ML20094C295
| ML20094C295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1984 |
| From: | Guild R CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, GUILD, R., PALMETTO ALLIANCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8408070443 | |
| Download: ML20094C295 (195) | |
Text
% b; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- a r-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING BOARD ~
24
-5 Pl :56
-In The Matter Of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, ~et al.
)
Docket Nos.
~
)
50-413, 50-414 g) (,
Catawba' Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 & 2
)
(Emergency Planning)
PALMETTO ALLIANCE & CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP PROPOSED FINDINGS'OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ROBERT GUILD 2135-1/2 DEVINE STREET COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29205 ATTORNEY FOR PALMETTO ALLIANCE JESSE L. RILEY PHILLIP L. RUTLEDGE BETSY M. LEVITAS 854 HENLEY PLACE CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28207 CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP JJuly 27, 1984 D-~
8408070443 840727 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G
[
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING BOARD
[
24 r?S -5 Pi :57 6:
In The Matter Of
)
~
'3 dcf '
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et,al.
.)
Docket Nos.
)
50-413, 50-414 Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 & 2
)
(Emergency Planning)
PALMETTO ALLIANCE & CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ROBERT GUILD 2135-1/2 DEVINE STREET L
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29205 ATTORNEY FOR PALMETTO ALLIANCE JESSE L. RILEY PHILLIP L. RUTLEDGE BETSY M. LEVITAS-854 HENLEY PLACE CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28207 CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY (
JP July 127, 1984
PALMETTO ALLIANCE & CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION Page INTRODUCTION.
1 INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 1 and 7 PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 7
INTERVENOR' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 3 and 6 THE ADEQUACY OF PLANNING FOR SHELTERS TO BE USED IN AN EVACUATION 88 INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 8 INADEQUATE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES 103 INTERVENORS ' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 9 PROMPT ALERT AND NOTIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC 127 INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 EXPANSION OF THE PLUME EPZ INTO SOUTHEAST CHARLOTTE 141 INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 14 and 15 EVACUATION.
174 INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 18 ADEQUACY OF LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM 185 CONCLUSION OF LAW 190
PALMETTO ALLIANCE & CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION INTRODUCTION 1.
This Partial Initial Decision addresses the contested emergency planning issues with respect to the application for operating licenses for Units 1 and 2 of the Catawba Nuclear Station (Catawba) filed by Duke Power Company (Duke or the Company), North Carolina Municipal Power Agency One (NCMPA-1),
North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation (NCEMC),
and Saluda River Electric Cooperative (SREC)
(collectively:
The Applicants) and opposed by Palmetto Alliance and the Carolina enviornmental Study Group (Intervenors).
2.
A separate Atomic Safety and Licensing Board entered a Partial Initial Decision on safety and environmental contentions June 22, 1984.
That same Licensing Board ruled on the admission of the emergency planning contentions which we decide here on the record of a pre-hearing conference conducted August 8,
- 1983, cppearing at Tr. pp. 1084-1102 and in Orders issued August 17, September 29 and December 30, 1983.
Where the original Licensing Board's rulings on the admission of contentions bear on our consideration of the evidence at hearing, the specifics of that Board's rulings are referred to in the -body of this decision.
Suffice it to say, here, that we are mindful of those rulings and treat them as the law of the case in establishing the issues for litigation and decision by us in this proceeding.
3.
By motion of the Applicants, supported by the NRC Staff and opposed by Intervenors, the initial Licensing Board which had admitted the emergency planning contentions and decided the safety and environmental-issues entered its Memorandum and Order of February 21,
- 1984, (Concerning Motion to Bifurcate This Proceeding) establishing a separate Licensing Board to conduct hearings-on emergency planning matters in order that Applicants then May 1, 1984 fuel load schedule not be adversely impacted by delays in the decisional process.
That Board's decision was founded upon its assurance that the rights of the Intervenors to fair and adequate time to prepare and participate would be protected and that any subsequently appointed Board would duly consider the existing record as it might bear on emergency planning matters.
On February 27, 1984, the Chief Administrative Judge established this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to preside over all emergency planning issues in the Catawba proceeding.
4.
By Memorandum and Order of February 28, 1984 we directed the parties to confer a,nd propose specific dates for the submission of pre-filed testimony and commencement of hearings.
i Subsequently, the Applicants and the Intervenors, conferred in i
on unsuccessful effort to narrow and resolve the ten admitted cmergency planning issues and to resolve matters of scheduling in the proceeding.
These issues included potential conflicts bstween proceedings still pending before the original Licensing Board on outstanding safety
- issues, particularly those 2
contentions with respect to the integrity of emergency diesel generators, and the litigation of emergency planning matters before this Board.
5.
By Order of April 2, 1984 we established the dates for pre-filing of testimony and commencement of hearings in this proceeding subject to the condition that Applicants and Staff cgree to a suspension of discovery obligations on the pending diesel generator matters, which agreement was forthcoming.
6.
Evidentiary hearings were conducted commencing May 1,
1984 in Rock Hill, South Carolina at which all parties actively participated through the presentation of their own witnesses, the introduction of documentary evidence, and the cross examination of witnesses presented by the other parties.
Hearings were con 8ucted May 1,
2,-
3, 4,
7, 8,
9, 10 and 11 in Rock Hill, including a limited appearance session on May 9,
1984.
Three days of hearings were held May 23, 24 and 25 in Charlotte, North Carolina on Emergency Planning Contention 11 with respect to the issue of the need to include portions of the City of Charlotte in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the facility.
Finally, four additional hearing days were conducted June 5,
6, 7 and 8,
again in Rock Hill,. South Carolina.
All told, some 16 hearing days were logged reflecting a record of ever 4,000 pages and the receipt of some more than 70 hearing exhibits.
7.
We note at the outset the general positions advanced by the parties:
Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina 3
Enviromental Study Group each emphasized their desire that the level of emergency preparedness for those residing near the Catawba Nuclear Station be enhanced to the raximum extent possible.
Both Palmetto and CESG candidly expressed their reservations regarding the safety of the Catawba facility as reflected in the safety and environmental contentions which they have actively advanced before the other Licensing Board in this licensing proceeding.
Neither Intervenor recedes from their position that the Catawba facility should not be licensed to operate because of safety and environmental flaws.
However, both groups express their acknowledgement of the inevitability of the plant's licensing and operation with some measure of cynicism cith respect to this Commission and its Licensing Board's pro-nuclear track record.
The Intervenors stress,
- however, that their goal with respect to these emergency planning issues is to enhance the state of emergency preparedness through the process of critiquing deficiencies in the e,xisting plans and implementing capabilities and through the relief and remedial measures which they seek from this Licensing Board.
They observe that it is their acknowledged expectation that the Catawba plant will be
' licensed and will operate in the face of their safety concerns that enhances their conviction that the perceived flaws in cmergency planning should be remedied in order to assure that offective protective action will be accomplished in the event of an actual radiological accident at the facility.
Palmetto and CESG characterize the emergency planning process as a cooperative i
4
venture involving Duke power Company, federal, state, and local authorities, members of the affected
- public, and interested citizen groups such as the Intervenors themselves.
This is a sometimes adversarial process
- which, appropriately
- enough, requires a critical examination of the adequacy of existing
- plans, ultimately producing a
superior state of emergency preparedness.
8.
Applicants, together with the NRC staff, representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the North Carolina and South Carolina State authorities, and tha County cuthorities from Mecklenburg, Gaston and York Counties within the ten mile EPZ predictably defend the adequacy of the existing plans and state of preparedness while acknowledging the fundamental points made by palmetto and CESG:
that the overall Otate of emergency preparedness is enhanced through the process at hand.
Pointedly, Applicants and their allied federal, state and local associates acknowledged the critical contribution which Intervenors have made in the process already.
They point to a number of changes in the emergency plans and supporting materials cuch as Applicants' public information brochure which have already integrated changes in response to the critiques made in the Intervenors' emergency planning contentions.
The record also reflects further acknowledgement by Applicants' witnesses and cmergency planning officials of the validity of-critical cuggestions raised during these proceedings.
5
9.
We agree with the fundamental observation made by all the parties that emergency planning is of necessity a cooperative process involving all of the participants with particulkr, though
-sometimes divergent, interests in the subject matter.
It is this Board's conviction that all the participants, and more importantly the public as a whole, gain from the process of critical analysis of the adequacy of emergency plans and the incorporation of such critical contributions in the planning product.
It is with these principles in mind that we pass to our decision on the ten emergency planning contentions admitted for litigation in this proceeding with the general observation that as to.each contention the result to which we strive is the echancement of emergency planning for the facility.
l l
6
.INTERVENORS'S EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 1 and 7 pUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 1.
In Contentions 1 and 7, the Interrenors allege that the public information programs conducted by Applicants and state and local officials, which relies principally on Duke Power Company's emergency plan brochure, is inadequate to inform the public of how they are to be notified and what their initial actions are to be in order to assure effective emergency response in the event of.an accident at the facility.
The ability to assure effective in-place sheltering as a protective action is Palmetto and CESG's challenge to the effectiveness of Duke's emergency plan brochure, both as to content and design, and support their criticisms with the expert _ testimony of witnesses Andrews and pittard, a doctoral candidate in community psychology and an audio visual specialist, respectively.
Through the introduction of a number of Duke documents and publications and through cross examination of Applicants' witnesses, Intervenors further argue that Duke has obscured the required emergency information in its reassuring public- ~ relations and "public acceptance" programs designed to
humanize the plant".
2.
North and South Carolina state officials concede the lapses in implementation of their own state p'lans' public information program requirements and concede reliance on Duke's own efforts, principally their emergency brochure.
Duke Power insists that its emergency brochure, upon which it relies in catablishing compliance with the Commission's requirements, 7
m contains the necessary information as well as additional background and informative material.
Duke disclaims the relevance. of its other public relations efforts while denying that such. efforts either dilute, obscure or mislead the public regarding the seriousness of the hazard from an accident at the
. facility or the appropriate emergency response.
Duke points to cpecific revisions in its emergency brochure including language
~
changes, additions, and a reduced reading level as responsive to the Intervenors' criticisms, and commit to future changes to respond-further.
3.
We find for intervenors on this contention and agree that-the public information presently provided by applicants and state and local authorities has not been demonstrated to be ddequate to assure appropriate responses in the event of a
radiological emergency at the facility.
We agree with a variety of-specific criticisms leveled at the design and content of Applicants' emergency brochure; find troubling the contradictory messages. communicated on balance _by Duke's "public acceptance efforts" targeted at the Catawba EPZ population; and conclude that the state and local authorities have failed to demonstrate offective implementation of the commitments made in their own cmergency plans for the facility as well as failing in their overriding-obligations to share in the coordinated rssponsibilities for -effective public information.
We are
_ disturbed and disappointed in their abdication of responsibility t
8
and unwarranted reliance upon Applicants to perform their public duties.
4.
Contention 7, which all parties treated at hearing as a
-corollary claim related to Contention 1, asserts that the efforts of - Applicants and state and local authorities, including the brochuro, failed to adequately address the subject of in-place sheltering such that inadequate protective action would result if cheltering were the advised response.
We agree.
Not only is this result required where the general public information efforts are proven inadequate, but we find specific deficiencies in the failure to provide clear, concise and adequate instructions on the subject needed in order for the public to effectively protect themselves.
5.
Contention 1 was admitted by the initial Licensing Board at the conclusion of the August 8,
1983, pre-hearing conference conducted to consider Intervenors' proposed emergency planning contentions.
The entire contention as drafted was admitted.
Tr.
1085-1086.
Its admission was not opposed by Applicants, but was cpposed on various grounds by the NRC staff.
The contention r: ads:
Public information provided by Applicants and state and local officials is not adequate to insure appropriate responses to notification procedures.
The principal source of information is Applicant's brochure, which is inadequate, intentionally deceptive regarding potential health effects of radiation, and misleading, in that:
A significant body of scientific evidence that indicates health effects at very low levels of radiation is not cited.
Therefore, people with compelling reasons to stay (such as farmers tending to 9
L.
livestock) may not take the threat seriously, especially after being repeatedly told in the past that radiation is not particularly harmful, and that a serious.tecident is extremely unlikely.
It does not indicate that there is danger in accumulated radiation dosage.
It does not give adequate information on protection from beta and gamma rays.
It does not specify how young "very young" is.
There is no chart to indicate overexposure during non-routine releases or accident to put into perspective the possible dose received before or during an evacuation.
It does not specify ingestion dangers from contaminated food and water.
It does not specify the importance of getting to reception areas for registration for purposes of notification for evacuees' re-entry to their homes, nor of emergency notification for evacuees, accounting for fiscal aspects of evacuation and for the basis of establishing legal claims which might result from the evacuation, as specified in
" Catawba Site Specific NUREG Criteria" p.B2, #3.
In fact, citizens are told they may go directly to
" stay with friends or re.Latives living at least 15 miles from the plant" (p.
10 #5).
Neither does it state that the reception areas exist to provide. decontamination of people and vehicles.
It states that in an emergency at Catawba, citizens "would be given plenty of time to take necessary action."
This cannot be guaranteed in the event of a
sudden pressure vessel
- rupture, where sheltering would be indicated.
This eventuality is not mentioned.
It assumes all recipients can read, and at a certain level of comprehension.
As a primary source of information, it is imperative that all have access to and understanding of the emergency procedures to be taken.
There is no information concerning the existence of a
" plume exposure pathway," which would influence a citizen's choice of escape -rontes.
Although this information may be available via other media during a
- crisis, it is important for citizens to be aware of this phenomenon beforehand.
Although the North Carolina state plan calls for emergency information to be distributed as detailed in Part 1,
Section IV, 2,
3, and 4, no such material other than Applicants' brochure has been made available.
When and if such material is formulated, it should include information on points of concern as listed in this contention.
The emergency brochure falsely reassures residents that they "would be given plenty of time to take necessary action" in the event of an emergency.
In the event of a vessel rupture, such as one resulting from a
- incident, a
catastrophic failure of the containment is a proximate result.
In that event, significant releases would reach residents well before they were able to remove 10
themselves from harm even under Du'ke's overly optimistic evacuation time estimates.
6.
The obligations of Applicants and state and local officials with respect to public information and education are established.by the following regulatory requirements:
10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7) provides:
Information is made available to the public on a
periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
listening to a local broadcast station and remaining
-indoors),
the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance and procedures for - coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.
10CFR-Part 50, App.
E,Section IV.D.2 provides:
Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume explosure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency.
Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would helpful if an accident occurs.
7.
We also found helpful the available decisional precedent on the issue of the adequacy of public information programs with particular reference to the adequacy of the content and
-distribution of ' emergency planning brochures.
In two previous partial initial decisions Licensing Boards have required remedial changes to ' Applicant 's - public information brochures in light of the legal and analytical principles which we find instructive for 11
our consideration of the issues before us in this proceeding:
Consumers Power Company (Big Rock Point Plant) LBP-82-60, 16 NRC 540- (1982);
Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric _ Station, Unit 3), LBP-83-27, 17 NRC 949 (1983).
8.
We agree with the Licensing Board in Big Rock Point that the purpose of the emergency planning brochure is
'To give residents and transients the information they need to respond to audible alarm systems and to be sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the importance of responding.
The purpose of the pamphlet is to communicate necessary information.
To do that, it must be clear, concise, and well-organized.
It also must be properly distributed, so that the people who need the information will be likely to receive it.
16 NRC at 544.
9.
We also agree with the Licensing Board in Waterford that i
The most important informational function of the br_ochure is to prepare people to turn on their radio and television stations upon the activation of the siren in order to find out what actions they might be asked to take at that time.
17 NRC 949 (1983).
10.
Guidance as to how these regulatory obligations can be catisfied is provided by an NRC regulatory document, entitled NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1,
" Criteria for preparation and Evaluation of.
Radiological Emergency
Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (November 1980).
This document is hereafter referred to as NUREG-0654.
The criteria. contained in NUREG-0654 are not requirements.
- Rather, 12
\\
l i
they are intended as guidance for use in drafting and reviewing emergency plan's.
11.
In the original January 1980 promulgation of NUREG-0654 (Rev.
0),
language is included which does not appear in the r
current Rev.
1 which provides us with helpful suggestions for
-: understanding the purpose of the public education and information requirements-as well as directing us to important sources of 4
empirical evidence to test whether such obligations have been ef fectively. met.
In the Rev. O version of NUREG-0654 Criteria IIG2, an acceptance standard is suggested:
The public information program describing this system is. acceptable if the permanent and transient adult population within about ten miles of the site is provided an adequate opportunity to become aware of
.this-information annually.
The program should include provision for written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency.
12.
Further, in Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 (Rev.0), "Means For.Providing a prompt Notification to the Population,"
the offectiveness of the Applicant's notification system is to be ovaluated:
Every
- year, the operator shall take a
statistical sample of the residents of all areas within about ten miles to assess _ the public's awareness of the prompt Notification System and the availability of information on what to do in an emergency.
The plan must include a
. provision for corrective measures to provide reasonable assurance that coverage approaching the design objectives.is maintained.
' 13.
Although this specific language is not contained in the current revision - of NUREG-0654, it continues to provide useful guidance as to how we should weigh the evidence in this proceeding since the regulatory obligations themselves remain 13
unchanged.
We agree with a similar observation made by the Seabrook Licensing Board in interpreting the meaning of the Commission's Emergency Planning requirements:
Although this particular passage is not found in NUREG-0654, Rev.
1, the Board can find no indication that the NRC purposely intended to change the requirement.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et.
al.
(Seabrook
~ Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32A, 17 NRC 1170, at 1178 (1983).
14.
We find helpful the admonition in Rev. O of NUREG-0654 that the permanent and transient EPZ populace is to be "provided an adequate opportunity to become aware of this information cnnually." Id.
Such a requirement of " adequacy" underlies the Commission's Emergency Planning requirements since the test of Emergency Planning requirements overall must be whether they will cork in-practice.
Such a standard of effectiveness is explicit in the general Emergency Planning Rule, 10 CFR Section 50.47 (a)
(1):
no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be isssted unless a finding is made by NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency.
15.
Finally, the desirability for and probative value of empirical evidence reflecting the effectiveness of the public information-and education program is acknowledged in the most current FEMA guidance on this subject, " Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plant," FEMA-43/ September 1983, which requires the conduct of a otatistically sound telephone opinion survey of plume EPZ 14
t residences in order to make a
" final determination of the effectiveness of an alert and notification system."
Such a i'
survey lmust be designed to determine:
. The validity of the address and telephone; If the respondent was aware of any emergency alerting signal; How the respondent was made aware of any emergency alerting signal; The location (at
- home, away from home) of the respondent at the time of the test; and If( the residence had received an emergency instruc-tional package regarding what to do in an actual emergency.
At.the requesti of Palmetto, we took official notice of FEMA-43.
Tr,-1598.
16.
As our starting point for evaluating the evidence on Emergency Plaitning Contentions 1 and 7 regarding the adequacy of the public education and,information programs for Catawba, we y
look to the. provisions of the applicable state and local plans b
for the facility to, determine the planning commitments which are ack,nowledged by the< participants Duke Power Company and the otIteand<1ocalauthorities.
The North Carolina Plan admitted as
- Ap'pl.
EA.
EP-1, Tr.
128,,
stablishes the requirements for a
, "Public Education and Information" progr'im:
" Instructions and s-Directions" to-be provided after an actual emergency has been
- Oclared, and
" educational" information to' he provided on a
basis" in advance of an accid'ent to educate the
~
"gontinuous
-public.so that they will be prepared for an accident, will know a
how they are to be notified, and what their initial actions are i
-to be if an accident occurs.-
These provisions of the North 15 n'
Carolina plan appear at Part 1 at pp.
53-56.
The provisions material to this contention state:
Two types.of public information concerning nuclear power plants are required within the EPZ.
The first type, which is " educational" in nature, acquaints the public with the effects on the human body in the environment of an accident release of nuclear
-radiational in the atmosphere and contains precautions to minimize these effects.
In addition, the methods used to alert and notify the public of an emergency are
-included.
The means by which this type of information is made available to the public on a continuous basis may include, but are not necessarily limited to:
(a)
Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Brochure (figure 15),
(b) information printed in local telephone directories, (c) magazines, periodicals, newsletters and bulletins published by departments and agencies of State and local governments, (d) industrial and business publications, (e). local newspapers, (f) direct mail, (g) displays and/or literature in those facilities listed in the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan, (h) local radio and television service spots, and (1) programs presented to civic organizations.
(Emphasis supplied)
State and local governments and Duke Power Company share a joint responsibility for disseminating this type _of information.
Duke Power Company will serve as the managing agency for the production and distribution of the brochure.
17.
We conclude that the North Carolina authorities have been inexcusably ineffectual in the implementation of the commitments in their own plan.
Not only has North Carolina, Olong with the other participants including local government and the Applicants Duke Power Company, failed to accomplish the objective which they have established with what little they have done; but they have almost wholly failed to employ the means Chich their own plan specifies are to be employed to accomplish the public education and information objectives.
16
v r
e 18.7 Intervenocs stated their claim directly in Emergency Planning Contention I of July lfi83 :
"Although the North Carolina State Plan calls for ' emergency information to be distributed as
=
detailed-in Part I,
Section IV, 2,
3 and 4,
no such material o'her than Applicant's brochure has been made available."
t 19.:
In his pre-filed testimony, Appl.
Ex.
EP-7, the Director of the North Carolinac Division of Emergency Management, J.
T.
Pugh, candidly concedes the accuracy of this criticism,
" insofar as.it.goes."
He explains that North Carolina has chosen to rely on Duke's Catawba brochure "ra.ther than to distribute one f
of its own."
Appl.
Ex.. EP-6,7.
We find such candor to be warrantedbytheweihht of. all the evidence though Witness Pugh
- i undermined his original forthrightness by his efforts at 3
" clarification" made upon taking the stand.
The Intervenors' question misquotes the plan of North j
Carolina.
The North Carolina Plan does not call for emergency information to be distributed in the detail i
stated in their question.
It does list the options for the plan that may be implemented, and it needs to be j
clarified..,The plan does not call for the distribution j
of public information in any set way.
It lists four or five options in NUREG-0654.
Those options are what were listed in the plan.
I Pugh Tr. 147-148, 5/1/84.
20.
, We find this effort at " clarification" troubling in and k
, $f. itself since it bespeakF: an effort-to contort the plain d
English language meaning of the plan's own terms leaving us with men'surably less confidence that we can rely on the express v
. i, provisions of that written. commitment.
Mr., Pugh characterizes he means listed in the plan as mere " options", Tr.
147, and j
i 17
?
=
offers the construction that "the plan does not call for distribution of public information in any set way." Tr. 148.
He construes language of the
- plan, "may
- include, but are not necessarily limited to" to mean "may not include, and may be limited to less than."
We are of the opinion that a fair reading of the terms of this portion of the North Carolina State Plan is that the means by which the specified public information is to be made available will include most if not exactly all of items (a) through (i) and perhaps others not listed.
The clear implication is that the list should not be understood as all inclusive.
Other means may very well be employed as the plan is implemented.
The fact of the matter, however, is most fairly reflected in Mr.
Pugh's original pre-filed testimony, prior.to " clarification."
- However, one of the options of the North Carolina Emergency Plan is that the state may opt to rely on Duke's Emergency Plan EP brochure rather than to distribute one of its own.
The State of North Carolina has elected to adopt that option.
21.
In substance, the State of North Carolina has no discernible public education and information program of its own, but places almost total reliance, as was alleged originally by Palmetto and CESG, upon the brochure authored and disseminated by Applicants Dake Power Company as virtually the sole vehicle for
" acquaint (ing) the public with the effects on the human body and the environment of an accident release of nuclear radiation in the atmosphere and (communicating) precautions to minimize these effects."
18
I 22.
" Presently, we have opted to rely on the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency brochure."
Pugh, Tr. 292, 5/2/84.
No brochures or other public information materials are provided by North Carolina which address the " hazard" for which emergency planning is required, i.e.
the effects of an accidental release of nuclear radiation on the human body and environment.
- Pugh, Tr. 305, 5/2/84.
23.
It is only by straining at gnats that we can find any measurable public information activities conducted by other than Applicants Duke Power Company through their Catawba brochure.
Generally, it appears that Mr. Pugh's staff members respond to questions from the news media and members of the public regarding the plan, although no scripts or other written materials reflect such presentations.
Pugh Tr. 295, 5/3/84.
The North Carolina authorities also have published a general dut'/
"all-hazards" brochure entitled " Disasters and What To Do To Protect Yourself" s
in the form of tabbed cards on subjects of nuclear power plant emergency, thunderstorm, winter
- storm, tornado, hurricane, earthquake, flash flood, and fire, bound together in a small handy brochure format.
Appl. Ex. EP-12.
24.
While the All-Hazards brochure is helpful and presents its disaster information in a
commendably concise and clear format, it is not offered by the authorities or Applican~s as a c
Catawba specific information vehicle, which Mr. Pugh's pre-filed testimony concedes, Appl. Ex.
EP-7, Pugh pp.6-7, North Carolina relies on Applicant's Catawba Emergency Plan brochure.
No 19 l
6,,3
=
evidence is offered to suggest that North Carolina's "All-Hazards" brochure has even been made available to the public in the Catawba EPZ.
Pugh Tr. 292-293, 295-296, 530-531, 5/1/84, 5/2/84.
25.
Thus, looking at the listing of means to be employed under the North Carolina Public Education and Information Plan, Appl. Ex. EP-1, Part 1,
pages 53-55, there appears to be no use of Items (b)
"Information printed in local telephone directories;"
(c)
" Magazines, periodicals, newsletters and bulletins published by departments and agencies of State and local governments," except for the limited reference and use of the "All-Hazards" brochure;"
(d)
" Industrial and business publications;"
(e)
" Local newsp, apers," except for information supplied in response to questions by journalists; (f)
" Direct mail;"
(g)
" Displays, and/or literature in those facilities listed in the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan;" (h) " Local radio and television service spots;" (i) " Programs presented to civic organizations," except the unspecified meetings and talks attended by North Carolina authorities upon invitation.
In short, while the North Carolina plan acknowledges that " State and local governments and Duke Power Company share a
joint responsibility for disseminating this type of information," Id.
at p.
55, North Carolina state authorities have almost entirely reneged on their part of this responsibility and have, instead, deferred to the Applicants, Duke Power
- Company, et al.,
to determine the content and extent of the public information and 20 Ek
education program for the populace effected by their own Catawba
[
facility.
For all practical
- purposes, the North Carolina authorities place full reliance on Duke's Catawba brochure to
[
accomplish this purpose.
Pugh Tr. 295, 5/2/84.
26.
Mr. Pugh attempts to comfort us that such deficiencies, past and present, may be remedied in the future once his affice succeeds in its hiring of a full time public information officer.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Pugh. 6; Tr. 532, 5/3/84.
We see no reason why such a belated and indefinite assurance should be relied upon as curing the longstanding and clear past deficiencies.
The North Carolina authorities have been aware of the criticism reflected in Palmetto and CESG's contention as to their undue reliance on Duke's brochure, since July of
- 1983, and yet they show no evidence of any remedial measures until they take the stand in this proceeding.
Further, in a slightly different context, Mr.
Pugh asserts that his entire fifty person staff is capable cf L
public education and information activities on this subject.
Pugh Tr. 293, 5/2/84.
If this be so, we see no reason why the addition of a single new staff member should be expected to greatly enhance the level of effectiveness of the North Carolina program.
27.
The situation appears to be much the same in South Carolina.
We find that the written plan makes appropriate and explicit commitments to a
public information and education program to accomplish the purpose of ensuring effective protective response and set forth the means to do so.
- However, 21
~. -
much as in the case of North Carolina, the plan's commitments are worth little more than the paper upon which they are written.
There is virtually no evidence of real effort at implementation.
The South Carolina authorities, like their colleagues in North Carolina, ultimately trust and rely on the Applicants, Duke Power
- Company, and their Catawba brochure to provide the required public education and information.
28.
The South Carolina plan, " South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan" or SCORERP, admitted in evidence as Appl.
Ex.
EP-2, in Annex C,
p.
on Public Information, commits the authorities to the following mission:
To provide the general public and transient population with appropriate educational information relating to potential hazards resulting from a nuclear facility
- incident, State,
- local, and facility radiological emergency response programs and appropriate actions for public self-protection in the event of an incident.
29.
We find this statement of purpose laudable and fully consistent with regulatory requirements.
However, when employed as a standard by which they South Carolina plan's implementation is judged, this mission statement proves to be an indictment of those charged with implementing the plan's terms.
30.
Under
" execution" at p.
C-9, the plan assigns responsibility to the Public Education Section to " coordinate the conduct of program activities within the state."
Among the
" program elements" to which the planners have committed are included:
(a) identification of possible types of incidents to include potential health and environmental effects, (c) appropriate actions for public self-protection.
22 z.m
M-31.
The plan, further, provides for the means by which such public information will be communicated:
(E)ducational information will be disseminated through available public and private resources to include:
(a) publications, (b) printed and electronic media, (c)
State displays and distributions of prepared literature at public locations, (d)
- State, local and facility participation in civic, public and school programs or meetings.
Dissemination of information to the transient population will be accomplished by providing access to educational materials at appropriate locations to include facility visitor centers, motels / hotel lobbies,
- airports, train
- stations, parks, campgrounds, recreation areas, etc.
'M.
at C-10.
32.
Again, these provisions sound good.
They appear to reflect good planning to implement the stated mission for the State of South Carolina's Public Education and Information Program and appear appropriate to meet regulatory requirements in this area.
However, they are merely words on paper which fail,
- wholly, to reflect actual practice which is deficient and inadequate to accomplish the requirements of their own plan let alone Commission regulations.
33.
Applicants offer the testimony of Messrs.
P.
R.
Lunsford and W.
M.
McSwain irom the Emergency Preparedness Division of the South Carolina Adjutant General's Office in support of their case on Contentions 1 and 7.
Mr. Lunsford concedes that the South Carolina authorities " rely heavily on the utility" to adequately inform the public at Catawba.
Lunsford 23
E i
1 i-Tr. 240, 5/1/84.
He provides the following summary of the L=
South Carolina Program:
I consider it extremely important that the public be h
educated, that there be a continuing effort for that.
L Insof ar ' as our own efforts, I cannot speak for the entire State government.
I can speak for the Emergency Preparedness Division what we have done.
In addition to what has already been mentioned, that has been done by Duke Power, we've participated L
insofar as I know, a representative from our office has
[
been at every meeting that we have been invited to that is public meeting.. to have a representative.
In i
- addition, the York County
- director, or some representative, I believe, has attended also.
g I myself have made a number of tnose appearances.
I think that's comething that is good to be done.
3 Unfortunately, we don't have enough people to do it with the frequency that I deem it should be done.
We manufacture a
brochure in cooperation with Clemson i
University.
Of course, I was not the individual that was working on that, but it was a colleague of mine, and we distributed it in accordance with a distribution out of our state's statistics on the number of farmers per county.
This was mainly for the ingestion pathway.
=
The responsibility for public information in the state of South Carolina rests in the Division of Public Safety Programs, the Governor's Office, so I cannot speak for that agency, although I am aware of some of F
the things that have been done, particularly efforts in publicity in the
- media, particularly in radio and television.
On a sustaining level, as I mentioned, there hasn't been enough, in my view, and I say that in my testimony and it takes a continuing effort of all of us.
5 Lunsford Tr. 223-224, 5/1/84.
34.
Mr. Lunsferd emphasized his belief in the importance of public education in this pre-filed testimony, Appl.
Ex.
EP-7,
- Lunsford, p.
16:
I would hope there would also be more continuing education of the public, for in my view that is one of the most important things that must be done.
24
35.
By way of rebuttal to the direct cases of Applicants and the NRC Staff, Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and CESG were permitted to present the testimony of Judith D.
Turnipseed, Public Information Officer for the Division of Public Safety in the South Carolina Governor's Of fice.
Ms. Turnipseed testified that she acts as the designated representative of the Governor's Press Secretary who is assigned primary responsibility for public information activities under the Catawba plan.
Turnipseed Tr.
4506, 6/8/84.
She agreed that the South Carolina authorities rely primarily on Duke's Catawba Emergency Plan brochure, Id. Tr.
4509; and she is aware that other offices in state government have made available a publication entitled,
" Agriculture and Nuclear Power in South Carolina," Appl. Ex. EP-10, which has been distributed through the County Extension Service to farmerIs.
Its primary emphasis is on interdicting exposure to farm animals and agricultural products.
She was unaware of the extensiveness of its distribution.
I_d,.
Tr. 4511-12.
In addition, Ms. Turnipseed was aware of the existence of a FEMA publication - "In Time of Emergency; a Citizen's Handbook on Nuclear Attack and Natural Disasters,"
Appl.
Ex.
EP-ll, which she understood had been distributed on occasion by the Emergency Preparedness Division.
This brochure contains no information regarding emergency response for accidents at fixed nuclear facilities like Catawba.
I_d,.
Tr. 4513.
d 36.
With reference to the listing of means for dissemination of public information as contained in the South 25
Carolina' Plan at p. C-10, Ms. Turnipseed was unaware of any other it' ems under (a) " publications," made available under the South Carolina Plan.
Item (b) " printed and electronic media," reflects responses to questions from members of the news media as well as press releases regarding the annual exercise at the facility.
M. Tr. 4515.
Item (c) " State displays and distribution prepared literature at public locations" is reflected by a
now discontinued audio visual presentation but no other such activities ' nown to Ms. Turnipseed.
M. Tr. 4516.
With respect to-Item (d) " Programs or Meetings" Mrs. Turnipseed was aware of the participation by others such as Mr.
Lunsford and local officials in meetings sponsored by Duke Power Company, although che herself had never attended such events.
Id. Tr. 4517-18.
37.
With regard to the dissemination of information to transient populations in the EPZ, Ms. Turnipseed was unaware of any educational material to be distributed through
" facility visitor centers, motel / hotel lobbies, airports, train stations,
- parks, campgrounds, recreation areas," except for the general purpose sticker composed by Duke Power Company, Appl. Ex. EP-9, which makes no reference whatsoever to the potential hazard resulting from a nuclear facility incident.
M. Tr. 4519.
38.
With regard to communicating the message set forth in the South Carolina Plan's statement of mission, i.e.
" potential hazards resulting from a
nuclear facility incident,"
Mrs.
Turnipseed agraed that the Duke sticker fails to indicate the i
nnture of the hazard at all.
M.
It does not even employ the 26
word " nuclear" in its obscure reference to the reader's presence in "an area covered by an emergency warning system."
39.
Ms. Turnipseed acknowledges that, as the plan provides in its statement of mission, [The public] should understand that
[it is]
in
- danger, yes."
I_d_.,
Tr.
- 4520, (6/8/84).
She d
acknowledges,
- however, that the relied-upon Catawba emergency brochure of Duke Power Company fails to even denote the " health effects" from a
severe accident as adverse or otherwise communicate the life-threatening or injury-producing nature of the hazard posed by the nuclear accident being planned for.
Id.
Tr.
4523.
Lest we rely upon Ms.
Turnipseed herself to communicate the needed -information regarding the nature of the hazard of nuclear accidents, which information is notably absent from the written materials disseminated to the public, her lack of even the most general knowledge on the subject of potential cccidental levels of dosage and consequent health effects clearly establishes her lack of qualification to serve as the source of Cuch needed information.
Id. Tr. 4541-4543.
40.
It is fundamental that Applicants and their allied State and local authorities must demonstrate that they can and cill implement the planning commitments which they have made in order that effective protective action can and will be taken in the event of an accident at the Catawba facility.
It is axiomatic that State officials must demonstrate their capability to implement their own planning commitments.
It is abundantly clear on this record that such is not the case and that serious 27
deficiencies exist in the capabilities and_ track record of the North Carolina and South Carolina state officials' implementation cf their own public information and education planning I
commitments.
Such' deficiencies are, themselves, a basis for our ultimate. findings in favor of Intervenors and against Applicants and Staff on Contentions _1 and 7.
Analytically, however, such findings of deficiencies reinforce the emphasis which is called for in our review of the adequacy of Applicants' public information and education efforts.
The State officials' deference.to Duke in this regard confirms Intervenors' basic
- allegation that Duke has largely monopolized the field in providing public information on the subject of emergency response at the Catawba facility.
41.
Before we reach our review of Duke Power Company's cfforts in the public information field, we need to touch briefly upon the efforts by local county officials in the public information area.
While we conclude that the emergency management officials for each of the counties involved in response within the plume EPZ
- have, creditably, served as rasources in their communities for informstion regarding the plan for the Catawba facility, it is clear that
- they, too, defer primarily_ to the efforts and materials of Duke Power to get the message across.
Their efforts, while commendable, do not begin 4
to fill' the void in the implementation of the North and South Carolina State plans nor do they make a dent on the overwhelming impact of Duke's own efforts in the field.
28
42.
The plans themselves charge local officials with very limited tasks in this area.
Except for public information activities keyed to the annual emergency planning exercises,
' virtually all reference in the county plans relate to post-occident public information activities only.
For example, the Gaston and Mecklenberg County portions of the North Carolina Plan, Parts 2 and 3,
respectively, which are almost verbatim copies of_each other, speak generally of the Public Information Officer's responsibility for
" preparation and release of cmergency public information and instructions concerning a
nuclear radiation incident or accident at the Catawba station,"
which appears to relate principally to post-accident emergency response.
Item D-3 of each county plan speaks of an annual informatioit presentation for the media to be conducted jointly eith Duke Power' Company and state authorities.
Appl. Ex. EP-1, Part 2,
pp. 25-28; Part 3,
pp. 27-30.
The York County, South Carolina plan provides similarly, but in even more general terms.
Notably, at page D-14 of the York County Emergency Operations Plan, the reliance upon Duke's Catarba Emergency brochure in the event of an actual accident is explicit:
Public information support teams will refer to the brochure printed by Catawba Nuclear Station.
This brochure will be in the home of all residents in the ten mile EPZ as well as posted in the County Emergency
' Preparedness Office and other open locations for dissemination to transient populations.
(Emphasis supplied) 29
I Appl. Ex. EP-2, York County EOP,
- p. D-14.
43.
We conclude that the local county officials responsible for implementing the Catawba Emergency Plan, like their State counterparts, add little to effectively inform and educate the public as to how they will be notified and what their initial cetions should be in the event of an accident at the Catawba facility.
All
- parties, then, point to the efforts of the Applicants, Duke Power
- Company, et al.,
for their primary reliance in effective performance of the public education and information requirements of the plans and Commission regulations.
We now turn to a review of the efforts by Applicants in this field.
Findings on Emergency Planning Contentions 1 and 7.
44.
For its part, Applicants seek to make their case through relliance on the content of their
" Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan brochure (1984 edition) which has been d
rcceived in evidence as Applicants' Exhibit EP-5.
The thrust of their case is that the Commission's regulatory requirements, particularly those contained in the evaluation criter!<a of NUREG 0654, prescribe only very general content requirements applicable to the annual publication of the licensee, here Duke's Catawba brochure, and that such limited content requirements are fully catisfied by reference to language which is contained in the 1984 brochure.
Further, Applicants urge us to limit the scope of our 30
consideration on; Contentions 1 and 7 to the brochure alone, and not to any other aspects of Duke's information programs.
McGarry Tr. 473, 5/2/84.
We decline to do so.
45.
Palmetto and CESG assert, and we agree, that their contentions call into question the effectiveness of the required public information and education programs in their totality, but that the Duke brochure - even if judged in isolation - fails to demonstrate effective compliance with the Commission's public information and education requirements.
In much the same way that they allege that the required information contained in the brochure is embedded
- and, therefore, obscured by secondary information assuring the reader of the plant's safety and Duke's
- goodwill, Intervenors urge that the overall impact of Dqke's public information program for the facility is to
" falsely reassure" the public regarding the hazard involved in a potential nuclear accident and, therefore, lull the publ'ic into a false cense of security and reduce the likelihood of effective response in the event of an actual accident.
Guild, Tr. 473-474, 5/2/84.
46.
The NRC staff joins Applicants in their position that the scope of the contentions are limited to the brochure.
McGurren Tr. 478 5/2/84.
The FEMA witnesses Heard and Hawkins limit ~ their analysis on these contentions to a review of the centent.of the state and local plans and Duke's brochure.
NRC Staff Exhibit EP-2 pp.
4-7.
Such a limited review of the plan end brochure
- alone, which we have of necessity performed o'trs e lves, gives us little basis for confidence in the value of 31
the FEMA endorsement of the adequacy of the public information program for the facility.
Accordingly, we attach little weight to their cursory analysis or approval of the present program.
- 47. Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group offer an extensive case in support of their positions on Contentions 1 and 7 through the presentation of expert direct evidence through witnesses Andrews, Pittard and Rutledge, through cross examination of the witnesses presented by Applicants and
- FEMA,
' including the introduction of extensive documentary
.cvidence obtained in the course of discovery from Duke's files, and finally, by way of rebuttal through witnesses Turnipseed, Chernoff and Best.
We agree 'with the substantive criticisms chich Intervenors advance through their direct witnesses and chare many of the concerns raised by Intervenors in the Cxamination of witnesses on cross examination and rebuttal.
We are directing Applicants to cure those deficiencies in the public information and education program for which they are responsible and are requiring a
further demonstration by Applicants of cufficient remedial action on the part of others to establish that the program as a whole will hereafter meet the Commission's regulatory requirements.
48.
Palmetto and CESG have made a persuasive case that the primary theme of Duke Power Company's public relations programs targeted at the EPZ public is that the plant will operate safely and that Duke can be trusted as a good neighbor to assure the cafety of those living near Catawba; but that the required 32
information on emergency preparedness has not been effectively communicated.
In support of their position Intervenors offer an
' internal Duke memorandum authored by Mary Cartwright, Duke's Gene.ral Manager for Community Relations, entitled
" Catawba Information Programs," and admitted as Intervenors' Exhibit Ep-7.
This document makes amply clear that Intervenors' thesis is
-- correc t.
The subject of emergency planning is referred to in the memo in the context of what is described as Duke's "public acceptance efforts" targeted at the communities in the emergency planning zone for Catawba.
It appears that emergency planning is merely one of the " focus issues" which are identified as "those that have been admitted in some form as contentions," presumably 1.
in the operating-license proceedings which are also said, in the
- memo, to include a quality assurance contention focusing on celding inspection and alleged lack of hands-on experience by Catawba plant. operators.
A number of specific information vehicles are described in detail in the memo.
For example, We have been preparing features-for placement in the smaller papers that serve the communities around the plant.
All features are designed to humanize the plant.
M.
The memo further describes a series of media briefings on issues which are anticipated to be in the news during the coming ycar.
Examples described include steam generator problems which C;re anticipated and a briefing on quality assurance including
-colding inspection and the engineering work involved in pipe cupports.
33
I 40.
Duke has been extensively involved in what they describe as " community activities" near the Catawba facility.
They have employed a
" Catawba Information Coordinator,"
identified as Pat Osborne, Int. Ex. EP-12, who has given tours and spoken in the community concerning the plant for at least two years.
The company memo mentions a special emphasis by the communications coordinator on placing thermo-luminescent dosimeters in homes and businesses around the plant "so that we could begin educating the public on background radiation."
It mentioned mailings to civic clubs who have churches in local communities inviting recipients to tour the plant:
(T) heir tour featured the plant, refreshments and an introduction to our weatherization program in which Duke provides materials for churches to weatherize low-income homes.
We have purposely tied the two programs together in this community.
La-50.
Special tours have been conducted for barbers and beauticians within ten miles of the plant who are recognized by Duke as
" discussion leaders" who will be encouraged to keep literature in their shops on a regular basis.
Seminars are planned on radiation for physicians and dentists around the plant.
" Dear Neighbor" letters were mailed to each residence in the EPZ just prior to siren installation to alert residents to their purpose and to invite them to community meetings to discuss the plant.
Int. Ex. EP-12.
The memo, further, observes that Duke's public relations staff is particularly concerned about
" young mothers who do not work outside the home," for whom an 34
4 cmphasis was placed upon physicians and dentists as sources of information as well as the planned use of cards to be entitled "Now ' That We're Neighbors" to be placed in grocery stores and chops around the plant.
Welcome Wagons will help distribute literature and Catawba frisbees for the kids to "our new neighbors."
For school children informational tours are planned as well as contests, games and energy songs.
51.
As Ms. Cartwright's memo reflects, Duke has employed a regular newsletter called "The New Generation" which has been mailed on.a quarterly basis to all of the households in the EPZ.
As she explains,-
(A)rticles in the newsletter are again geared to the subject areas of the contentions.
We have dealt with weldings with operator training, radiation monitoring 1
and emergency planning.
We will continue to dwell on subjects likely to draw media attention over the coming months.
Appl. Ex.
EP-7.
Duke's Mr. Carter reflects that some 8 or 9 Gditions of "The New Generation" have been distributed to EPZ hcuseholds as contrasted with the distribution of a single mailed cdition of the emergency planning brochure 1984 edition.
- Carter,
- Tr. 476-477 5/2/84.
A specimen of "The New Generation," the December 1983 edition, Int. Ex. EP-8, reflects the limited manner in which the subject of emergency planning is treated in this public information material.
Among articles entitled " Catawba's i
Naighbors Attend Open House," " Resident NRC Inspectors Follow All A0pects of Plant" and " Catawba Security Officers Are a Highly Trained Team" there appears the
" humanized" treatment of the i
cubject of emergency planning under the heading, "On the Job, 35
Mike Bolch."
Mr.
- Bolch, who appeared as a witness in the
' proceeding,-
is described as the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for.the Catawba Nuclear Station.
The possibilities of us ever having a serious problem are very, very low - but they're not zero... that is ~ why. we have an extensive emergency plan for this plant.
Mr.
Bolch acknowledges, and with regard to Duke's public
'information efforts, we agree We can always find better ways to do things - we can always improve.
I,d,..
. This ~ publication, while informative and artfully
- done, d
contributes nothing to the accomplishment of the required public information and education objectives established in Commission regulations.
It is, as acknowledged in Ms. Cartwright's memo, clearly part of Duke's "public acceptance efforts" regarding the plant and designed to respond to concerns by-the public including cxplicitly the contentions of Palmetto and CESG.
.52.
Intervenors offer a
further example of p.:blic
~information materials disseminated by Duke in the form of a pamphlet
- entitled,
" Catawba How Much Radiation Do You R;ceive?"
Int. Ex..EP-11.
This pamphlet, which is apparently distributed upon request at the plant to members of the public, d:picts a fold-out table under the same heading as the brochure's title with the.following explanation:
We' live in a radioactive world.
Radiation is all around us and is part of our natural environment.
By
. filling out this form you will get an idea of the amount you are exposed to every year.
The average American is exposed to a total of 180 units.
36
=_
The reverse side has a narrative discussion of the subject by a physician identified as the Corporate Medical Director for Southern California Edison Company which concludes:
From my perspective, the benefits of radiation and radioactive materials cle1Lrly outweigh the risks.
M.
Neither this pamphlet which is specifically on the cubject of radiation or in "The New Generation" or Duke's
" Dear Neighbor" letter regarding radiation dosages or health offects in any accidental or non-routine
- release, mentions circumstances such as those for which emergency response by the public would be required.
53.
We review these matt,ers in some detail because they put in perspective the content and format of the Catawba Nuclear Station emergency plan brochure, Appl.
Ex.
EP-5, the " Catawba Nuclear Station Student Emergency Plan," Appl. Ex. EP-6, and the decal for transients in the EPZ, Appl. Ex.
EP-0, which are the public information materials specifically relied upon by Duke Power Company to establish compliance with the Commission's emergency planning public information and education requirements.
54.
It is clear that Duke has had more than ample cpportunity to get the required emergency planning messages ccross to the EPZ population.
In its own voluntary public rolations programs targeted at the Catawba EPZ population, it has virtually carpeted each household with volumes of written material regarding the facility.
It certainly cannot be said that Applicants' failure to effectively communicate the needed Cmergency response information is to be excused for lack of 37
opportunity due to limitations on space in their published literature, -personnel in their corporate communications and public. relations departments, or opportunity generally.
Failure to communicate the necessary information is not a product of l
_ circumstances, but is a. product of Duke's choice and design.
55.
Further, our review of the documentary evidence offered by ' Intervenors on Duke's
" Catawba Information Programs" makes clear that the 1984 Catawba emergency planning brochure is a product in its format and content of the deliberato and well-
. considered str.ategy of Duke's overall Catawba information and public-relations programs.
While we express no view as to the desirability or propriety of Duke's "public acceptance ef forts,"
as reflected in these materials, and cannot perform the role of
" censor" over Duke's communications activities, we can and do conclude that these materials and this program fail to
.cffectively accomplish the public information and education requirements of Commission regulations.
They
- are, instead, clearly public relations efforts designed primarily to comfort cnd assure the public as to the safety of the Catawba Nuclear Station and the good intentions of its operator, Duke power Campany.
As such, we at the Commission may find them laudable; but they cannot stand for Applicants' compliance with emergency plancing requirements; and since they form a part of the public's information and educational understanding they must be judged along.with the proffered emergency planning materials in weighing the effectiveness of Duke's total public information program.
38
56.
Duke Power Company, itself, is apparently very mindful of the effects of its public information efforts on the Catawba EPZ population.
They have employed scientific opinion research data in order to test the effectiveness of these "public occeptance" programs and presumably to, fine-tune these programs en the basis of such data, as needed.
Ms. Cartwright 's internal memorandum concludes:
(T)he measurement for this program has been opinion research in the emergency planning zone.
Our first survey was in 1981.
We had another one in the spring of 1983 and we will be going back into the field the last two weeks of September.
We are not not only comparing the Catawba community historically, but are also comparing it with the ten mile area surrounding our Oconce Station which has been operating ten years and our McGuire Station which has operating for two years.
This information has not only confirmed the success of our Catawba information programs but has allowed us to tailor these programs to the informational needs of our community.
Int. Ex. EP-7.
It is therefore clear that Applicants have had in their possession extensive empirical evidence, upon which they themselves rely, to establish the effectiveness of their public information programs in the Catawba Emergency Planning Zone, both Over time and by comparison to the programs and results in.the EPZs surrounding Duke's operating Oconee and McGuire nuclear otations where people have been the recipients of Duke's informational programs for some time.
This empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of Duke's public information programs at
- Catawba, although clearly available, has not been offered by Applicants in support of its position that, contrary to the cliegations of Intervenors' Contentions 1
and 7,
Duke's 39
information programs have been adequate to establish that Commission requirements have been met and that effective protective action can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency at Catawba.
The only proper inference we can draw from Applicants' failure to, themselves, offer this cmpirical evidence is that such evidence would prove adverse to Applicants' defense.on these contentions and would instead cupport Intervenors' claims.
57.
We are persuaded, further, that we should infer that Duke's opinion survey evidence reflects unfavorably on its defense to Contentions 1
and 7
by the testimony of Marvin Chernoff, subpoenaed by Intervenors on rebuttal, whose firm was responsible for Duke's surveys.
While we declined to admit the
~
curvey results themselves when offered by Intervenors, Tr. 484-92, or presented through Mr. Chernoff as part of their rebuttal case, Tr. 4268, we did permit Mr. Chernoff to be questioned as to the success of the Catawba information program as he measured it through his opinion research.
He agreed with Ms. Cartwright's conclusion that the "public acceptance" program for Catawba had b:en successful and confirmed that survey results show that Catawba EpZ residents are less concerned about radiation effects end the possibility of a radiological accident than the general p;pulation as a
whole.
- Chernoff, Tr.
4304-4305, 6/7/84.
Chernoff interprets this as an indication that Catawba EPZ residents feel " comfortable with the information in support of Duke Power." Chernoff, Tr.
- 4305, 6/7/84.
We note in passing 40
cithout relying thereupon, that some survey results, as provided by Applicants in discovery for surveys conducted in September 1983 and February 1984 of the Catawba EPZ populations, were identified by Intervenors as offers of proof and marked for i
identification as Intervenors' Exhibits EP-10 and 9,
respectively.
Among the questions asked was Q21 (D)uring the past year have you received any brochures or pamphlets which tell you about the steps to take in the event of an emergency at the plant?
Int.
Ex.
EP-9, for identification only as an offer of proof.
This February 1984 survey conducted one month after Applicants' claim to have mailed the 1984 brochure to each household in the EPZ reflected that some 26% of the total respondents answered "No" when asked if they had received an emergency planning brochure within the last year.
58.
As previously observed, Applicants and the NRC staff urge that our inquiry be limited to examining Duke's 1984 Catawba brochure, within which, we are told, we will find the information rcquired to be disseminated by Commission regulations and the ovaluation criteria of NUREG 0654.
As previously
- noted, we d: cline to adopt such a narrow view of either the scope of Intervenors' Contentions 1
and 7
or the meaning of the Commission's regulatory requirements with respect to public cducation and information.
59.
It is clear that the general obligation imposed by the regulations and explicated in the evaluation criteria is to provide both the permanent and transient adult population within 41
the plume EPZ an " adequate opportunity to become aware" of "how they will be notified and what their actions should be in an
~ emergency."
NUREG 0654 II G.
The evaluation criteria specify the content of the program which "shall
- include, but not necessarily be limited to:
information on radiation, on contact for additional information, on protective measures, and special needs of the handicapped.
It is clear that this listing is not intended to be exclusive or all-inclusive.
We emphasize, again, that the plain meaning of the regulations and evaluation criteria is that the information itself be adequate to educate the public for effective protective response.
60.
Applicants and the NRC Staff, further, would have us look solely at the Catawba brochure as satisfying Commission requirements.
- Again, we reject such a narrow limit on our
- inquiry, which is unsupported by the terms of Intervenors' contentions that reach the totality of the public information and cducation programs of Applicants and state and local officials; cnd is unsupported by the Commission regulations and evaluation criteria.
NUREG 0654 sets forth a
listing of "means for cccomplishing this dissemination"
- which, again, are clearly exemplary and are explicitly identified as a non-exclusive list.
Among the items listed is the annually distributed publication -
hOre the Catawba brochure - but also information in the telephone
- book, in utility bills and postings in public areas.
- Thus, roliance by Applicants and the Staff upon the Catawba brochure as reflecting full compliance with the regulatory requirements is 42
obviously misplaced.
- Again, the evaluation criteria itself provides the standard by which the effectiveness of the means for dissemination as well as the information itself disseminated may be tested:
"The public information program shall provide the permanent and transient adult population within the plume exposure.EPZ an 3 " adequate opportunity to become aware of the
\\
information annually."
(emphasis added).
The evaluation criteria sets forth the additional standard that "the programs chould include provision for ' written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency."
Id.
It is clear, then, that Applicants and NRC, staff must demonstrate that cdequate information is not only prepared but is effectively i
disseminated and retained for use during an emergency.
p.
s s
N.,
61.
The only public information materials beyond the 1984 s
.w-
'hCahawba brochure to which Applicants p'oint as fulfilling their rcgulatory responsibilities towards transient populations within a
the plume EpZ are the small
- decal, Appl.
Ex.
EP-9, rather s
m mysteriously referring to the reader's presence in "an area covered by an. emergency warning system;" and the signs posted n;ar Lake Wylie.
- Again, the NUREG 0654 evaluation criteria 2; cxplicitly make clear that such narrow reliance is misplaced.
In
- 4. o cddition to the other ; means for dissemination of information to both permanent and transient adult populations, the evaluation criteria provide a suggested listing of means to reach transients given their obvious special requirements and the obvious ineffectiveness of a mailed distribution such as is appropriate 43 1
for the permanent resident population.
The evaluation criteria
- cuggests,
" signs or other measures (e.g. decals, posted notices or other means, placed in hotels,
- motels, gasoline stations and phone booths) shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EpZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an emergency or accident occurs.
Such notices should refer the transient to the telephone directory or other source of local emergency information and guide the visitor to appropriate radio and television frequencies."
Id.
With respect to means we are pointed to none other than the decal and signs at Lake Wylie.
No evidence was offered Cuggesting the use of signs in any other location, of any posted
- notices, of any information at all to be placed in hotels, motels, gasoline stations, or phone booths.
We note specifically that no indication whatsoever was given that any information regarding emergency planning for Catawba was to be provided to the largest and most problematic concentrations of transient populations, the 26,000 person peak attendance at the Carowinds theme. amusement park or the 10,000 peak attendance at the H:;ritage USA PTL religious retreat both located within the plume EpZ for Catawba.
62.
Neither the decal nor the Lake Wylie signs comply with the explicit terms of the state plans or the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0654 with respect to informational content, let alone offective dissemination.
As previously discussed, both state plans require that public information include content regarding the hazard for which emergency response may be required.
The Snuth Carolina plan in the SCORERp mission statement requires 44
hI o
9l j
y' information
" relating to, potential hazards resulting from a
nuclear, fa' cili'ty incident," AppJ. Ex.
EP-2, p.
C-9.
The North Carolina., plan,Bpenfics that such public information should Ocquaint the publIc with "the effects on the human body and the environment of an accidental release of nuclear radiation in the atmosphere."
, Appl. Ex. EP-1, Part l ',, p. 5 3.
Applicants' decals cnd signs make no reference whatsoever to the nature of the hazard, -let alone even the existence of the Catawba Nuclear Station in the reader's proximity., 'Neither they nor any other f,acet of the public information program for the transient EPZ population meets the pl:ns requirements in this regard.. The FEMA testimony, NRC Staff Ex.
EP-2, provides only a
generalized endorsement that the emergency > planning standard.for public information has been satisfied.
The FEMA testimony reflects no analy, sis whatsoever of the adequacy of
'the information dissemination to transients and their
- finding, therefore, is cccorded.very little weight.
63.
We turn now to an analysis of the " Catawba Nuclear 5
Station Emergpucy Plan" brochure (1984 edition), Appl. Ex. EP-5, upon which A.pp15' ants and the NRC Staff place primary reliance c
for. proof t h.'t ~ th e public information and education program at Catawba satisfies regulatory requirements.
At the outset we
,"l i
' chould note that the 1984 brochure was preceded by a " preliminary
. version" of the
- brochure, Appl.
Ex.
EP-7, Carter p.
3, distributed to the partjes, the NRC, state and local officials
'and,approximately 3,000 members of the public who attended T-y-
9 7-
---.7 y
cmergency planning meetings in 1983.
This 1983 version of the brochure was admitted in evidence as Appl. Ex. EP-8.
While this 1983 brochure was ultimately replaced with the 1984 edition which was to be mailed to all EpZ households in January 1984, nothing on the face of the 1983 edition identifies it as a " preliminary version" or a draft in any way, nor are we informed of any basis for the recipients understanding that this 1983 edition was being circulated for comment, criticism and ultimate revision.
Be that as it may, it is the 1983 version of the Catawba brochure, Appl.
Ex.
EP-8, which was the target of Intervenors' specific criticisms contained in Contentions 1 and 7.
64.
While palmetto and CESG mai_ ain their fundamental criticims of Duke's Catawba brochure, that it is inadequate to inform the public as required by Commission regulations in that it falsely reassures the reader regarding the hazard of exposure to accidental releases of radiation from the ~ f acility and is ineffective in communicating instructions on emergency response, Applicants appear to acknowledge the validity of a number of the cpecific criticisms leveled by Intervenors at the 1983 brochure in the revisions which are reflected in the 1984 edition.
Further, Applicants have committed to make additional revisions in the upcoming September 1984 publication at the behest of state and local officials, also responsive to Intervenor criticisms.
65.
For
- example, Applicants respond to Intervenors' contention that the original brochure failed to specify how young "very young" is in warning of their particular vulnerability of 46
young children to harm from exposure to radiation.
The brochure text was revised to specify " children up to six years old" in response to this criticism.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Carter, p.
9; Appl.
Ex.
EP-5, p.
4; Carter, Tr. 173, 5/1/84.
In their contention Intervenors assert that the brochure "does not specify ingestion dangers from contaminated food and water."
Applicants respond by revision of the brochure at p.
9 to state that " water, milk and food supplies will be monitored for potential contamination.
The cmergency broadcast stations will notify the public of any actions to be taken in regard to food and water."
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Carter, p. 10; Glover, Tr. 174-175, 5/1/84.
66.
Intervenors allege that the brochure does not specify the Importance of getting to reception areas for registration for purposes of notification for evacuees' re-entry to their homes, nor of emergency notification for evacuees accounting for fiscal aspects of evacuation and for the basis of establishing legal claims which might result from the evacuation in fact, citizens are told they may go directly to stay with friends or relatives living at least 15 miles ffom the plant.
The 1984 revision of the brochure added language at page 10 under the heading, "If You Are Ordered To Evacuate" explicitly noting that "... after you register at the shelter, you may choose to
-ctay with friends or relatives 66.
Further language was added to provide, " registering at the shelter to enable officials to contact you to tell you when you can go back home.
You can also get information there while ccay from home."
An entirely new section is added to the 1984 47
i f
edition of the brochure under the heading " Services Provided at the Shelter" to emphasize the need to go first to the shelters if ordered to evacuate.
This new section added information about e
the services to be provided by the Red Cross, Salvation Army and insurance companies and was added at Intervenor's behest.
Appl.
Ex.
EP-5,-p.
10; Appl. Ex. EP-7, Carter, p.
11.
In response to Intervenor's contention that the brochure failed to state that decontamination of people and vehicles would be performed at the shelters",
Applicants added language in this new section to provide, " Shelters would have facilities for decontamination of evacuees and their vehicles and personal items."
Id.
67.
Intervenors asserted that the brochure had falsely reassured the public by stating that in an emergency people
'"would be given plenty of time to take necessary action," Appl.
'Ex. EP-8, p. 10.
In response, this sentence was deleted from the 1984 edition.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Carter, p.
13; Tr. 1517-1519.
68.
Palmetto and CESG criticized the original brochure ccserting that-it " assumes all recipients can read, and at-a cartain. level of comprehension," adding that "as a primary source of information, it is imperative that all have access to and understanding of the-emergency procedures to be taken."
Duke cubmitted a' draf t of the brochure to Susanna V.
Duckworth, a rsading specialist at Winthrop College, for assessment of the reading level.
She determined the initial draft to be cpproximately at a college level.
She advised Duke that parts of r
the copy were verbose L and too complex.
In response to this
- l 48
criticism, the text of the brochure was revised in an effort to lower the reading level.
Dr. Duckworth testified that based on cpplication of the Fry Readability Formula, which utilizes a cimple quantitative measure of readability based on sentence length and number of eyllables, she determined that the
" narrative" portions of the 1984
- brochure, such as the information on page two under the heading "How it Works" regarding plant operations and page four under the heading
" Radiation, a Fa ct of Life" were written on an eleventh grade level.
" Instructional" portions such as the listing of actions to take under the heading "You Might Be Told to Stay Indoors" on page nine, under "If You' Are Ordered to Evacuate," on page 10, and under " Things You May Want to Take in an Evacuation," on page 11, - are. written on a
seventh grade reading level and are appropriate for the average reader.
Appl.
Ex..EP-7, Duckworth, pp. 14-15; Tr. 446, 450, 5/2/84.
69.
In their testimony in the proceeding, officials of f
North Carolina and South Carolina also suggested the need for a number of revisions in the brochure.
Mr. Pugh of North Carolina cuggested that the brochure should give more emphasis to the nccessity of going directly to the shelters in an evacuation and that the availability of monitoring and decontamination at the chelters should be stressed on page 10 under the heading "If You Are Ordered to Evacuate" under item five.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Pugh, pp. 7-8; Pugh Tr. 392-393, 5/2/84.
Mr. Pugh's suggestion at this j
49
time is somewhat ironic since in June of 1983 he had urged that a contrary provision be included:
Our other concern is on page 10 in the paragraph beginning " North Carolina residents go first to the shelter for your area Our plan does not call for evacuees who will not be seeking public shelter to Esport to a shelter first before continuing to their destination.
We would be suggested that the statement _
be changed to say that you mky go to the shelter shown on the map for your ares or you may choose to stay with friends or relatives living at least fifteen miles from the plant."
Pugh letter of June 28, 1983 to Glover of Duke Power Company, Intervenor's Exhibit EP-2;
- Pugh, Tr.
- 393, 5/2/84.
Duke has agreed to make these changes.
- Glover, Tr.
392-393, 5/2/84.
-South Carolina officials Lunsford and McSwain suggested certain revisions Duke has agreed to.make to its next brochure.
Appl.
Ex.
EP-7, Lunsford and
- McSwain, pp.
13-14; Glover Tr.
- 384, 5/2/84.
These revisions include modifying the map of shelters to indicate county boundaries and the communities in each zone, Appl. Ex. EP-7,.Lunsford and McSwain, p.
13; Glover, Tr. 520-522, 5/3/84; and insertion of a tear-out card by which information on blind, hearing-impaired, transportation-dependent and others with
'cpecial needs could notify emergency management officials, Appl.
Ex.
EP-7,. Lunsford and McSwain, pp. 13-14, Glover, Tr. 382-387, 5/2/84.
In the hearing, Applicants also agreed to make a number of further' revisions in the next edition of the brochure, such as to correctly depict the Charlotte city limits as contiguous with the boundaries of EPZ Zones A-2 and A-3, Glover, Tr. 335 5/2/84, cnd to delete all of-the shelters shown for York County in the table on page 13 and map on page 14, since the shelters have been 50
found inadequate during review by the Red Cross.
Appl. Ex. EP-7,
- Lunsford,
- p. 13.
70.
While we find all of these changes appropriate improvements on exisiting Duke public information brochure, they are far short of sufficient to remedy the more fundamental problem with the brochure as an effective public information and education tool or-to cure the more general inadequacies in the public information program as required by the Commission for the Catawba facility.
71.
palmetto Alliance and Carolina Fnvironmental Study Group presented testimony of three witnesses supporting their criticism of the public information and education program for Catawba focused particularly on a critique of the ineffectiveness of - the Catawba nuclear station emergency plan brochure (1984 cdition),
Appl.
Ex.
Ep-5.
They presented authoritative, thoughtful and balanced criticisms of the brochure's design and content founded carefully on expert treatment of the subject of individual psychological response to. crisis events such as would likely occur if any emergency were declared at the Catarba otation, as well as a persuasive and thoughtful treatment of the d;: sign considerations which should be employed in the preparation of written emergency planning informational materials such as Duke's. brochure.
Each witness offers helpful and well considered recommendations for remedial-measures to enhance the offectiveness of the public information and education program and cny written materials to be employed therein for use at Catawba.
51
72.
Intervenors presented the testimony of Arlene Andrews to establish how people are likely to respond in the event of an cmergency at the Catawba station and how effective emergency preparedness can enhance effective emergency response.
Ms.
.Andrews. critiques the 1984 edition Catawba brochure:
As presently designed (it) does not provide the clarity and direction needed by individuals in a state of anxiety and potential psychological crisis.
1 Int.
Ex.
- Andrews, p.
4.
Ms.
Andrews is a doctoral
, candidate in Clinical-Community Psychology at the University of South Carolina.
She holds a Master of Social Work with an cmphasis in community intervention and she has academic training in crisis intervention including particularly the impact of disasters on communities and in the field of environmental psychology which represents the study of the effects of the physical and social enviornments on individual behavior.
Ms.
Andrews - is a part-time faculty member in the College of Social Work at the University of South Carolina and has been employed as the adninistrator of crisis intervention agencies.
73.
Ms. Andrews explains that an emergency at the Catawba facility is potentially an event which may precipitate psychological crises for members of the public.
In such a state, p;ople may respond with maladaptive behavior including disorganized functioning, confusion and disorientation; or, alternatively, the perception of threat which may lead to heightened arousal and to protective, life saving responses.
The actual individual response is likely to depend upon how prepared 52
he or she is to deal with such an event.
Ms. Andrews offers the following view as the purpose for emergency planning from the perspective of individual psychological response:
A major goal of emergency planning is to prevent psychological crises by promoting positive emotional coping
- skills, clarity of
- thought, and prompt appropriate action among individuals so that masses of people will act in a
cooperative and coordinated manner.
An effective emergency plan will reduce confusion and promote a
sense of competence and personal control by individuals in response to their per_ceived threat.
I d,., at p.3.
An effective plan should present " simple, clear information about specific behaviors the individual should perform and accurate, easily accessible information about helping resources during the state of emergency."
M. pp.
3-4.
, Suc h-information should be "immediately comprehensible, decisive and directive."
M.
74.
In Ms.
Andrews' opinion, the 1984 Catawba brochure fails to adequately promote effective emergency response by individuals.
The brochure presents too broad a
range of information leaving the reader unclear what action he or she is to take in an emergency.
"Information regarding what to do and cho will help is " embedded in lengthy text about the power
_ plant and radiation."
M. at p.
5.
She offers the following recommendations:
1.
The "what to do" information could appear at the beginning of the text.
Informational materials such as the sections entitled "How it Works," " Radiation A
Fact of Life," "About Radiation," and " Nuclear Terms" should be either placed in an appendix at the end or deleted if not relevant in an emergency.
2.
The "what to do" information should be clear and repetitive.
53
3.
The
" helping resources" information should be clear and repetitive.
75.
We found Ms. Andrews to be a thoughtful and forthright citness.
Her qualifications to offer insight into individual psychological responses to an emergency at the facility are unquestioned and her critique of the brochure's inadequacies is cell founded on her expertise and experience with individual response to crises.
We consider her recommendations informed and persuasive.-
76.
Intervenors next presented the expert testimony of Ms.
Ruth Pittard, the Director of Audio Visual Services at Davidson College.
Ms.
Pittard has worked for over ten years in the design, production and presentation of audio visual materials for instructional use at the college as well as materials for use by community and service organizations.
She had familiarized herself with the NUREG-0654 public information planning objectives and evaluation criteria and evaluated Duke 's - Catawba brochure (1984 edition) for its effectiveness in accomplishing the primary objective of effectively informing the public r;garding how they will be notified and what their actions should bs in an emergenc3 Int.
Ex. EP-38, Pittard, at p.
3.
She concludes that the brochure does not effectively accomplish this objective and recommends that we require the brochure's modification or replacement to effectively communicate this message.
We note with appreciation Ms. Pittard's offer to assist in redesigning such materials.
M., at p.
8.
54
~
77.
Ms. Pittard explains that the " required message" as specified in NUREG-0654 is obscured rather than enhanced by the
" design theme" actually communicated by the " physical placement or layout of the information presented to the reader as well as the language mode used to communicate the message."
Id. at pp.
4, 6.
The brochure's design theme communicates, inappropriately, the point that Duke power Company is concerned about safety at the Catawba plant.
H. at p.
7.
78.
Ms. pittard stresses that through the use of factors cuch as location of the message within the text, consistency and repetitiveness of the
- message, use of pictoral means and illustrations to reinforce the message, boldness of print, use of
" alarm" colors like red and orange as compared to " cool and calm" colors such as green and blue, setting off the message from the body. of the text, language mode such as active versus passive
- language, and actual volume of the material to be read will influence how effectively the required message is
- read, interpreted and retained.
79.
In the context of providing emergency planning information, Ms. pittard stresses that such information should be communicated in a simple, coherent and consistent message written in a bold and decisive manner.
The information should be written in an active voice.
It should employ bold colors and be cupported with pictograms or illustrations to reinforce the f-printed message.
All secondary information should either be rslegated to the end of the materials or omitted all together if 55 l
l
the text will not otherwise be short and to the point.
Ms.
Pittard finds the 1984 Catawba brochure to be weighty and not chort and to the point.
She finds the required message is located in the body of the text towards the end of the brochure and not in a manner to focus the reader's attention on the important information.
Duke's use of such language as the very first section heading, "We Want You To Be Prepared," communicates the secondary message that Duke is concerned about safety at the nuclear facility rather than the required message regarding oppropriate response actions by the reader.
80.
In response to questions on cross-examination, Ms.
Pittard acknowledged that the required message as specified in NUREG-0654 is contained in the brochure.
She stresses, however, the important point that because of the conflicting design theme of the
- brochure, this required message is obscured and not offectively communicated.
Pittard, Tr. 1731, 5/10/84.
81.
We found Ms.
Pittard's testimony very informative, helpful and persuasive.
We note in passing that her observation concerning the use of such
" alarm" colors as red and orange appears very well taken.
While the colors on the inside of the brochure pages are limited to soothing blue and greens such as appear on page 5 in the chart entitled " Sources of Radiation" and in the protective action zones and shelter location maps on pages 12 and 14.
In fact, the only place where the " alarm" color red appears at all is on the photograph of the annunciators on the control room panels at Catawba depicted on the cover of the 56-
brochure.
It appears that the efficacy of the use of such
" alarm" coloring has not escaped Duke in enhancing the visibility of displays for its own Catawba station operators.
We think a similar. principal, as espoused by Ms. Pittard, dictates the use of such a color scheme to reinforce the critical messages which Duke should communicate to the public in its emergency planning materials.
We find Ms. Pittard's analysis and observations very helpful in our own review of the Catawba brochure.
82.
Finally, Intervenors presented the testimony of Philip
- Rutledge, a member of Carolina Environmental Study Group who performed a relephone survey to assess the level of public knowledge of emergency response information to persons living in the EPZ - for Duke 's McGuire nuclear station.
While we excluded Mr. Rutledge's survey evidence as not bearing sufficiently on the otate of emergency preparedness for the Catawba EPZ population, Co did find that Mr.
Rutledge's background knowledge and experience warranted consideration of his recommendations for icprovement-in the effectiveness of the Catawba public education program.
83.
Mr. Rutledge has academic training in psychology and cociology, is a Master's degree candidate at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and nas extensive experience in
.r: search and the conduct and analysis of public opinion surveys.
His conduct of the survey of Duke's McGuire EPC population and cxperience in active participation in the emergency planning phase of this proceeding as well as in assisting the Charlotte 57
Mecklenberg Emergency Planning Review Committee provides us ample basis for thorough consideration of his suggested improvements in the Catawba public information program.
We will pass to Mr.
Rutledge's recommendations the conclusion of our consideration of the evidence on Contentions 1 and 7.
84.
We agree with Intervenors' witnesses that the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan brochure (1984 edition),
is ineffective and inadequate to accomplish the public information and education planning objective of informing the EPZ public how they will be notified in the event of an accident at Catawba and that their initial actions should be.
While the brochure is attractive and professionally produced, we find it's 14 pages ponderous, verbose, overly technical and wholly ineffectual in communicating the simple and concise messages which are called for by the Commission's public information requirements.
85.
To begin with, even the most diligent and literate reader, not likely to be represented by large numbers of the general public to whom the brochure is addressed, would be left, cfter the most exhaustive perusal of the brochure, to wonder just oxactly what the hazard was for which the emergency plan is required.
It requires the legal scholarship of Applicant's able counsel to find, buried in the text at page four of the brochure under the bold heading
" Radiation A
Fact of Life,"
any information whatsoever on the subject of what the fuss is all about.
There, following a paragraph ending with the sentence,
(
,.You can see an operating nuclear power plant adds very little to 58
I how much radiation we get" is the only indication of the nature of the hazard for which the public's preparedness is required:
If there were a major emergency at Catawba, people in areas near the plant could be exposed to high levels of radiation.
Exposure to high levels of radiation causes health effects.
For your protection, follow the instructions on the emergency broadcast stations.
Id.,
p.
4.
Opposite this obscure acknowledgment regarding some unspecified, neutral " health effects," is a full page entitled,
" Sources of Radiation," featuring a soothingly green and blue pie chart reflecting in milligrams the sources and amounts of background and man-made radiation to which one is normally exposed.
The only reference to a nuclear plant is in the observations that only.15 percent of the total exposure comes from " releases from nuclear industry," and that "living next to cn operating nuclear plant" exposes one to less than one cilligram per year.
8G.
How one may be convinced that plowing through the rcmainder of this ponderous brochure serves any point at all, let clone that preparedness for protective response in the event of an actual accident might save the life and health of the reader cnd his or her family, one can only wonder.
The nature of the hnzard involved in emergency planning for radiological accidents 10 clearly information required to be communicated effectively in the Catawba public information and education program.
As previously discussed, both the North Carolina and South Carolina plans explicitly call for information on the " potential hazard" 59
=-
and the' effects of accident releases of radiation on human beings to be communicated.
87.
NUREG-0396 at page I-7 makes clear that the reduction
- of - early severe health effects, defined as serious injuries and deaths, is the first priority for emergency response.
At page I-51 of the same NUREG, the term "early health effects" is used as synonymous with early fatalities and injuries.
Further, in
.NUREG-0654, the description of the planning basis for establishment of the plume EPZ speaks explicitly in terms of "early severe health effects (injuries or deaths)".
88.
Witness upon witness in this proceeding points to the passage at page four of'the Catawba brochure cited above as the cole reference to the nature of the hazard to which this cmergency plan is directed.
We find this sheepish, apparently cmbarassed effort-to hide the obvious facts which are required to bs-communicated to the public as reflecting a clear failure on the' part 'of Applicant's public information effort.
We are convinced that the public. not only deserves but wants some
- cimple, plain truth communi,cated by Duke and its emergency planning officials.
We have no doubt that the public response, nnd - _the - ef fectiveness of its emergency preparedness, could be nothing but enhanced by some simple, plain, unadulterated honesty regarding the nature of the hazard, as unlikely as we all hope it
-to be, for which all of the efforts of -Duke Power Company, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State and local planners, all 60
f7 those who are called upon to demonstrate emergency response capability are directed.
89.
We think that, as Ms. Andrews suggests, a clear and concise and straight-forward acknowledgment of the threat will go i-a long way toward preventing shock, psychological crisis, panic and inappropriate behavior which would result if the public only learns of the nature of the hazard at the time of the actual acciden't.. Duke Power's efforts to obscure the unlikely but real hazard of a severe nuclear accident which could, indeed, cause injury and
- death, is clearly counterproductive to insuring offective protective response on the part of the public.
We will requir_e'that this deficiency be remedied in the revised materials chich we are directing be produced as part of this decision.
90.
We agree with the observations of the licensing board
.in Consumers' Power Company (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-60, 16 NRC 540 at.546 (1982) regarding the brochure in that proceeding.
They viewed. that brochure as reassuring the plant's neighbors that plausible accidents could lead only to minimal doses:
Such an -unmitigated reassurance might,
- however, have
. led. people to disregard evaculation warnings.
After all, why respond when no harm could come to one anyway?
The Board encouraged and Applicants agreed to a language change chich-states:
- However, prudent emergency preparedness includes planning - for less likely
" worst case" accidents in which larger, even life-threatening doses of radiation might be released within the five mile EPZ.
M.
61
Such simple straight-acknowledgment of the facts upon which emergency planning is based must be effectively communicated in the materials for the Catawba EPZ public.
91.
We agree, further, with the Licensing Board in the Big Rock Point proceeding that the importance of emergency planning
-information, including the meaning of the siren signal and the evacuation-routes, is more effectively communicated if presented "in a more prominent position at the beginning of the pamphlet."
Id.
at p.
552.
This same point is effectively made by Intervenor's witnesses Andrews and Pittard.
Int.
Ex.
.Andrews, pp.4-5,
- Pittard, p.
6.
Ironically, Applicant's own reading specialist, Dr. Duckworth, makes the same point, perhaps unwittingly, in her acknowledgment that the critical instructional information which is written on the
" average rcader's" seventh grade reading level is set forth towards the rrar of the brochure on pages 9, 10 and 11; while the narrative partions of the brochure describing plant operation and information concerning radiation on pages 2 and 4 of the brochure are written on the higher eleventh grade level.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Duckworth, pp.'14-15.
92.
Dr. Duckworth makes clear that she left the choice of vocabulary and decisions as to comprehension with the Duke brochure's authors.
Tr.
p.
421, 5/2/84.
She also acknowledges that the 1984 brochure still contains material of a technical and vorbose character.
The only real response to this critical evidence with respect to the placement of the required emergency 62
response information is provided by Applicant's Mr. Carter in his pre-filed testimony:
Preliminary information on the operation of a nuclear
- station, facts about radiation, and definitions of nuclear terms were placed in the front of the brochure to aid the reader in understanding the importance of emergency planning and protective actions.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Carter, p.
5.
93.
Mr. Carter may well fairly reflect Applicant's motives in designing the brochure as it is with the critical information at the lower reading level buried in the rear of the dense 14 page document; however, such an explanation does not effectively justify such a design which has the effect of embedding and obscuring the critical information behind this lengthy and verbose introductory material which we conclude is,.at best, cupplementary, and, at worse, irrelevant and distracting from the important and required message.
94.
We agree with Intervenor's position that the format of the. Catawba brochure's presentation is ineffective and inadequate to establish compliance with the Commission's requirements.
We find that it_does not effectively inform the public as to how
.they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in
- the event of a radiological emergency at the Catawba station.
-The information which does communicate this required message thould be provided in a revised replacement emergency planning information material which is clear,
- accurate, and concise in both form and content.
63
- 95. _
While we cannot and do not specify the specific language or design features, we commend to the Applicants and the responsible state and 1ccal officials the recommendations and volunteered assistance of Intervenor's witnesses, and direct that Applicants submit such reviewed public information materials to the parties and this Board for review and approval in order to establish compliance with the Commission's public information and education requirements and to prevail on Contention 1.
96.
Although our fundamental findings which support Intervenor's position on the public information contention focus on the important generalized inadequacies in the program and its principal vehicle, Duke's 1984 Catawba brochure, for its failure to effectively communicate the required emergency information, we fcel it necessary to touch briefly upon a number of remaining Intervenor criticisms regarding content and textual matters in order to emphasize what we find appropriate and inappropriate to guide the parties in their efforts at revision.
We stress,
- again, the important part that neither the numerous textual changes already made or agreed to by Applicants nor further changes in response to the following criticisms will cure the fundamental inadequacies of the brochure and the present informational program.
Our decisions which follow on textual and editorial matters should be understood in the context of our rcquirement for a
general revision and improvement of the program.
l 64
97.
Intervenors make the point that in treating the subject of radiation, Duke's brochure fails to focus on the hazard for which preparedness and emergency planning is necessary:
"The effects on the human body and the environment of an accidental release of nuclear radiation in the atmosphere," Appl. Ex. EP-1.
North Carolina Plan, Part I,
p.
53.
In similar language, the Douth Carolina plan also makes clear that subject of radiation to
- be included in the public information program must effectively
-communicate " potential hazards resulting from a nuclear facility incident."
Appl.
Ex.
- SCORERP, NXC-9.
Intervenors in Contention 1 which targeted the earlier brochure, criticized the failure to site evidence indicating health effects of exposure to
. vsry - los levels of radiation and emphasized that the public rsceives a general message that " radiation is not particularly harmful, and that a serious accident is extremely unlikely."
08.
They chide Applicant's brochure for failure to indicate that there is danger in accumulated radiation dosage and for its failure to include information such as a chart as the one used to dIpict " normal" exposures from background and man-made sources to
-indicate levels of exposure.during non-routine releases or under cccident conditions.
Each of these criticisms is treated individually by Applicants' witnesses and the FEMA rcpresentatives either as treated sufficiently with reference to obscure and ineffectively presented passages in the brochure, or reflecting information not required by Commission regulations and guidance.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, pp. 1-19; NRC Staff Exh. EP-2, 4-7.
65
~. -.. -..
99.
For example, Applicant's witnesses Glover, Birch and Carter responds to Intervenor's criticism that the brochure does not show a chart reflecting exposure under accident conditions to put into perspective the chart regarding background radiation chich has been included:
First, the NRC regulations do not require such a chart.
- Second, the composition of such a
chart would be voluminous due to the number of scenarios that would need to be covered.
Finally, the brochure contains adequate information concerning radiation levels on page two.
Appl. Ex. Ep-7, p.
10.
100.
These responses by Applicants are not only wrong, but they miss the fundamental point.
As the Licensing Board in the Big Rock Point plant proceeding observed, 16 NRC 540 at 546, "after all, why respond when no harm could come to one anyway?"
- There, the agreed upon remedy was to state simply that under torse case accidents for which prudent emergency planning is m required, "even life-threatening doses of radiation might be released..."
101.
The point is that, as required by both the North Carolina and South Carolina state plans and the Commission's regulations, public information and education programs must rdequately inform the public to assure offective protective nction in the event of an emergency, and that the brochure or other public information material must communicate simply and clearly that exposure to radiation under severe accident conditions can cause serious injury and/or death.
The point must 66
be made that the hazard for which we are planning is a serious one involving threats to life and health ana that, therefore, the
.public must prepare to respond and take the threat seriously.
In l:
our view, such information is required by NRC regulations, need
.not require voluminous treatment in order to communicate the simple point that radiation released from the plant in a severe occident could cause injury and death, and, finally, thc existing
-brochure is wholly inadequate to communicate this message.
102.
We pass next to Intervenor's criticism that the brochure is written at an inappropriate reading level which will not be effectively comprehended.
103.
Duke's witness, Dr. Duckworth, performs a quantitative measure ;of readability
- but, herself, disclaims any expert
. analysis of the brochure as to comprehension and vocabulary which care " Duke's business not mine."
Duckworth, Tr. 421, 5/2/84.
The revised
- brochure, at
- best, contains instructional information, though buried at the back of the brochure, which is in her opinion " appropriate for the average reader," written on a ocventh grade reading level.
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Duckworth, pp. 14-15.
104.
Applicants offer no expert evidence, whatsoever, on the effectiveness of the brochure in terms of its comprehension cr vocabulary; nor do they establish the appropriateness of targeting the " average reader" with a public information vehicle Chich,is required to reach the entire general adult population r;2iding. or transient in the plume EPZ for Catawba.
Applicants 67
cnd the NRC staff simply fail to carry their burden of ostablishing the effectiveness of the brochure in terms of comprehension or reading level.
105.
We note-that in Waterford, supra, 17 NRC 949 at 968, the Licensing Board there approved the Applicaat's revised brochure on the basis of expert testimony that the overall
~ material is written at the sixth grade reading level with critical instructional information at the fourth grade level characterized as written to "the lowest level that he could, consistant with accuracy and appropriateness."
In reviewing that
- brochure, Applicant's expert explicitly "did not aim at the cverage reading level,"
for the EPZ public.
Dr.
Duckworth acknowledges
- that, even as
- revised, Duke's 1984 brochure continues to include material that is " verbose in terms of being cordy and pithy..."
Appl. Ex. EP-7, Duckworth, p.
456, 5/2/84.
106.
Next, Intervenors fault the brochure for failing to explain the term
" plume exposure pathway" or to provide information concerning the phenomenon of radiation transport in ordsr that the public will understand the necessity for and ganeral means of taking protective action when directed.
While it is clear that the anticipated emergency broadcast system messages will employ these very terms in instructing the public concerning evacuation or sheltering, Applicants have chosen to omit references to these terms or belated information although they define in detail 14 " Nuclear Terms" employing an entire page of the 1984 brochure.
Applicants' Exhibit EP-8, p.
6.
If a 68
brochure is to contain this sort of definitional or background information, at all, it certainly should include information on this subject.
Applicants' explanation that such information is not required and that its inclusion may cause public confusion is, simply put, unpersuasive.
Applicants' Exhibit EP-7, Glover, pp. 15-16.
107.
We note that the Licensing Board in the Big Rock Point Plant case endorses ~ a revision to include in simple terms a description of the plume transport phenomenon:
Since an accident's severity and the wind's direction determine the pattern of radiation releases during an emergency, radio, T.V. and public address systems will advise you whether to evacuate and what routes to take.
16 NRC 540, at 549.
Applicants' own " initial version" of the Catawba brochure, Appl.
Ex.
EP-8,
- itself, is more helpful in communicating the fundamentals of radiation exposure mechanisms in a passage which was deleted in the 1984 edition:
How radiation would harm you depends on "....the type of radiation to which you are exposed; the amount of radioactive material you breathe or take into your body; the length of time you are exposed; the amount of your body exposed and which part."
Id. at p.
4.
Such simple information makes comprehensible and
-parsuasive the EBS instructions which would likely be given in the event of an accident.
Such information should be included in
.public information materials to provide a sufficient base of understanding to prompt effective public response.
108.
We note in passing that troubling questions remain as
.to the effectiveness with which Duke and the state and local 69
authorities have actually disseminated what little public information materials that exist for the Catawba EPZ permanent and transient population.
The Big Rock Point plant Licensing Board emphasizes this same concern:
However, whether because of lack of resources or lack of commitment, these officials have not developed information that would let them know whether the tasks they initiated have been effectively carried out.
They were concerned that steps were taken to fulfill the requirements that a pamphlet be distributed, but they did not find out how well those steps were carried out or whether the pamphlet was received.
16 NRC 540 at 551-552.
109.
That Board requires a demonstration of effective remedial efforts to ensure thorough dissemination of the public information materials to the affected public.
And observes that it is comforted by what was then the commitment to regularly 9
review the effectiveness of the dissemination and understanding of the public information materials.
We take some comfort that the regulations require
- annual, methodologically sound
("a statistical
' sample") sampling of people living and working in the vicinity of the plant, to determine if they are aware of the meaning of the prompt notification signal and if they have information available to them about what to do in a radiological emergency.
In
- addition, corrective measures must be taken if the level of knowledge is substantially short of 100%,
the level specified as an objective.
This survey requirement, properly administered, can provide useful empirical information for improving the booklet's ability to "get through" the intended information.
16 NRC 540, at 545.
110.
Sadly, on the basis of the record in this proceeding, to can express no similar comfort in such a commitment for performance of such an empirical verification of
-the 70
ix l
1 offectiveness of the public information program.
FEMA has conducted no_such survey although'+ their own guidance, F Ei.tA-43,
requires such a
survey to be conducted and endorses the importance of such' empirical verification.
111.
For their part Intervenors have attempted to obtain just such empirical evidence in the form of the survey conducted by Intervenors' witness Mr.
Rutledge.
Unfortunately, for
-justifiable and, we are sure, praiseworthy reasons, Mr. Rutledge cas'able to survey only the Duke's McGuire EPZ population.
His 7
curvey results were excluded by the Board as not sufficiently rolevant to the questions of the Catawba program.
We note, cithout reliance thereon,! that Mr.
Rutledge's survey results raise troublings questions as to the effectiveness of the dissemination of information.and its understanding in the McGuire EPZ.
Intervenors' offer of proof,'Tr. 1811, 5/10/84.
We trust that the NRC staff and FEMA will take advantage of the s
icvailability of this ehpirical information with respect to the McGuire planning add bake appropriate and effective action to correct any deficiencies.
112.
Suffice' it to say, here, that Applicants have not d;monstrated that either-the brochure or other public information
- materials have 'been effectively disseminated to the required cudience.
Ne note that although Applicants have conducted dGtailed and r$peated scientific surveys of the EpZ population nnd-including questichts concerning the receipt of public information materials, they have declined to offer the results of 4
71-I
those surveys in evidence in support of their case.
We can only conclude, as Intervenors have offered to show, that, such evidence reflects adversely upon Applicants' claims that their public information program is effective in this regard.
113.
We note further, that in Waterford the Licensing Board ondorses Applicants' plans there, where Brochures will be distributed in bulk, or posters containing such information will be provided to area industries,
- hotels, motels, post offices, libraries and other.public areas.
Information will also be provided in local telephone directories The NRC staff will verify that this distribution has taken place prior to issuance of the operating license.
17 NRC 949, at 956.
Applicants have made no such commitments, hsre, and we find the absence of evidence of otherwise effective means for disseminating required information reflect an important inadequacy in Applicants' and th'e state and local authorities public information programs.
We will require submission of proposals by Applicants and others to the parties and board for review of adequate remedial measures to hear these deficiencies in: dissemination of required public information.
114.
In addition to its principle, " Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency plan" brochure (1984 edition), Applicants' Exhibit EP-5, Duke Power Company has published a
brochure designed c0pecially for school children, parents and teachers, Applicants'
-Exhibit-Ep-6:
Written because I had a perception that there was a need to focus information for the larger number of schools and school children that we have in this
- area, particularly to make parents aware of particular plans that were being developed for the schools, for evacuation of those facilities, and to 72
l u
n, highlight any information,at all, let alone the critical "what to
/
do" message. 'The boldest text is employed in the first two words "pearDtudent.
All other text appears in the same dense type face.1 Except for the front cover and map, the entire contents
./
are dull, colorless black and white text.
The cover, itself, inexplicably depicts pleasant scenes of students passing in the
~
- hall, playing football and disembarking from a
school bus:
cubjects which have no bearing on the nature of the hazard or
-oction to be taken in the event of an emergency., at the Catawba facility.
Once again, use of the " alert" colors of red and orange are reserved for these irrelevant color photos and are not
' ' employed at all.in the balance of the material.
117.
Intervenors presented the rebuttal testimony of a
local high school teacher, Ms. Brenda Best, who observed the mock Meacuation of two bus loads of students'from her school during the February 1984 Catawba emergency plan exercise and was asked sto # distribute the student brochure to her class and to lead a dised'ssion with her students regarding emergency planning for Catawba.
She expressed the opinion that neithd$
she nor her students had been effectively educated, regarding how they would be informed and what actions they should' take in the event of an 3
cccident at the facility.
Best, Tr. 4565 6/8/8,4.
She expressed p3rticular concerns about the false assurances in the brochure n
n that:
Your teacher will look after you.
Stay calm.
Your teachers a'nd principal have been taught what to do.
~
74
.e*
- -- ~ _-
s Appl.
Ex.
EP-6, 2nd page.
Ms.
Best explained, "I
was never taught to do anything Best, Tr. 4551, 6/8/84.
She had never been informed of the existence of an evacuation plan for the Charlotte Mecklenburg schools or of the roles and responsibilities of teachers under such a plan.
I d_,.
at Tr. 4555.
d 118.
Although the plan assumes that her privately owned vehicle at the school will be utilized to evacuate students, she has never been asked if she could perform' this function in an cmergency.
And in fact, since she has the only car in the family, she might well be forced to look after the needs of her family first.
I d,.
Tr. 4557.
119.
Despite her best efforts to explain the importance of the information to her students many were simply left behind, "and the trash cans of Olympic High School were full of these cards, these booklets."
Id. at Tr. 4559.
Ms.
Best strongly urges that the deficiencies in the public information program be corrected prior to plant operation.
I don't see how it can happen if people don't know the information, haven't taken
- t hom, and people don't know what to expect or what to do and when I have raised these questions before, people say, "It is going to happen.
We are going to teach the teachers how to do it and we are going to do these things."
But you don't get a driver's license until you can drive the car, until you pass the driver's test and I want all these things done so that my students will be safe.
If'I am supposed to look after them, I need to know what I am supposed to do, what the plan is, where to go and who is going to do what.
If I don't understand it, I cannot make them.
75
- g.,
Tr.
4567.
We agree with Ms.
Best's observations and conclude that Applicants' required remedial plan reflect specifically on means for curing the identified deficiencies in the program targeted for students, teachers and parents.
CONTENTION 7 1.
Intervenors' Emergency planning Contention 7 challenge the adequacy of public information and education to achieve offective in-place sheltering in the event that sheltering is ordered as a protective measure in the event of an accident.
As admitted, Contention 7 reads:
The Applicants' possessive emergency plans and public brochure and the plans of the relevant state and local authorities do not adequately address the preparations that 'should be made to achieve effective sheltering, nor the actions that people should take when advised to seek shelter.
Hence, the plans and brochure fail to provide a reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency as required by 10CFR 50.47(a)(1).
2.
The contention was admitted as revised by the Licensing Board in its Memorandum and Order (ruling on remaining emergency planning contentions) of September 29, 1983 at p.
7.
Contention 7 was t'reated by all parties as a corollary to the more general Contention 1 challenging the adequacy of the public information and education program to achieve effective protective action.
Contention 7 targets one of the two likely choices for protective cetion:
that of in-place sheltering.
The focus of the discussion on Contention 7 at hearing was on the inadequacy of the information pro vided in Applicants' Catawba brochure, Appl.
Ex. Ep-5,-regarding preparations that should be made to achieve 76
offective sheltering and the actions that people should take when
,cdvised to seek shelter.
Since we view the general public education and information program of Applicants and state and local authorities as inadequate to achieve effective protective cetion, those general inadequacies compel the conclusion that euch inadequacies would also preclude effective sWitering.
3.
Applicants presented testimony of Dr. Samuel L.
- Finklea, III of 'the Bureau of Radiological
- Health, South Carolina Departme'nt of Health and Environmental Control, to discuss the information provided on actions which members of the public chould take if and when they are advised to take-shelter.
As provided in the plans, protective actions would be advised to minimize the exposure of individuals in the event of an airborne release of radioactivity in an accident at the facility.
Evacuation before exposure is the recommendation of choice... but this may not always be possible.
Furthermore, untimely evacuation ma7 in some instances result in greater exposure than one would receive while remaining in available shelter until conditions were more favorable.
All else being equal, larger buildings, buildings with more massive construction, and buildings with basements provide more protection thr.n smaller, lighter buildings without basements...
In those situations where evacuation cannot be completed before exposure begins, the plans provide for. a recommendation of sheltering in-place to be made.
Appl. Ex.
EP-7, Finklea, pp. 25-26.
Since structures commonly found in the plume emergency planning zone may vary
- n their chielding effectiveness and therefore their dose
> duction factors by a factor of 20, Finklea, Tr. 632-633, 5/3/84, il faced tith the choice of seeking shelter in two different structures, 77
individual and concerned would be "better advised to go to the one with the better protection factor."
- Finklea, Tr.
- 618, 5/3/84.
- 4..
The question, then, raised in Contention 7 is whether sufficient information is provided the public to enable them to choose the superior structure in order to achieve effective in-place sheltering.
According to Dr.
Finklea such information would be broadcast in the EBS message.
Finklea, Tr. 618, 5/3/84.
However, no such information is provided for in the present plans
'with. regard to EBS broadcasts.
Finklea, Tr. 620, 5/3/84.
5.
It is clear that the Catawba brochure (1984 edition),
Appl.
Ex.
EP-8, contains no such information.
Its only instructions with regard to in-place sheltering are contained at p.
9 under the heading in bold "You Might Be Told To Stay Indoors".
There, after telling you to close windows and doors, the biv:hure states,
" move to a basement if possible."
This reference, while good advice, is obscure in the absence of even the simplest explanation that ' the mass of. the structure enhances
.your level of protection, may well be gratuitous since, as we
= note, basements are indeed uncor =non. in the southeast region where
.the Catawba facility is located.
6.
-We
. direct that in Applicants
revised public information materials, they include simple and concise information, such.as that stated by Dr.
Finklea in his own Ltoetimony, Appl. Ex. Ep-7,
- Finklea, p.
25, to enable the public to'~. understand the comparative effectiveness of various structures 78
for-. use during in-place sheltering.
Such information should, of
- course, include ' the caveat that one should remain in one's present structure unless one can reach a superior structure in time :to avoid exposure to the plume while in transient.
The EBS
' message - should provide the basis for such a decision.
- However, the public is entitled to be informed of this rudimentary information to enhance their level of protection.
7.
The allied question raised by Intervenors relates to the cdequacy of information. provided in order to achieve effective rsspiratory protection for members of the public.
Applicants' Catawba brochure (1984 edition), in the section entitled "You Might Be' Told To Stay Indoors," at p. 9, states only:
"4.
Place a damp cloth over your nose and mouth."
8.
Intervenors urge that this information is clearly inadequate to achieve effective respiratory protection, and we cgree.
Intervenors asked Applicants in discovery, "What was the offectiveness of breathing through a damp cloth for removing Girborne radioactive volatiles and particulates?"
Applicants' d
- citness Burch responsed with reference to a study of readily available materials measured by Cooper and published in NUREG-
.2272.
-It appears that the dose reduction by 6 layers of damp cheet is only 9% for
.4 micron particles.
Clearly, for only 1 inyer of damp sheet, the dose reduction would be much less,
- although Ms. Burch disclaimed specific information.
Burch, Tr.
. 201-204, 5/1/84.
9.
While the Catawba brochure specifies only "a damp cloth over your nose and mouth",
a very large difference in 79
offectiveness depends on whether the filter medium is simply held or fully taped over the nose and mouth.
For example, a surgical mask, merely tied in place, permits 36% of the material to get through; while if fully taped, all but 4.2% of the particulates are filtered out.
Further, a respirator such as a commonly available 3-M dust mask is demonstrated by the NUREG study to be 10-20 times more effective at particulate removal than a damp cloth, depending upon how it is attached.
Burch Tr. 206, 5/1/84.
Ws see no reason whatsoever why a simple, concise and accurate
.information should not be provided so that members of the public con choose the-more effective respiratory protection available to them.
A damp cloth over the nose and mouth is simply inadequate to accomplish effective sheltering.
The language approved in the Big Rock point plant case, supra 16 NRC 540, at p. 549 at least provides some additional information as to the preferred Glternative and the purpose for.such respiratory protection:
...Put on a
dust mask or breathe through a damp handkerchief to filter out any dust in the air.
Id,.
. We think simple and clear information as to the relative offectiveness. of commonly available materials should be included
'co that the public can enhance their level of self-protection.
Wa direct Applicants and others to include such information in th0ir revised materials.
ll.
We conclude that Intervenor's prevail on Contention 7 as diccussed above.
While the FEffA witnesses endorse the adequacy of the emergency plans-and brochure, they do not explain at all tho basis for their confidence and assert that such information 80
s not required by NUREG 0654 for in-place sheltering.
NRC Staff i
Ex.- EP-2, Heard and Hawkins at p.
14.
Accordingly, we attach little weight to the FEMA endorsement since it is given without cny apparent factual basis.
12.
Having ruled in Intervenor's favor on both Content. ions 1 and 7 based on our findings of inadequacies in the public information and education program for Catawba area citizens, we now turn to the question of remedies and take up the recommendations of Intervenors including those made by their
.citness, Mr. Philip Rutledge.
13.
As previously discussed, Mr. Rutledge, who is trained in psychology, sociology and research including conduct of opinion surveys, offered testimony presenting the results of a tolephone survey he had conducted of the effectiveness of Duke's public education efforts for its nearby McGuire nuclear station.
Based upon his experience, and in part upon the survey results, Mr. Rutledge presented a series of recommendations for improving the public education and-information program under review here, for the Catawba EPZ public.
While we excluded Mr. Rutledge's McGuire survey and related testimony on relevance grounds, Tr.
1810,-
5/10/84, we did agree to consider Mr.
Rutledge's recommendations.
Int.
Ex.
EP-38, Rutledge.
We find these recommendations helpful and meritorious in a
number of particulars.
They will aid us in the formulation of remedies d cigned to make needed improvements in the public education and information program for Catawba.
i 81
14.
In his first recommendation, Mr. Rutledge urges that a public body be established to exercise control of the public information functions now performed almost exclusively by Duke Power Company.
Such a
committee would be comprised of representatives of Duke Power Company, government officials, ordinary citizens, and
_r:presentatives of organizations who's concerns for public health and safety are well documented.
Input should be openly encouraged from everyone and decisions should be made in meetings open. to the general public.
Particular input should be encouraged from educational and other groups with the EPZ.
This will also stimulate greater public awareness of these issues.
Id.
15.
This suggestion is premised upon Intervenor's n sertions that Duke faces a conflict of interest in its dual task of assuring the public of the safety of its Catawba station, while at the same time communicating frankly the potential hnzards of a
nuclear accident and the need for emergency preparedness for such an eventuality, however remote.
Duke's conflicting roles take on even greater significance where, as h re, state and. local officials have deferred so thoroughly to
. Duke in the performance of the public education tasks.
As we have concluded above, DAe has largely monopolized responsibility for the information program.
16.
This recommendation has clear merit.
There is a strong
- nced to establish a specific mechanism for insuring that complete cnd accurate information is disseminated to the public in the most ef fective manner.
Ironically, perhaps, the relevant state plcns each prescribe that such efforts are to be a
" joint 82
responsibility" to be conducted with
" coordination" of the various state, local and Duke Power participants.
North Carolina Plan, Part I,
- p. 55, Appl. Ex. EP-1; SCORERP, p.
C-8-9, Appl. Ex.
EP-2.
17.
While we are convinced that we have full authority to require the establishment of a vehicle to ef fectively administer the public education program required by Commission regulations, no - well as by the North and South Carolina state plans, we b311 eve that the specifics of the composition of such a body and its operating procedures are best left to the formulation by the p2rties involved.
We stress that such a body should, to be effective, encourage the fullest participation 'ay all interested
- parties, particularly Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study who have demonstrated that their interest in
'this subject is a sound basis for effective contribution to this program.
)
18.
While it is clear that Applicants bear the final r;sponsibility for demonstrating compliance with Commission rcgulations in this regard in order to receive authority to cp; rate the Catawba
- facility, that responsibility cannot be discharged in a vacuum, nor can it be offectively discharged cithout the fullest cooperation of all concerned.
19.
Mr.
Rutledge's second recommendation urges that the financing of such a
committee's efforts in managing and implementing the public education program be made independent through the establishment of an independently controlled fund 83
1 intended specifically for the public information program.
While this Board does not have the direct authority to require the establishment of any particular funding mechanism for offectuation of an adequate
- program, we can and do require thatever remedial measures are necessary to assure that the end result - an effective public education program - is realized.
20.
Each of the participants inherently now bears costs associated with their performance under the program.
Presently 1
cuch costs include Duke Power's present public information program, including the publication and distribution of materials cuch as the brochures, and what limited public information offorts are presently conducted by the state and local authorities.
We urge the various parties to consider adoption of a-mechanism of the sort recommended by Mr. Rutledge in order to more effectively implement the joint responsibility through coordination of the efforts of all involved.
21.
In his third recommendation, Mr. Rutledge suggests use of a better primary-instrument to be used in communicating basic cmergency planning information, given the apparent
-ineffectiveness of Duke's Catawba brochure as reflected in his oxperience with the McGuire survey results.
His suggestion, chich seems helpful and meritorious to this Board, is that a hnnging poster be distributed by Duke which would most suitably ba hung in a permanent location where it would be easily found in
-the event of an emergency.
We are very concerned that whatever 84
-.,:a the_ vehicle employed is, it be readily available to EPZ residents then most needed in the time of an actual accident.
22.
As reflected earlier, it appears that local emergency
- planners, themselves, rely upon the ready availability of the Catawba brochure for reference by residents in an actual cmergency.
York County EOP, D-14, Appl. Ex.
EP-2.
A vehicle cuch las that suggested by Mr.
Rutledge should be considered carefully by the parties in their submission of proposed remedial measures 'as required by our ' decision.
We note, also, that the
-NUREG-0654 suggestion that including emergency information in telephone directories might similarly insure easy access in the ovent of an actual emergency.
23.
In his fourth suggestion, Mr. Rutledge urges that the involvement of " educational groups, civic groups and the media in disseminating information" be
. strengthened.-
He suggests cpecifically.
that the use of periodic public service announcements would increase the visibility of this information.
Wa, of course, agree.
The involvement of such local groups as the
- PTAs, Tr.
4595-96, 6/8/84, is bound to increase the effectiveness of the public information and education programs.
The use of public service announcements is already identified in the North Carolina plan, Appl. Ex.
EP-1, Part I,
p.
55, though not presently utilized.
24.
Unless we accept the notion that the information regarding the nature of the hazard of an accident at Catawba and the appropriate emergency response by the public should be kept a 85
p.
i l
cecret, it seems obvious that the more broadly the publi c and interested participants are in the process of disseminating this information the more effective will be the level of public understanding and preparedness.
We urge that this principle and these specific mechanisms be incorporated in the necessary L
remedial measures.
l 25.
Finally, Mr. Rutledge urges that the emergency plans and their implementation be the subject of annual review and revision in order to assure their maximum effectiveness.
He f
l ctresses that such a review be based upon the impirical evidence I
cupplied through the conduct of annual surveys of the EpZ i
f p::pulation conducted by an independent research firm.
l 26.
The value of such survey evidence is indisputable in I
l this record.
The original version of NUREG-0654 required just cuch an annual survey to verify ef fectiveness. or permit needed corrective action to be taken.
While, apparently, that annual
_ requirement has been since deleted in the revised NUREG, the use cf survey data as a basis for reviewing the effectiveness of the plan's implementation continues to be endorsed by PEMA in its guidance document FEMA-43.
Applicants Duke Power Company themselves have chosen to rely upon such survey evidence for their own internal use in confirming the success of their general public information program, although they have chosen not to effer such survey evidence in support of the effectiveness of thoir program in accomplishing this Commission's public information objectives.
86
27.
While we may not have direct authority to order the conduct of an annual survey, we can and do emphasize that our level of confidence in the adequacy of the public information and education program for Catawba, after needed revisions have been made,_would be significantly enhanced if we could rely upon the knowledge that such annual reviews and corrective actions, based upon imperical survey evidence, would be committed to by the parties.
Consumers Power Company (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-60, 16 NRC 540, 545 (1982).
+
87
INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 3 AND 6
-THE-ADEQUACY OF PLANNING FOR SHELTERS TO BE USED IN AN EVACUATION l.
Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group's Emergency Planning Contention 3
was discussed and
~ cdmitted at the pre-hearing conference of August 8,
1983.
Tr.
1086.
Order (Concerning Miscellaneous Matters) August 17, 1983.
-As admitted, Contention 3 reads:
The emergency plans do. not provide for adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.as required'by 10 CFR 58.47 (b) (8)
-in that:
(a)
The plans do not provide for sufficient uncontaminated food, clothing, and bedding for persons who are evacuated.
The plan does not attempt to estimate these needs nor provide specific information c
on how they are to be met.
(b)
The plans.
do not demonstrate the unlikely
. proposition that just fourteen reception centers / shelters are adequate to register and process some seventy-five thousand evacuees.
-Indeed, the Catawba Nuclear Station Site Specific Plan (Part IV, SCORERP) provides that "all'
- evacuees, both those ordered and those -spontaneous, will be processed through their respective reception centers" (p. B-2).
2.
With no clear plan for controlling entry and exit from
'the reception centers, and.no restrictions on who may enter, it la very likely that reception centers will become overcrowded.
Porsons from outside the evacuation area will be understandably
. concerned about whether-or not they have been exposed to radiation and might well proceed to a nearby reception center --
'ox3cerbating problems of crowding that already loom as serious
.given the enormity of the task of processing EPZ evacuees at reception centers with limited space and supplies.
I 88
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-~,yy-
-,.-,e
-y-,,,-w
,e9
.,.,-w+yg,~_m-.,--w y
-j.=.y---w-9
---w>1r--* * -, -.
-wa-
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-e pe--.9-v-1----s-w
3.
The contention targetc two basic concerns:
first, the absence' of planning for provision of the specified
" food, clothing, and bedding" to be utilized in the shelters in the
-cvant of an evacuation; and, second, the adequacy of the plans to l provide' for reception centers or shelters which can accommodate the registration, monitoring, decontamination and housing of the large number - of. persons who may evacuate upon instructions or cpontaneously in the event of an accident at Catawba.
4.
Applicants and the responsible state and local officials
'r:spond to these concerns of Intervenors by (1) supplying the obsent information as to the available supplies of the necessary items and the means for obtaining them at the shelters; (2) changing the plans to address the obvious problems of overcrowding created by the reception center concept; and (3) undertaking a review of the adequacy of the designated shelter fccilities.
App. Ex. EP-13.
We remain troubled by a number of ictncerns which surfaced in the trial of this contention and find ourselves unable to make our reasonable assurance finding absent
~further submissions by Applicants to resolve our doubts.
5.
Applicants and their witnesses, who include state and local officials as well as representatives of the Red Cross and Salvation Army, respond to Intervenor's concerns regarding the obsence of plans for provision of food, clothing, and bedding by cupplying a listing of sources and quantities of such items bslieved to be available for use in shelters in the event of an accident at Catawba.
App. Ex. EP-13, Neves, pp.
5-7.
While it 80
is somewhat troubling that Mr. Neves, for example, who serves as a member of the North Carolina State Emergency Response Team and could be responsible for the provision of such items, disclaims cither personal or indirect knowledge of the detailed identification of the food stuffs he lists in his testimony as cvailable, Neves, Tr. 671-677, 5/3/84.
The fundamental position of Applicants and their allied emergency response authorities is that= given enough time to be able to draw resources from cuppliers at great er distances, a sheltered population could be maintained for an adefinite period of time.
Neves Tr.
- 664, 5/3/84.
6.
This casurtl confidence that the Catawba Emergency Plans cre rather effortisosly expandable pervades the position of Applicants, respons,ble officials and the NRC Staff on this and a number.of other. contentions.
We remain unpersuaded that offective protective action can be taken on the basis of c sentially ad hoc efforts over the wide range of accident Ccenarios and consequences.
7.
Closely allied to Contention 3
are the concerns raflected in Contention 6 which relate to adequacy of provisions for dealing with contaminated persons, including registration, monitoring and decontamination.
Contention 6, as revised by the Licensing Board in its August 8, 1983 pre-hearing conference was cdmitted in the following form:
The emergency plans do not provide reasonable assurance that. adequate protective measures can and will be taken (10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1)) in that:
90
(c)
There are no adequate provisions for preventing contaminated persons from entering a non-contaminated zone.
The plans do not make clear whether or not registration at a reception center / shelter is mandatory or not; if mandatory, by what procedures will it be enforced and what effort will these procedures have on evacuation times-and traffic flow?
8.
The position of Applicants and the NRC Staff, as well as ctate and local officials, on this contention is that although registration is not mandatory, all potentially contaminated members of the public would in fact be expected to register, be conitored, and be decontaminated at designated shelters in the event of an accidental release at Catawba.
App.
Ex.,
pugh p.
4;
- Glover, p.
1; McSwain, p.
1.
Here, too, the Catawba plans are optimistically viewed as capable of ad hoc expansion over a wide range of accident scenarios and, therefore, a wide range of d:mands in terms of numbers of persons affected and severity of oxposures.
We can only be skeptical about such casual assurances in the absence of more detailed planning to cope with this wide rcnge of response requirements.
9.
The scale of emergency response capability for which the Catawba plan should effectively assure implementation is large
- indeed, particularly as compared to the scale of emergency rcsponse capability actually demonstrated in past experience.
For example, the North Carolina officials assume a planning basis for evacuation at Catawba of from 70,000 to 80,000 people, Neves, Tr. 653-654, S/3/84, and the final environmental statement for the Catawba facility, NUREG-0921 projects 'an exposure to over 200,000 persons of a dose in excess of 25 rem in the nost severe 91
~._
- cccident scenario.
M.,
Figure 5.3, p.
5-60.
These e::tremely large numbers of people who would require registration, tonitoring, decontamination and sheltering services contrast
_ctarkly with the largest number of persons for which sheltering
[
cervices have actually been provided, and with actual experience
' limited to "several hundred."
Neves, Tr. 678, 5/3/84; Gregory, Tr. 803, 5/4/84.
10.
The responsible state officials rather blithely rely on the assurance that enough people and enough monitoring equipment tculd be available under any scenario to register and monitor within the asserted twelve hour maximum standard established by the. Commission.
Gregory, Tr. 807, 5/4/84.
Yet, if it took as little as six minutes per person to
- register, monitor and d: contaminate each of -those 240,000 potentially affected persons, 2,000 separate sets of registration, monitoring, and d: contamination personnel facilities and equipment would be required in order to accomplish such a monumental task in the required twelve hour period.
It belies believability to simply ccsume that such a level of resources could be marshalled without any_ more advanced planning than has been demonstrated here.
Approached another way:
assuming 15,000 evacuees requiring two Einutes registration time alone it would take the twenty
-r:gistrars (which the Red Cross' Mr. Johnson thought sufficient) fc total of 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> to complete that portion of the process
.nlone; Johnson Tr. 707-709; or:
"if we need more people, there C111 be more people available;"
or: "if we need 100 registrars, 92
ce will have 100 registrars." M.,
Tr. 710.
It seems obvious to this Board that no prior thought whatsoever had been given to cither analyzing the staffing and logistical requirements to cccomplish the task at hand or to planning for the delivery of cuch resources to the _ shelters where they would be required in the event of an actual emergency.
11.
Most troubling to this Board is the strong evidence chich we heard with regard to these contentions on sheltering chich demonstrates a
wide disparity between the cavalier nesurances of the Applicants and emergency planning officials as to the effectiveness with which their plans will be implemented cnd the cautious skepticism, and sometimes ignorance and incompetence, ref,lected in the testimony of those who are charged with the tasks of actual implementation of the written plans.
palmetto and CESG raised this troubling disparity between the
" paper plans" and the capabilities of implementation, at the cutset of.these proceedings.
Opening statement on behalf of P31metto Alliance, Guild, Tr. 108-121, 5/1/84.
The evidence in this proceeding gives us grave concern that there is,
- indeed, porvasive disparity "between the ability to implement and the ability to write," Tr. 120, where the plans on paper may appear cffective and adequate to meet regulatory requirements, but Otrong evidence casts doubt on the likely effectiveness with chich those written plans can be implemented.
12.
While such a disparity between written commitment and d:monstrated implementation is well reflected in our earlier 93
discussion of failures to effectively implement the state plans' public information and education commitments, supra, this same
" gap" between planning and implementation is equally clear in the crea of shelter management.
13.
The Catawba emergency plans and the testimony of Applicants and planning officials underscore the heavy reliance placed upon the American Red Cross for effective implementation of the plans in an emergency in the critical areas of evacuation Chelter management.
The Mecklenburg County plan, North Carolina Plan, _
Part 3,
p.
8, Appl.
Ex.
EP-1, assigns the following r:sponsibilities to the Mecklenburg County Red Cross Director:
1.
Operate the shelter at UNCC (University of North Carolina at Charlotte) or at any other designated shelter location as required.
2.
Assign shelter staff members to radiological monitoring training.
3.
Augment Mecklenburg County medical personnel, equipment, and blood products.
14.
The Gaston County plan assigns the same responsibilities to the Red Cross for directing sheltering operations there.
North Carolina Plan, Part 2, p.
11, Appl. Ex.
EP-1.
15.
Under the South Carolina Plan, the American Red Cross
'is assigned support responsibility for the Social Services function primarily assigned to the State Department of Social S:rvices.
- SCORERP, p.
56, Appl.
Ex.
EP-2.
The York County Emergency Operations Plan sets forth the assigned rcoponsibilities to the American Red Cross (ARC) for shelter management:
94
ARC will assist with sheltering of evacuees by providing
- food, bedding, and clothing.
ARC will register evacuees upon arrival at designated shelters.
Health Services will receive assistance from ARC in providing medical care to evacuees.
York County E0P, p.
Q-7.
- Then, having conveniently assigned these critical responsibilities to the American Red Cross under the Catawbs
- plans, Applicants and the responsible planning
-cfficials blithely presume that effective implementation has also b;en established:
(T)he agencies responsible, i.e.,
Red
- Cross, Department of Corrections, Department of Human Resources, and Department of Agriculture, have signed the plan thereby accepting responsibility for their assigned mission.
Appl. Ex. EP-13, Pugh, p.
4.
However, the Red Cross officials themselves tell a rather different story.
16.
By way of rebuttal testimony, Intervenors palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group presented cvidence from two representatives of the American Red Cross who hnd direct personal involvement in the actual implementation of the paper plans.
Linda Harris Anderson is the Chapter Manager of the Rock Hill Chapter of the American Red Cross.
In the York County emergency plan she is identified as the
" Shelter Coordinator" for York County.
Anderson, Tr. 4460, 6/8/84.
Betty Long was also presented as a rebuttal witness.
She is Director cf Disaster Services for the American Red Cross in Charlotte covering Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.
- Long, Tr.
- 4459, 6/8/84.
95
17.
Ms.
Anderson of Rock Hill describes the process by chich she became familiar with the tasks assigned her chapter of the Red Cross and the manner in which very serious planning inadequacies came to her attention.
The sequence of events described by Ms.. Anderson reflect very adversely upon not only the likely effectiveness of implementation of the Catawba plan in regards to sheltering; but also the derelict
- and, indeed, backwards approach to planning shown here raises significant questions about the effectiveness of emergency planning for this facility, generally.
First, Ms. Anderson was not even made aware of her assigned tasks as Shelter Coordinator for York County until after the most recent January 1984 revision of the York plan had already been published.
- Anderson, Tr.
4463-4464, 6/8/84.
The late York County emergency planning official, Mr.
C3rroll, had inaccurately informed Ms. Anderson that the shelters to be utilized in the event of a radiological accident at Catawba care the same shelters as would ordinarily be used under the c;unty's standard disaster plan.
So I was not concerned that we would be doing anything particularly different.
M.
Tr.
4463.
Only after learning of her countywide r:sponsibilities under the plan did Ms. Anderson consult with the Rd Cross' Disaster Specialist, Dennis Johnson, and begin to curvey the shelters designated in the York plan to determine th;ir adequacy employing Red Cross guidelines.
All shelters chocked were found inadequate:
I personally visited the first two shelters on the list which were listed as primary shelters.
And when 96
I' went I found the capacity overstated in the York County Plan and that they did not have adequate shower and toilet facilities for the capacity stated.
They didn't-have showers at all, which would be necessary for decontamination end is included in our separate guidelines that Ms.
Long referred to for shelters involved with nuclear functions.
And I ' then _ telephoned the other the principals of the schools on the other shelters and the manager of Kings Mountain State Park.
I didn't visit any of those shelters personally.
I telephoned the
-principals and found out that they did not have showers I made the county people aware as soon as I knew.
But I really am not sure about who I made aware.
They then immediately began to make plans, alternate plans, because their shelters were not suitable.
M.,
Tr. 4465-4467.
Thus, all of the shelters listed in the York County Plan, Appl. Ex. EP-2,
- p. Q-98, were determined by the Red Cross to be inadequate for use in the event of a radiological cmergency.
Bethany ARP Church and Bethany Elementary School are listed there as primary shelters.
Sharon Elementary School, Hickory Grove Elementary School, and South Carolina State Park (Kings Mountain) are listed as secondary shelters.
The January 1984 shelter and capacity listing is pref aced with the following d:scription:
The shelters listed in this appendix are in compliance with ' American Red Cross Disaster Services Guidelines and Procedures, ARC 3074, dated August 1976.
H.
Yet, neither Ms. Anderson, nor any other Red Cross official to her knowledge, had given any prior approval for the listing of those shelters.
Tr. 4469.
Not only were these shelters listed crroneously and inexcusably in the revised York Plan without prior Red Cross knowledge or approval, but their designation as 97
approved shelter facilities was widely published in both the initial'and 1984 edition of the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan brochure.
Appl. Ex.
EP-8, p.
13; Appl. Ex.
EP-5, p.
13.
.The former brochure, which was the subject of criticism in Intervenors' emergency planning contentions, identifies Bethany Elementary School and Bethany Presbyterian Church as " reception etnters" where York -County evacuees are to be processed, monitored and decontaminated prior to being sent onto shelters.
In the 1984 brochure, Sharon Elementary School and Hickory Grove School are listed as York shelters along with Bethany Church and Elementary.
Both brochures had very wide distribution with the EPZ.
Several thousand of the earlier version were distributed to local citizens who attended meetings or plant tours.
Applicants tcstify that the 1984 edition was mailed to all 95,000 households in the plume EPZ.
While we are assured that the next revision of the brochure will delete these inadequate shelters, and perhaps others found only later to fail to meet Red Cross standards or be otherwise inadequate, the damage that's been done is likely carious and irreparable.
How many evacuees might improperly rely upon one of the superseded brochures with the erroneous listing, Ov;n after the corrected version is published, we would likely n ver know.
However, such potential for confusion, with the very r:31 possibility of resulting harm, is,
- indeed, inexcusable; particularly
- where, as
- here, all such confusion is entirely unnecessary and solely the product of inexcusable failure by
'cmergency planning authorities to verify the contents of their 98
r plans with the authorities tasked with implementing it.
Subsequent to the Intervenors' criticism of the plans' reliance upon 14 reception centers, including the inadequate York County fccilitie=, as contained in their July 1983 emergency planning cententions, the South Carolina authorities scrapped the r:ception center concept and have designated a system of 38 primary and over 100 secondary shelters which are still in the
. process of review for adequacy.
We took a.hard look at the reception center concept for Catawba and based upon the size of the population felt it would not be feasible to use such a concept, thus we went to a sheltering system where the public would go directly to shelters rather than first to a reception center and then to a shelter.
We have approximately 38 primary and well over 100 total shelters designated in the state and local plan for Catswba that could.be called on if the population warranted it.
Appl. Ex. Ep-13, McSwain, pp. 11-12.
We understand that beyond the York facilities a number of other listed shelters may be dOtermined inadequate, such as elementary schools still listed for South Carolina which commonly have no shower facilities at cll.. M.,
- McSwain, p.
13.
While the review by the American Red Cross of the adequacy of presently designated shelters will be ccmpleted, "within the year, if possible," M.,
- Johnson, p.
13, co are not comforted by either the prospect of plant operation bafore the review of shelter adequacy is complete, or the failure by Applicants and planning officials to perform the necessary rOview for adequacy long
- ago, and certainly prior to their d:cignation in the plans as " adequate" and the wide publication of such designation such as in Duke's Catawba brochures.
99
18.
Lest we leave tlie impression that only the South Carolina authorities are guilty of planning inadequacies, or that s
cur only criticism is"for the late Mr'.
Carroll who can no longer d2 fend himself; we turn to strikingly similar evidence of planning deficiencies in North Carolina on the part of Charlotte-Mecklenburg planning authorities.
The January 1984 revision of the Mecklenburg County part of the North Carolina Plan for Catawba, Part 3, p. 34, lists a single designated shelter for all M;cklenburg County evacuees:
Shelter Spaces t
University of North Carolina 20,100 at Charlotte Highway 49 Charlotte, N.C.
t Appl. Ex. EP-1.
Applicants' Mr. Glover prepared and submitted a
(
~
list of designated shelters for Catawba identified during the hcarings on May 4, 1984, Tr. 821, also listing the University of N rth Carolina at Charlotte with a capacity of 20,100 evacuees.
That same day Mr.
Wayne Broome of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office pointedly corrected his prefiled tcstimony, Appl. Ex. EP-13, Broome, p.
1, 1.
15, to delete the plural reference to " shelters":
WITNESS BROOME:
Just remove the plural designation from " shelters", remove the "s" on " shelters" and just make it " shelter".
Br::ome, Tr. 600, 5/3/84: a " minor change in my testimony."
I_d.
Mr. Broome is less than forthcoming on this point.
19.
In
- fact, the American Red Cross had rated the Univeristy of North Carolina at Charlotte as adequate for only 100
5,000 evacuees in the event of a radiological accident on the basis of their review of the facility in connection with the Duke McGuire Nuclear Station exercise some two years before.
- Long, Tr. 4474-4480, 6/8/84.
In much the same fashion as in the case of the York County planning officials and Ms. Anderson of the lccal Red Cross, Ms. Long was not aware of the Catawba listing of 1
UNCC's capacity as 20,100 until af ter the January 1984 Plan was cetually published.
She promptly pointed out the incorrect listing by letter of February 3, 1984.
M.,
Tr. 4480.
In place of UNCC as the sole shelter, the Catawba Plan for Mecklenburg svacuees will now designate some 24 public schools for shelters chich have not yet been reviewed for adequacy by the Red Cross.
H. Tr. 4484.
The so-called "All Hazards Plan" for the City of Charlotte lists some 30 schools as general duty emergency chelters, Int. Ex. EP-46, a number of which may-prove inadequate cince the Red Cross recognizes enhanced requirements, such as d: contamination facilities, for shelters to be used in rcdiological emergencies.
M.,
Tr.
4484.
Whether the North
- Carolina Plan's f ailure ' to accurately reflect the two year old r; view and downgrading of the University of North Carolina at Chnrlotte's shelter capacity is itself explainable as mere
- in:ptitude or administrative oversight, the consequent failure to consult with the Red Cross authorities responsible for plan itplementation which is disclosed by such error is indeed b1cmeworthy and reflects a significant planning failure.
As was the case with the York County South Carolina shelter errors, the 101
i
_,)
~
j' '
'{
,1 designation of UNCC as the sole shelter for Mecklenburg evacuees cas widely published througn both the original and 1984 revised cditions of the Duke Power Catawba Emergency Plan brochure.
Appl. Ex. EP-8r p.
13; Appl. Ex.
EP-5, p.
13.
The prospect of c me fraction of.the improperly listed 1500 evacuees streaming in the direction of UNCC in reliance on the old brochures, even if later corrected, adds significant weight to the Intervenors' concerns regarding evacuation problems in Charlotte and is chilling indeed.
20.
We direct Applicants to demonstrate that a
final
' listing of shelters to be esployed for Catawba evacuation has
.bren the subject of full Red Cross review for adequacy prior to cuthorization for plant operations above 5% power level.
102
INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 8 -- INADEQUATE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES 1.
The initial Licensing Board admitted Palmetto and CESG's cmergency planning Contention 8 on the subject of coordination of cmergency response activities at the close of the prehearing conference held August 8,
- 1983, to consider admission of cmergency planning contentions.
As admitted, the contention rcads:
There is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures een and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency in that the emergency plans of Applicants, the states of North Carolina and South
- Carolina, and the counties of Mecklenburg, Gaston and York fail to assign clear and effective primary responsibilities for emergency response and fail to establish specific responsibilities of the
.varioits supporting organizations.
Conflict, confusion and lack of coordination are likely to prevail.
Conditions may be the worst during the seven to nine hours after notification of state authorities e,f the
' existence of an accident at the Catawba Station while the North Carolina State Emergency
Response
Team (SERT) assembles and travels from Raleigh to the South Carolina Forward Emergency Operation Center (FEOC),
located dangerously within the 10 mile EPZ at Clover, South Carolina.
The FEOC itself would require at least three and one-half hours to be assembled and staffed from Columbia, South Carolina.
While the formal authority to order an evacuation of the plume exposure pathway EPZ straddling the North Carolina-South Carolina border rests with the respective state governors, a confusing and ineffective array of consultative and delegative authority appears to cloud the lines of primary responsibility.
The residual responsibilities of the respective county governments,
- agencies, and the support organizations are either unspecified or inadequate to the task of effective protective response.
103
~ _.
. ~ _
' Order (Concerning Miscellaneous Matters) August 17, 1983.
Tr.
- 1088-1080,- 8/8/83.
In admitting Contention 8,
the Licensing Board Chairman observed:
No.
8 -is a contention that is concerned with the various aspects of coordination.
We are going to
. allow-this. contention.
Again we thought on some specifics it was a rather close call, but we decided that it was sufficiently specific.
Another interpretive comment that we would make that I thought is merely consistent with what we said earlier today.
The first couple of sentences of this contention are quite general.
We read them as really introductory sentences and not as substantive complaints..But with that understanding then starting with the third sentence, the sentence that begins "Condtions may be worse" and so on, there are three or four.different points that are made that we understand to be the focus of concern.
- r I.M '
2.
The siting of the Catawba Nuclear ~ Station virtually g
actride the North Carolina-South Carolina state boundary on the South Carolina shore of Lake Wylie presents _ rather unique problems. for coordination of the various licensee, local and Otate response organizations charged with. tasks in the event of 4
fan' emergency at the. station.
While the plant is physically
'lecated in York County, South Carolina, thus requiring assignment of primary. responsibilities to public officials in York County
- ond South Carolina state government, the prevailing wind blowing tcward'the northeast and the' close proximity of such a populous metropolitan area as the city of.
Charlotte, located in
- M;cklenburg ^ County,- North
- Carolina, only 9.7 miles from the
' facility
-requires the demonstrated capability for close
' coordination ~
and timely response by public officials in 104
i Mecklenburg County and North. Carolina state government also charged with primary responsibility under the Catawba Plans.
Sze, m., discussion of Contention 11, infra.
3.
While this coordinated response has been the subject of an exercise at Catawba in February 1984, reflecting, apparently, cctisfactory efforts in the eyes of the FEMA observers, Heard and H;wkins Tr.
1660-1663, 5/9/84, we are unable to conclude with ccnfidence that Applicants and their allied state and local officials have demonstrated that effective assignments of primary and support responsibilities and the coordination of such response activities can and will be realized in the event of an cctual-radiological emergency at the Catawba facility.
We balieve that the Intervenors' concerns expressed in Contention 8 cre well founded and will require remedial measures in order to cupport a reasonable assurance conclusion as to the adequacy of cmergency planning for Catawba.
4.
As Palmetto and CESG point out in their contention, the most critical problems of coordination are likely to arise during the first several hours after the initiation of an accident at Catawba.
It is during this period of time that the South.
-Carolina and North Carolina stcte officials who are ultimately charged with primary responsibility for directing protective action will not yet be assembled and sufficiently organized to undertake that ultimate task.
5.
In the case of the South Carolina authorities, located in the state capitol of Columbia some ninety miles from the 105
Catawba
- site, their assembly and relocation to the Forward Emergency Operations Center to be established at the Clover National Guard Armory just inside the 10 mile plume EPZ is i
cotimated to take a
minimum of three and one-half hours.
Applicants' Exhibit EP-21, Lunsford & McSwain, pp. 4-5.
In North Carolina the principal state authorities who will ultimately take command are located in the state capitol of Raleigh, some 150 miles from their field command post located at the North Carolina Air National Guard Headquarters at Douglas Airport in Charlotte.
'The North Carolina State Emergency Response Team (SERT) would rcquire seven to nine hours to activate the near site command post.
North Carolina Plan, Part 1,
- p. 4, Appl. Ex. EP-1.
6.
During these first few hours prior to the assumption by etate authorities of primary responsibility for offsite protective response such primary responsibility is assigned to various emergency response and local government officials in Gaston, Mecklenburg and York Counties.
Appl. Ex. EP-21, Pugh and Harris, pp. 4-5; Lunsford and McSwain, pp.
3-4, 9; Phillips, p.
2; Broome, pp. 1-2; Thomas, pp. 6-7; NRC Staff Ex.
EP-2, Heard Cnd Hawkins, p.
15.
'ust these critical few hours, when the 7.
It is in j
ac2ignments of responsibility and coordination are at their w;akest, that the most severe core melt accident sequences with gravest offsite consequences requiring prompt and effective protective action to accomplish life and injury savings would cccur.
See, Sholly, Int. Ex. EP-49.
It is jus such an accident 106
-for which promptest protective action would be required where the offectiveness of emergency planning is most critical.
We are much 'less troubled by the likely ability of the responsible parties to effectively coordinate and respond under circumstances cf a slowly developing accident scenario moving only gradually from.an alert through 1 general emergency and calling for offsite protective action only hours or days after initial notification
.of the distant state officials.
However, the test of effective planning is rarely the easy cases where the stakes are lowest.
H$re, where the stakes are highest and the life and injury cavings.to be realized from effective response are at their
- greatest, we would,
- indeed, be remiss in failing to require dcmonstrated effectiveness.
8.
In relevant part Commission's emergency planning r gulations, 10
- CFR, Section 50.47 (b)(1) require that the
.offsite emergency response plans, here, must meet the following ctandard:
Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by state and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization'has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.
9.-
The Commission and FEMA's NUREG-0654 evaluation
- criteria, IIA
" Assignment of Responsibility (organization control) provide in relevant part:
1.a.
Each plan shall identify the
- state, local, federal and private sector organizations (including utilities),
that are intended to be 107
7 part. of the overall response organization for Emergency Planning Zones. (See Appendix 5).
- b. Each organization and suborganization having an operational role shall specify its concept of operations, and its relationship to the totc1 effort.
2.a.
Each organization shall specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements and key individuals by title The description of these functions shall include a
clear and concise summary such as a table of primary and support responsibilities...
- b. Each plan shall contain (by reference to specific acts, codes or statutes) the legal basis for such authorities.-
NUREG 0654 Appendix 5-1 provides:
10.
There may be more than one state
- involved, resulting in application of the evaluation criteria separately to more than one state.
To the extent
-possible,
- however, one state should be designated lead.
Applying these evaluation criteria we conclude that the acsignments of primary and support responsibilities under the Catawba plans are inadequate to provide reasonable assurance of cffective protective action and that where such primary
{
responsibilities are assigned under the plans, such assignments cre'not supported by reference to adequate legal bases for the nuthority of such organizations or individuals to perform the
-ccsigned. responsibilities.
11.
Of course, there are, indeed, both the states of North
.cnd > South Carolina involved in emergency response within the plume-emergency planning zone for Catawba.
As noted, above, each otate 's emergency response team is organized independently, is 108
located independently at separate command posts at great distance from each other; even after the state authorities have traveled from their respective state capitols to the facility area and have assumed control from the local county officials.
The ovidence reflects that each state reserves unto itself the independent responsibility to determine protective action and to control emergency response activities within its own jurisdiction.
No evidence was offered to suggest that one state or the other had been " designated laad;" nor was any evidence offered by Applicants, the NRC staff, or the respective state
-officials on the question of to what
- extent, if
- any, such
~
d signation of lead responsibility had been determined possible or not; or whether such designation had even been given
' consideration.
Failure to address this important question ignores the NUREG 064 regulatory guidance, Appendix 5-1, confirms the concerns the Intervenors ao to lack of coordination, and raflects a clear failure to demonstrate reasonable assurance that offective protective action can and will be taken at Catawba.
12.
Turning, now, to claims by Applicants, state and local officials, that primary responsibilities under the plan have been offectively assigned and that such responsibilities are supported by appropriate legal authority.
13.
The South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency ROponse Plan (SCORERP),
Appl.
Ex.
Ep-2, p.
1, asserts the following legal basis for the assignment of primary 109
[
t responsibility for emergency response activities under its provisions:
1.
South Carolina Legislative Act No. 199, Section i
21, 30 July
- 1979, establishing the Emergency b
Preparedness Division (EPD) in the Office of the State Adjutant General.
This act places responsibility for emergency planning for natural and manmade disasters on the Emergency Preparedness Division and provides extra-ordinary powers to the Governor to direct operations.
2.
Article X,
Constitution of the United States, specifically recognizes that pursuant to the sovereign power of the State of South Carolina, the state has the responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
3.-
Article IV of the Constitution of South Carolina
.provides that the Governor has complete responsibility for all activities of the state.
-4..
. Legislative Act No. 223 of 1967 and subsequent amendments thereto relating to atomic energy and radiation
- control, places the overall responsibility for protecting the health and safety of. the general public in the event.of a
. radiological-incident upon the State Department of Health and Environmental Control, a
>In 1.ts Table 3, "REit Responsibilities Summary Table to SCORERP,"
- the-South Carolina Plan specifies the assignments of primary and cupport responsibilities to various agencies with' regard to each of :the specified emergency response functions set out in the planning criteria.
For the function " Command and Control" the
. plan assigns primary responsibility to the Office of the
- Governor."
Support responsibilities are assigned to the Emergency-Preparedness
- Division, the Office of the Adjutant G:neral', and the Department of Health and Environmental Control.
. Primary ~ responsibility for the function of Protective Response"
!1e assigned to the-Department of Health and Environmental Control 110 b
w
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way-+-
i=t=t-t Tw 7-t-'
"i.t--'-*a~4 T--9%
- y p*?'-'P y-e-'*
-*"--1 g
T=
M 9FPtr 7--W'WFT----"'y-T2
-e-
-e*Ch-MP
Uith support responsibilities for this function assigned to some
-12 other organizations including the Emergency preparedness Division and local governments.
Appl. Ex. EP-2, SCORERP pp. 55-58.
14.
South Carolina Legislative Act No. 199 of July 1979, cited -in SCORERP as the primary authority for assignment of rcsponsibilities under the Plan has been codified as Sections 25-1-420 g seq.,
Code of Laws of South Carolina (1984) and provides in Section 25-1-440, entitled "Adr'*ional powers and Duties of Governor During Declared Emergency," as follows:
(a)
The
- Governor, when an emergency has been declared, as the elected Chief Executive of the
- State, shall be responsible for the
- safety, security and welfare of the State and shall be empowered with the following additional authority to adequately discharge this responsibility:
(7)
Direct and compel evacuation of all or part of the populace from any stricken or affected area if this action is deemed necessary for the preservation of life or other emergency mitigation, response or recovery; to prescribe
- routes, modes of transportation and destination in connection with evacuation; and to control ingress and egress at an emergency area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein.
(b)
The Governor shall be responsible for the development and coordination of a
system of Comprehensive Emergency Management which shall include provisions for mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery in anticipated and actual emergency situations.
15.
The York County, South Carolina Emergency Operations plcn, Appl. Ex. EP-2, indicates as its legal basis for assignment of responsibilities the following legal authority:
111
)
1.
York County Ordinance dated October 10, 1980.
2.
South Carolina Act No. 223 of 1967, as amended.
3.
South Carolina Act No. 199, July 30, 1979.
Id.-at p.
1.
The cited 1980 York County Ordinance provides for comprehensive emergency response activities and the assignment of responsibilities for such activities to county authorities:
-A state of disaster or emergency may be declared by the County Council if it finds a disaster or emergency has occurred, or that the threat thereof is imminent, and. extra-ordinary emergency measures are deemed necessary to cope with the existing or anticipated situation.
Once declared, the state of emergency e
shall continue until terminated by proclamation of the County Council.
L In; addition.to any other powers conferred by law, the County. Council may,- under the provisions of this Ordinance:
(F)
Direct evacuation of all or part
.of the population from any stricken or threatened area within' the county if such action is deemed necessary for preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or rec ~overy; Jg. at pp.~vi-vii.
In direct conflict with the provisions of the Ordinance which asaigns responsibility for emergency response to
~the' County Council Annex Q to the York. Emergency Operations Plan, thich applies explicitly to ' _ radiological accidents at Catawba, raponsibility for the function of " direction-and control" is
'deaigned, not - to County Council, but to the " County Manager."
_-12.
. g. p.
Q 16.
'It is abundantly clear that not only is there this ~
internal;' inconsistency and' therefore lack of appropriately cocigned responsibility within the -
York County Emergency 112 6'
,rm, s.r-- - - - - - -, - -..
+_-
.,c
-mm,,
.--------,.w--._--+-c-+--,-m__ _.,,, -. -
r-,
Operations plan-for Catawba but there is a
confusing and
-ineffective assignment of primary responsibility to York County officials,.regardless of whether to be exercised by County Council or the County Manager in the face of clear statutory
.nssignment of the. authority to evacuate the public to the
-Governor of South Carolina as specified in Act 199 of 1979.
There is, simply put, no adequate legal basis for the assignment of primary responsibility to York County officials to effect cvacuation as a protective response during the critical early hours of an emergency at Catawba.
The correctness of this legal pcsition advanced by Palmetto and CESG is endorsed by the opinion of none other than the Attorney General of South Carolina in an official opinion of September 5,- 1980.
Int. Ex. EP-21.
- There, the Office of the Attorney General responds to the following question presented:
Do "loccl" officials or governing bodies have the authority to order and compel an evacuation of all or part of the populous within their respective jurisdictions?
I d_.
The Attorney General of South Carolina concludes that notwithstanding the passage of home rule legislation in South Carolina,-these powers are reserved expressly to the Governor of South Carolina or his designated successor but are not available to local authorities.
He concludes:
I, is accordingly the opinion of this office that, u.1 der existing law, neither a county nor municipal governing body or official has the authority to direct and compel an evacuation of any of its populace.
This is not to say, however, that local public officials, including law enforcement, should not continue to warn o r.
encourage evacuation when hazardous or dangerous conditions-exist on a local level.
113 m
v y
y w..
y1--
r
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---e
--r-+-
wr r
Should the General Assembly decide to expressly grant this extra-ordinary power on a
limited basis to counties and municipalities (i.e. evacuation to other areas within the control and jurisdiction of the entity involved),
I see no impediment to such legislation.
d.,
p.
4.
The language of the Attorney General's Opinion is absolutely clear.
The Applicants have pointed to no subsequent 1cgislation granting such power to local officials as is claimed in the York County Ordinance.
Further, the significance of this opinion seems well understood by responsible South Carolina state authorities who communicated the effect of such a
legal limitation in advising Mr. McSwain in the course of his planning for Catawba.
Lt. Thomas of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division wrote in January 1983:
I met with Assistant Attorney General John Wilson on this date in reference to our problem at Carowinds.
He advised I was correct in stating that only the Governor in the State of South Carolina could ask for an evacuation.
Home Rule is in effect in this state; however, it does not give local authority any power as to the_ question of evacuation.
Specifically speaking of Carowinds, Jim Carroll's office can advise the management of each phase in the emergency process and can suggest an early close-down as they normally would, but should not tell them to evacuate.
The term evacuation should be avoided unless an order has been signed by the Governor; this is true for any large private employer in York County.
Int. Ex. EP-21.
The point of Lt. Thomas' letter to Mr. McSwain, which we think is very well-taken, is that regardlese of the c:cantics employed, whether one chooses such words as " direct, compel, order" or even " warn or encourage" the power to effect an evacuation is reserved under South Carolina law to the Governor 114
I of South Carolina: which, even then, must be exercised through the process specified in the statute involved.
17.
It is abundantly clear to this Licensing Board that the NUREG '0654 planning criteria requiring citation of legal cuthority to support assignments of responsibility under the plan cerves a critical purpose.
It must be presumed that a plan can only -be effectively implemented when the organizations and officials assigned
. responsibilities under that plan have
' cuf ficient ' legal authority to perform the tasks with which they cre charged.
Under South Carolina law, not only as we interpret it, but as-is interpreted via the Attorney General's Opinion on the ' subject, York County authorities cannot be assigned the primary responsibility for accomplishing an evacuation as presently assigned under the South Carolina and York County Plans during the critical early hours of an accident prior to or in the absence of specified action by the Governor.
We conclude that the South Carolina and York Plans are deficient in this regard Cnd that such deficiency must be corrected in order to establish the
" reasonable assurance" conclusion required by Commission rcgulation.
10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).
18.
By way of rebuttal Palmetto and CESG presented the
-toctimony of Harold Dickson, Chairman of the York County Council, the senior elected official of York County.
Dickson, Tr. 4012, 6/6/84.
As specified in the York County Emergency Operations
- Plan, p.
15, Appl. Ex.
EP-2, under the heading " Direction and Control" the line of succession of authority in York County is 115
headed by the York County
- Council, followed by the County
- Manager, Director of General
- Services, and Director of the Emergency Preparedness Agency.
Yet, at p.
Q-12 of the. York Plan under the same heading
" Direction and Control" authority is assigned to first, the County Manager; second, the Director of General Services;
- and, then, the Director of Emergency Preparedness.
Mr. Dickson saw no contradiction in this obviously conflicting assignments of responsibility specified in the Plan.
Tr. 4015.
When asked to comment on the apparent conflict between the October 1980 York County Ordinance claiming powers on the part of County officials to evacuate the public and the contrary Attorney General's opinion, Mr. Dickson responsed:
I believe since that Ordinance has been enacted, it has been overruled by the Attorney General that particular part of it as far as-taking control of
.maybe moving people or compelling people to do certain things as far as the county is concerned.
Q.
Do you mean the Attorney General said you couldn't do that?
A.
I believe that is correct.
- Dickson, Tr. 4011, 6/6/84.
If actually called upon to perform
.r:sponsibilities in an emergency, we can only doubt Mr. Dickson's offectiveness since he disclaimed any knowledge of the emergency l
plans for Catawba and did not participate at all in the February 1984 exercise.
M. Tr. 4017-4018.
19.
Intervenors also presented the rebuttal testimony of J.
- Elber.t - Pope, the Sheriff of York County.
Sheriff Pope disclaimed knowledge of responsibilities assigned under the plan to the Shariff of York County explaining that he had designated a
.cubordinate to " attend all these meetings and so forth."
Pope 116
Tr. 3969, 6/6/84.
Sheriff Pope disclaimed knowledge of what plans are in existence for an emergency at Catawba, had read "not a one of them," and was not aware of the other agencies and officers in York County which were assigned responsibilities under the plan. M.,
Tr. 3977.
Despite the fact that the York County Sheriff is assigned primary responsibility under the plan,
- p. Q-56, for all " traffic control, security and law enforcement" Sheriff Pope disclaimed knowledge of what his department's r:sponsibilities were even in the, area of law enforcement.
Id.,
Tr. 3980-3981.
20.
Intervenors presented the rebuttal testimony of Frank B. Sanders, the Director of the Division of Public Safety in the Office of the Governor of South Carolina.
As Director of the Division of Public Safety, I have responsibility for the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Governor's Office.
Within the Governor's Office we are responsible for the possible command and control of local and state governments to reduce or eliminate any damage to state government or to property or to persons in case of an accident at a fixed nuclear facility.
- Sanders, Tr.
- 3085, 6/6/84.
The South Carolina Plan makes no r;ference whatsoever to the existence of the Division of Public Safety yet alone the assignment to it of primary responsibilities for command and control.
M., Tr. 3094.
The Plan does make oxpress reference to the Governor's press secretary or authorized representative to whom public information responsibilities are acsigned.
Jd. Tr. 3096-3097.
21.
South Carolina state government is dominated by the legislative branch with most executive functions performed by 117
independent boards and commissions whose professional staffs are answerable directly to them.
Such a system contrasts strikingly with the more common structure where the Governor as Chief l
Executive controls the executive aepartments through the oppointment of secretaries as in a cabinet system.
Important South Carolina state government offices with responsibilities under the Catawba Plan such as the Office of the Adjutant General and the-Department of Health and Environmental Control are independent of the Governor's authority.
The Adjutant General is cn independent elected constitutional officer who reports to the Governor only under the limited circumstances where the Governor his called out the National Guard.
'Similarly, the staff of the Department of Health and Environmental Control, including those cho are assigned responsibilities under the Catawba Plan, report to the head of that department and its board and not to the Governor.
Sanders Tr. 3100-3103, 6/6/84.
72.
Under such a legal structure it is very difficult for this Licensing Board to understand in what sense the Office of tho Governor is legally empowered to exercise the command and control responsibilities assigned to it under the South Carolina Plnn.
With the various actors such as the Emergency Planning Division of the Adjutant General's
- Office, the Bureau of Radiological Health of the Department of Health and Environmental Control and the Office of the Governor assigned various raaponsibilities under the South Carolina
- Plan, it is very difficult for us to have confidence that anyone is in charge at a 118
particular point in time.
The only clear legal foundation for i
assignment of such command authority rests upon.he Governor only cfter his declaration of an emergency as provided by statute.
Since this is the case, we can only conclude that the Catawba Plan's assignments of responsibility otherwise are ineffective and without appropriate legal authority.
This deficiency must be rcmedied either through the revision of the plans to reflect oppropriate assignments of responsibility only to those with the rcquisite legal authority, followed by a commensurate showing of the ability to take effective protective action under such a revised plan; or, a
demonstration that the requisite legal authority exists, as with the passage of the needed legislation cuggested in the correspondence to Mr.
- McSwain, Intervenors' Exhibit EP-21, such that those now assigned responsibility under the South Carolina Plan are given the needed legal authority to carry out their assigned tasks.
73.
The situation is little better in North Carolina.
The North Carolina officials make similar clains that county officials have full authority to effect an evacuaation in the first seven to nine hours before the state officials themselves take command.
Appl. Ex. EP-21, Pugh and Harris, pp-. 4-5.
- 74. to the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan - in support of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Appl. Ex. EP-1, Part 1, is entitled " Authorities, References and Agreements," and reproduces verbatim the statutory legal basis for the assignments of responsibilities as reflected in the plan.
As they bear on 119
the legal support for the assignments of primary responsibility under the plan, the-authorities referenced include the North Carolina Emergency Management Act-of 1976 (North Carolina General Statutes 166Al g seq.=;
- and, as to the " authority of local government," a reference -to North Carolina General Statute 14-288.1 et seq. and North Carolina General Statute 166A-1 et seq.
i 75.
A review of these asserted legal authorities makes clear that with respect to affecting an evacuation, the
-ccsignment of primary respor.sibility to local government in North Carolina during the first few hours of an accident is as untenable as such assignment under the South Carolina Plan.
The operative provisions of the North Carolina Emergency Management Act with respect to the authority of the Governor are as follows:
' State of Disaster.
The existence of a
state of.
- disaster may be proclaimed by the Governor, or 'by resolution of the General Assembly if either of these finds that a disaster threatens or exists.-
Any state of disaster shall be terminated by proclamation of the
. Governor or-resolution of the General Assembly.
b.
Powers of the Governor, with the concurrence of the Council of State:
(1) to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any
-stricken
.'or threatened area within the state; to prescribe
- routes, modes of transportation and destinations in connection with the evacuation; and to control ingress and egress ' of a disaster area, the movement of people within the area, and the occupation of premises therein.
NCGS 166A-6.
Such provisions is strikingly similar to the terms of.the : statute authorizing - the Governor in South Carolina to
- @f fect an. evacuation upon declaraticn of a state of emergency.
In North Carolina, however, the Governor's powers are exercised only with the concurrence of the Council of State.
Id.
120
4-26.
Turning now to the referenced authority of local government cited in the North Caroldina Plan, we find no support for the assignment to county officials of primary responsibility to effect an evacuation.
Section 166A-1, el seq. clearly does not extend powers narrowly given to the Governor to local cfficials with~ respect to evacuation.
The other authority cited NCGS14-288.1 g seq. appears codified as Article 36A, entitled,
" Riots and Civil Disorders."
The thrust of the article is to provide for the exercise of extra-ordinary powers by the Governor or the chief elected official of local governing bodies, such as mayors and chairman of boards of county commissioners to declare
^
.ctates of emergency to cope with riots and civil disorders through the imposition of special criminal penalties for the violation of special ordinances authorized under this statute.
-By its terms the enactment has no application -to emergencies or cccidents at fixed nuclear facilities, nor does it empower local authorities to effect evacuations.
We think it is clear that the czrefeully worded and conditioned statutory authorization for the Governor of North Carolina must be understood as excluding any implied. extensions of the same authority to others not of the Governor's stature or delimited with the procedural restrictions cpplicable to him.
27.
Mr.
J.
T.
Pugh of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management attempts in his prefiled testimony to avoid the obvious implications of such a restriculon.
In his initially 121
prefiled testimony Mr.
Pugh is asked the following questions beginning at p. 5:
Q.
DO STATE OFFICIALS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER EVACUATION OR OTHER PROTECTIVE ACTION?
A.
Yes, they do, on issuance of a declaration of a disaster by the Governor.
Q.
WITH WHOM MUST THEY CONSULT BEFORE DOING SO?
A.
They must consult with the Council of State,
- however, copies must be on file with the appropriate County Clerks of Court and the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety prior to compelling evacuation.
Appl. Ex. EP-21, pp. 5-6.
28.
When he took the stand Mr.
Pugh offered a
" clarification" to this testimony, Appl. Ex. EP-21A:
Q.
WITH WHOM MUST STATE OFFICIALS CONSULT BEFORE ORDERING EVACUATION?
A.
There is no requirement that they consult with anyone.
Q.
DO STATE OFFICIALS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL EVACUATION OR OTHER PROTECTIVE ACTION?
A.
Yes.
_Q.
MUST ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS BE TAKEN BEFORE EVACUATION CAN BE FORMALLY COMPELLED?
A.
Yes.
The Governor must issue a delcaration of a disaster, and state officials must consult with the Council of State.
In addition, NC State Law require that copies of a declaration of disaster be disseminated promptly and in a manner designed to bring the declaration to the public's attention.
If time and circumstances
- permit, copies of the declaration are to be filed with the appropriate County Clerks of Court, the NC Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety, before evacuation is compelled.
It should be noted, however, that by the time this step of formally compelling evacuation has been taken by state officials, evacuation would already have been ordered and would be underway.
29.
We think this attempt at clarification merely cmphasizes the absurdity of the positions taken by Applicants and tho state and local officials in their efforts to avoid the 122 L
obvious implications of the plain meaning of their own statutory laws.
It would make meaningless, indeed, the carefully craf ted ctatutory provisions empowering the governors of South Carolina Gnd North Carolina to " direct and compel" evacuations, etc.,
to imply that the power to accomplish the same as resides in these lcsser officials.
We note that even in prescribing a sample message to be communicated on the emergency broadcast system in the event the protective action of evacuation was necessary, the South Carolina Plan remains schizophrenic in its treatment of the cub, ject:
(PROTECTIVE ACTION, EVACUATION) l Those persons living in the affected area are (advised)
(requested)
(ordered) by the Governor to proceed with an orderly evacuation over (the nearest route) to the reception center located at SCORERP, Annex C-17, Appl. Ex. EP-2.
We note in passing that no mention is made in these messages of any authority other than the Governor
" directing,"
" compelling,"
" ordering,"
" advising,"
" requesting," or " warning," or " encouraging" evacuation of the
,EPZ population.
We are convinced that the lack of clear legal b2cis for the assignments of primary responsibility to effect an ovacuation in both South and North Carolina reflect deficiencies in the plan and its implementation capability requiring remedial
.mnasures in order to permit a " reasonable assurance" finding.
30.
We are urged to accord substantial weight to the findings by FEMA reflected in their testimony and in the results of their observations of the Catawba exercise conducted in 123
i February 1984 in support of Applicants' and Staff's position on this contention.
We decline to do so for a number of reasons, and conclude that the FEMA views should be accorded very little caight.
31.
The scope of their analysis is limited in the extreme.
The pre-filed testimony of the FEMA witnesses Heard and Hawkins
.ic, as typical of their testimony generally, extremely brief; h re, consisting of one and one-half pages.
The review reflected ic limited solely to an analysis of the content of the respective written plans.
While deficiencies in the content of those plans cre noted, NRC Staff Ex.
Ep-2, Heard and Hawkins, pp.
17-18, there is no indication whatsoever that the review extended to cither an analysis of the implementation capability of those
_ charged with responsibilities under the plan, or even a review of the sufficiency of the legal authority referred to in the plans ao the basis.for the plans assignments of responsibility.
32.
We are directed to the FEMA witnesses ' observations regarding the Catawba station exercise as a basis for crediting their endorsement of the Applicant and Staff position on this contention.
Heard and Hawkins Tr. 1660-1663, 5/9/84.
- However, by des'ign, the exercise itself was an ineffective test of the cbilities of the authorities to respond under the severe accident Octnario which is the subject of Intervenor's concern.
The cccident scenario actually modeled reflected a very gradually unfolding incident with only the most minor
- release, with a projected 50 milligram offsite dose, which occurred only on the 124
morning of the second day, long after all emergency response personnel had been in place and prepared to respond as such limited response was necessary.
While a more realistic exercise cculd clearly have projected a plume that followed the prevailing meterology, FEMA's concern here seemed only to be that the exercise tests the Gaston County response, thereby missing all together Mecklenberg County and the populous city of Charlotte.
H ard and Hawkins Tr. 1626-1631, 5/9/84.
33.
The rather rosy FEMA critique of the Catawba exercise appears, further, unduly colored by their failure to receive and consider criticisms actually observed by participating exercise evaluators who did not happen to be working for FEMA.
Int. Ex.
EP-34, 35, for identification.
We got nothing from other evaluators.
We would not need anything.
We do not use other peoples' evaluations for preparation of our report.
H;ard, Tr. 1641, 5/9/84.
34.
Yet, evaluation form shown the witness by Palmetto oigned by one Ray Connolly, DHEC (FEOC) Controller / Evaluator, r0flects the following comment on the Catawba exercise:
The Clover Armory was set-up before the exercise.
Consideration should be given to not doing this in future exercises to add additional challenge to the participants.
Int. Ex.'EP-35, for identification.
While neither FEMA witness had seen this evaluation form, nor was either aware of the participation of these additional ovaluators, Tr. 1642, they were aware that the Clover National Guard Armory, the Forward Emergency Operations Center for the 125
South Carolina Emergency Response Team (SERT) had been set up in advance of the exercise.
Under normal circumstances no staff or equipment would be pre-located at Clover;
- and, instead, they would require some three hours to arrive from Columbia.
This lack of realism did not concern the FEMA witnesses since they bslieved that the South Carolina authorities had shown the ability to set up armories in other exercises for other facilities.
Heard and Hawkins Tr. 1643-1644, 5/9/84.
We are not comforted by this reliance by the FEMA witness on prior
. parformance in other settings and find very disturbing this and other limits on the realism of the Catawba exercise.
For these
- reasons, we are attach little weight to the FEMA position on Contention 8; and, in fact, find that the lack of zeal reflected in the FEMA review enhances rather than relieves our concerns.
126 4
.r
_m_ _ _.. _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,. _
INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 9 PROMPT ALERT AND NOTIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC 1.
As admitted by the initial Licensing Board at the close of 'the August 8,
1983 pre-hearing conference, Tr.
1089-1092, Order (Concerning Miscellaneous Matters),
August 17,
- 1983,
' Palmetto and' CESG's Emergency Planning Contention 9 states as
-follows:
The emergency plans for Catawba do not adequately
-provide for the early notification and clear instruction to state and local response organizations and the public that are required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) in that:
(a)
[If]
the sirens do
- sound, not all citizens who would be effected and therefore require notification would be able to hear a warning siren.
Such a situation could arise as' a result of hearing impairments, weather
. conditions, distance from sirens, etc.
-(b)
In the. event of a power outage, the public 's access (and possibly the access of
-state and local authorities with emergency responsibilities) to emergency broadcast information could be seriously impaired.
Without a specific, reasonable ' plan to deal with such a contingency, the emergency plans do not meet 10 CFR '50.47 (b)(6) as well as
_(b)(5).
(c)
[N]either the Carowinds Theme Park nor the Heritage U.S. A.
religious retreat appear to have any notification plans or procedures.
A conservative estimate of a
peak summer crowd at Carowinds is 30,000- to 35,000
-people.
For such a crowd to be notified and given instructions on how to leave the park in a quick, orderly and safe manner clearly requires some set of special procedures that is yet to be formulated.
'Wo' find'for Intervenors on important parts of Contention 9 and cill require that remedia.1 measures be performed by Applicants and others,~and submitted for our review prior to our reaching a "reasonab'le assurance" conclusion on this issue as required by 127
i
==
Commission regulations.
In short, we agree with Intervenor's assertion that there has been no effective demonstration that all citizens who require notification of an accident or emergency at the Catawba facility will actually hear the siren warning signals 5
or otherwise receive the prompt alert and notification which is required by Commission regulations.
Required verification of the effectiveness of the Catawba prompt alert and notification system has yet to be accomplished.
Therefore,.the full extent of
/
--:n deficiencies in this system has yet to be determined;
- and, consequently, corrective actions have yet to be either undertaken or completed.
In the face of Intervenor's contention to this effect and the evidence cf record, we cannot simply trust that the matter will be satisfactorily taken care of through post-3 hearing NRC staff and FEMA action.
Prior to the authorization e
for power operations above five per cent testing level, we must be assured that the alert and notification system for the Catawba j
EPZ has been tested, reviewed, corrected where necessary, and is acceptable.
2.
As we noted, supra, with respect to emergency planning Contentions 1 and 7,
serious deficiencies exist in the public
=. _
information and education program for the Catawba EPZ permanent L
and transient populations.
These deficiencies underscore the importance of effective design and implementation of the alert s-and notification system.
Because of the public education and information program deficiencies, we have even less confidence that the unproven prompt alert and notification system will serve 128 D
^^
its intended purpose of reasonably assuring effective protective action in the event of an actual radiological emergency at Catawba.
This point is particularly appropriate with respect to planning for the special problems involved in the concentrations of transient populations, in excess of 30,000 persons at summer
- peak, at the busy Carowinds Theme Park and Heritage U.S.A.
- retreat, both located within the ten mile plume EPZ.
Where virtually no program exists to disseminate information to transients at Catawba, the deficiencies in the planning for these two facilities are magnified in their effect on the likelihood of effective response.
3.
In addition to the general regulatory requirement of 10 CFR 50.47 (a)(1) that prior to licensing there be demonstrated a reasonable assurance that " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency," specific regulations and guidance are established for reviewing the adequacy of the prompt alert and notification system to be employed to inform the public in the Catawba EPZ of an accident or emergency at the facility and what their initial actions by way of protective response should be.
10 CFR 50.47 (b)(5) requires that:
Heans to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
Appendix E
to 10
- CFR, Part 50, Part IV D
" Notification F
Procedures," establishes the standard by which the effectiveness of such a system is to be judged:
129
The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EpZ within about fifteen minutes.
10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E, IV D 3.
4.
In the NRC and FEMA emergency planning evaluation criteria guidance, NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), criteria E-6 provides:
Each organization shall establish administrative and physical means, in the time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency planning Zone.
(See Appendix 3)
It shall be the licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who implements this requirement.
It shall be the responsibility of the state and local governments to activate such a system.
Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 establishes the following " Criteria for Acceptance," for the prompt alert and notification system:
1.
Within the plume exposure EPZ the system shall provide an alerting signal and notification by commercial broadcast (e.g.,
EBS) plus special systems such as NOAA radio.
A system which expects the recipient to turn on a radio receiver without being alerted by an acoustic alerting signal or some other manner is not acceptable.
2.
The minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by the system are:
(a)
Capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area wide basis tureaghout the ten mile EPZ, within fifteen minutes.
(b)
The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site.
(c)
Special Errangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume EPZ.
The basis for any special requirements exceptions (e.g.,
for extended water areas with transient boats or remote hiking trails) must be documented.
Assurance of 130
continued notification capability may be verified on a statistical basis.
Every year, or'in conjunction with an exercise of the facility, FEMA, in cooperation with the utility
- operator, and/or the state and local governments will take a
statistical sample of the residents of all areas within about ten miles to assess the public's ability to hear the alerting signal and tleir awareness of the meaning of the prompt notification message as well as the availability of information on what to do in an emergency.
The system plan must include a provision for corrective measures to provide reasonable assurance that coverage approaching the design objectives is maintained.
' NUREG-0654,' Appendix 3,
pp.
3-3, 3-4.
- Further, the Appendix provides:
Sirens Wherever proposed as a part of a system, subject to later testing by statistical
- sampling, the design concept and expected performance must be documented as part of plan submitted by licensees, states and local governments.
The designs of such systems must take into account the demography and topography of the areas being considered...
As an acceptable criteria at most locatioils 10 db above average day time ambient background should be a target level for the design of an adequate siren system.
In cases involving industrial operations, a special survey to determine design sound level targets or an inside system may be needed to provide an audible 10 db dissonant differential.
Sirens on vehicles may
- be used to supplement fixed alert systems outside the inner five mile radius of the plume exposure EPZ.
.p.
3-8.
. FEMA 5.
will observe or receive a statement of the annual statisti al sample of population in the EPZ hearing a test based on a field test or in conjunction with an exercise.
FEMA will approve corrective measures necessary to provide assurance that siren systems are meeting the objectives for alerting the population (where they are the specific means for such alerting) approved jointly by NRC and FEMA.
p.
3-13.
The NUREG-0654 Appendix 3 concludes with a description of other. systems which may be employed to supplement the primary mathod of initial notification including the Emergency Broadcast 131
-e-e e
.' System, NOAA weather or emergency alert
- radios, telephone
'sutomatic dialers, and aircraft with loud speakers.
pp.
3-13 l-thru 3-16.
5.
FEMA performs its evaluation of Applicant's siren system according to the guidance of NUREG-0854 and FEMA-43,
" Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power ~ Plants," (September 1983).
The Board has taken
. official notice of these regulatory documents.
Tr. 1597, 5/9/84;
.Tr.
4615-17, 6/8/84.
The required FEMA review has not been parformed.
The posture of this issue is reflected succinctly in the.prefiled' testimony of the FEMA witnesses, Messrs. Heard and Hawkins:
Q57.
Is the siren system -adequate to provide early notification to the persons in the EPZ (plume)
(1) generally,.(2) who have hearing impairments, (3) who are inside homes with perhaps competing sounds from t.v.
programs and record players, and (4) who are asleep,- giving consideration in each case to the
-effects of weather conditions such as snow or excessive winds with howling or strong wind noise?
Explain.
- A57.
Alert and notification systems have been satisfactorily operationally tested periodically.
The official, enginieering and acoustical testing will be accomplished utilizing guidance provided by the publication entitled " FEMA 43" at some future date.
NRC Staf f - Ex.
EP-2,.
pp. 20-21.
In short, the answer to the
= questions posed - both by-Intervenors. in their Contention 9 and a::ked of' the' FEMA ' witnesses is, in all respects, "We don't know."
L nd,Uimportantly, we can't know since the actual field testing of A
the " sirens.end conduct-of the statistical survey of the EPZ i pcpulace to determine whether. the sirens have been heard and their ' meaning understood have, themselves, not been conducted.
132 G
w.--
,,y a
-- r, r r w,,, - -
+,,.--,-,--e
,,,---,,~,,,-,,.r,
,r-,,,,,,-,r,,,,.--,c.,v
(Such surveys have, apparently, been conducted by Applicants Duke Power Company of the Catawba EPZ population to determine, at
- least, whether Respondents have received Duke's emergency planning brochures which contain information regarding the siren notification system.
Such survey results have not been offered in evidence by Applicants or the NRC Staff.
They were offered by Intervenors in support of their position on Contentions 1 and 7 regarding the inadequacies in the public information and cducation program at Catawba.
While their offer in evidence was refused, tha summary results of the surveys have been identified ca offers of proof, Int.
Ex.
EP-9 and 10.
We note that in r sponse to.a February 1984 survey question some 25.7% of the respondents indicated they had not received any brochures or pamphlets telling them what steps to take in the event of an emergency at the plant.
Int. Ex. EP-9, Offer of Proof, Q21.
We ara not relying, here, on these survey results but simply point cut that Applicants have, apparently, conducted such surveys th:mselves prior to the conduct of these hearings.
Regardless of tha significance of the survey data, it seems clear to us that
-Applicants, FEMA and other parties ware fully capable of compliance with the regulatory guidance to determine the cffectiveness of siren coverage and understanding and to at least id0ntify necessary corrective action if not fully remedy
- id:ntified deficiencies.)
6.
Applicants present the testimony of their consultant, M.
R;0da Bassiouni of Acoustic Technology, Inc.
who performed 133
studies of the Catawba siren system assertedly as required by FEMA-43.
FEMA-43 describes the means for satisfying the design criteria of NUREG-0654.
These criteria are satisfied:
When the design report shows
- that, for those geographical areas to be covered by fixed
- sirens, either (a) the expected siren sound level generally exceeds 70 Dde where the population density exceeds 2,000 persons per square mile and 60 DBC in other inhabited areas, or (b) the expected siren sound level generally exceeds the average measured day time ambient sound levels by 10 db where the estimated siren
, sound level does not generally meet the specified level based either on population density or a
10 db differential between the measured average ambient sound and estimated siren sound level, the siren system must be enhanced by other alerting methods which must be described in the design report.
FEMA-43, p.
E-7, 8.
FEMA-43 proceeds to describe specifically the required and comprehensive elements which must be included in the ' licensee's design report regarding the use of such other alerting methods as mobile siren vehicles, tone alert radios, and other "special alerting methods."
Neither Applicants nor the NRC Staff have submitted any evidence of design reviews for such other alerting methods.
7.
Mr. Bassiouni's own study showed that for some areas the
.Gxisting siren acoustic coverage f ails to meet even these design
~ tandards.
Soma ten additional sirens must be installed to c
.rrmedy even these design deficiencies.
Appl.
Ex.
EP-17 Bngsiouni, pp.
3-4; Bassiouni Attachment C; Glover Tr.
- 1822, 5/11/84.
- However, designing a
siren system to meet these projected sound levels does not assure that the sirens will 7
cetually be heard which, of course, is the only basis for relying on such a system to accomplish the regulatory requirement of 134
9 ccsentially 100% notification.
Limits on actual audibility can only be identified through the actual field testing of the sirens Ecnd.the conduct of a statistical survey to determine whether the cirens have:in fact been heard and their meaning understood.
8.
Weather conditions will effect the ability of the sirens
-to be= heard and do their job.
Falling rain will raise ambient ndise levels by several decibels.
Bassiouni, Tr. 1860, 5/11/84.
Snowfall.on-the' ground can absorb the siren sound up to six or coven decibels.
Bassiouni, Tr. 1860-61, 5/11/84.
And a siren
- cignal propagating ' against the wind will be attenuated based on
. Vind ' velocity and direction deflecting the siren signal upward and limiting its audibility in positions that are upwind from the cirea'.
Bassiouni, Tr.
1862, 5/11/84.
Further, as contrasted Uith the FEMA-43 guidelines which specify a steady siren signal,
.~the Catawba sirens, but one, rotate four times per minute through c -full 360 degree arch providing a maximum signal
$some 25 dscibels louder than the minimal signal = only when the horn of the siren is pointing directly toward the listener.-
All of Dr.
Be.csiouni's testing presumes the maximum signal as if the siren
- 10 p,ointed continuously at the listener, thus, even assuming all other-conditions are as modeled by Dr. Bassiouni, the 10 decibel cbove - ambient-standard will' not be met at distances from the is directed away from the listener.
Bassiouni Tr.,
iciren when it c1842-1845, 5/11/84.
The Catawba sirens will only produce their dacign : sound levels from the perspective of the listener for a i
135
3 p
1
'psriod of between 2.4 and 5 seconds during each rotation.
Tr.
1851.
9.
Many people' in the EpZ also will not likely hear the cirens if indoors where such normal life functions as the operation of an air conditioner with closed windows during the hot months or the-sound levels from a_t.v. or stereo may generate ambient noiso levels which drown out the sirens.
Bassiouni, Tr.
1852-1854, 5/11/84.
10.
Without an empirical measurement of the degree to which
'the limitations on siren audibility will adversely affect roliance upon the siren system as a means for prompt notification there-is no basis for establishing the design requirements to be applied to the use of supplemental notification means to notify those-_ which the. siren system has not reached.
On the state of this record we are simply unable to reach meaningful conclusions
.ac-to the effectiveness of the alert and notification systems to b3 employed in the Catawba EPZ.
These deficiencies must be idsntified and remedied.
Either FEMA must perform the analysis
. and review charged to it in its own guidance or Applicants must propose and implement a sufficient substitute measure on its own to, accomplish the required verification of system adequacy.
In either
- event, it shall be Applicant's responsibility to demonstrate ~ the adequacy of these prompt alert and notification means.
-NUREG-0654 II E-6.
11.
We pass now to the remaining subject of concern in Intervenor's Contention 9:
The adequacy of the alert and 136
r -
-notification systems for the largely transient populations at the cpecial' facilities, Carowinds Theme Park and the Heritage U.S.A.
raligious retreat, both located within the ten mile EPZ of the Catawba facility.
On these issues we heard testimony from York County 's Mr. Thomas and Mecklenberg County 's Mr. Brooce as well ac tir. James T.
Oliphant, the Loss Prevention Operations Manager cith-Carowinds Theme Park, whose responsibility includes fire, c:curity, first aid and safety at the facility.
Oliphant Tr, 4186, 6/7/84.
Carowinds projects a peak total park population of 26,000 persons, Tr.-4688, with 5,800 visitor cars, Tr. 4356, 300
- buses, 700 employee vehicles and another 200 trailers or rcereational vehicles at ' the park campground.
Tr.
4356.
As ccknowledged -by Duke Power's traffic planning consultant, Int.
Ex. EP-41, " evacuation of Carowinds on a peak day is a monumental task, requiring careful planning and good traffic control."
12.
Officials early on identified the unique problems presented by the Carowinds and PTL (Heritage U.S.A.) facilities.
In one of several meetings conducted to discuss these problems,
-tho following topics were included in the meeting agenda:
(1)
Who will notify Carowinds of the situation at Catawba Nuclear Station?
(2)
Who will make recommendation that Carowinds be closed or evacuated?
(3)
At what stage or level of emergency will (2) above take place?
(4)
Will we (local government) open shelters for a precautionary evaculation?
(5)
How will EBS be handled for a
precautionary situation or evacuation?
(6)
Will volunteers respond to a
precautionary condition versus a declared emergency?
l (7)
Is Carowinds the only special facility that is to be considered for precautionary action?
137 l
(8). Will an early precautionary evacuation do more harm than good from the standpoint of local and state credibility?
(9)
How will the media view an evacuation of Carowinds when no other action is planned for special facilities?
Int. Ex. EP-40.
13.
Mecklenburg County 's Mr. Broome is responsible for the initial notification of Carowinds.
He addressed the status of these concerns:
WITNESS BROOME:
I might be able to clear the whole thing up, Mr. Guild.
I think if you took this document dated February 1983 you can just about eliminate everything on here becAle everything on here is going to be readdressed.
BY MR. GUILD:
Q.
When is that going to happen, Mr.
Broome?
A.
(Witness Broome)
Some of it has already been readdressed with the allocation of resources to the park to assist them and a procedure will be attached to an SOP that we have indicated to be developed.
It will incorporate a course of action that we and Catawba deem necessary in order to protect the people.
Q.
When Carowinds writes a new plan?
A.
When Carowinds writes a nee plan or when I go down there and address those people in the theme park themselves to look what is in place and what we can do.
Broome, Tr.
1924-1924, 5/11/84.
With respect to this list of nine problem itemsi Ef r. Broome explained:
They will either be closed out or in the process of
~being closed out, and they will be addressed in the SOP when it is completed.
- Broome, Tr.
- 1944, 5/11/84.
Mr.
Broome projects that such recolution will occur within the next 90 to 120 days.
M.
14.
The existing so-called emergency plan for Carowinds was id:ntified and' introduced by Intervenors.
Int. Ex. EP-39.
Its 138
5 cover letter indicates that "We will be revising the plan. prior to opening on March 18, 1984."
However, no such revision has yet beec made to cover nuclear accidents at the Catawba facility.
That is' by another plan that will be developed that will cover all the aspects of this.
Q.
Where is that plan now?
A.
Most of it is in my head and Mr. Broome's head, I imagine, because the plant is not on line yet.
Oliphant'Tr.. 4401-4402, 6/7/84.
15.
No plan exists to address the contingency of an casterly or westerly evaculation route being interdicted by the plume passage from Catawba, Oliphant Tr. 4385; no plan exists for cheltering any of the park guests, despite the availability of
. indoor space for several thousand, Oliphant Tr. 4387; no plan exists for training Carowinds' staff, Id_.; nor is there any plan for the distribution of information or brochures to park visitors r:garding the proximity of the Catawba facility or the emergency pinn for the plant.
Oliphant Tr. 4389.
16.
In the face of this conceded monumental task of
-cvacuating or taking other protective action for the largest cingle concentration of people in the Catawba EPZ, it is simply unbelievable that those responsible remain as casual about the tnck -at hand.
We simply cannot accept on the basis of wishful thinking or glib promises of future planning that effective protective action can and will be taken to protect the largely transient and uninformed visitors at these facilities in the
.cb:ence of concrete and effective plans for our review.
- Further, 139
the wholesale failure to provide for any public information and education whatsoever for these critical transient populations i
underscores the inadequacies of the plans to effectively alert and notify the visitors to these facilities.
We are requiring cubmission of completed plans to address the special needs of the Carswinds and Heritage U.S.A. populations to include an effective program for the provision of emergency planning information as
- required by Commission regulations.
t n
(
140
INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 11 - EXPANSION OF THE PLUME EPZ INTO SOUTHEAST CHARLOTTE.
1.
The Intervenor's original contention of July 11, 1983 c11eged that. emergency planning should be required for the City cf Charlotte.'
In order to assess this argument, the original Licensing Board requested Applicants to provide certain information which included a map depicting the northeast boundary of the plume EPZ, Charlotte's city limits, and recent data on p pulation densities in the area.
2.
Both the Applicants and the Staff argued this contention cas an impermissible attack on the pertinent NRC rule, which in part reads:
Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ rce nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles in radius The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a partiular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access
- routes, and jurisdictional
' boundaries 10 C.F.R. 50.4" (c)(2).
3.
Because a plume EPZ for all of Charlotte would have to oxtend some 25 miles from the facility, the Board concluded on Ssptember 29, 1983 that:
Although the guideline in the rule -
"about 10 miles"
-- is purposefully imprecise, it cannot be stretched as far as 25 miles.
We conclude that this contention as drafted is an impermissible attack on the rules and reject it on that basis.
M:morandum and Order (Ruling on Remaining Emergency Planning Contentions), Sept. 29, 1983, p. 2).
141
4.
The Board, however, did not agree "that the concept of including some portion of Charlotte in the plume EPZ should be excluded altogether."
Sept. 29th Order, pp.
2-3.
The Board noted that Intervenors expressed an interest in including part of the city in the plume EPZ and cited several factors which are rolevant to extending the plume EPZ, including demography, access routes, and meterology.
Sept. 29th Order, p. 3.
5.
While explicitly accepting the first two factors mentioned above, the relevance of the third factor, meterology, was. discussed in the ruling:
Both the Applicants and the Staff argue that meteorological conditions are not a
permissible consideration in determining the boundary for the plume EPZ.
The Staff states that
" adverse meterological conditions have been factored into the planning basis assumptions and analyses which led to the Commission adoption of the
'about 10 mile standard' A difficulty with this argument is that it rests entirely on inferences from Staff documents.
Neither in the rule nor in associated Commission documents has the Commission itself ever said or indicated that meterological conditions are irrelevant under the rule.
The language of the rule itself points to the opposite conclusion It is clear that the list of
" conditions" is not intended to be exclusive.
Presumably any relevant local condition can be considered.
Meterology certainly qualifies under that standard.
S:pt. 20th Order, pp. 3-4.
6.
Thus, accepting meterology as a legitimate factor, the Board admitted the following revised version of Contention 11:
The size and configuration of the northeast quadrant of the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (Plume EPZ) surrounding the Catawba facility has not been properly determined by State and local ofiicials in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities, as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (c)(2).
The boundary of that zone reaches but does not extend past the Charlotte city limit.
There is a substantial 142
v-resident population in the southwest part of Charlotte near the present pinae EPZ boundary.
Local meteorological conditions are such that a
serious accident at the Catawba facility would endanger the residents of that area and make their evacuation
. prudent.
The likely flow of evacuees from the present plume EPZ through Charlotte acess routes also indicates the need for evacuation planning for southwest
. Charlotte.
There appear to be a suitable plume EPZ boundary lines inside the city limits, for example, highways 74 and 16 in southwest Charlotte.
The boundary of the northeast quadrant of the plume EPZ should be reconsidered and extended to take account of these demographic, metorological and access route conditions.
7.
Subsequently, Applicants filed a
motion for
.r consideration, arguing that the revised contention is an
. impermissible attack on 10 C.F.R. 50.47 (c)(2).
Appl. Motion of Nov.
3, 1983.
- However, the Board determined that they had "mischaracterized" the revised Contention 11 as " proposing" a 17 mile EPZ when in fact the Board merely cited potentially suitable boundarios in the form of Highways 16 and 74.-
Memorandum and Order (Denying Applicants' Motion for Reconsideration Concerning R; vised Emergency Planning Contention 11), December 30, 1983.
8.
In addition, the Board clarified that a 17 mile plume EPZ is not ipso facto inconsistent with the regulation and noted that "the problem should be viewed, not in the abstract, but as a rather complex regulatory requirement in a realistic factual cetting."
Dec. 30th Order, p. 3.
Indeed, Applicant's attempt to cite the huge additional population in the southwest part of Charlotte under consideration (124,000 people) as evidence cupporting dismissal of the revised contention was interpreted quite differently by the Board:
143
p These statistics argue in favor of the revised contention.
A central purpose of the EPZ rule is to ensure that appropriate protective action plans are in place for nearby areas of high-density population.
i Dec. 30th' Order, p. 4, (emphasis added).
Thus, the Board denied Applicant's motion for reconsideration and reaffirmed the factual considerations supporting the revised contention.
9.
Hearings on this contention were held from May 23 through May 25, 1983.
After considering all of the evidence presented by Applicants, the NRC Staff, and the Intervenors, this Board concludes that there is substantial basis for extending the plume EPZ to include the high-density population of southwest Charlotte.
10.
We agree with the original Licensing Board that the,
dotermination of the plume EPZ cannot be made with " scientific precision" and that it must involve "large elements of judgement."
With the health and safety of the potentially affected public as out highest priority, we find the evidence ev0rwhelmingly suggests that it is in the best interests of the potentially affected public in southwest Charlotte to receive the benefits of enhanced emergency planning.
This ruling conforms 01th the original Board's interpretation that one of the central purposes of the EPZ rule is to ensure that nearby areas of high-
'd:nsity population have appropriate protective action plans in
~
plCce.
11.
As the Board sees it, it is the Applicant's burden to d:monstrate that the allegations in Contention 11 lack merit and that the size and configuration of the plume EPZ sufficiently 144
r-cddress local emergency response needs and capabilities in such a Ocy as to ensure the health and safety of the public.
This Board c2ncludes that Applicants have failed to (1) adequately demonstrate that the substantial resident population in southwest Charlotte would be unaffected by a serious accident at the site er that existing protective action mechanisms will ensure their
-cafety should they be threatened; (2) demonstrate that local m3teorological conditions are such that a serious accident at the
. Cite would not pose a threat to residents of that area; and (3)
- cdequately demonstrate how the likely flow of evacuees from the pr: posed plume EPZ through Charlotte access routes would not cuggest a need for appropriate planning for southwest Charlotte.
12.
Correspondingly, Intervenors have addressed these iccues sufficiently to cause the Board to question whether State end local officials have properly determined the plume EPZ in ralation to local emergency response needs and capabilities, as
- required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47 (c)(2).
13.
Jesse Riley of Caroline Environmental Study group cxplains that the Intervenors' efforts to seek more,ef f ective cmergency planning for Charlotte are founded upon the unique risk of exposure for the city due to its location a mere 9.7 miles dornwind from the Catawba plant.
Int. Ex. EP-48, Riley, p.
7; Glover,.Tr. 344, 5/2/84.
14.
As the NRC Staff's analysis of severe accident consequences in the Catawba FES, NUREG-0921 (January 1983), makes
- clear, the key parameters for projecting radiological 145
consequences of such an accident are Catawba-specific meterological data (such as wind direction) and population.
I d,.,
pp. 5-37.
All early fatalities projected from such an accident at Catawba are within 20 miles of the site, i.e.
in major portions of the City of Charlotte.
M. pp. 5-40.
.15.
Applicants' witnesses Edmonds and Casper attempt to obscure the uniqueness of the Catawba-Charlotte accident exposure by targeting in isolation the factors of population and wind direction for a number of other reactor sites as compared to Catawba.
App. Ex. EP-19, Edmonds,
- p. 6; Casper, pp. 11-15.
What ic inescapable from the consideration of these two key factors together (population and prevailing wind) is the confirmation of Catawba's unique position among the reactor sites considered.
Of
~
tha 17. reactor sites considered by Applicants' population and meterology witnesses, App.
Ex.
EP-19, p.
7,
- Catawba, indeed, ranked number one; well ahead of Indian
- Point, Limerick, Waterford, Davis-Besse and the others in magnitude of potential CScident exposure.
Edmonds and Casper, Tr. 2019-2022, 5/23/84.
16.
Of course, it is for people, first and foremost, that cmergency planning is
- required, not acreage or political cubdivisions.
The Commission's emergency planning rules rgeognize demography as the principal condition affecting local Cmergency response needs and capabilities which are the basis for catablishing the plume EPZ size and configuration.
10 C. F. R.
50.47 (c)
(2).
It is only through the application of the meterological forces of wind direction, speed and atmospheric
'46
conditions such as stability class and precipitation to the site demographics that planners can project the radiological c nsequences for which emergency response is required.
17.
The initial Licensing Board itself recognized that such cxtremely adverse weather conditions as stable air inversions and low wina speed " occur frequently in the Catawba-Charlotte area" cnd account for large accident consequences there.
partial Initial Decision, June 22, 1984, p.
260.
Consideration of these Catawba site specific demographic and meterological data in the esvere accident consequence projection by the NRC Staff in the C3tawba FES amply substantiates Intervenors' concerns:
some 270,000 persons are projected to be exposed to radiation doses in excess of 25 Rem and some 24,000 early radiation fatalities are predicted in the absence cf effec Lve protective response.
- FES, pp. 5-81, 5-82.
Commission regulations require that Applicants d:monstrate that Edequate protective measures can and will be taken'in the event of a radiological emergency.
The NRC Staff assumes that such protective measures are Oxtended to those persons who are exposed to radiation between 10 ond 25 miles from the facility.
The Staff predicts, for example, that 5,000 lives will be saved if " supportive" medical treatment 10 provided to persons exposed to over 200 Rems of radiation,
- g.,
p.
F-4; and that 18,530 of the 19,000 early fatalities projected to occur beyond 10 miles are avoided if effective rolocation after plume passage is accomplished.
In order to reasonably assure that such protective measures, and others as 147
necessary, can and will be taken for the large population of the City of Charlotte, we agree with Intervenors that enhanced emergency planning is required.
18.
Applicants and tne NRC Staff have attemped to d:monstrate that the proposed plume EPZ satisfies the NRC's rcgulatory guidance criteria by arguing that there is nothing unique about the Catawba circumstances that they are indistinguishable from the NUREG-0396 generic case -- and that current planning would provide an adequate base for expansion into Charlotte if necessary.
App. Ex. EP-19, Glover, pp.
8-9.
The planning basis for the plume EPZ size was developed in
.NUREG-0396 which notes that:
-The potential consequences of improbable but nevertheless severe power reactor accidents do require some specialized planning considerations.
We do-not suggest that these specialized planning considerations are or ought to be excessively burdensome.
- Rather, we recommend that they be considered and developed as a matter of prudence.
~Id.,
Appendix III, pp.
1-2.
This document dictates that the size and shape _ of the EPZ should take into account local conditions cuch as demography, topography, land use characteristics, access
- rcutes, and jurisdictional boundaries, M.,
p.
14.,
and that emergency planning must consider a
spectrum of postulated conditions, including adverse meteorological conditions.
Id.
Appendix 3,
A 10.
Although a radius of "about 10 miles" was Colected, "the actual shape would depend upon the characteristics cf a particular site."
Id., p.
16.
19.
NUREG-0654 also addresses the plume EPZ guidelines:
148
The size (about 10 miles radius) of the plume exposure EPZ was based primarily on the following
-considerations:
a.
projected - dose from the traditional design basis accidents would not exceed Protection Action Guide levels outside the zone...;
- b.. pro'jected doses from most core melt sequences would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; c.
for the worst core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone; and
-d.
detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.
NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, p.
12.
20.
To refute the allegation that the Catawba site has such unique characteristics as to justify additional
- planning, Applicants have attempted to show that the Catawba sit;e is not unusual when compared with the generic analysis used in NUREG-0396 which establishes the plume EPZ at "about 10 miles."
In one cepect of their. attempt to do this, Applicants commissioned Mr.
Thomas E.
Potter to compare the Catawba site with the generic cace on points "a",
"b",
and "c"
of the NUREG-0654 considerations.
21.
The first consideration, involving the exceeding of PAG 1evels outside the zone from traditional design basis accidents, taa not contested by the Intervenors.
Int. Ex. EP-49,'Sholly, pp.
5-6.
The thrust of this contention involves beyond design b cis core melt sequences and possible consequences.
In accord cith the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) and NUREG 0603, the 149
cize and configuration of the plume EPZ should be determined by core melt accidents because these accidents dominate public risk considerations.
22.
Mr.. Potter's analysis for core melt accidents used PWR release categories from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) to rcpresent core melt releases from the Catawba plant.
As the Brard sees it, this is one of the key technical factors which Applicants and Intervenors disagree on.
Applicants' analyses and conclusions are premised upon the adequacy of using the WASH-140'O model reactor, Surry Unit 1, as the surrogate for Catawba.
- Thus, Applicants' conclusions are based primarily upon inferences made about the Catawba site using the Surry unit 1 reactor as the model.
App. Ex. Ep-19, Potter, pp 3-6.
23.
However, we find that the Applicants have failed to cdequately demonstrate that core melt releases from the Catawba plant can be reliably modeled from the Surry design.
To be sure, Applicants were aware that the design differences between the fccilities -- Surry has a large dry containment while Catawba has cn ice condensor containment -- could affect the difference of ralease categories, thus making the WASH-1400 data inappropriate for use in modeling Catawba releases.
Potter Tr.
2073-74, 5/23/84.
24.
Mr.
Potter therefore reviewed other information available and considered "to some extent" the RSSMAP program for the'Sequoyah plant as a data base, because Sequoyah also has an ico condensor containment.
- However, Mr.
Potter rejected the 150
g
=.
r Sequoyah model, despite this similarity, because the Sequoyah
'RSSMAP did not account for the presence of a hydrogen mitigation cystem such as.is present at Catawba.
Potter, Tr. 2074, 5/23/84.
25.
Mr.. Potter's rejection of the Sequoyah RSSMAP model is based entirely upon the presumed effectiveness of the hydrogen citigation system in preventing a hydrogen explosion which would E
cause the containment to fail early in the accident.
Should such an explosion occur, Mr. Potter recognizes, then the probabilities cf.the more severe releases would be higher.
- However, it is ocsumed that the hydrogen mitigation system at Catawba will typically be both operational and reliable, and thus will reduce the probabilities of the more severe radioactive release.
Potter Tr. 2074, 5/23/84.
26.
Using the McGuire hydrogen mitigation study, Mr. Potter postulated the impact of a hydrogen mitigation system on the 8:quoyah RSSMAP release frequencies.
Assuming an effective 1-hydrogen mitigation
- system, he concluded that the release cctegory frequency spectrum was sufficiently similar to that from thi WASH-1400 study and thus he adopted the WASH-1400 release categories and probabilities as his model for application to Catawba.
Potter, Tr. 2076, 5/23/84.
27.
-The Board finds,
- however, that Mr.
Potter's entire rationale for disgarding the Sequoyah model in favor of the Surry model rests upon an as-yet unproven site-specific component - the hydrogen mitigation system.
The reliability and effectiveness of the hydrogen mitigation system is still an unresolved generic
'151
issue.
Applicants have presented a
case in which their established probabilities of release are dependent on the proper functioning of a particular site-specific component which is the cubject of a pending rulemaking.
Such an argument is, at best, inappropriately premature because it presumes the issue will be r: solved. entirely in favor of the adequacy of the Applicants' cystem.
28.
-This is not to deny the existence of what may turn out to be the key mitigating component that Applicants have suggested this ' system to be.
We merely assert that Applicants' basis for rejecting the Sequoyah model at this time is flawed.
We cannot presume to know what the outcome of the future rulemaking will bg.
Thus we cannot accept-the premise that the existence of the hydrogen mitigation system at Catawba ipso facto renders Sequoyah Go a weaker model than Surry.
29.
Mr. Potter claims he has accounted for the fact that tho hydrogen mitigation system could fail to operate.
However
. hic purpose was not to empirically investigate this scenario per CO : -
In any
- case, when we shifted the frequencies we actually wound up shifting only ninety percent of the frequency, and the reason we did that was not so much that we thought the hydrogen system would be effective over ninety percent of the time, but that we did want to leave some residual contribution for releases from sequences like that in the original categories.
152
Potter, Tr. 2079, 5/23/84.
In effect, it appears that Mr. Potter crbitrarily assumed a 10% failure rate on an unexplained and less than-scientific basis, and his purpose in doing so was merely to
' leave in some small " residual contribution" from the original Sequoyah releases.
30.
The Board also notes Mr. Riley's testimony that the hydrogen mitigation system may work in a counter-productive way Gnd actually cause a severe accident which otherwise might not
-hnve occurred.
Riley Tr. 2454-57, S/24/83.
The point here is that we are not in a position to decide the technical merits of the hydrogen mitigation system.
Whether its failure rate is an arbitrary 10% or whether it may actually be counterproductive in c me cases is not for this Board to decide.
31.
Emergency planning for radiological accidents cannot afford to make liberal or careless assumptions.
Mr. Potter and Applicants realized that the differences between Surry and Catawba "could affect the difference of release or the probabilities of different release categories,"
- Potter, Tr.
2073, 5/23/84, and also realized that in the case of off-site and en-site loss of power the probabilities associated with the Sequoyah model are more appropriate.
- Potter, Tr.
2077-78, 5/23/84.
Yet Mr. Potter and Applicants dismissed the Sequoyah model because of a liberal assumption regarding an unresolved iC;ue that neither they nor this Board can make at this time.
153 2
Clearly, the more appropriate model, and the more conservative, at least until this generic issue is resolved -- is the Sequoyah model.
32.
Intervenors presented an expert, Mr. Steven Sholly,
' chose analysis was based upon the Sequoyah model.
Mr. Sholly I
notes that - accident progression (timing) results for sixteen accident _ sequences at Sequoyah are found in the RSSMAP analysis
[and]
ten.of the sixteen sequences analyzed will be cccompanied by ' containment failure within about four hours or
-lcss."
Int. Ex. EP-49, Sholly, pp. 12-13.
Using NUREG-0654 for guidance on plume transit times he determines that the plume transit time for a distance of 17 miles ranges from one and a half to six hours, compared with one to four hours within 10 miles.
According to Mr. Sholiy:
When the core melt accident timing considerations are combined.with the plume transit times, we obtain time periods ranging - roughly from five and a half to ten hours from the beginning of the accident to the arrival of'the plume in the vicinity of Charlotte (assuming the wind is blowing in the direction of Charlotte).
M.,
pp. 13-14.
Mr. Sholly's comments are in the context of his conclusion that "given a large release with the wind blowing torard Charlotte,. even in the mean (average) case protective
- rctions will be necessary beyond the existing 10 mile EPZ."
-[cmphasis added] ;M., p. 21.
33.
Thus the Catawba site is relatively unique in that a tcchnical analysis using the closest-fit model of inference tho Sequoyah model -- suggests a severe accident at the site has 154
7-.
O greater than
" acceptable" chance (using NUREG-0396 probabilities as the " acceptable") of threatening lives beyond the proposed plume EPZ.
The Board concurs with this finaing.
34.
The Board notes that whether the Sequoyah or the Surry plant provides the more appropriate model of inference for Catawba is largely a " straw man" debate.
Applicants have staked much of their case on the issue of probabilities of exceeding certain doses beyond 10 miles.
They chose the Surry model in their attempt to show that the probability of exceeding PAG doses b; yond the proposed EPZ is within the bounds considered
" acceptable" by NUREG-0396.
App. Ex. EP-19, Potter, p.
7.
Thus ccnceding that serious accidents "could" threaten people in Charlotte, Applicants have argued-that this. " threat" is no more than
" average."
Intervenors, through Mr.
Sholly's testimony, d:monstrate that the probabilities of exceeding. PAG doses beyond 10 miles are somewhat greater than that envisioned in NUREG-0396 ca - acceptable risk."
Whether or not the Board accepts Applicant's argument here and we cannot the risk differences between the Surry and Sequoyah model are marginal at b;;t.
The FES states that its severe accident probabilities may b2 off by a factor of 100.
The issue in Contention 11 is whether tho size and configuration of the proposed EPZ has been properly d;termined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities such that a serious accident at Catawba would not endanger the residents of southwest Charlotte.
We presume a Corious accident.
In other words, the issue is, given a serious 155
accident -- which Applicants acknowledge might affect residents of southwest Charlotte -- are there factors relative to Catawba cufficiently compeling to warrant extending the plume EPZ?
The NRC Staff, itself, presents such a severe accident analysis for Catawba which supports enhanced emergency planning for Charlotte.
35.
The consequence reduction benefits from enchanced emergency planning for the city of Charlotte are demonstrated very effectively in the NRC Staf f 's own severe accident analysis i
presented - in the Catawba Final Environmental Statement (FES).
NUREG-0921 (January 1993).
Application of the rebaselined Reactor Safety Study (RSS) core melt and containment breach esvere accident' scenarios to the Catawba site meterology,and d:mography makes clear that because the prevailing winds at the cite blow toward Charlotte with its large urban population the consequences of such an accident here would be extremely grave.
Tho dose
- and, therefore, consequence reduction benefits of cnhanced protective action capability to be realized from improved emergency planning for Charlotte would also be great.
36.
The effects of emergency response capability are integrated into the Staff's consequence projections:
(T)he consequence model also contains provisions for incorporating the consequence reduction benefits of evacuation, relocation, and other protective actions.
Early evacuation and relocation of people would considerably reduce the exposure from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground in the wake of the cloud passage.
156 I
1 Catawba FES,
- p. 5-38.
37.
The need for such protective action is not limited to the 10 miles radius plume EPZ in the event of severe accidents, but is required beyond.
Early evacuation within and early relocation of people frora outside the plume exposure pathway EpZ (see Appendix F) and other protective actions as mentioned above are considered as essential sequels to serious nuclear reactor accident involving significant release of radioactivity to the atmosphere.
Therefore, the results shown for Catawba include the benefits of these protective actions.
M.
With early evacuation alone of the plume EPZ population the Staff projects near-zero fatalities within the EPZ itself, but come 19,000 early fatalities "all within 32. KM (20 MI) of the cite."
FES, pp. 5-40 and 5--82.
When the population between 10 cnd 25 miles is relocated within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after plume passage to cvoid more extended exposure to the significant ground contamination from passange of the radioactive cloud and the EPZ 10 evacuated, early fatalities are reduced ta enly 470.
M. pp.
5-40; 5-82; F-3.
38.
The projection of 19,000 early fatalities without ralocation assumes " supportive" medical treatment consisting of medical care facilities and services for all persons exposed in cxcess of about 200 Rems.
With only " minimal" medical treatment, tha Staff projects an additional 5,000 early fatalities for a total of 24,000 deaths without effective relocation.
Id.,
p.
F-4 The 200 Rem dose is identified as the threshold at which hospitalisation would be required for treatment of radiation injury.
A 25 Rem dose is identified as the threshold for 157 t-
clinically observable physiological effects.
Id.,
p.
5-39.
' Assuming early evacuation of the plume EPZ only, p.
5-39, this cOvere accident scenario would produce exposure of 44,000 persons to a dose of over 200 Rem-and exposure of 270,000 persons to over
'25 Rem.
Id., p. 5-81.
39.
The initial. Licensing Board which admitted the revised Charlotte emergency planning contention recognized these unique circumstances presented by the Catawba site meterology and d:mography in its Partial Initial Decision of June 22, 1984.
~
There, the Board chided the NRC Staff for deficiencies in its dalineation,of the significance of frequently encountered severe w:ather_ conditions on severe accident consequences at Catawba.
' The Board observed:
(T)here is no dispute among the parties that conditions of-stable air inversion and low wind speed occur frequently in the Catawba-Charlotte area Maximum health consequences are associated with such conditions.
M.. at p.
260.
'40.
It. is the minimization of these enormous potential h:31th consequences which is the objective of effective emergency plcnning.
The NRC Staff's severe accident analysis,
- itself, reflects that some 5,000 lives are to be saved if " supportive" g,Cmedical-treatment is provided to the 44,000 persons exposed to I dores of 200' Rem or greater.
18,530 early fatalities are avoided if the population between the present EpZ boundary of 10 miles
= cad-25 miles is successfully relocated within eight hours.
The 270,000 persons exposed to doses in excess of 25 Rem, and those 158 L
with unknown lower levels of actual
- exposure, would require offective monitoring and decontamination services in order to identify dosage and prevent further exposure.
None of these censequence reduction benefits will be realized without effective protective response, the likelihood of which can only be enhanced through advance emergency planning.
41.
Demography-people-represents the principal condition which effects local emergency response needs and capabilities.
Our general guidance is that we include concentrations of. populstion that don't necessarily have a municipal boundary.
But we strive to include, where there are any concentrations of population.
Lunsford, Tr. 346, 5/2/84.
42.
The 1980 census showed a popoulation of 93,483 people within the present Catawba EPZ, Edmonds, Tr. 2007, 5/23/84, with a population density of 251 people per square mile.
Id.
By contrast in 1980 124,000 people resided in the southwest Charlotte area reflected in the revised Contention 11 zone.
Id.
Thnt area, including only an additional 77 square miles has a prpulation density of 1,'850 people per square mile, some seven times' greater than in the present EPZ.
Id.,
Tr. 2008.
Detailed population and density data for sectors out to 30 miles from the facility reflect the high population concentrations in the Charlotte area out to about 20 miles.
Int Ex. EP-43.
The existing emergency plan for the people of Charlotte is embodied in a seven page document (with eleven additional pages of " Annexes") entitled
" City of Charlotte Protective Response Plan for All
- Hazards, 1982,"
Int.
Ex.
As its name l-159
l l
reflects, the "All Hazards Plan" is a general-duty document more accurately described as a functional statement of what is to be done in the face of a hazard rather than a detailed plan to accomplish any particular protective action.
It pales in comparison to the detail and specificity contained in the hundreds of pages of plans required for the Catawba EPZ response organizations.
NC Plan, including Gaston and Mecklenburg County
- Plans, App.
Ex.
EP-1; SC Plans,
- SCORERP, STRERP, York Cou'nty Emergency Operations Plan, App. Ex. EP-2.
44.
The Applicants themselves offer the most comprehensive analysis of the " Actions to Be Accomplished to Formally Extend Catawba's Plume EPZ" into Charlotte and thereby identify the comparative planning disparities between the "All-Hazards" plan
~
now in Charlotte and "the full extent of planning (as present within the existing plume EPZ)..."
A listing of these required planning actions was submitted as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Duke's Mr.
Glover in support of
" Applicants' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Revising and Admitting Contention 11,"
etc., of November 3, 1983, filed (and denied) in this proceeding.
We took official notice of this filing, here.
Tr. 2146, 5/23/84.
Some 52 separate planning actions are identified on a three page list which are characterized by Mr. Glover as showing that:
... extensive changes would be required within the previously submitted plans of the State of North Carolina and the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Emergency Management Agency.
160
I M., p.
3.
The list includes such items as installation of additional sirens, commitment of city resources, establishment of rollable communications
- systems, procedures for alerting and mobilizing emergency personnel, provision of Duke brochures and public information to residents and transients, establishment of traffic control
- plans, new procedures for transport of the handicapped and institutionalized, training of planners and emergency personnel, and the conduct of plan reviews and oxercises.
Suffice it to say that a largely ad hoc response capability would be supplanted by detailed advance planning.
45.
The only significant test of the All-Hazards Plan to date involved the evacuation of some 2,000 people during a chemical fire at the Baxter-Harris Chemical Warehouse in 1982.
App. Ex. EP-19, Broome, pp.
6-8.
Significant deficiencies were noted in the post fire report including the exposure of unevacuated members of the public to toxic smoke when the wind shifted.
Over 100 civilians sought medical attention after the incident.
Int. Ex. EP-52.
A review of the All-Hazards Plan was recommended to determine needed revisions.
M.
46.
Access routes in and around the City of Charlotte present a
further specific condition which affects local emergency response needs and capabilities in a manner warranting oxpanded emergency planning for Charlotte.
Under present conditions, without such additional
- planning, Mr.
Broome estimates about seven hours would be required to evacuate the proposed southwest Charlotte zone.
App. Ex. EP-19, Broome, pp.
161
--_----------------_----__-----------_---_----_--_-_-----J
3 9-12.
He estimates that four to five hours would be required to evacuate Charlotte Memorial Hospital under " perfect" conditions and nine hours under adverse conditions.
- Broome, Tr.
- 2121, 5/23/84.
Applicants' consultant Mr. Kulash estimates five hours and fifteen minutes for southwest Charlotte and evacuation of the chole city in nine hours under existing plans.
App. Ex. EP-19,
- Kulash,
- p. 4; Attach C, p.
11.
Clearly such estimates reflect an ccknowledgement that significant evacuation time reductions can bg realized with enhanced planning including notification,
.cducation,
- routing, traffic control and use of transportation recources.
47.
The present emergency plans call for evacuation of part of the EPZ population north into the city of Charlotte on several routes:
I-77, SC/NC 160, SC/NC 49, and I-85.
Even Applicants'
. consultant acknowledges that the voluntary evacuation of Charlotte would lengthen evacuation of one of these routes.
App.
Ex..EP-19, Kulash Attach B,
p.
9.
We believe that unplanned ovacuation of parts ?f Charlotte, either " voluntary" or directed by the authorities would more likely produce confusion and chaos on these and other access routes.
Of the evacuation routes bound for Charlotte from the EPZ, three of the four are represented on th0 City of Charlotte listing of "1982 High Accident Locations,"
COch more than once.
Int. Ex. EP-45.
162
l F-T 48.
A review of the conditions affecting local emergency response capability for the city of Charlotte convince this Board L
that effective protective action for this substantial population in the event of a radiological accident at Catawba will indeed require enhanced levels of emergency planning for Charlotte.
49.
The actual size and configuration of the plume cmergency planning zone for Catawba is to be determined on the basis of local emergency response needs and capabilities.
We find very little evidence of any thorough, daliberative or particularized consideration of such needs and capabilities in the original determination of the present EPZ configuration in the NW where the zone boundaries have been catablished as contiguous with the City Limits of Charlotte, N::rth Carolina.
50.
Mr. Wayne Broome of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office considered the present EPZ adequate "in view of the NRC investigation which preceded the decision to set the EPZ radius at about ten miles,"by which he means the generic invectigation of NUREG-0396.
App. Ex. EP-19,,Broome, p.
2.
The prcsent ten mile radius at Charlotte does not reflect the results of any local investigation of needs and capabilities, nor even Mr. Broome's judgement:
From the position I'm in, I
have to accept the judgement of the regulations.
163 b
r Broome, Tr. 2096, 5/23/84.
51.
The Charlotte city limit boundary was selected by Broome with input from Duke power.
Broome, Tr. 2000, 5/23/84.
N3 evidence was offered by Applicants or the NRC Staff showing any further consideration of local emergency response needs and ccpabilities.
It simply appears that the Charlotte city limit, then 9.7 miles from the Catawba plant, seemed "about ten miles" cnd was selected as the most convenient boundary, despite its Cxclusion of the large concentrations of population over the line in southwest Charlotte.
52.
With respect to the establishment of the plume EpZ
- boundary, Applicants and planners have reliell upon political boundaries as the determinative factor which accounts for their hcving accepted the pfesent EPZ configuration.
Applicants' and lccal planners' justification for including Rock Hill in the EPZ io as follows:
Well, it's mainly because fo the location of the city in relationship to the plant the City of Rock Hill begins maybe five to seven miles from Catawba and a major portion of the City is within the ten mile radial area And so that we would not split a city as a part of it being within the zone and part of it being outside of the zone.
Primarily we extended it to include the entire city.
Glover, Tr. 2027, 5/23/84.
53.
In the case of Charlotte, which is 9.7 miles from the plcnt, Applicants and planners again chose to use the city limits no the principal boundary guideline, except in this case their d: cision was to exclude the entire city.
Essentially, Applicants 164
k and planners saw Charlotte's city limits as "about ten miles" from Catawba and used Charlotte's political boundaries as EPZ boundaries.
In the words of one planner, "The ten-mile EPZ for Mecklenburg county was extended to Charlotte to give identifiable boundaries for the people living inside the ten-mile EPZ."
- Broome, Tr.,
p.
- 331, 5/2/84.
In the view of one planner, splitting a city, for example, Rock Hill with the EPZ boundary would " reduce the number of potential evacuees, but the problem I could see with that would be in trying 'to define for area residents who is included and who is not."
Glover Tr.
- 2029, 5/23/84.
54.
The Board has a number of concerns with Applicants' argument on this matter.
Applicants essentially argue that to extend an EPZ into a city's limits would not only create more evacuees -- which is not necessarily the undesirable consequency that these planners imply -- but would also cause confusion over who is or is not advised to take protective action.
This argument presumes that the public is incapable of understanding anything but a political boundary.
The Board reminds Applicants and planners that political boundaries are themselves abstract concepts which should be defined by concrete physical phenomena such as roads, creeks, etc.
Indeed, some of the same planners who participated in delineating the current proposed EPZ are aware that one of the primary deficiencies of the so-called All-
'n its current reliance upon Hazards Plan for Charlotte is i
evacuation by political precinct -- an abstract political concept 165
3 i
A which is recognized by planners today as essentially meaningless for evacuation purposes and which must now be modified to provide more concrete and recognizable landmarks for effective evacuation.
Fincher, Tr. 4140, G/6/84.
55.
Thus, while the public.may be aware of whether they f
live within a city's limits, the public is also like y to be aware of key physical landmarks which help define their city limits as well as various partitions within their city.
- Indeed, the original Board recognized this fact when they suggested highways 16 and 74 as possible alternative boundaries for the EPZ.
These are major routes within the city which are clearly
_2
[_
marked and easily recognizable.
A review of a street map of the city, Int. Ex. EP-44, shows other city routes which would also suffice as potential EPZ boundaries.
Duke's Mr.
Glover and Charlotte planner Mr. Broome iden'tified strees boundaries between
[:-
12 and 13 miles which would be appropriate EPZ boundaries in southwest Charlotte.
Glover and Broome, Tr. 2156-7, 5/23/84.
~
56.
The Board also notes that Applicants' argument that
]! =
including only
- a. portion of a city within the EPZ would cause e
confusion directly counters their faith in the presumed efficacy of Applicants' public information program.
We remind Applicants A
that a central purpose of this program is to provide vital information to the potentially affected public regardless of abstract or physical boundaries and we would expect that this 4-166 0
7
program be directed to all of the EPZ population in an effective manner whether or not they live within a particular political boundary.
57.
Perhaps most troublesome to the Board are our observations of conflicting testimony by Applicants and planners themselves over the criteris used in delineating the EPZ.
In the words of one planner, "Our general guidance is that we include concentrations of population that don't necessarily have a
municipal boundary We strive to include, where there are any concentrations of population."
- Lunsford, Tr.
- 346, 5/2/84.
Another ple.nner ignored the site-specific heavy concentration of Charlotte population just beyond the proposed EPZ in his zeal to
" accept the judgement of the regulations," which in his eyes apparently did not permit an EPZ to be extended into Charlotte.
Broome, Tr. 2006, 5/23/84.
- Yet, the Catawba. planners see no problem with the Rock Hill proposed EPZ of 13.1 mile.5, Glover, Tr. 2026-27, 5/23/84.
58.
While Applicants' predict confusion would result from extending the EPZ into a
portion of Charlotte's political boundaries, they have no qualms about citing examples to show that Charlotte's eventual growth into the proposed EpZ will pose no similar problems or confusion.
- Indeed, this has already occurred at McGuire.
Mr. Broome notes that Charlotte's partial inclusion within McGuire EPZ does not pose any significant planning or resource problems.
Broome, Tr.
2220-30, 5/23/84.
- Here, Applicants and planners cite political boundaries as 167
l essentially irrelevant yet elsewhere political boundaries are cited as a key determinative factor in their decision to exclude portions of Charlotte from their proposed EPZ.
The Board reminds Applicants that you simply can't have it both ways.
59.
NUREG-0396 clearly identifies a number of factors which must be considered in the matter of EPZ boundary definition and political jurisdictions are merely one of these factors.
It is essential that additional factors be considered, particularly where these factors interact to produce unique effects at the site specific level.
This is the essence of the Intervenors' argument.
60.
In September 1983, local citizens, including members of the Carolina Environmental Study
- Group, approached the Mecklenburg county Commission to request their review of Charlotte's emergency planning needs related to Catawba.
Riley Tr. 2266-67, 5/24/84.
In response to this request and in order to identify local emergency planning needs and capabilities, the County Commissioners established the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency ifanagement Planning Review Committee (hereafter referred to as the Planning Review Committee).
The nine member commititee, chaired by Dr. Harry Nurkin, was given the following charges in October 1983 by the Mecklenburg County Commission:
1.
Identify and consult with federal and state agencies regarding the establishment of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the adequacy thereof.
2.
Identify and consult with parties advocating extension of the 10-mile EPZ.
168
3.
Review and determine the adequacy of current emergency plans for radiological responses and other related emergency plans.
4.
Consult with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency i
Management Office and other local emergency and public safety departments / agencies concerning roles in executing emergency plans.
5.
Determine the consequences, legal and otherwise, of Mecklenburg County developing radiologic'1 response plans which may deviate significantly from state and federal planning.
I 6.
Make recommendations to the County Lommission on what steps need to be and can be taken by Mecklenburg y
County to improve emergency plans and enhance the public safety in the event of a radiological or related incident.
E Int. EP-42.
61.
The Board..otes that the official purpose stated at the committee's establishment is for "a
Blue Ribbon Citizens Committee to advise the Commission and staff on adequacy of 7
Emergency Response Plans for Radiological Incidents."
Int. EP-a h
42.
62.
The Committee has met for more than seven months on a I
frequent and regular basis.
it has reviewed evidence and heard presentations by Duke Power, CESG, staff from the Charlotte-E 1 t-Mecklenburg Emergency Management
- Office, fire departments,
- police, medics, environmental protection
- agencies, and other
'M y
interested organizations during this period.
In addition, three public meetings were held to gather input from the general L
prSlic.
Gordon, Tr. 4310-14, 6/7/84.
169
63.
On May
- 16th, 1984, the Planning Review Committee officially adopted a
resolution requesting that the County Commission " contend to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for the extension of the Emergency Planning Zone limits of the
-Catawba Plant to provide further security to residents and others in the affected areas of the southwestern quadrant of the ccunty."
Int. EP-42.
This recommendation was made "in order to acsure the citizens of Mecklenburg County that the response capabilities in the event of a catastrophic emergency at the Catawba Nuclear Station on the part of the utility operator and cf local, state, and federal officials are, in fact, effective, flexible, and of sufficient scope to warrant public confidence."
Int. EP-43.
64.
According to the testimony of Ms.
Kathy Gordon, a
member of the Planning Review Committee, the recommendation to
. extend the Catawba EPZ is based upon a
number of factual conclusions which were adopted by the Committee:
Whereas,. the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearing the Operating License proceeding for the Catawba Plant has admitted a contention for expandirg the Emergency Planning Zone an additional seven miles
'into a heavily-populated area of Mecklenburg County;
- and, Whereas, numerous studies have shown the existence and implementation of well-designed emergency plans can greatly reduce fatalities and injuries; and, Whereas, the location of the Catawba plant just ten miles from the city limits of the City of Charlotte and directly upwind of that City and tens of thousands of nerby residents in the path of the prevailing winds; and 170
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- Whereas, the responsibility for the expense of i.* E
.L establishing and maintaining an Emergency Planning
- 1.. '" p's Zone -- whatever its extent should be borne by
'1
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all the beneficiaries of the operating plant and not merely by its immediate1 neighbors; 6
i
. : i..
Int. EP-42; Gordon, Tr. 4341-42, 6/7/84.
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65.
Upon presentation of the Planning Review Committee's
~< ' *
- t 4'
resolution, the County Commission deferred action on the
[J. [
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recommendation, pending completion of the review of all six
(~T Y
.l.
7
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committee charges.
Gordon, Tr. 4338, 6/7/84.
The Committee's
. =
(
recommendation to extend the EPZ is only one of several upcoming
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findings regarding the charges, but because fo the timeliness of
[.M,
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L the licensing hearings the Committee decided to make their Z. ' k "!
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[
findings and recommendations regarding the issue of adequacy of
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the present EPZ known to the County Commission before all of the l5c.
- n. g charges were completed.
Gordon Tr. 4309-16, 6/7/84.
- j. F J, 3"
'_. Q 66.
The response by the Commissioners to delay Pr
- i
- s.. :..
p' recomendation may also have been influenced by the actions of the U: M c
'J y ;;*%
f:: o Planning Review Committee's chairman, Dr. Nurkin, who opposed the a.5 4."3 N
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Committee action and abstained from voting on the resolution p' j ' :,
- 3. %..
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which was adopted.
Duke Power privately lobbied the chairman to C 34 E
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delay a decision on the issue and the chairman communicated this j'Mk
.y
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viewpoint as his own to the committee in his urgings to delay 9N' ?.
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reaching a decision on the matter.
Gordon, Tr. 4316-7, 6/7/84.
- ^ k2.%
67.
Chairman Nurkin may also have influenced the County i.* L;"
3(.y
!(.
Commission decision to defer action on the EPZ resolution by his
. J.y. s,
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transmittal letter to the Commission which emphasized the D, f...'.
unfinished work of the Committee on the study of local emergency i '.-.
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response needs and capabilities and omitted the Committee's factual findings which supported the EPZ empansion resolution.
Gordon, Tr. 4342-44, 6/7/84.
68.
In any event, the planning Review Committee is still deliberating on the remaining charges and a
set of full
^
recommendations csn be expected sometime in the near future.
The Board acknowledges that the Committee clearly represents the first in-depth effort to study emergency planning needs and capabilities for Charlotte and Mecklenburg County by an objective and nonpartisan body of distinguished citizens.
e 69.
We credit their May 16, 1984 resolution as significant evidence supporting ezpansion of emergency planning for the City of Charlotte on the basis of their consideration of local emergency response needs and capabilities.
70.
We, further, credit their on-going w3rk in completing their remaining charges as leading to a
more definitive consideration of these local factors which must be the basis for emergency planning including the determination of the size and configuration of the plume EpZ in Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.
One respect for the proper work of local government and this Planning Review Committee in particular warranta our A; & 7 deferral to their on-going study of their own local needs and k.
NC i
capabilities as they bear on emergency planning for Catawba.
.; e 2.
s.
1 4
%,$,M.
71.
Our responsibility is to weigh the adequacy of their consideration of these local factors in establishing the EPZ for 47,j ;.
.j W)
Catawba.
While such a local review process is underway and, j.{g
- . ; e 17')
i -. '
apparently, proceeding with expedition, it is only appropriate that we await their determination of these matters which are appropriately left to them in the first instarco.
72.
We commend the Committee for its efforts and expect that its consideration of these issues will be communicated to us in due course.
We retain jurisdiction of this matter and direct the parties to report to us on significant developments as they
- occur, but no later than 6
months from this decision.
Thereafter, we will decide the matters before us, with or without further actions by local authorities.
73.
Ilowe ve r, on this record, in the face of the strong evidence supporting enhanced emergency planning for Charlotte, and with a rigorous process for determination of local needs and capabilities underway for the first time; we are simply unable to find reasonable assurance that the people of southwest Charlotte are adequately protected.
173 i
i INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 14 and 15 EVACUATION 1.
Intervenor's Emergency planning Contention 14, as admitted at the close of the pre-hearing conference August 8,
1983, Tr. 1094-1005, reads as follows:
The Applicants have failed to demonstrate their ability to take effective actions to protect the health and safety of the general public in the event of an eccident in that the evacuation time study presented by tne Applicants is a piece of fiction in the guise of science and may not be relied upon for determining the ability of Applicants and public authorities effectively to evacuato the residents of the Catawba EpZ in a timely manner.
By overestimating the flow of traffic on evacuation routes, the Applicants' timo study overestimates actual traffic movement by a
factor of between three and twelve.
A flow of no more than 900 vehicles / lanes / hour should be assumed, according to preliminary estimates by Dr. Sheldon C.
potkin of the Southern Califorria Federation of Scientists.
Traffic flows are further overestimated by failing to account for voluntary evacuation likely to take place from Charlotte via I-77.
All of the study's estimatos are promised only on estimates of traffic flow within the EPZ.
They fail to account for backups caused by extra-EpZ congestion, especially on I-77 in Charlotte.
The Applicant's evacuation time eatimates erroneously annume quick response by school buses and multiple school bus trips.
School buses in South Carolina are driven by high school kids.
No public of ficial would dare to send high school kids into an evacuation zone to transport those without vehicles.
Time must be allowed for finding drivers.
The Applicant's study is fundamentally useless to making a determination regarding the time in which evacuntion can be accomplished in that it makes numerous assumptions regarding work and living habits which are apparently made up out of whole cloth.
No references or other data bases are given for the assumptions underlying thoso evacuation time estimatos and they cannot be credited.
The evacuation time ostimatos should be based only upon worst caso assumptions rather than best caso conditions.
The Applicant's study is far too optimistic in assuming that worst caso conditions will requiro only 150% of the time of best caso conditions.
Tho judges are asked to tako notico of their own experienco in Applicants' counsol trying to roach York, South Carolina, in the midst of what may be a modest 174
snow storm to Yankee
- eyes, but which had plainly immobilized the entire vicinity.
Futher, Applicant's study naively fails to account for parents going first to their childrens' schools to pick up their children before evacutting.
- Moreover, Applicant's study by slight of
- hand, dismisses the major impact of the presence of large transient populations at Carowinds amusement park and Heritage U.S.A.
Those populations will take longer to evacuate than the study assumes and will co-congest I-77 with resident traffic.
The fundamental test of the adequacy of a evacuation plan is whether it can be implemented in such a fashion as to effectively avoid or minimize the radiological effects of a radiation release.
Absent a real life, real time evacuation drill to test the system, any study presented in support of the adequacy of the emergency plans must be technically valid from a
theoretical perspective and based upon assumptions having some relationship to the real world situation to which the study is supposed to apply.
This study lacks either basis.
A more realistic estimate of evacuation time for the Catawba Nuclear Station in the South Carolina piedmont is that ovacuation will require a minimum of 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />, assuming a conservative 600/ vehicle / lane / hour vehicle travel time.
Applicants are, thus, unable to " provide a reasonable assurance of being able to avoid or meaningfully minimize radiation exposure in the event of a radiation release at Catawba.
The Applicants thus fail to meet the requirements of NUREG-0054, Rev.
1, Appendix 4,
in that their evacuation time estimates may not be credited by the Commission and fail to meet Commission requirements that it be able to demonstrate the ability of local and state authorities to take effective protective actions.
Intervonor's Emergency planning Contention 15 deals with the related subject of transportation necessary in order to offect an evacuation.
It was tried at hearing together with Emergency planning Contention 14.
It was adtritted at the August 8,
- 1983, pre-hearing conference, Tr. 1005-1000.
It reads:
The Applicants and the local and Stato plans fail to provide adequate assurance that effective protective actions can be taken because the provisionn in the severni plans are inadquate with regards to transportation and related evacutory activities in the event of nn evacuation.
175
l The emergency plans fail, fundamentally, to address the peculiar conditions of the areas surrounding the Catawba Nuclear Station.
Large segnents of these areas are rural.
Some of them contain lower income communities.
The time estimates used by Applicants assume that 10% of the f amilies are without vehicles.
In many of these homes, the vehicle is not home during large parts of the day.
Often, those homoc will have children and elderly people at home without transportation.
No census of varying conditions has been done.
- Moreover, the plans are premised on using school buses to transport those without their own transportation.
School buses in South Carolina are driven by high school students.
Even if some public officials were prepared to leave emergency activities in the hands of 16 year old youths, none would dare send such a
child into an evacuation zone.
No provision is made for back-up drivers.
Even if the drivers can be found, in many communities those school buses are kept at the driver's home at night and not at some central motor pool.
Applicants and the local and stato planning officin1s have failed to demonstrate that adequate transportation facilities are available to evacuate the hospitals and nursing homes in the EpZ.
Nor do the plans demonstrate that adequate provisions have been made for transporting young children at day care facilities.
Numerous parents have iaforrred members of palmetto Alliance that in the event of an evacuation their fireL response will be to personally pick up their children regardless of paper plans.
The state and local plans fail to address this reaction which will slow evacuation and add to confusion.
The experience at Three Mile Island demonstrates that many citizens will not leave in the face of a major throat.
Southerners have n special commitment to innd and home which no government to date has been able to overcome.
Absent a
full-scale exercise which demonstrated that these hard-headed Scotch-Irishmon are going to leave, no assuranco can be had that the public will leave in the event of an evacuation order.
The emergency plans nasume, but do not demonstrnto, that adequate busos are available to move school children out in a timely manner.
Multiple bus pick-ups may be needed.
Evacuation pinns which fail to assume that human beings -- and not computer modeled facsimiles thoroof are to be evacunted cannot but fail in the tost.
Applicants and stato and local emergoney pinnners are unable to provido assuranco that the pinnu can be effectively implemented to protect the rosidents.
170
s-
_k q
2.
We ' agree with the parties that the appropriato
_b regulatory guidance by which we judge the evacuation timo studios submitted by Applicants is suggested by the Licensing Board's
[
decision in the Waterford proceeding:
The evacuation' timo estimates are for use by 4
emergency response officials who are charged a
with recommending and deciding on protectivo h
actions during an omorgency.
Evacuation, as a protectivo action, would be called for when it b
would result in doso savings to the population.
'i There is no standard for Judging the adequacy of the evacuation
- routes, nor has a
minimum ovacuation time boon set.
Under some accident sconnrios, ovacuation could reduce the dose to the population; under other situations, such as L^
sudden release of radioactivity, ovacuation may not be offectivo.
T__
3.
Louisiann power and Light Co. (Watorford Stonm Electric Station, Unit 3), LBp-82-100, 16 NRC 1550, 1501 (1982).
4.
While wo agroo, thus, that there is no "right" ancwor to the question of how long it will take to ovacuato people at risk from exposure to radiation rolonnes under accident conditions at b"
the Catawba plant, nor any " correct" means for accomplishing such nn ovacuation, the contral importanco of the ovacuntion timo study and the means assumod to be employed in such a timo study is that the ronults of this timo study are to be relied upon by local emorgency responso authorition in reaching the critical decision to ordor protectivo action.
As the Board in Watorford I
obnorven ovacuntion may navo livos if it can bo accomplinhed in a y
mannor to nvoid or reduco rndintion donngo by gotting tho populace out of the way of the advancing plumo.
llowevo r, if tho advancing plumo would unduly oxpono membors of the public who 177
l could be caught in the process of evacuation, the clearly superior dose minimizing choice for them is to remain sheltered in their homes or other structures until after plume passage.
The very worst possible consequence of either an erroneous evacuation timo study or a misplaced relianco upon a study due to ignorance of its imperical limitations, would be represented by a mistaken decision to order an evacuation where it, in fact, could not bo accomplished in time to minimizo radiation doso.
While we agroo that Applicants' time studios and the state and local officials presumed means for accomplishing ovacuation are not to be hold to a standard of perfection, or to any magic minimum timo, we conclude that they are seriously flawed and unreliable as the decisional tool for which they are assumod to servo.
It is the plannor's misplaced confidence in the precision of those time ostimatos and evacuation plans which represents the most dangorous wonkness reflected in the evidence on those contentions.
5.
Por examplo, Mr. Pugh, the director of the Division of Emergency Management, tho senior omorgency responso official for the stato of North
- Carolina, is asked to explain his understanding of the error bounds reflected in Applicant's ovacuation time ostimr.tos:
Q.
...In it an hour oither way or in it a minuto oither way, Mr. pugh?
What do you think?
A.
I don't think you can ron11y say bocnuno one of the basin for ovacuation is the concern that you have boon oxprosning now for about sovon days:
Is the evacuation prior to the warning?
So, thoso ovncuntion timos may bo roduced substantin11y becauso of thnt...I don't say it'n improciso, I nay our use of it must bo it 17 8
cannot be judged, for our uso, in precise terms.
Mr.
Kukash is, I
am sure, an expert in the field and certainly has outstanding credentials, and his figures are precise.
There is no question about that.
But the way we use his figures must be in general and a less precise nature...you are trying to apply errors to a study that I don't the errors are in that study.
I believe there is a latitude that you must have in carrying out ovacuation plans...I think the three hours and twenty-five minutes that they came up with in the three zones of North Carolina are ah indication of about how long it is going to take to evacuate those zones.
Q.
When you say "about,"
what I
am trying to understand is what as a planner do you have in mind when you use the term "about"?
Is an error bound of an hour on either side or a minute on either side?
A.
I can't put it in quantitative --
Q.
You don't know?
A.
I can't.
Pugh, Tr. 1097-1101.
6.
In response to the same line of questioning, the senior South Carolina emergency responne
- official, Mr.
- Lunsford, answered:
As timo goes on, our familiarity with the area will become very, very good.
Right now, it's very good.
I have traveled all the roads inside the 10-mile EPZ myself that are in South Carolina.
I have had a radio in the vehicle to make sure that I could establish radio contact with certain people.
And as we become more familiar with these routes and where people live and what the circumstances are, we will become more familiar with how accurate those times are as we move about in the ton mile EPZ during various periods.
And I believe we will be able to give pretty good judgment about the accuracy of the time ostimates.
floro so than we are right now.
Right now what we have to go by is what purports to be, and appears to me to be a
reasonable approach to determining evacuation timos within the ton mile EPZ.
This is the fourth time that I
have been involved in something like this.
Thron other sites included.
And they seen to be reasonable.
And as Mr. Pugh has stated, and I don't wnnt to be redundant, but we have a very good process i
that is involved in which a number of good human beings are involved making Judgments.
And it is not unusual in situations like this for people to be doing this and uning similar tools.
17 9
i Q.
So, let me just focus it.
Can you, Mr. Lunsford, tell me whether in your view the error bounds in the time study are more on the order of a minute or an hour 7 A.
No.
Lunsford, Tr. 1112-1113, S/7/84.
7.
In response to the very same question, i.e.
whether the error bounds are on the order of a minute or on the order of an hour, the Applicants' expert who sponsored the evacuation time estimates was wholly unable to provide a meaningful context for understanding the degree of precision which should be attributed to his projection.
Ilis answer in full:
The error bounds can be computed.
If you wanted to give us what you thought was a maximum reasonable time for each of the steps.
In other words, instead of this notification time of substantially all the population within forty-five minutes and the shape of that curve that goes along with it.
If you wanted to stipulate a different curve, we could in fact -- and you know, you wanted to call that the maximum or realistic or possimistic time, that could be done.
And I
think what you would find is, in just qualitative terms that for the bulk of the population, like 50 or 60 por cent for the 50, 60, 70 percentile of population, evacuation times are quite insentitive to these types of variations.
And the reason stems from the statistical process that simulates how people are notified and prepared to leave.
To put it in more simple terms, for example.
We may differ between what the actual distance from work to home is.
This was an area that came up early today.
Okay, there may be some disagreement and substantial disagreement about what the maximum time really is, with us saying it's more like twenty to twenty-five minutes and you saying it's more like forty to forty-five.
But what we would find when we got looking at that more carefully is that the area of disagreement involves a very small segment of the population.
And that in fact, we would be in agreement on the great majority of the population.
We would -- with possimistic and optimistic scenario.
We would both
- agree, for
- example, that 70".
of the population lives within thirty minutes of their place of work, or within twenty minutes.
So whnt happens when you combine these things in a
statistically correct manner is you get if I can get technical 18 0
here for a minuto -- you got a curvo, an "S"
shaped curve that slopes very steeply.in the middle so that in this area from say, the thirtieth to the eightieth porcentilo of population, it's quito insensitive to large changes in the assumptions.
You can assumo a much longer maximum time.
It doesn't matter.
The great bulk of the population is still back in an area that has already boon simulated correctly, and the extremely possimistic type scenarios change only that little fringe of the tail, say, the ninetieth to the one hundredth percontilo population.
So, to summarize this in just a nutshell, changing assumptions quito radically has a much less than expected impact on the bulk of the population.
It will explain the maximun timos for the last person by almost the amount that you stipulate.
So if you say notification time is in fact two hours rather than forty-five minutes, it would in fact raise the last time out or the time out for the last person by about an hour and a quarter.
But it would hardly change at all the ninetieth percontilo timo for 81,000 of the people for example.
It 's kind of a complex statistical thing which wo nood to tako more timo to do.
Kulash, Tr. 1113-1110, 5/7/84.
8.
We find it quito disturbing that, Applicants' Mr. Kulash assuming the fullest qualifications and candor, is unable to provido a
straight answer to this rather straight-forward question.
And if, in fact, there is no " straight answor" to this
- question, the evacantion timo estimatos cannot be an offactivo decisional tool to bo employed by omorgency plannors.
If they cannot clearly understand, and they cortainly reflect no such und9rstanding on this record, whethor they should a s s urr o,
for examplo, that the throo hour and twenty-five minuto estimato for ovacuation of the last person from the North Carolina EPZ zones may be off by a few minutos on one sido or another, but in not likely to ho off an much as au
- hour, then wo can hnvo no confidenco in the offoctivo uno of thoso estimatos in making tho e
18 1
critical decision whether to direct an evacuation or in-place sheltering to save injury and lives.
The lack of unde rs tandint; reflected in this record is precisely the procursor to the misjudgment regarding protectivo action which may have catastrophic results for over exposures to the public.
The evacuation timo estimatos, themselves, are only as good as the understanding of those who will uso them to decido on appropriato protective actions.
9.
We conclude that many of Intervonor's criticisms lovolod at the lack of basis for the evacuation timo estimates factual promiso as well as their criticisms of similar lack of factuni basis for the evacuation plans thonsolvos nro genorn11y well takon.
Much work han obviously boon done by Applicant's consultants, PilC Vorhoon and the local plannorn to address Intervonor's concorns reflected in thono contentions.
Thin in creditablo, and reflects tho obvious value of subjecting the plannors' asnumptions to a
rigorous critical review as han occurred in this proceeding.
For otamplo, as reflected in Int.
Ex. EP-10, only after the adnlaston of thone contontionn and Duko 's offorts to securo from their consultants discovory materials sought by Intervonorn, did Duko dincover
- that, nn allogod by Intervonorn, PitC-Voorhoon had no tochnteni junttitention for itn nunumptionn of work hnhitn and bohnvior undorlying its projectionn of preparntion timo.
A formal techntent pspor reflecting nuch foundation wnn comminstonod.
In
- addition, nei n11ogod, no analynin had hoon porformed by PitC-18 2
Voorhoos of the offact of voluntary evacuntien of the city of Charlotto just outsido the existing ton mile EPZ.
Such a study cas commissioned by Duke.
Later, Duko commissionod a number of additionni studios by pRC-Voorhous to respond to Intervonor's criticians:
a formal report on the use of school tuson in both states for evacuation of school childron, a formel report on sheltor capacity, a report on the ovacuation of transportation dopondent persons, proceduros for evacuation of ht.spitals and nursing homos, and a dotniled robuttal of the innues raised in Contention 14.
Int. Ex. EP-20.
10.
In
- fact, Intervonor's mout extremo nGrortion that ovacuntion of the Catawbn EPZ would requiro thirty-throo hours, 7
is substantiated by Duke's own onrlier entinaton of tho *imo to ovncuato that part of its EPZ nonr Rock 11111, South Carolinn ontimated to take thirty-two hourn and twenty-five minuton tind<r normal wonthor and forty hours and twonty-fivo minutos under advorno woathor conditions.
Int. Ex.
Ep-10.
Thono estimaton coro not only submittod to the thiclonr Hogulntory Commission by Duko in 1980 but woro submitted, for comment, to the apocini facilition involved and woro "discunnod, nt longth, with toent and atnto officinin.
Hutunt agroomont wnn roached that tho80 valuun nro ndoqttato under a preliminary bnnin."
Int. Ex. EP-17.
The throo to four hour untimaton mado by Duko'n connultants and rollod upon by the local and ntato cmorgoney ronponno officia.In are n f ar cry,
indned; from tho thirty to forty hour ostimato proviounty mndo by Duko, and apparontly ondarned by thono namo 1H:1
officials only four years ago.
We are certainly left to wonder, as we expect the local officials may also wonder, which are the accurate estimates and what levels of error should an emergency response official assume in those short minutes when an actual decision regarding protective. action must be made in order to save life.
11.
We conclude that Applicants' evacuation time studies and plans are inadequate to assure effective protective action and will require that Applicants propose remedial measures to cure these deficiencies.
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INTERVENORS' EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 18 ADEQUACY OF LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM 1.
Palmetto and CESG Contention 18, admitted by the Licensing Board at the close of the August 8,
1983 pre-hearing conference, Tr.
1099-1100, Order (Concerning Miscellaneous Matters) August 17, 1983, reads:
In the event of an emergency, local telephone systems are inadequate to handle the immensely increased volume of telephone calls.
Since notification of emergency personnel relies upon telephones 6.nd since those without vehicles are expected to call for a ride, major parts of the emergency communication system will be effectively knocked out.
This applies especially to the notification of school bus drivers as specified in the plan.
2.
As was stipulated by the parties, Tr.
1373-1374, the overloading of the local telephone system under conditions of high volume usage, such as would likel'y occur once the general public was aware of an emergency at the Catawba facility, appears quite likely.
Parties stipulated to facts reflected in a
response to Intervenor's interrogatories:
Should a major emergency occur which would affect the residences and businesses located within the service territory of Rock Hill Telephone
- Company, it is estimated that simultaneous usage of approximately 10%
of the telephone lines in the service area would have the effect of tying up telephone service to remaining customers.
This situation has occurred on an infrequent basis in the past.
The tolophone usage which resulted immediately after the death of President Kennedy is a primary example of the situation.
In that case, the switching facilities of this company were effectively tied up for a period of time.
Id.
We conclude on this basis that it is established that, as alleged in the contention, "in the event of an emergency, local 18 5
telephone systems are inadequate to handle the immensely increased volume of telephone calls."
3.
Much of the concern which is founded upon the inadequacy of the local telephone system appears to be addressed through response by Applicants and the state and local planners who have identified a variety of alternative means including dedicated
- lines, various radio equipment, and personal
- beepers, to accomplish notification of at least the key emergency personnel in the event cf an emergency at the facility.
4.
We have remaining concerns, however, regarding effects of the unavailability of the local telephone system on the implementation ability as it relates to the larger number of lesser emergency response workers as well as the members of the general public who, requiring special assistance, would seek to communicate by telephone with emergency management officials.
5.
It seems clear to us that any reliance, whatsoever, on the local public telephone system for any link in the emergency response process would be ill-advised.
In order to understand the implications of relying on some other means for implementing the emergency plan for these participants, in the absence of the telephone system, we must look at the efficacy of the replacement link specified by Applicants and the local officials.
6.
For the transportation dependent, handicapped, or other members of the public with special needs for assistance, the Applicants' assurances that the plan will function even in the face of a failure of the telephone system are likely to be of 18 6
little comfort.
As emphasized by the testimony of Intervenor's witness Andrews with respect to individual response in crisis, many of these people in need will be looking for the helping resource to respond to their difficulty.
Assuming that they respond as predicted by turning to their Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan brochure, App. Ex. EP-5, a reference to the inside front cover reflects three bold-headed sections each directing the reader to one er more telephone numbers "If You Have Questions,"
"Uf You Hear Rumor,"
or "If You Are Hearing Impaired, or Have a Physical Limitation."
If the person in need wades through ten more pages of Duke's brochure and arrives at page 11, he or she would find a section headed, "What If I Don't Have Transportation?"
There he or she is
- told, "If you or members of your family cannot drive or do not have any transportation, call the emergency agency in your area at the number listed on the inside front cover."
Now, it is true, that at this point and in the earlier section directed at the handicapped the booklet explicitly states that the call should be made "today,"
or that one should "make these plans now."
However, nothing in this record suggests that any substantial numbers of people with these needs, who we must presume are in fact represented in significant numbers in the EPZ population, have called these numbers to register their needs at this time.
Applicant's own consultants, for example, reflect that some 10%
of the EPZ households are without access to a vehicle and must thus be counted as transportation dependent.
Persons with such 18 7
needs would, thus, number in the thousands.
Many of them will wait until the time of the actual emergency to attempt to call.
The panic and fear response of these people to finding the telephone system inoperative will likely be great.
We are not comforted by Applicants' suggestions that the EBS messages will effectively accomplish the needed communication with these people particularly in the face of the brochure's explicit commitments that the telephone will be the needed link.
7.
Mr. Thomas of York County seems to confirm our fear that the telephone is, indeed, relied upon to perform such a link:
Q.
Yes.
You have got the need to take protective
- action, and those persons require some special assistance in the protective action.
You have not identified them as of yet.
How do they get assisted in your plan?
A.
Okay.
Those that have been unidentified, and an event takes place, then the identification burden would fall on them to get in touch with us.
We don't know they are there.
Obviously we can't communicate with them, because we don't kncw who they are.
So they would have to identify themselves to us.
Most probably they would use a commercial telephone.
Thomas, Tr. 1431-1432, 5/8/84.
Mr. Thomas' further explanation provides little additional comfort:
If they needed to get assistance, they would be directed that there is a procedure to follow, by EBS, if an event has taken place, if they hadn't already notified them.
Hang your handkerchief on the door, sitting at the front door screaming, whatever it took.
They would be notified over the EBS, if they hadn't already notified us and gotten special notification.
If they tried to phone in and have a lengthy narrative over a commercial phone, I am sure it would be very difficult because of the great numbers on the phone.
But that doesn't mean they can't communicate with us.
Q.
How about.if they just want to call and say,
" Help"?
A.
EBS will tell them to stand on the front porch and yell help.
Somebody will pick them up.
They may get it over the phone; they may not.
18 8
Thomas, Tr. 1435-1436, 5/8/84.
8.
We are not persuaded that such an ad hoc response will effectively communicate as necessary the means by which persons eith special needs will receive assistance in the event of an emergency.
We are especially troubled by the inconsistent assurances implicit in the brochure that "if you need help," the telephone would be a.n effective means to communicate that need and have communicated the means by which those needs will be met.
We will require further demonstration of an effective means for accomplishing this communication in the absence of the availability of the local telephone system at Catawba.
18 9
CONCLUSION OF LAW Having considered the entire record in this proceeding, we are unable to conclude that the emergency plans for Catawba comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47 and 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E, or that Aplicants and the NRC Staff have demonstrated that deqquate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the facility.
We will require remedial measures by Applicants and others, as specified in this decision, in order to satisfy this Board that such " reasonable assurance" is demonstrated.
Applicants should submit to us and the parties a proposed remedial plcn within 30 days of this decision.
We retain jurisdiction of this matter until further order.
Res ectfully submitted, Robert CuLld 2135 1/ N evine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Attorney for Palmetto Alliance Jesse L. Riley Phillip L. Rutledge Betsy M. Levitas 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North carolina 28207 Carolina Environmental Study Group 190 m
s
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
~
Il' In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-413 DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
50-414
)
(emergency planning)
(Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
=
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I
hereby certify that copies of
" Palmetto Alliance Carolina Environmental Study Group Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision" in the above captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 27th day of July, 1984.
Morton B. Margulies George E. Johnson, Esq.
Chairman Office of the Executive Legal Atomic Safety and Licensing Director Board Panel U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Frank F. Hooper Albert V. Carr, Jr.,
Esq.
University of Michigan Duke Power Company School of Natural Resources P. O. Box 33189 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Dr. Robert M. Lazo Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel State of South Carolina U. S. Nuclear Regulatory P. O.
Box 11549 Commission Columbia, South Carolina 29210 Washington, D.C.
20555 James L. Kelley, Chairman J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Anne W.
Cottingham, Esq.
Board Panel Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
& Reynolds Commission 1200 Seventeenth St.,
N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20036 191
1 Chairman Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Jesse L. Riley DocLeting and Service Section 854 Henley Place U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Charlotte, N.C.
28207 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Karen E.
Long, Esq.
Don R. Willard Assistant Attorney General Mecklenburg County N. C. Department of Justice Department of Environmental P. O. Box 629 Health Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 120 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 John Clewett, Esq.
Bradley Jones, Esq.
236 Tenth Street, S.E.
Regional Counsel, Region II Washington, D.C.
20003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C.
20555 (h
i l
Robert (gild N.
19 2
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