ML20093M825

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Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept Re Hea Relays Supplied by GE Exhibiting Trip Force Values That May Cause Misoperation.Initially Reported on 840502.Relays Tested & Malfunctioning Hardware Replaced
ML20093M825
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek 
Issue date: 09/20/1984
From: Martin T
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8410230310
Download: ML20093M825 (3)


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- Thomas J. Martin

- Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 201/430 6316 Vice President Engineering and Construction September 20, 1984 Dr. Thomas E._Murley, Administrator U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1I 631cPark Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY GENERAL ELECTRIC "HEA" RELAYS HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

'On May 2, 1984,.a verbal report was made to Region I, Office

.of Inspection and Enforcement representative, Mr.

E.

C.

McCabe, advising of a potentially significant construction deficiency concerning HEA relays supplied by General Electric.

On June 1, 1984, an interim report was sent to your office.

The.following final report is provided in accordance with' 10CFR50.55(e).

Description of the Deficiency General Electric indicated in Service Advice Letter PSM 175.1 that HEA relays manufactured between September, 1980 and August, 1983 may exhibit trip force values which could cause misoperation.

The potential for malfunction is related to a

' minor design change that was implemented during the above time-framc.

General Electric recommended that all HEA relays manufactured between the above dates, corresponding to date

' codes KS, LS, MS, AT through MT, AU through-MU, and AW through

~HW, should be checked to determine the force required to trip the relay; and that any HEA relay not meeting specification be replaced.

Our Architect / Engineer and Constructor, Bechtel, advised us that thirteen (13) HEA relays installed in safety-4 8410230310 840920

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Dr. T. E. Murley 2

9/20/84 related systems failed to meet the specified trip force values when tested in accordance with General Electric's instructions.

Bechtel issued Nonconformance Report No. 3108 to document and control the discrepant hardware.

During a review of QA Information Flyers and Problem Investi-gation Requests conducted by Bechtel's Site QA organization, an additional potential deficiency was identified concerning HEA relays.

General Electric advised in Service Advice Letter PSM 165.1 that some of the HEA relays manufactured between May, 1979 and December, 1980 may fail to operate due to malformed i.

torsion springs.

General Electric recommended that all HEA relays manufactured between the above dates, corresponding to date codes ER, FR, GR, HR, JR, KR, LR, MR, AS, BS, CS, DS, ES, FS, GS, HS, JS, KS, LS and MS, be tested to verify that they will operate at the minimum voltage for the specific relay rating.

Bechtel issued Nonconformance Report No. 2264 to document and control the suspect hardware.

Corrective Action The thirteen (13) HEA relays that failed to meet the specified trip force values have been removed from the equipment and shipped offsite.

Twelve (12) of the relays have been replaced with acceptable spares drawn from storage.

Closure of Non-conformance Report No. 3108 is pending receipt and installation of the one remaining HEA relay.

All twenty-six (26) potentially defective relays have been replaced with HEA. relays with acceptable date codes.

Given the nature of the potential deficiency (i.e., malformed torsion springs), Bechtel Engineering elected to replace the twenty-six (26) HEA relays identified rather than test them for performance at the minimum voltage.

Safety Analysis The HEA relays in question are Class lE safety related components installed in systems required for safe operation

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Dr. T.

E. Murley 3

9/20/84 and shutdown of the plant.

It has been determined that failure of'one or more HEA relays'to perform as intended could

, adversely affect critical functions, to include the alignment of emergency power to Class lE busses and Emergency Diesel Generator load shedding.-

We therefore corsider this condition to be' reportable in accordance w.ith 10CFR50.55(e).

Very truly yours, C.

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division:of Reactor Construction Inspection Washington, D. C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek P.

O.

Box 241 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Records Center.

Institute-of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle.75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339

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