ML20094N008
| ML20094N008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1984 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8408160058 | |
| Download: ML20094N008 (2) | |
Text
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f" TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 1,1954 00
!7 BLRD-50-438/83-39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - WATER DAMAGE TO REACTOR BUILDING NORMAL SUMP ISOLATION VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR - BLRD-50-438/83 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on June 9,1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2381. This was followed by our interim reports dated July 8 and October 20, 1983 Enclosed is our final report.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing s
Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 e -
' OFFICIAL COPY-8408160058 840801 DR ADOCK 05000 An Equal o portunity Employer g
ENCLOSURE r~.*
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 WATER DAMAGE TO REACTOR BUILDING NORMAL SUMP ISOLATION VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR NCR 2381 BLRD-50-438/83-39 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficienci The motor operator and other internal electrical parts on the Reactor Building (RB) normal sump isolation valve (IWL-IFCV-068-B) were immersed in water during flooding of the RB Normal Sump Tank Room. The cause of this flooding was. valve misalignment during a flushing process. Because of a failure to take prompt corrective action on the operator, corrosion subsequently damaged the internal electrical parts. This failure to take corrective action stemmed from a failure of TVA's engineering personnel to evaluate the quality control investigation report (QCIR) which identified the soaked operator and generate a nonconformance report (NCR) from this QCIR. The NCR would then have required corrective action to be determined and performed which could have prevented any serious corrosion from occurring.
Safety Implications If the isolation valve motor operator had rusted to the point where it would fail to perform its intended function upon demand, then, during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), primary containment could be breached in that highly radioactive water from the sump tank could be pumped into the Auxiliary Building through the isolation valve. Therefore, this condition, had it remained uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.
Corrective Action TVA is shipping this motor-operator to Limitorque, the vendor, for repair and expects its reinstallation to be complete by April 19, 1985.
To prevent a recurrence of this condition, responsible personnel have been retrained in Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Construction Test Procedure (BNP-CTP) 6.1, " Cleaning and Flushing of Systems," which defines the alignment of the valves to be checked by quality control personnel before flushing. Also, BNP-CTP-10.4 has been revised (revision 10) to eliminate the use of QCIRs and this revision had an effective date of November 1, 1983 Conditions adverse to quality are now directly documented by NCR.
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