ML20094J605
| ML20094J605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1984 |
| From: | Swartz E COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 9053N, NUDOCS 8408140380 | |
| Download: ML20094J605 (32) | |
Text
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7'N Commonwealth Edison
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} Address Reply to: Post Othee bod 67
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j Chicago, Illinois 60690 August 2, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Additional FSAR Information NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455 and 50-456/457 Reference (a):
B. J. Youngblood letter to D. L. Farrar dated July 25, 1984
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter provides advance copies of responses to various Fire Protection questions for your immediate review to support our Byron Unit 1 Fuel Load.
Enclosed are responses to FSAR Questions 10.57, 10.63, 10.64, 10.65 and 10.66.
Our revised response to Question 10.57 is being provided as a result of our revised safe shutdown analysis.
Questions 10.63, 64, 65, and 66 respond to Item No. 5 of Reference (a).
Our Byron /Braidwood FSAR will be amended to include this information in the next Amendment.
Please address any questions that you or your staff may have concerning this matter to this office.
One signed original and fifteen. copies of this letter with Attachments are provided for your use.
Very truly yours, B
E. Do s Swart Nuc Licensing Administrator Attachment cc:
J. G. Keppler - RIII RIII Inspectors - B/B
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j, B/B-FSAR rww QUESTION 010.57
" Table 2.4-4a of.the safe shutdown analysis identifies E
safe shutdown instrumentation.
However, the analysis indicates that following a fire in a number of separate plant fire zones, redundant channels of certain of these instruments wh'ich must be available during hot shutdown will be lost.
This is unacceptable.
It-is our position that at least one channel of instrumentation essential
. c for ' safe shutdown be protected from fire damage in accor-dance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R or an alternate be provided'which meets the requirements of Section III.L of Appendix R.
The backup instrumentation justifi-cation discussion of these fire zones in the safe shutdown analysis does not comply with Section III.L.
Instrumen-
.tation'affected includes source range neutron flux mon-itoring, steam generator wide range level indication, reactor coolant hot and cold leg indication and auxiliary feedwater flow indication in the following areast a.
Control room b.
Lower cable spreading room c.
Auxiliary electrical equipment room L
- d. -Auxiliary bul'lding general Area, elevation 383'-0" e.
Radwaste and remote shutdown control room; and f.
Radwaste' drumming station and tunnel."
RESPONSE
L A discussion of each of the areas listed in the question
.follows.
Note that the lower cable spreading rooms are i
divided into five fire zones.
A discussion is provided for each zone.
Table Q10.57-1 lists the number of channels of instrumentation affected in each f.'re zone for each of L
the instrumentation types listed in the question except auxiliary feedwater flow indication.
It has been determined that auxiliary feedwater flow indication is not required for safe shutdown in the. event of a fire.
Also', the list in Table Q10.57-1 does not include now indication for some of these parameters added in response'to staff positions.
These are described in the applicable portions of Section 2.4'of the Fire Protection Report.
Reference to specific i
subsections which may be applicable are provided under the discussions for each fire zone which follows.
t 010.57-1 7
L
1 B/B-FSAR
'a.
Control Room (Fire Zone 2.1-0) l
'Both channels of source range neutron' monitoring instru-mentation would be affected by a fire in thin zone.
This-is due to the fact that the neutron monitoring system panel 1PM07J is located in the control room.
.It is the Applic~ ant's position, however, that the source range neutron monitoring instruments are not required
- to achieve or maintain the plant in the hot standby or. hot shutdown conditions.
In the event of a fire in this zone, the operators would have sufficient time to. scram the reactor prior to evacuating the room.
Once the control rods are inserted into the core, suf-
-ficient negative reactivity has been inserted to ensure subcriticality while hot standby or hot shutdown con-ditions are maintained.
Should it be necessary to deter-mine or verify the available shutdown margin, a primary coolant system sample can be drawn and analyzed for boron concentration.
This operation can be performed onsite by station personnel.
Thus, no reliance is placed on the neutron monitoring system instrumentation until actions are begun to take the plant to cold shutdown.
The Applicant believes this position meets Appendix R requirements.
In particular,Section III.L.l.a, which states that alternative shutdown capability shall be capable of achieving and maintaining suberiticality, is met by manually scramming'the reactor, since suberit-icality is assured by inserting the control rods into the core and maintaining hot standby conditions,-Section.
III.L.2.d, which states that-direct indication of process variables necessary to perform and control the reactivity control function shall be provided, is met because once the control rods have been inserted into the core, direct indication of neutron flux is'not required to control reactivity while hot standby is maintained.
Credit
.is taken for repairing fire damage to neutron monitoring system cables prior to initiating cold' shutdown actions, as per Appendix R.
In summary, the Applicant's position meets Appendix R and protection of neutron monitoring system cables from fire damage is not warranted.
Nevertheless, in response to a staff position, the Appli-cant has agreed to. provide indication of source range neutron flux independent of this zone.
Refer to subsec-tions 2.4.2.4 and 2.4.2.21 of the Fire Protection Report l
for a detailed description of the modifications provided.
010.57-2
-o B/B-FSAR b.
Lower Cable Spreading Rooms:
1)
Fire Zone 3.2A This zone does not contain any of the instrumentation cable Itsted for this question.
2)
Fire Zone 3.2B This zone contains cables from both trains of the neutron monitoring system.
Refer to part a of this response for the Applicant's position on this system.
Cables for all four wide range reactor coolant cold leg RTD's are routed through this zone.
As discussed in FPR Subsection 2.4.2.8, additional cold leg temperature indication will be provided independent of this zone at the fire hazards panel.
In the interim, operator training will allow use of steam generator pressure indication to infer reactor coolant cold leg temperature.
Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for other parameters listed in this question are routed through this zone.
Thus, addi-tional fire protection features are not required for this zone.
3)
Fire Zone 3.2C This zone contains cables from both trains of the neutron monitoring system.
Refer to part a of this response for the Applicant's position on this system.
Cables for all four wide range reactor coolant cold leg RTD's are routed through this zone (refer to part b.2 of this response).
Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for other parameters listed in this question are routed through this zone.
Thus, addi-tional fire protection features are not required for this zone.
4)
Fire Zone 3.2D Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for parameters listed in this question are routed through this zone.
Thus, additional fire protection features are not required for this zone.
5)
Fire Zone 3.2E Cables for all four channels of wide range reactor coolant hot leg indication and cables for Division 11 incore thermocouples are routed through this zone.
However, Division 12 incore thermocouple indication remains available.
Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for other parameters listed in this i
squestion are routed through this zone.
Thus, additional fire protection features are not required for this zone.
010.57-3
k B/B-FSAR l
c.
Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (Fire Zone 5.5-1) i Modifications to provide essential instrumentation independent of this zone are described in Subsection 2.4.2.21 of the Fire Protection Report.
d.
Auxiliary Building General Area - Elevation 383 feet
- 0. inch (Fire Zone 11.4-0)
Only one out of two channels of the neutron monitoring system are present in this zone.
Cables for all four l
channels of steam generator wide range level and reactor coolant hot and cold leg temperature instrumentation are present, however, these cables serve indication at the remote shutdown panel only.
Indication for these parameters is available in the control room and the fire hazards panel.
Thus, additional fire protection features are not required for this zone, e.
Radwaste and Remote Shutdown Control Rooms (Fire Zone
~11.4C-0)
The discussion under part d of this question for Fire Eone 11.4-0 is also applicable for this fire zone.
f.
Radwaste Drumming Station and Tunnel (Fire Zone 14.1-0)
The fire zone boundary of this zone is redefined in
.the revised Fire Protection Report.
The original boundary was arbitrary and did not conform to plant structural features.
The new boundary follows a structural concrete wall.
As a result of this change, the area on elevation 383 feet 0 inch roughly between column-rows 21 and 25 and P to Q was deleted from Fire Zone 14.1-0 and added to Fire Zone 14.4-0.
This area included the cables from the safe shutdown instrumentation listed in this question.
Fire Zone 14.1-0 now contains no safe shutdown cables.
Refer to part e of this question' for a resolution of this question for Fire Ione 11.4-0.
4 9
s 010.57-4
m-TABLE Q10.57-1
.f INSTRUNENTATION CHANNELS BOUTED THROUGE FIRE SOMES INSTRUMENTATION
-RC HOf AND FIRE NEUTRON SG WIDE COLD LEG AREA BONE MONITORING RANGE LEVEL TEMPERATURE a.
Control Room 2.1-0 SR: 2/2 b.
Lower Cable 3.2A-1 Spreading Rooms 3.2B-1 SR: 2/2 2/4 Cold Legs.4/4~
Cold Leg: 4/4 3.2C-1 SR: 2/2 2/4 Cold Leg: 4/4**
(_,
3.2D-1
-Y'
-3.2E-1 SR: 1/2 2/4 Hot Leg:' 4/4-g-
o g
c.
AEER 5.5-1 SR: 2/2 4/4 Hot Leg:
4/4 8
(Power Sources)
Cold Leg: 4/4 8*
d.
Aux. Bldg.
11.4-0 SR: 1/2 4/4**
Hot Leg:. 4/4**
El. 383 ft 0 in.
Cold Leg: 4/4**
e.
RSP 11.4C-0 SR: 1/2 4/4**
Hot Leg:
4/4**
Cold Leg:.4/4**
f.
Radwaste 14.1-0 (1/2)*
(4/4)*
- Due to redefinition of fire zone boundaries, Fire Zone 14.1-0 now has no safe shutdown cables. routed through it.
- Remote shutdown panel indication only.
m B/B-FSAR QUESTION 010.63 "The inspection of Byron, Unit 1 indicated that the information provided-in the fire protection report may not reflect as built condition.
For-as built conditions, provide a' list of all fire areas containing redundant safe shtudown equipment or cabling (power, control and instrumentation) including associated circuits, for each of the Byron /Braidwood units."
RESPONSE
The safe shutdown analysis contained in Section 2.4 of the Fire Protection Report has been revised (Amendment 3) to reflect the as-built condition of. Byron Unit 1.
All fire areas con-taining redundant safe shutdown equipment or cabling are addressed in the safe shutdown analysis.
'The safe shutdown analyses for Byron Unit 2 and Braidwood Units 1 and 2 have not yet been performed; isowever, these analyses will reflect the as-built condition of the respective units.
e Q10.63-1 i
B/B-FSAR QUESTION 010.64 "The inspection of Byron, Unit l' and the fire protection report indicate extensive reliance on manual operations for safe shutdown; however, procedures have not been developed.. For each fire area of the Byron /Braidwood units, provide a summary of the post-fire operator actions necessary for safe shutdown and the location of the operator ac tions.
For fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment for two units or shared equipment, address the actions necessary for safe shutdown of both units."
RESPONSE
Refer to revised Subsection 2.4.1.5 of the Fire Protection Report (Amendment 3), which responds to this question for Byron-Unit 1.
A safe shutdown analysis for Byron-Unit 2 has not yet been performed.
The Unit 2 safe shutdown analysis will address the last part of this question regarding manual actions required for sate shutdown of both units.
This analysis is expected to be available by January 1985.
9 l
s Q10.64-1 i
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BYRON-FSAR QUESTION 010.65 "The response to Question 10.55 provided by Amendment 39, ragarding operator response to plant transients caused by fire-induced spurious operation of equipment does not provide sufficient detail.
For each fire area, identify the plant transients that could be initiated by fire-induced spurious operation of equipment.
Identify the instrumentation available to the operator to assess the transient and necessary corrective actions to be taken.
Identify how the corrective actions would be integrated into the shutdown actions identified for Question 10.64 "
RESPONSE
Valves are the only plaot equipment considered subject to spurious operation, as a result of a fire, which could impact the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
Spurious starting of pumps due to a fire is i:ot considered because there is no adverse safety impect of a pump starting.
An analysis has been performed to identify those valves which are subject to spurious actuation due to a fire and could impact safe shutdown capability.
Assumptions The assumptions made in performing the analysis were as follows:
a.
Appendix R definitions of safe shutdown capability were used; b.
Fire occurs in only one fire zone of the plant; Spurious actuation of a valve resul'ys from hot short c.
or open to power or control cables; 1 d.
Only one spurious actuation occurs poh single fire; e.
Spurious actuation plus failure of ide c.ical redundant
. components were not considered because raparation of redundant equipment is addressed in Shetion 2.4 of the. Fire Protection Report; and
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f.
Valves with power locked out were not cons 9ered because a hot chort of the control cables wUuld s
not cause actuation.
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010.65-1
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BYRON-FSAR System Review Each plant system's piping and instrumentation diagram whs reviewed to determine the effect of the worst case singla spurious valve actuation.
(Pressurizer PORV's, block valves, and RHR suction valves have been addressed in Subsection 2.4.3 of the Fire Protection Report.)
As a result of the system review, 17 valves were identified whose fire-induced actuation could affect safe shutdown capability of the plant.
These valves are as follows:
a.
Auxiliary feedwater pump discharge test valves lAF004A and 1AF004B; spurious operation closes valve A (B) and results in loss of AFW train A(B) flow, b.
Fire protection system containment isolation valves 1FP010 and 1FP011; spurious operation closes either valve and results in loss of water supply for hose stations inside containment.
c.
Essential service cooling tower hot water bypass valves OSX162A, OSX162B, OSX162C, and OSX162D; spurious operation opens valves A or C (B or D) resulting in reduced cooling of essential service water train A (B).
d.
Essentia-service water pump suction valves 1SX001A and 1SX001B; spurious operation closes valve A(B) resulting in loss of ESW train A(B).
e.
RCFC essential service water inlet valves 1SX016A and 1SX016B; spurious operation closes valve A(B) resultir, in loss of RCFC train A(B).
f.
IGFC essential service water outlet valves 1SX027A and 1SX027B; spurious operation closes valve A(B) resulting in loss of RCFC train A(B).
g.
Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil cooler outlet valve 1SX101A; spurious operation closes valve resulting in loss of lube oil cooling.
h.
. Suction valve 1SX173 for engine-driven cooling water pump for diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump; spurious operation closes valve resulting in loss of oil and pump cubicle cooling.
- i. s Diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump cooler outlet valve 1SX178; spurious operation closes valve resulting in loss of oil and pump cubicle cooling.
Q10.65-2 e.mm:;azac>mv:sury w.mwea:#.a= mw m,mv r,,mee-m
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.I BYRON-FSAR
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. Table Q10.65-1 lists the cables required for each of the above valves.and Table 010.65-2 gives the cable routing byJfire-zoneDfor these valves.
(Cable listings and routings
~forsvalves OSX162C and OSX162D are not given since these fare Unit 2 valves.
- However, J the evaluation which follows addresses these valves as well as the Unit 1 valves OSX162A and OSX162B.)
e Evaluation-4.
The cable routings for the 17 valves listed above (except
-lFP010 and lFP0ll) were reviewed against the cable routings ifor other safe shutdown components to determine if a single fire could result in a cpurious valve actuation and a simul-taneous. loss ~of1 function of redundant safe shutdown' components suchlthat safe shutdown capability would be impaired.
The results of this review are given in Table 010.65-3 which s
.is a tabulation of the fire zones for which safe shutdown
-capability.could be impaired.
Valves 1FP010 and 1FP011
'were;not-reviewed in the above manner since-the spurious
. actuation-alone iresults in the worst case effect on safe
' shutdown capability.
Fire zones in which a fire could cause e
spurious operation of.these valves are those zones listed
'in. Table 1Q10. 6 5-2.
Disposition of Results iAsishown in Tables Q10.65-2 and Q10.65-3, there-are numerous ifire zones for'which spurious actuation of any of the 17 valvescidentified previously due to a single fire could affect lthefsafefshutdown capabilitylof the plant...The.following.
9
-discussion' addresses the actions-that will be taken in. regard.
- to these; valves..
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a.~ Valves lAF004A and 1AF004B
~Inithe.eventLof a' loss ofiall AFW' flow there are
- numerous. control'roon% indications thatvin'dicate:
.a lossiof?feedwater flow to the steam generators
' and AFW pump trouble.
Also, there are existing
.proceduresLavailable to cover'this: event.
In particular,.
one.oramoreiofjthe,following procedures could be sco
$ applicable)foria. loss of:AFW: flow':-
(l'.
'~1BEP'-0,7" Reactor Tr'ipor-Safety Injection";
(2...lBEP-0.l', " Reactor' Trip l Recovery";~and s
E L.3. 51BFR-H.li)" Response.to Loss _ cf Secondary Heat,
Sink."-
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JQ10.65 '
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BYRON-FSAR I
Furthermore, in the event'of a loss of AFW flow, there is adequate time for;the operators.to diagnose
~
the. problem and determine which procedure to follow.
b..
Valves 1FP010 and 1FP0ll o
These. valves are normally open energized valves, thus they fail closed on loss of power.
The fire protection line served by.thesa-valves is only required in the event of a fire-inside containment.
The cables-for outboard isolation valve 1FP010 are routed
~ outside containment and, therefore, a fire inside containment could not spuriously close this valve.
Spurious closure.of 1FP010 or 1FP011 due to a fire outside containment is not a problem'since it would not be necessary to supply. water to hose stations,
-inside containment.
Since a fire.inside containment could cause spurious closure.of' inboard isolation valve 1FP0ll, the valve will either be modified to allow manual reopening, or the valve will be replaced with a check valve.
Assuming that 1FP011-is modified for manual operation,
'it has been verified that this valve is in an accessible location.
Albo,-lFP0ll can be reached by a fire hose brought in from outside containment through the personnel hatch.
Thus, in the event of a fire in the immediate location of 1FP0ll, the fire hose could be used to cool off the valve and surrounding area prior to manually operating 1FP011.
If the present valve is replaced with a check valve, spurious. actuation due to a fire could not occur.
c.
Valves OSX162A, OSX162B,.0SX162C, and OSX162D Spurious opening of any of these valves would be detected by a gradual rise in essential service water temperature.
Sufficient time (at least 30 minutes) is available to allow for manual valve closure.
- d. ' Valves ISX001A and 1SX001B Circuit breakers supplying power to these valves will be deenergized during normal plant operation.
This will preclude spurious operation of these valves.
e.
Valves 1SX016 A, 1SXOl6B, 1SX027A, and 1SX027B The worst case scenario involving these valves assumes that a fire in the auxiliary building damages the Q10.65-4
l.
BYRON-FSAR
'[
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h power cables to one train of RCFC f ans and causes a spurious closure of either the inlet or outlet valve for the essential service water supply to I
the redundant RCFC train.
This would result in i
a complete loss of RCFC function until the valve i
could be manually reopened.
Instrumentation available l
to the operator ' to determine that this situation l'
exists includes containment temperature indication l
and RCFC status indication in the main control room.
i.
It has been verified that the inlet and outlet valves j
dre accessible for manual operation.
l
+In addition, a calculation is in progress for the loss of all RCFC's (conservatively assuming that the reactor continues to operate at full power) to determine if sufficient time (at least 30 minutes) l is available to allow for manual operation prior
}
to the time at which the containment temperature I
reaches the equipment environmental qualification temperature (325* F).
h f.
Valves 1SX101A, 1SX173, and 1SX178
-The consequence of the worst case scenario involving L
spurious operation of any one of these valves is a loss of all auxiliary feedwater flow.
Refer to item a. above.
f.
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C Q10.65-5 m
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BYRON-FS'AR
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TABLE!Q10.65-1" q
POWER AND CONTROL CABLES -FOR
-VALVES'WHOSE; SPURIOUS ACTUATION COULD AFFECT' SAFE SHUTDOWN-CAPABILITY.
' CABLE-NC..
' DESCRIPTION TYPE *
- Valve'lAF004A-lAF197~
Junction Box lJB795A to valve limit C
- switch. -(close) 1AF198
'lJB795A to valve solenoid C
"lAF199-lJB795A to valve limit switch (open)
- C
'lJB795A tolPrdtection System Cabinet C
1AF200' 1PA09J
~
1AF201-
-lJB795A to Handswitch lHS-AF121 C
1AF202.
'lJB795A~tofl25-Vdc-ESF Distribution C.
Panel 111 (lDC05EA) s
~1AF311-
.lJB795A to. Valve Accumulator Pressure?
C' Switch 1PS-AF156A Valve 1AF004B-l 1AF204
' Junction Box lJB796A to valve limit C
' switch (close) 1AF205 lJB796A to valve solenoid:
C flAF206 lJB796A'to valve limit switch (open)
C ElAF207=
'lJB796A to Protection -System Cabinet:
C 1PA10J.
- lAF208 lJB796A to Handswitch 1HS-AF122 C
- lAF209*
lHS-AF122 to 125-Vdc Distributiuon C
Panel 112 (lDC06EA) 1AF312 lJB796A to Valve Accumulator Pressure C
Switch 1PS-AF156B
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3' 010.65-6
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BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-1 (Cont ' d)
CABLE NO.
DESCRIPTION TYPE
- Valve 1FP010 1FP035 Containment Isolation Panel 1PMllJ C
to Junction Box lJB618A 1FP036 lJB618A to valve solenoid C
1FP037
-lJB618A to valve limit switch (open)
C 1FP038 lJB618A to valve limit switch (close)
C 1FP039 1PMllJ to Safeguards Test Cabinet C
1PA12J 1FPO40 1 pal 2J to Protection System Cabinet C
1PA10J Valve 1FP0ll 1FP030 Containment Isolation Panel lPMllJ to C
Penetration 1SIO3E 1FP031 ISIO3E to Junction dox.lJB662R
.C 1FP032 Junction Box lJB238R to valve C
lFP033 10B238R to valve' limit switch (open)
C lFP034
~1JB238R to valve limit switch (close)
C lFP458' lJB662R to lJB238R C
Valve OSX162A 5.t-1SX155-480-Vac ESW Cooling Tower MCC 131Z1 P
(LAP 93E) to valve 1SX156 LAP 93E to valve limit switch
- C, -
lSX157 1AP93E to handswitch at MCB OPM0lJ C
1SX158 Handswitch at MCB OPM0lJ to Temperature C
Switch OTS-SX090 s
-lSX345 Handswitch.at MCB OPM0lJ to 4160-Vac C
ESF Switchgear Bus 141 (lAPOSEB)
Q10. 6 5-7 4
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BYRON-FSAR-
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. TABLE Q10.65-1 (Cont ' d )
L
-CABLE'NO.
DESCRIPTION TYPE
- Valve OSX162B' -
-lSX167 480-Vac ESW Cooling Tower MCC 132Z1
?
.(1AP92E) to. valve
-lSX168-1AP92E to valve limit' switch C
1SX169 1AP92E to handswitch at MCB OPM0lJ C
'lSX170 Handswitch at MCB'OPM01J to Temperature C
Switch 0TS-SXO91
.lSX346 Handswitch at MCB OPM0lJ to 4160-Vac C
ESF Switchgear Bus 142 LAP 06EB
- Valve lSX001A lSXO31 480-Vac MCC 131X3 (LAP 22E) to valve P
lSX032 1AP22E to valve limit switch C
1SXO33
. LAP 22E to handswitch at MCB: LPM 06J C
Valve'1SX001B.
ISX035 480-Vac MCC 132Xl (LAP 23E) to valve P
~
lSXO36 1AP23E to valve limit switch C
1SXO37 1AP23E to handswitch at MCB LPM 06J C
Valve 1SX016A 1SX051~
480-Vac'MCC 131X5 (LAP 30E) to valve P
LlSX052 1AP30E to valve limit switch.
C 1SX053:
LAP 30E to handswitch at MCB 1PM06J C
ISX473 Handswitch at MCB LPM 06J to Protection C
System Cabinet 1PA09J
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Q10.65-8 h--
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BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-1 (Cont'd)
CABLE NO.
DESCRIPTION TYPE
- Valve 1SX016B 1SX054.
480-Vac MCC 132X4 (LAP 28E) to Valve P
1SX055 1AP28E to valve limit switch C
1SX056 1AP28E to handswitch at MCB 1PM06J C
1SX475 Handswitch at.MCB LPM 06J to Protection C
System Cabinet 1PA10J Valve 1SX027A ISX057 480-Vac MCC 131XS (LAP 30E) to valve P'
1SX058 1AP30E to valve limit switch C
1SX059 1AP30E ta handswitch at MCB LPM 06J C-1SX208-LAP 30E to Remote Shutdown Panel lPLO4J C
Valve lSXO27B
.1SX060 480-Vac MCC=132X4 (LAP 28E). to valve P
-lSXO61 LAP 28E to valve limit switch
.C 1SX062 1AP28E to handswitch at MCB-LPM 06J C
1SX209 1AP28E to Remote Shutdown Panel 1PLO5J C
Valve'lSX101A ISX471 4160-Vac ESF Switchgear Bus 141-LAP 05EM-P to valve solenoid Valve ISX173
AFW pump 1B-startup panel lAF01J'
'~
^ lSX075' NFW pump 1B.startupfpanel lAF0lJ C
to valve solenoid a
- 1VA584-480-Vac-ESF Switchgear Bus 132X (LAP 12E)
C to AFW pump lB startup panel lAF01J.
Q10.65-9
. p.
s
' BYRON-FSAR
. TABLE Q10.65-1 : (Cont'd) t-CABLE.NO.
- DESCRIPTION
- TYPE *
. Valve--1SX178' 1AF196
'480-Vac ESF_'MCC 132X1 (LAP 23E)
P to'AFW pump =1B startup panel ~lAF0lJ LISXO76
' AFW-pump 1B startup-panel lAF0lJ C
i to valve solenoid
-lSX347.'.
- AFW pump 1B startup panel ~lAF0lJ C
to valve limit' switch
- lVA584 480-Vac ESF Switchgea'r Bus 132X. (LAP 12E)
C to AFW pump 1B startup panel'1AF0lJ A
e e-ee 4
- P =-Power
.C;= C$ntrol t'
- \\.
i 2
Q10. 65-10
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, + -, -, -
c-.,w--.3r-,..,---w.
,,_,,,--,..c,-e....--,.c
.,,rtwe-e-ww----
e
[i BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 CABLE LISTING BY FIRE ZONE FOR VALVES WHOSE SPURIOUS ACTUATION COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE ZONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves lAF004A and 1AF004B 3.2-0 1AF207 1AF004B 3.2A-1 1AF209 1AF004B
~3.2B-1 1AF207 1AF004B 1AF209 1AF004B 3.2C-1 1AF207 1AF004B 1AF209 1AS004B
~3.2D-1 1AF209 1AF004B 3.2E-1 1AF200 1AF004A 1AF202 1AF004A 3.3B-1 1AF200 1AF004A 1AF202' 1AF004A 3.3C '
1AF200 1AF004A 3.3D-l~
lAF200 1AF004A 1AF202 1AF004A 3.4A-1 1AF200 lAF004A' 1AP202 1AF004A 5.4-1 lAF200 1AF004A-lAF202 1AF004A 5.5-1 1AF200 1AF004A.
lAF207 1AF004B 5.6-1 1AF202 1AF004A
~
'11.4-0 1AF197 1AF004A 1AF198
.lAF004A V
1AF199
'lAF004A 1AF200 1AF004A'
'lAF202
-1AF004A 1AF204 1AF004B 1AP205 1AF004B 1AF206 1AF004B 010.65-11 V
_ z.
BYRON-FSAR
. TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont ' d )
FIRE ZONE CABLE'NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves-1AF004A and 1AF004B (Cont'd) 1AF207 1AF004B 1AF208 1AF004B 1AF209 1AF004B 1AF311 1AF004A 1AF312 1AF004B 11.4-1 1AF201
'lAF004A
. Valves 1FP010 and 1FP011 1.2-1 1FP031.
lFP0ll 1FP032 IFP0ll 1FP033 1FP0ll 1FP034 1FP0ll 1FP458 1FP0ll-2.1-0 1FP030 1FP0ll 1FP035 1FP010 1FP059 1FP010 3.2-0 1FP035 1FP010 3.2B-1 1FP040 1FP010 1FP059 1FP010 3.2C-1 1FP035 1FP010 1FP059 1FP010 3.2E-1 1FP030 1FP0ll
.3.3C-1 1FP030 1FP0ll 3.3D-1 1FP030 1FP011 3.4A-1 1FP030 1FP011 4-11.3-0 1FP035 1FP010 11.3-1 1PP035 1FP010 s
IFP036 1FP010 1FP037 1FP010 1FP038 1FP010 11.4-0 1FP035 1FP010 Q10. 6 5-12
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont ' d )
FIRE ZONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves IFP010 and lFP0ll (Con t ' d )
11.5-0 1FP030 1FP0ll 1FP035 1FP010 ll.5A-1 1FP030 1FP0ll 11.6-0 1FP030 1FP0ll 1FP035 1FP010 Valves OSX162A and OSX162B 2.1-0 1SX157 OSX162A 1SX158 OSX162A ISX169 OSX162B 1SX170 OSX162B 1SX345 OSX162A 1SX346 OSX162B f
3.2-0 1SX170 OSX162B 3.2A-1 ISX157-OSX162A 1SX169 OSX162B 1SX345-OSX162A ISX346 OSX162B 3.2B-1 ISX169 OSX162B 1SX346 OSX162B
. 3.2C-1 ISX169 OSX162B 1SX170 OSX162B 1SX346 OSX162B
. 3.2E-1 ISX158 OSX162A 3.3A-1
-lSX157 OSX162A 3.3B-1 ISX157 OSX162A ISX345 OSX162A
. 3.3C-1 ISX157 OSX162A 4
1SX158 OSX162A
)
(
ISX345 OSX162A 3.3D-1 ISX158 OSX162A Q10.65-13 a
sh
- BYRON-$SAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont ' d )
FIRE ZONE CABLE-NO.
' VALVE NO.
Valves OSX162A-and OSX162B (Con t ' d )
- 3.4A-1 ISX158 OSX162A-5.1-1 ISX169 OSX162B 1SX346 OSX162B
- 5.2-1 ISX157 OSX162A ISX345 OSX162A J
- 5.3-1' 1SX157.
OSX162A 5.4-1 1SX345 OSX162A 5.6-1 ISX157-OSX162A 1
1SX345
'0SX162A 11.lA-0 ISX158 OSX162A ll.lB-0 ISX170 OSX162B
-11.2-0 ISX158 OSX162A 1SX170 OSX162B 11.3-0 ISX158
-0SX162A 1SX170 OSX162B 11.4-0 ISX158 OSX162A 1SX170 OSX162B 11.5-0 ISX158 OSX162A 1SX170 OSX162B 11.6-0 ISX158 OSX162A 1SX170 OSX162B 17.2-1 ISX167 OSX162B ISX168 OSX162B 17.2-2 ISX155 OSX162A 1SX156 OSX162A ISX157 OSX162A
\\
18.4-1 ISX157 OSX162A ISX345 OSX162A Q10.65-14 w-4 r e
,-r--v-y
--,n w=--gr
m e
~
BTRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont ' d )
-FIRE ~ ZONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves OSX162A and OSX162B (Cont ' d )
18.14A-1 ISX167 OSX162B 1SX168 OSX162B 1SX169 OSX162B
-Valves 1SX001A and 1SX001B 2.1-0 ISX033 ISX001A 1SXO37 ISX001B 3.2-0 1SX037 1SX001B.
3.2C-1 1SX037 ISX001B 3.2E-1 ISX033 1SX001A 3.3C-1 1SX033 1SX001A 3.3D-1 ISX033 1SX001A 3.4A 1SX033 1SX001A 11.1A-1 ISX031 1SX001A 1SX032 1SX001A 11.1B-0 1SX035 OSX001B 1SX036 OSX0013 11.2-0 1SX031 1SX001A 1SX032 1SX001A 1SX035 1SX001B 1SXO36 ISX001B 11.3-0 1SXO31 ISX001A 1SX032 1SX001A 1SX035 ISX001B 1SX036 ISX001B 1SXO37 1SX001B 11.4-0 1SXO31 1SX001A 1SX032 1SX001A s
1SX033 ISX001A 1SX037 ISX001B.
Q10. 6 5-15
.. +..
a.
.a
, p -+..
--s s. m
c BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont ' d )
FIRE 'ONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Z
~
Valves 1SX001A anct ISX001B (Cont ' d )
11.5-0 1SX033 1SX001A 1SX037-ISX001B 11.6-0 ISXO33 ISX001A ISX037 1SX001B Valves 1SX016A and 1SX016B 2.1-0 lSX053 ISX016A ISX056 ISX016B 1SX473 1SX016A ISX475 1SX016B 3.1-1 ISX056 1SX016B 3.2A-1 1SX056 ISX016B 3.2B-1 ISX475 ISXOl6B 3.2C-1 1SX056 ISX016B ISX475 1SX016B 3.2D-1 ISX056 ISX016B
,3.2E-1 ISX053 1SX016A 3.3B-1 ISX473 ISX016A 3.3C-1 ISX053 ISX016A 1SX473 ISX016A 3.3D-1 ISX053 ISX016A 3.4A-1 1SX053 ISX016A 5.5-1 ISX473 ISX016A 1SX475 ISX016B 11.3-1 ISX051 ISX016A ISX052 ISX016A 1SX055 1SX016B
\\
ll.3E-1 ISX051 ISX016A.
010.65-16
. w w
=.
=
-L
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Cont'd)
FIRE ZONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves 1SX016A and 1SX016B (Con t ' d )
11.5-0 1SX051 1SX016A 1SX052 1SX016A 1SX054 ISX016B 1SX055 1SX016B 1SX056 1SX016B ll.5A-1 ISX051 ISX016A 1SX052 ISX016A 11.58-1 ISX054 1SX016B 1SX055 ISX016B
~
11.6-0 1SX051 ISX016A 1SX052 ISX016A 1SX053 1SX016A 11.6-1 1SX054 1SX016B 1SX055 ISX016B 1SX056 ISXOl6B
' valves ISX027A and 1SX027B 2.1-0 2SX059 ISX027A 1SX062 ISX027B'
.3.1-1 ISX062 1SX027B 1SX209 ISX027B
'3.2A-1 1SXO62
- 1SX027B, 1SX209-lSX027B 3.?C-1 ISX062 1SX027B 3.2D-1 1SX062 1SX027B-3.2E-l~
ISX059 1SX027A 3.3C-l=
ISX059 ISX027A
'3.3D-1
-lSX059 ISX027A
'3.'4A-l' 1SX059 1S*;0 27A 11'.3-0 1SX209 ISX027B Q10. 6 5-17
(l BYRON-FSAR e
F TABLE Q10.65-2 (Con t ' d )
-FIRE-ZONEL CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
Valves ISX027h and ISX027B -(Cont'd) 11.3-11 ISX057' 1SX027A ISX058 ISX027A 1SX061 1SX027B ll.3E 1SX057 1SX027A 11.4-0 1SX208 ISX027A ISX209 1SX027B ll.4C-0 ISX208 ISX027A-ISX209 ISX027B 11.5-0 1SX057 ISX027A 1SX058
-1SX027A 1SX060 1SX027B 1SX208 1SX027A 1SX209 1SX027B 11.5-1.
ISX062 1SX027B
'll.5A-1 ISX057 ISX027A.
1SX058 ISX027A ll.5B-1 1SX060 1SX027B 1SX061 ISX027B 11.6-0 1SXG57 ISX027A-ISX058 ISX027A ISX017A ISX059 ISX062 ISX027B 1SX208 ISX027A ISX209 ISX027B 11.6-1 ISX060 1SX027B 1SX061 ISX027B 1SXO62 1SX027B Va'lve 1SX101A 5.2-1 1SX471 1SX101A 11.4-0 1SX471 1SX101A 11.5-0 1SX471 ISX101A 11.6-0 ISX471 1SX101A Q10.65-18 i-
- 2...
.-a
-,- m.-
<- m -,- m
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-2 (Con t ' d )
- FIRE ZONE CABLE NO.
VALVE NO.
~
- valves-ISX173 and 1SX178 3.1-1 lVA584 ISX173 and 1SX178 5.1-1 lVA584 ISX173 and 1SX178
.11.3-0 1AF196 1SX173 and 1SX178
~
-11.4-0 1AF196 1SX173 and 1SX178
~
IVA584 ISX173 and 1SX178 ll.4A-1 lAF196 ISX173 and ISX178-ISX075 1SX173-
~
1SX076 1SX178 1SX347 ISX178 1VA584 1SX173 and ISX178 11.5-0
.IVA584 ISX173 and ISX178
='De e.
w e
~
Q10. 6 5-19 k _ kgRh 4m j
3
.W
p.
- ~.
- s
- Vf?
' BYRON-FSAR
~
TABLE-Q10.65-3 SPURIOUSL'Y ACTUATED VALVES AND REDUNDANT
, EQUIPMENT WITH CABLING IN COMMON FIRE 2ONES FIRE ZONES CONTAINING CABLING FOR VALVE AND
. VALVE REDUNDANT-EQUIPMENg REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT 1AF004A.
-Auxiliary feedwater 5.4-1, pump 1B (lAF0lPB) 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 Auxiliary feedwater 3.2A-1 1AF004B' pump 1A (1AF0lPA) 11.~4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0.
OSX162A ESW pump 1B (lSX0lPB) 11.2 11.3-0
.11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 OSX162B ESW pump 1A (lSX0lPA) 11.2-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0
- lSX001A ESW pump 1B. (lSX01PB) 11.2-0' 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 a
~
IS'X001A Centrifugal' charging 3.2A-1 pump 1B (lCV0lPB) 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX001A' RCFC train B fan'lVP01CB 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 s
ISX001A RCFC train B f an IVP01CD 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 010.65-20
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-3 (Cont ' d)
FIRE ZONES CONTAINING CABLING FOR VALVE AND VALVE REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT ISX001A Auxiliary feedwater pump 1B 11.3-0 (lAF0lPB) 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 1SX001B ESW pump 1A (lSX0lPA) 11.2-0 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 1SX001B Centrifugal charging 11.3-0 pump 1A (lCV0lPA) 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX001B RCFC trair A fan IVP01CA 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0
~1SX001B RCFC train A fan IVP01CC 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 1SX001B Auxiliary feedwater 11.4-0 pump 1A (lAF0lPA) 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISXOl6A' ESW pump '1:B (lSX0lPB) 11.$-1 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISXOl6A RCFC train B fan IVP01CB 11.5-0 11.6-0 lSX016A; RCFC train B fan IVP01CD 11.5-0 11.6-0
'lSX016B ESW pump 1A (ISX0lPA) 3.2A-1 11.3-1 11.5-0
\\
ISXOl6B RCFC train A fan IVP01CA 11.5-0
'lSX016B RCFC train A fan IVP01CC 11.5-0
--010.65-21 a
r'
- r
~
i;*.>
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-3 (Cont ' d)
FIRE ZONES CONTAINING CABLING FOR VALVE AND VALVE REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT'
' REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT ISX027A-
..ESW pump 1B (ISX0lPB) 11.3-1
~
11.4-0 ll.4C-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX027A RCFC train B fan IVP01CB-11.4-0 ll.4C-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX027A.
RCFC' train B fan IVP01CD 11.'4-0 ll.4C-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX027B ESW pump lA. (ISX0lPA) 3.2A-1 3.2C-1 11.3-0 11.3-1 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX027B
'RCFC train A fan IVP01CA 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX027B.
RCFC' train A fan IVP01CC 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 e
ISX101A Auxiliary feedwater 11.4-0
_ pump 1B ' (lAF0lPB) 11.5-0 11.6-0 ISX10lN ESW pump 1B (ISXOlPB) 11.4-0 11.5-0 11.6-0 lSX173,*
Auxiliary feedwater 11.4-0 pump 1A (lAF0lPA) 11.5-0 ISX170 ESW pump 1A (lSX0lPA) 11.3-0 11.4-0 11.5-0 010.65-22
l
+,.;-
BYRON-FSAR TABLE Q10.65-3 (Cont ' d)
I FIRE ZONES CONTAINING
+
CABLING-FOR VALVE AND EVALVE REDUNDANT ~ EQUIPMENT REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT
'lSX178 Auxiliary feedwater 11.4-0 i
pump 1A (lAF0lPA) 11.5-0 i
1SX178 ESW pump 1A (lSX0lPA) 11.3-0 11.4-0 L
11.5-0 j
V i
t
..t,,
w t
I V
Q10.65-23 W
c-Ep:
'O-
~
'B/B-FSAR
' QUESTION L10.66 "The'firefprotection report, Section 2.4.1.6, indicates that the' ability exists to achieve and maintain hot shutdown independent offeach fire zone, without taking' credit.for repairs. fHowever, the June 17, 1983 revision of the. report indicates that repairs'are necessary.to overcome fire-induced spurious operation of the pressurizer PORV.
SRP Section 9.5.1 requires'that~one train of' systems necessary to~ achieve and maintain hot standby /.
shutdown be free of fire damage.
Provide a description-of.the. design modifications necessary to prevent spurious operation of the PORV or describe the operator actions necessary to overcome spurious operation of the PORV without repairs.
Additionally, verify that' operator actions identified in Questions 10.64 and.10.65 do not require repairs to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions."
RESPONSE
Refer.to= revised Subsection 2.4.3.2.2.3 of the Fire Protection Report (Amendment.3) for-a discussion of design modifications and operator actions necessary to overcome spurious operation of the pressurizer PORV's.
No repairs are7 required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions.
I 1
\\
l Q10.66-1
.