verifying each deep well pump will provide at least 550 gpm flow rateg And J. 18 en4b ly visolig inspech3 e d ver'Es 3 no ska.m al f r ea k rye or do.y a dd:.s .I L h Il m d er:als in +h aHS c..l:q 1owee.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-15 Amendment No.
.__ _ _ _ _ _ __ ~ _ __ . _ - . ___ __ ___ _ _ __ _ ___ _
o o . PLANT SYSTEMS BASES _ 1 l 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES I The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steae generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line i rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, , and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line ' rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. , 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RTHDT f 60'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle _ fracture. 3/4.7:3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operatinn of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failura, is consistent with the assemptions used in the safety analyses. 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water System ensures that _ sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant coo'ing capacity of this system, assuming a single f ailure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits. 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK g Qg { coolingtowerbasinscontainwaterthatisimmediateTyavailabi station coo A volume of 200,000 gallons in each basin is rejarvet!' for supply to the aur.iliary e system (FSAR Q10.1-1) and 90 000-gaTTons as a minimum inventory for other plant co . requirements R-QT8.35-1). Alternatively, the inventory of 200,000 gallons is a Ga or transporting heat released from one unit following a loss-of-co et T ciden n Qe second unit during an orderly shutdown. Sin inventory would be exhauneQabout 1 day, achievement of esign basfr requirement of cooling capabilTty-for 30 days is depen - on redundant makeup systems. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-3
i PLANT SYSTEMS
' i BASES '
ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (Continued)
\ A redundant makeup system using deep wells as a water source is designed /
to Mthstand design basis tornado events, river flood events, and design basis ,/ seismi gvents combined with low Rock River flow or level. The second redunsant system is the essential service water makeup system that uses the Rock Rivef , as a water soor. . It is designed to withstand all design basis naturj V ' phenomena event ' combinations of events except for seismic events'during ; low Rock River flo 'T tes, design basis tornado events and riverffTood events. ; Each essential servic Nwater makeup pump is powered by a diesel engine with a fuel supply adequatt for approximately 3 days of operat1on. Achievement of the design basis 30-day operatior: is W endent upon successful implementation of plant procedures to replenish the fuel supp followin design basis events. With water in the cooling tower basi an initial temperature less tnan or equal to.80*F, shutdown can be achiey ,_ eteorological. conditions foi-lowing a design basis tornado, without operatio s the cooling tower fans and i without the temperature of the waJef discharged fro (e4he essential service wa pump exceeding 110'F, the maxipum acceptable temperature for componer.ts and systems cooled by the essen tal cooling water system. AclKvementofthedesign function of the UHS duri more severe meteorological conditibnt, or following a design basis-LOCA,j qu res operation of two cooling tower fant go maintain the discharge temperature less than or equal to 110*F. Plant proced q s ensure thatthefansarestartedandcontrolledbyoperatoractiontomaintaingdis-charge temperature of less than 110*F. With all 4 Unit 1 designated coolits : tower farfrunning, either redundant' ultimate heat sink train is capable of . tepfratureof98gF.removjp(the desi n bases LOCA heat load without exceed 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period
;is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room ,
t BYRON - UNITS ; . 2 B 3/4 7-4 Amendnent No. 32, '
I l l insert 0 DASES 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The limitations on the bitimate heat sink ensure 1) sufficient cooling capacity is ' available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions and 2) adequate inventory is available to provido a 30 day cooling , water supply to sofoty related equipment. The limiting design basis event for the UHS ! is a loss of coola 9 uccident coincident with a loss of offsito power on one unit, in conjunction with the other unit proceeding to an orderl shutdown and cooldown from maximum power to Mode 5, assuming a single active allure. The minimbm UHS cooling tower basin water level of 50% indicated (873.75 foot above Moan Sea Level) and the snrvice water pump dischargo temperature limits assure that adequate thermal capacity is available in the SX water inventory to absorb tho initial accident heat input. Six of eight cooling tower fans are required to be operable so that the required number of fans are available after a single active failure. i Tho SX cooling tower basin temperature will remain loss than 100'F. ; A volume of 200,000 gallons in each cooling tower basin is available to supply the auxiliary feedwater system. The basin inventory is also available for transportin0heat ' from safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. Due to evaporation, blowdown, and auxiliary foodwater supply the basin inventory alone is not adequato for the requireo 30-day cooling water supply, therefore makeup systems are provided to replenish the basin inventory. Adequate inventory is maintained by the SX makeup system that uses the Rock , River as a water source. The SX makeup system is designed to withstand all design basis natural phenomena events and combination of events except for seismic events during low Rock River flow or level (loss of SX makeup pump suction), tornado, and river flood, A backup makeup system uses the deep walls as a water source. The deep well system is designed for solsmic, tornado, and river flood events. l Each essential service water makeup pump is powered by a diesel engine with a fuel supply adequate for approximately 3 days of operation. Achievement of the design basis 30-day operation is dependent upon successful implementation of plant procedures to replenish the iuol supply following design basis events. The operability requirements for the basin level switches, Rock River level limitations, and tornado watch limitations assure that the SX makeup system is available to provide makeup water. The corresponding actions assure that the backup deep well system is available and increases the minimum cooling tower basin level to assure that adequate basin water inventory is available after a two hour delay to manually start the deep well pumps after an accident. t ZNLD/1645/24
i 9 e ATTACilMENT C EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT llAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Byron Station has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards considerations. According to 10CFR50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards if operation of the f acility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: , 1. Involve a significant increase In the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident pr6viously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a signi'icant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed amendment rnakes several changes to Byron's Ultimate Heat Sink Technical Specification. These changes involve: 1) SX fan operation and SX pump discharge temperature '.imiting Conditions for Operation (LCO),2) SX fan operation Action Requirements, ';) UHS cooling tower basin level switch operability,4) addition of the provision that spo;ification 3.0.4 is not applicable to the SX makeup pump Action Requirement,5) editorial changes,6) Technical Specification Bases rewrito. A. The proposer, changes (ks not irrvolve a significant increaso in the protmbility or consoquences of an accident previously evaluated. The Essent'al Service Water (SX) system provides cooling water flow from the station's Ul'.imate Heat Sink (UHS) mechanical draft cooling towers to various safeguard aquipment. The system is comprised of two pumps per unit, divided into two trains, where the common trains (l.e., trains A or B) of the two units share a UHS coc!ing tower. Each cooling tower has four fans, (high and low speed capability,480 volts AC) two of which are loaded on each unit's safeguard bus, thereby maintaining the required train separation, Providing makeup water to the UHS are two trains of SX makeup pumps using the Rock River as a source of water, The UHS is designed to dissipate the maximum possible reactor decay heat and essential cooling system heat loads under worst case environmental conditions after normal reactor shutdowns and all UFSAR chapter 15 accident and transient scenarios. The Technical Specification Ultimate Heat Sink tower parameters of required number of fans, basin level, and basin temperature ensure the UHS will always be in a condition capable of performing its design functions from normal operations to its design basis limiting scenario of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) on one unit and a normal shutdown of the other unit from full power to cold shutdown and the most limiting single active failure The UHS can till perform its design function whhin the allowances of the Action Requirements assuming no single active failure. This is consistent with the metnodology of action requirement de"elopment. ZNLD/i645/20
Design calculations show that the design basis accident limiting scenmlo can be met with a min. mum of five fans operating in high speed with a basin temperature less than or equal to 96=F. An EDG f ailure on the LOCA/ LOOP unit would result in 4 f ans operable, which is acceptable, since the LOC A unit heat input to the SX system is reduced by approximately one half. T he proposed chan0es to the UHS LCO would require 6 of the 8 cooling fans to be operable when one or both units are in Modes 1 through 4. Also changed are the SX pump discharpo temperature limits. The maximum basin temperature allowed has been reduced to 90 F from 98"F, provided the operable fans are running in high speed. These parameters do not,in themselvos, factor into any initiatiny event o UFSAR chapter 15 u sccident scenarios and consequently do not ncrease the probability of oc;.urrenco for these previously evaluated accidents. However, although not a factor in initiating r ny accident, the UHS plays a vital role in mitigating the consequences of
- accident or transient. The proposed changes wBl nnsure that the rninimum cteditions necessary for the UHS to perform its desl0n functions will always be met. Engineering calculations demonstrate that the SX supply design temperature limit of 100'F, which was assumed as an Initialinput for the accident analyses,is preserved. Consequently, the proposed changes to the number of cooling tower fans operable and SX pump discharge temperature do not increase the consequences of any accidents previously evaluated l ne Byron UHS requires makeua capability in order to meet the design criteria of providing cooling for 30 days. T lis makeup capabilijt > is provided by the two trains of SX makeup pumps taking suction from the Hock River. Each UHS bat,in has a level switch which provides an automatic start of the appropriate SX makeup pump if basin level drops below the auto start setpoint of 53% Neither the UHS basin water level nor its automatic makeup feature factor into any initiating event of the UFSAR chapter 15 accidents and therefore does not increase the probability of occurrence of any of these accidents. The proposed addition of the basin level switches to the LCO requirements would uncouple their operability requirements from that of the SX makeup trains. The action i requirement for one or two inoperable basin level switches would allow for an alternative means of ensuring adequate water inventory during the period of inoperability. Separate level channels provide operators indication of basin level.
_ By ensuring basin level is at least 82%, there is sufficient time after the limiting. design basis accident scenario to monitor UHS basin level and manually initiate the start of an SX makeup pump or deep well pump in ordet to maintain necessary basin inventory. With this proposed change, the UHS can still perform its design function for the required 30 days. Therefore the consequences of any accident previously evaluated is not increased. The proposed change to the action requirements for the SX makeup pump would allow a unit startup if in the 7 or 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirement (LCOAR). A degraded $X makeup capability is not an initiating event for any chapter 15 accidents analyzod. The seismically qualified deep well pumps with safety related power supplies provide an adequate backup to the SX makeup trains. To rely on a deep well pump as a backup for one makeup pump for a limited period of time does not significantly increase the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. ZNI D/1645/21
Q
- 0 The other proposed changes to the UHS Technical Specification are considorod administrative in nature. They do not change in any manner the liconsing basis, oaorations, maintenanco or regulatory iequiromonts of the UH3. Thorofore thoso changes do not involvo any increaso in the probability or consequencos of an accident previously ovaluated.
D. The prtuosed chanDes do not croato the possibility of a now or ditfuront kind of acckton t from any accident proviously ovaluated. The pro: .esed limits in the number of operablo cooling tower fans and SX pump discharge temperature are fully within the design capabilities of the UHS. With these LCO and LCOAR limits the UHS will always be in a condition to dissipato the required heat load from the dosi n limiting accident scenario of one unit undergoing large broak LOGNLOOI and the normal shutdown of the other unit. These chan0es do not involve any now hardware changos or allow any now modes of oporation. These changos are necessary to support the revised licensing basis of the UHS. Consequently, they do not create the possibility of a now or cifferont kind of accident from thoso previously evaluated. Allowing for a Unit startup while one train of SX makeup is inoperablo doos not affect plant safety. The analyses periormed bound the situation of both units at full power. This does not,in itself, creato a now or difforent kind of accident from those previously evaluated. The new bas;n lovel switch LCO would allow for continued plant operations with the automatl0 makeup feature inoperable provided alternative actions are taken to 9nsure the UHS will be in a condition to periorm its design functions. No physical modifications are being mado to the plant. The proposed altomativo means of ensuring adoquate water for the UHS both initia ly and for long term cooling is adoquate. Allowin0 continued plant operations with the automatic makoua inoperablo does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of acc dont from those previously evaluated. The other proposed changes to the UHS Technical Specification are administrativo in nature. They do not in any mannar change the licensing basis, operations, maintenanco, or regulato y requiromonts of the UHS Thorofore they do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated. C. The proposed changos do not involvo a sig7iticant rnduction in a margin of safoty. The now LCo limits for number of fans and SX pump dischargo temperature are based on the results of the UHS reconstitution effort which in part to defined the Technical Specification margin of safety. These now limits wiI ensure under the most limiting accident scenario that cooling water from the basin will meet the accident analysos SX input limit of 1007. The proposed LCO limits would ensure, at the start of the limiting accident scenario, the required number of fans are operable, a bosin level of greater than 50% and basin temperature of no greater that 967. Under worst case environmental conditions, for the worst caso scenario evaluated, design calculations show the basin water temperature will reach a maximum of 99.1T. l l ZNLD/1645/22
i
- . Allowing for continued operations with the automatic makeup feature inoperable - '
i does not significantly reduce any margin of safety. Compensatory actions required by the specification will be taken to ensure there is an adequate source of cooling water to meet the SX design bases. , The other proposed changes to tha UHS specification are administrative in nature ! and do not reduce any margins of safety. Therefore, based on the above evaluation, Commonwealth Edison has concluded that these changes do not involve significant hazards considerations. l l e L i l- ZNLD/1645/23 , n
" * ~ - ~ ~ + 4u ,><-,.. __
ATTACHMENT D ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Commonwealth Edisc'1 has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10CFR51.21. It has been determined that the proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided for under 10CFR51.22(c)(9) and (10). This osteneination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10CFR50, it involves changes to the use of facility components located with n the restricted area as defined in 10CFR Part 20 and the amendment meets the following specific critoria: (i) the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. As demonstrated in Attachment C, this proposed amendment does not involve , any significant hazards consideratiorm. (11) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. As documented in Attachment A, there will be no change in types or increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite. (ill) there is no significant increase in indiv' dual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. There will be no change in the level of controls or methodology used for processing radioactive effluents or hendling solid radioactive waste, nor wih N ' proposal result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposurc resulting from this change. These changes meet the categorical exclusion permitted by 10CFR51.22(c)(9). Other changes are essentially changes in administrative requirements and therefore meet the > categorical exclusion permitted by 10CFR51.22(c)(10). l ZNLD/1645/24
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ATTACHMENT F LIST OF AFFECTED UFSAR SECTIONS e 4 ZNLD/1645/26
m . Byron /Graiawood 8893-74 l Uf 5/Jt Change Log i ef 6 0D!' 4 009 3/92 Section_ Page Descriptian of Change Reason] Basis _ References / Rec. arks 2.3.1.2.4BY 2.1-10BY Utlete caragraph tiescribing Replace with new Clarify proper wet bulb the maxicum water cakeup description on page temperature. UHS final report, i required by the UHS 2.3-IIBY page 12 l 2.3.1.2.48Y 2.3-118Y Revire paragraphs discussing Clarity design basis UHS final report, p,sge 12 UHS design temperature and of UHS cooling towers I meteoroingica! data 2.3.1.2.4HY 2.3-llBY Revise three paragraphs Document calcolation " Byron Ultimate Heat Sink discuse.ing the (cat ing tower results Cooling Tower Basin Makeup makeup water supply rattulatton," Calculation f4D-M MSD-14 Revision O. dated January 9,1992 1 2.3.68Y 2.3-52 Add reference 32 Citation of ASHRAE Referente 16 of UHS final excest6nce value in report subsect im 2.3.1.2.4 Hevision of paragraph Docu s t calculatio, Calculation NED M-MSD-14,
- 2. 4. l l . 511Y 2.1-20BY discus:inu cooling ? ewer results Revision 0, dated ,lanury 9.
makeup 1992 1 2.4.ll 6BY 2.4-23Bv Revise paragraph discussing Doc ument c alt.ulat ion Calculation NED M-MSD 14 ! ompliance with Regulatory results Revision 0, dated Jsury 9, l (uide 1.27 1997 2.4.l!.6BR 2.4-?28R insert "Ihe [$CF f'as . Document review of 4 re from B. J. Adams to D. E. seismic event." Braidwood UllS with $1. L t .u r dat ed Newmber 4, respect to Byron UHS 1991 (PA 91-094) des:gn basis reconstitutien l l 2.5.6.9BR 2.5-ll2BR insert "The E*.CP . event." Document review of Mem f rem B. J. Adaus t o D. t Braidwood UHS with St. Clair dated Nowreber 4, respect. to Byron UHS 1991 (RA-91-004) design basis reconstitution 3 - -- . ,
Byron /Braidwod 8393-14 Uf SAH Change i mJ 7 of 6 DRP 4-009 3/92 Settion Page Descrip, tion of Change Reuon/ Basi <. Ref erences/Wearks _ __ 6.P.I.l.3 6.2-3 Ada e w paragraoh describing Document differences UHS ;-inal Geport, Sectios the c ontainment analyses in the Chapter 6 and Ill.C, page 13 contained in sidsect inn Cl anter 9 ana3yses 9.2.5 6.2,? 6.?-33 Add new paragra3h describing Docunent dif ferences liH5 Iinal Report. Section t he c ontainment analyses in the Chapter 6 and Il!.C, pago 18 (ontained in sutnec t ion Chapter 9 analyses 9.7.5 9.7.1.2.I 9.2 - 2 Rovise section Reflett design basi, uhs Final Report 9 2.!.2.2 4.7 ? insert 'Actuaf S vs t ern Sperify th t the UHS Final Repa: 1 :,ocf.io n 1 1 .I , flows." stated flow rate is page 13
'typicai" 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-2a insert reference to Iable Editorial New tablo is teing ad& d 9.2-16 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-3 Insert 'and are normally Daremont normal Normal operation opea" system operation 9.2.1./.2 9.2-3 Replace "fach" with "At iditorial System design bas u, Byron, the", replace " tower is" with " towers are" and delete "Both towers in operation" 9 ? 5.1 9.2-29 Insert "Since the Document s ntem VitS I inal Report, Section !! . A.
act ive f ailut e" design basis page 9 9.2.5.! 9.2-29 Delete "reduadant" and fdiierial Editorial delete "Only essential tcwers " 9.7.5.1 0.2-29 laseri " Components . lahse Refer 9nce tha Editerial 9.7-1" and delete "The appropriate table for normal . . Blu/hr." :: nit heat loads
k.g s Byron /Ilrr.idwuo( 8893 14 UiSAR Change Log 3 of 5 IN:P 4-009 3/92 _Section Page !)escription of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 9.2.5.1 9.2-29 Delete references to lable Editorial Table and Iigures are being 9.2 6 and Figures 9.2-5 and deleted or revised. 4.2-5. Ixpand the discussion of f igure 9.2-7
'J . 2 . 5. 2 .1 9.2 29 Delete "aDuve normal water Iditorial System configuration levol" and 'troegh" 9.2.5.?.1 9.2-29a Change "sint.s" to " sink" (ditoriel Editorial 9.?.$.? 2 9.2-29a insert descriptien of the Rettect sy sten Letter Byron o? 0114 Preposed eserti ial scrvice wates conf 2quration lechnical Specifitation root ing towers Araondner,t , pdJe 2 9.7.5.7.1 9.? 29a Pelete *Each of . but Docurrr.1 u stem UHS final Report, Scotion !!.A, shutdown.' and insert "The design basis page 9 ultimate an occurrence" 9.2.5.1 9.2-29.i insert "Ihe ultimate heat Document system tiHS f inal Report, :,et.t ion I I . A,
. active failura." design basis. Daye 9 t).2.5.2.1 9.7 30 Replace " supply header" with Editorla! Proper terminology
" pump di scharqa
9.2.5.2.1 9.2-10 Colete stated setpoint Editorial infomation is not rart of the values. !;ef er to "a system design basis predetermined value" 9.7.5.2.2 9.2-30 Delete " emergency' iditorial Proper teminology 9.2.5.2.7 9.2-30 ilepin e *a voluine to" Doct: ment calculation Calculation NED M MsD-14, with
- sufficient . and results Revisinn 0, dated J.ir.uary 9, for" 1997 9.2.5.2.2 9,2 31 l'hange ' post " to "das ign Docuwnt system Ull's I inal keport . Sect ion iV.B.
ba s is" and inster t " low rever design basis page 25
. event."
M' t Byron /Braidwood 6843-/4 UESAR thange 103 4 of 6 DRP 4-009 3/92 Section l' age _ Description of Change Reason / Basis Peferenc g/Rcearks _ _ _ ,, S.2.5.2.2 9.2-31 Delete "t r ougS" Editoriai Proper teeminology 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-3) Delete " automatically" Reflect syst em Normal cperating precedure oreration a 2.5.2.2 9.?-31 Change " pest" to "desi.In Document calculetion Calculation NI.0-M-MSD-14, basis" results Revision 0, dated January 9. 1992 9.2.5.3.1 9.2-32 Delete "ait her . Docurent system Memo f rom 1. K Sr hotter to passive," replace ~without design basis G. Cont r ady dated August 2. imnaring failure" with 1991. UHS Iinal Report settice
*while . function *, II.A, page 10 reference Table 9.2-16, insert 'The review . a failure "
, 9.2.5.3.1.1 9.2 32a insert new subsertion Eocument system Lil5 finel Report, Sections ill desiun basis and IV r 9.2.5.3.1.2 9.2 33 Insert new <.ubsection title Lditorial Divide 14<qe subsection 9 2.5.3.1.2 9.i 33 Replace "above with "in Lditorial Editorial Subsection 9.2.5.3.1.1" 9.2.5.3.1.3 9.2-34 l'isert new subsection title Editorial Divide 14-or subscetiori 9.2.5.3.1.4 9.2 35 lasert new subsect ion title Editorial Divid !arge subsection 9.m.5.3.1.4 9.2-35 Replate 'a slight Editorial Prnpee terminology supertneling of" with
" freezing at" 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-36 Replace stated setpoint iditorial Informat ion it not part et the values with "a predetermined system design basis value" 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-37 Replace "is looked" with Reflect system Normal operat irg procedure
" remains" operation
M* L
=
Hyron/Braidwood 8893-74 UfSAR Change tog 5 of 6 DRP 4-009 3/97 Section Page Description of Chany _ _ Reason / Basis _ References /Remarts __ 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-37 Oclete discussion of post- Document calculation Calculation NED M-MSD 14 accident evaporation, blow- results Revision C. dated Jaiiuary 9, down, ar'.d makeilp ratos 1991 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-38 Delete "therefore" iditorial Ed ii.or i al 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-38 Poplace "in onc , down" Document system UHS f inal Report , sort ion II.A, with "cointident . . dosion base page 9 artise failure" 9.2.9 9.2 61 Insert referentes 7 through !ditorial References us-d in pr eparmy 11 new .'hsection 9.2.5.3.1.1 9.7 9.2 62 Revise lable 9.2 i Reflect system Nornu aperat ing ur otechtre operation 9.2 9.2-/! Delete Table 9.2-6 Editnrial Infornation containerf in riquer 9.2-7 4.2 9.2-9/ Revise Table 9.i-il Reflect systen dcsion Heat Exchariger Data Sheet s, l et t er i rom S . C . Meht .: to I. Lentina dated Jaii;sary i7 1993 9.2 9.2-98 Delete table 9./-12 fditorial information tontained in revised Table 9.2-!1 9./ 9.2-99 Delete Table 9.2-13 Editorial Information contained in revised Table 9.2-11 9.2 - Add Table 9.2 16 Doownt calculation "Vitimato Heat bir.L Desigo results Basis LOCA Single Failure scenarios." 5&L Calculation UHS-01. Revision I. Augus t 5. 1991
467 8 O 7
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