ML20094A716
| ML20094A716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1984 |
| From: | Van Witbeck T ENERGY, INC., GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094A683 | List: |
| References | |
| SP, NUDOCS 8411060511 | |
| Download: ML20094A716 (4) | |
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THt; M W s VM TIMES, TUESDAV MAy 3, !g79 Lagm Reportmg ReautorDamage y
LaidtoExperts Lag m. Reportm.g Laid to Experts, er n. -w esus MIDDLETOWN, Pa., May 7-A tech-Constaved From Page Al nT,",I snad ces e g n fint i n
nician frora the Three Mile Island nu.
t not believing their instruments and not clear plant told visiting congressmen Floyd, the technician, told the touring understanding what they meant. "It was today that contros room personrm am Congressmen that the gas explosion had a very unusual situation to find yourself Federal inspectors knew inat me piants been dearly monitored by the control in,"he nmarked.
fuel core was ser ausly aamagea two room instruments in full view of both The group was taken to the base of the days before the damage was formally re.
plant operators and the N.R.C. inspec.
190. foot.high reactor containment build.
portad and the seriousness of the accident tors, whom he did not identify. "We as.
ing, where John G. Herbein, a Metropoli.
sumed they knew what we were doing," tan Edison vice president, pointed at the made puNic.
a Jim Floyd, a control reorn supervisor, he added.
huge, circular conente street.are and had trf told members of a House enert,y subcom.
(s d th eQ I
f ac wa er e bise.
g y
d mittee that inspectors from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission wm standing reactor building that had to be turned off ment of this building." He indicated an -
by operators, again in full view of the
" imaginary !!ne on the structure, saying, by as the tracing needle on a reactor pro commissioninspectors.
It's up to about the six. foot level."
sure monitoring gaugeleapec.
In Washington, Frank Ingram, a com.
The Congnssmen, who were receiving That so<alled " pressure spike "
mission spokesman, said that existing de fint fun tour M me stricken plant caused by an exp;osion of hydrogen in the regulations might require plant opera. since President Carter arrived at the reactor vessel arid showing that the reac.
tors and Federal inspectors to report height of the crisis, were shown a variety tor core itself had been damaged, was re.
safety incidents to N.R.C. officials, "de.
of systems under construction designed corded at 1:58 P.M. Wednesday, March pending on the circumstances." But he to guarantee that the reactor can be con.
28, about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the start of the na.
said the circumstances of this incident YMto bradioac.
uw sta o term d by agen.
Herman Dieckarnp, president ok" the tion's most senous nuclear accident.
- *',"g yg bl e ti ra Reported 2 Days I.ater sider whether any reporting requirement g
The commission has said that it was exyt said there wu at least one known in' n a d
ehton could not aware of the explosion until Friday, impose penalties for infractions of its stance of human error-two valves on a March 30, when it was formally reported regulations ranging from an " enforce. backup water system closed during a test by the Metropolitan Edison Company, mentletter"requinnga correctionof the were never re pened. Yet, he said, the perator who had dosed the valves indl.
which operates the reactor. Company of.
infraction to revocation of an operating 11 fleials have said the significance of the cense and fines up to 3:3,000.
on a checklist that be had reopened event was not realized until tnen.
' Disturbing'to Udall "W'e have the name of this person. We in anocer dmlopment sn me smwMg At Middletown, Representative Morris have interviewed him. His response was, concern over nuclear power, President K. Udall, Democrat of Artrorta, who is 'I thought I completed that,'" and re.
Carter told organizers of yesterday's an.
chairman of the subcommittee, said the opened the valves. Mr. Dieckamp said.
tinudear demonstration that shutting disclosure was extremely disturbing.
Commission of ficials told the Congress.
down all the nation's nudear generating "The fact that there was an explosion men that the plant was now stable and plants, as the protesters were demand.
that first morrung and that the company that no more radioactivtty was being ing, was "out of the question," but he knew about it certainly should have been released frem it than from a normal oper.
added that his Administration was trying reported to the Governor, who had evacu. ating plant.
ers:,er the tour, Mr. Udall told report.
Aft t3 minimize the need for nuclear power.
atson responsibility " he said.
You get inside one of these things Senator Edward M Kennedy told constit.
Victor Gilinsky, a commission member who came along on the tour, said he was and you realize how enormously complex uents that be favored a moratonum on concemed about the report that N.R.C. and complicated they an. Maybe the building new nuclear plants and a thor
- inspectors on the site may have known technology is so complex it's beyond the ough examination of all existing reactor.
about the explosion two days before their ability of even well. intentioned people to (Page A18.]
Jupenors.
control. The futun of nuclear power At the enppled nuclear generator, Mr.
7 "This is the first I have heard that they hangs in doubt."
7 observed it at the time it happened," Mr.
hGilinsky said. "It will be a subject of Centlaued on Fr ee Alt,Chlame s gmetaculous review."
Mr. Floyd attempted to reconstruct the night of the accident for the visitors. "A lot of things happened real quick," he 4/
said.
k He showed the Congressmen a ye!!ow
,I,3 tag dangling from a control board instru.
j
,s*
ment that be said might have covered a i
A*.I, light showing that a critical valve was l
f closed insteadof open.
i
,b He said that control room operators sp.
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MCKUn November 1,'1984-UDE
'84 NOV -5 P2:24
' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L H ci '-
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD'
.In.the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289 SP
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(Restart-Management Remand)
(Three Mile. Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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TESTIMONY OF THOMAS LEROY VAN WITBECK My name is Thomas Leroy Van Witbeck.
I currently hold the position of Corporate Vice President Plant Services Group for Energy Incorporated.
The Plant Services Group provides con-sulting services and management information systems to the utility' industry, primarily to the nuclear utility companies.
The consulting services are provided in the areas of plant startup, operation and maintenance.
The management information systems are designed to support operation and maintenance of capital intensive facilities such as nuclear power plants.
-My background encompasses 25 years of association with the nuclear industry, of which seven, years wert in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Program, four years in facility operation, 10 years in
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plant startup and operations consulting,.and the past four years.in the management of a consulting business.
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l' I hold a Bachelor of-Science Degree in Nuclear Enginee' ring from Oregon State University.
I am a member of the American
- Nuclear Society, a registered Professional Engineer, and have i
held a reactor' operator's license.
On March 30, 1979, Energy Incorporated was requested to provide assistance to GPU at Three Mile Island.
I arrived at the TMI. visitors center at approximately 8:00 AM on March 31, 1979, with a crew of six EI employees.
The resumes of the EI personnel and a letter of introduction were presented to GPU.
By 2:00 PM all personnel were checked in and had received as-signments.
My initial assignment was to participate in the prepara-tion of a sequence of events.
After several weeks I was placed in charge of the group developing the sequence of events.
This group grew in charter and number to become the Accident Assess-ment Group (AAG), having about 15 members at the peak of activ-ity.
The AAG prepared in excess of a dozen technical data re-ports covering events surrounding the accident.
To prepare these reports the AAG reviewed plant records and interviewed plant staff and drew upon their experience and knowledge.
As a leader of this group I reviewed all reports which I personally
.did not prepare.
As a result of the review of records and discussions with the.TMI staff the AAG became aware of the pressure spike on,..-
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.y March 31, 1979.
My appreciation for the-significance of the pressure' spike'as a measure of core: damage however was not
! gained until I.was exposed to calculations of the volumelof H2 involved which was somewhere in the' period-April 2nd through April 4th.
Jus head of the AAG, I was involved in several.sessio*i.
'With the GPU management regarding the development of a sequence of events during the period April 6, 1979 through May 1, 1979.
Herman Dieckamp was present at each of these review sessions and asked questions regarding the sequence which were indica-tive of his desire-to have a detailed knowledge of the accident and events surrounding the accident.
During the.easly days of the accident I also'saw Herman Dieckamp in the trailer city and the dining tent periodically.
At these chance meetings we would discuss some technical point or Mr. Dieckamp would ask questions regarding the AAG work progress-which indicated a knowledge of the technical' aspects of the investigation.
On September 15, 1979, I made the last formal presentation to Mr. Dieckamp and Mr. Arnold that I recall making.
At this meeting I covered three topics:
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F Initiating events of the' accident,
'-HPI/MU performance,. and
- Operator actions during the first 72. hours following the accident.
These topics.and-their. technical'. content are-typical of the de-tailed' technical knowledg'e'Mr. Dieckamp required and over dhich-
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