ML20093K286

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Forwards List Providing Status of Open Items Identified in Draft Ser,Section 1.7.Items Identified as Complete Considered Closed.Resolutions to Draft SER Open Items Also Encl for Review & Approval
ML20093K286
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1984
From: Mittl R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8410170261
Download: ML20093K286 (62)
v • d • e


Text

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- 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 -' MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation October 15, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention:

Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-356 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OPEN ITEM STATUS is a current list which provides a status of the open items identified in Section 1.7 of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

Items identified as " complete" are those for which PSE&G has provided responses and no confir-mation of status has been received from the staff.

We will consider these items closed unless notified otherwise.

In order to permit timely resolution of items identified as

" complete" which may not be resolved to the staff's satis-faction, please provide a specific description of the issue which remains to be resolved. is a current list which identifies Draft SER Sections not yet provided.

Enclosed for your review and approval (see Attachment 4) are the resolutions to the Draft SER open items listed in A signed original of the required affidavit is provided to document the submittal of these items.

8410170261 841015

[DRADOCK 05000354

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The Energy People 95491214MI 7 83 '

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i Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2_

10/15/84

' Sh'ould you have any questions or require an~y additional

~information on these-items,!please; contact us.

Very truly-yours,

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Attachments / Enclosure C

D. H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager (w/ attach.)

W. H. Bateman USNRC Senior Resident Inspector (w/ attach.)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA L

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-354 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby submits the enclosed responses to DSER open items and FSAR Ouestions for the Hope Creek Generating Station.

The matters set forth in this submittal are true to the best,

of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Respectfully submitted, Public Service Electric and Gas Company-a

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By:

Chomas J.

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Vice Pres ent -

Engineering and Construction Sworn to and subscribed before me, a Notary Public of New Jersey, this /Sd day of October 1984 k

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DAVID K. BURD NOTARYPU80C 0F NEW JERSEY Ify Comm. heires 10 23 85 MC 28 02 e

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DATE: 10/15/84 ATTACHMFRT 1 DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPEN' SECTION A.' SOlWENCER SUB.ECT STATUS LETTER DATED T

ITEM NUMBER ~

1

- 2.3.1 Design-basis temperatures for safety-Cmplete 8/15/84 related mixiliary systes s

2a 2.3.3 Accuracie of meteorologica1 Cmplete 8/15/84 measurements (Rev. 1)

~2b 2.3.3 i

Accuracies of meteorological ~

Catplete 8/15/84 measur m ents (Rev. 1) 4 2c 2.3.3 Accuracies of meteorological Cmplete 8/15/84 measurements s

(Rev.'2)

Cmplete 8/15/84 2d 2.3.3 Accuracie of meteorological x

measurements (Rev. 2) 3a 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite meteorological Cmplete 8/15/84 measurements program (III.A.2)

(Rev. 2) 3b 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite meteorological Cmplete 8/15/84 measurements program (III.A.2)

(Rev. 2) 3c 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite meteorological NRC Action measurements progran (III.A.2) 4 2.4.2.2 Ponding levels Cmplete 8/03/84 Sa 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Cmplete 10/15/84 water intake structure (Rev. 4 )

Sb 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Cmplete 10/15/84 water intake structure (Rev. 4)

Sc 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Canplete 7/27/84 water intake structure 5d 2.4.5 Wave impact ard runup on cervice cmplete 10/15/84 water intake structure (Rev. 4)

J 6a 2.4.10 Stability of erosion protection conplete 8/20/84 structures 6b 2.4.10 Stability cf erosion protsetion Cmplete 8/20/84 structures 6c 2.4.10 Stability of erosion protecticn Cmplete 8/03/84 structures i -

1 l

M P84 80/121-gs i

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_ATDOIMENT 1 (Cont'd)

R. L. MIT11 1D DSER A. SQlWENGR :

CPEN SECTICN ITEM NUMBER SUILTECT SIX1tJS LETTER D429 ' )

7a 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Omplete

-8/3/84 7b 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Quplete 8/3/84

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8 2.5.2.2 Choice of maximum earthquake for New Ccaplete 8/15/84 i

Ehgland - Piedmont Tectonic

  • Province 9

2.5.4 Soil dauping values Caplete 6/1/84 10 2.5.4 Foundation level response spectra Complete 6/1/84' 11 2.5.4 Soil shear moduli variation Cbeplete 6/1/84 12 2.5.4 Ccubinatim of soil layer properties Omplets 6/1/84 13 2.5.4 Lab test shear moduli values Omplets 6/1/84

~f 14 2.5.4 Liquefacticn analysis of r4ver bottcm Caplets 6/1/84 sands 15 2.5.4 Tabulations of shear noduli Ccaplete 6/1/84 16 2.5.4 Drying and wetting effect en Ccaglete 6/1/84 i

Vincentczn 17 2.5.4 Power block settiment monitoring Ccaplete 6/1/84 18 2.5.4 Maxinta earth at rest pressure Ccaplete 6/1/84 coefficient 19 2.5.4 Liquefaction analysis for service Ccaplete 6/1/84 water piping 20 2.5.4 Explanatica of observed power block Cauglets 6/1/84 settlement 21 2.5.4 Service water pipe settlement recortis ccuplete 6/1/84 22 2.5.4 Cofferdam stability Ccaglete 6/1/84 3

M P84 80/12 2 - gs 6

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ATDCIDENT 1 (Cont'd)

R. L. MIT!L 'IO MR A. SOGENCER WEN SECTICN S'IKIUS IIITER QA2 E TIEM NUMBER SUBJECT 23 2.5.4 Clarification of ISAR Tables 2.5.13 Complete 6/1/ 84 and 2.5.14

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24 2.5.4 Soil depth nodels for intake Cagdeto 6/1/84 structure 25 2.5.4,

Intake structure soil nodeling Conglets 8/10/84

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26 2.5.4.4 Intake structure sliding stability Complets 8/20/84 27 2.5.5 Slope stability Ccaplete 6/1/84 28a 3.4.1 F1 cod protecticn Ccaplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 1 28b 3.4.1 Flood prrt.ection Canplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) i 28c 3.4.1 Flod p :tection Ccuplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1)

I 28d 3.4.1 F1 cod protection Canplete 8/30/ 84 (Rev. 1) 28e 3.4.1 Flod protection Ccaplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 28f 3.4.1 Flood protection Ccmplete 7/27 / 84 28g 3.4.1 Flood protection Canplete 7/ 27 / 84 29 3.5.1.1 Internally generated missiles (outside Canplete 8/3/84 (Rev. 1) contairment) 30 3.5.1.2 Internally generated missiles (inside closed 6/1/84 (5/30/84-containment)

Aux.Sys.Mtg.)

31 3.5.1.3 Turbine missiles Ccaplete 7/18/84 32 3.5.1.4 Missiles generated by natural phenmana Ccuplete 7/27/84 33 3.5.2 Structures, systems, and cmponents to Conglete.

7/27/84 be protected fr a externally generated missiles I

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ATIACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)

R. L. MITH. TO DSER A. SONNCER TEN SEETICN ITEM NUMBER stb ECT STA7tJS TETIER D42TD 34 3.6.2 Unrestrained whipping pipe inside Couplete 7/18 /84

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contairment 35 3.6.2 ISI progran fcr pipe welds in Carplets 6/29/84 break exclusion zone 36 3.6.2 '

Postulated pip ruptures Carplate 6/29/84 37 3.6.2 feedwater isolation check valve Complete 8/20/84 cperability 38 3.6.2 Design of pipe rupture restraints Canplete 8/20/84 39 3.7.2.3 SSI analysis results usirg finite Ccmplete 8/3/84 element nethod and elastic half-space approach for containient structure 40 3.7.2.3 SSI analysis results usir$g finite Canplete 8/3/ 84 element authcd ard elastic half-space approach for intake structure

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41 3.8.2 Steel containnent backlirg analysis Canplete 6/1/ 84 42 3.8.2 Steel centainnent ulthnate capacity Canplete 8/20/84 analysis (Rev. 1) 43 3.8.2 SRV/todA pool dynamic loads Carplete 6/1/84 44 3.8.3 ACI 349 deviatiors for internal Ccaplete 6/1/84 structures 45 3.8.4 ACI 349 deviations for Category I Complete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) structures 46 3.8.5 ACI 349 deviatiors for fcundations Carplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 47 3.8.6 Base not response spectra Ccmplete 8/10/84 (Rev. 1) 48 3.8.6 Rocking time histories Carplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1)

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s ATDOIMENT 1 (Cat'd)

R. L. MIT:L 'IO DSER CPDi SECTICM A. SOMNCER ITD4 NUMBER SI N ECT STA'ITJS LEITER EKIED 8/20/84 Gross ccmcrete section Complete 49 3.8.6 (Rev. 1) 50 3.8.6 Vertical floor flexibility response Ccaplete 8/20/84 spectra (Rev. 1) 51 3.8.6 -

Caparison cf Bedstel independent C mplete 8/20/84 verification results with the design-(Rev. 2) basis results 52 3.8.6 Ductility ratics due to pipe break Ccaplete 8/3/84 53 3.8.6 Design of seismic Category I tanks Ccaplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 54 3.8.6 Cambination cf vertical responses Ccaplete 8/10/84 (Rev. 1) 55 3.8.6 Torsional stiffness calculation Ccapletr 6/1/84 56 3.8.6 Drywell stick model develcpnent Ccmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 57 3.8.6 Rotational tine history irputs ccmplete 6/1/84 58 3.8.6 "O" referena point for auxiliary Ccaplete 6/1/84 building model 59 3.8.6 overturning scment cf reactor Ccmplete 8/20/84 building foundation mat (Rev. 1) 60 3.8.6 BSAP element size limitations Ccmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 61 3.8.6 Seismic nodeling cf drywell shield Cczplete 6/1/84 mil 62 3.8.6 Drywell shield wall boundary Camplete 6/1/84 conditions 63 3.8.6 Reacter building dcme boundary Cczplete 6/1/84 conditions i

l M P84 80/12 5 - gs

f ATDO9 eft 1 (Cont'd)

D6ER-R. L. MIT2. E CPEN SECTICN A. SOMN 3R T11M NLMDER SLE ECT STMTJS LETID DC.D 64 3.8.6 -

SSI analysis 12 Hz cutoff frequency Ocaglete 8/20 /84 (Rev. 1) 65 3.8.6 Intake structure crane heavy load Complets 6/1/84 i

66 3.8.6 Impedance analysis for the intake Canplete 8/10/84 (Rev. 1) structure 67 3.8.6 Critical loads calculation for ccuplete 6/1/84 reactor tuilding d: ne 68 3.8.6 anactor tuilding foundation mat Ccmplete 6/1/84 contact pressures 69 3.8.6 Factors d safety against' sliding and Couplete 6/1/84 oveIrturning cf drywell shield wall 4

70 3.8.6 Seismic shear force distributicm in Ccaplete 6/1/84 cylinder all 71 3.8.6 overturnirg cf cylinder all Canplete 6/1/84 72 3.8.6 Deep beam design cf fuel pool walls Canplete 6/1/84 73 3.8.6 ASRSD dame nodel load irputs Canplete 6/1/84 74 3.8.6 Tornado depressurization Canplete 6/1/84 75 3.8.6 Auxiliary tuilding abnocnal pressure Canplete 6/1/84 j

76 3.8.6 Targercial shear stresses in drywell Canplete 6/1/84 shield wall and the cylinder wall 77 3.8.6 Facter cf safety against overturning Ccaplete 8/20/84 I

l cf irtake structure (Rev. 1) 78 3.8.6 Dead load calculations Canplete 6/1/84 79 3.8.6 Post-trodification seismic loads for Canplete 8/20/ 84 the torus (Rev. 1)

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ATDODENr 1 (Cont'd)

DSER R. L. IETIL TO

@EN SECTION A. SODeKER ITD4 M MBER Sulk 7ECT STEIUS MITER DN!ED 80 3.8.6 Terus fluid-structure interactions Couplete 6/1/84 i

81 3.8.6 Seismic displacement d torus Complete 8/20 / 84 (Rev. 1) 82 3.8.6 Review d seismic category I tank Caplete 8/20/84 design (Rev. 1) 83 3.8.6.

Factors d safety for drywell Ccaplete 6/1/84 tuckling evaluation 4

84 3.8.6 Ultimate capacity d contairment Caplete 8/20/84 (materials)

(Rev. 1) 85 3.8.6 toad ccabination consistency Ccaplete 671/84 86 3.9.1 Ccaputer code validation Canalete 8/20/84 87 3.9.1 Information on transients Ccaplete 8/20/84

1 88 3.9.1 Stress analysis and elastic-plastic Canplete 6/29 /84 analysis 89 3.9.2.1 Vibration levels for NSSS piping Ccaplete 6/29/84 systems-90 3.9.2.1 Vibration nonitoring g4.s during Couplete 7/18/84 testing l

91 3.9.2.2 Pipirg supports ard anchors Ccaplete 6/29/84 92 3.9.2.2 Triple flued-head containment Ccaplete 6/15/84 penetrations 93 3.9.3.1 Iced crmbinations md allcamble Ccaplete 6/29 /84 stress limits 94 3.9.3.2 Design of SRVs and SRV discharge Cenplete 6/29/84 piping 1

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ATUGMENT 1 (Cont'd)

DSER R. L. MIT5. 10 '

WEN SECTIQ4 A. SO M N 3 R ITDI NLNBER SLW ECT STAIVS LETTER DICTD 95 3.9.3.2 Fatigue evaluation cn SRV piping Cmplete 6/15 /84 and IDCA di:wncaners 96 3.9.3.3 IE Information Notice 83-80 Ccuplete 8/20/84-(Rev. 1)

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97 3.9.3.3 Buckling criteria used for otmponent Ccaplete 6/ 29 /84 supports 98 3.9.3.3 Design d bolts Caplete 6/15/84 99a 3.9.5 Stress categories ard limits for Ccuplete 6/15/84 core sJpport structures 99b 3.9.5 Stress categories and limits for Couplete 6/15/84 core support structures 100a 3.9.6 10CFR50.55a paragraph (g)

Caplete 6/29/84 100b 3.9.6 10CFR50.55a paragraph (g)

Complete 9/12/v4 (Rev. 1) 101 3.9.6 PSI and ISI p6%saiis for pungs and Ccaplete 9/12/54 valves (Rev. 1) 102 3.9.6 f.eak testing d pressure isolation Ccuplete 9/12/84 L

valves (Rev. 11 103a1 3.10 Seismic ard dynamic qualification of Caplete 8/20/64 nachanical ard electrical equipent 103a2 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification cf Conglete 8 /20 / 84 mechanical are electrical equipaent j

103a3 3.10 Seismic ard dynamic qualificaticn of Ccng,lete 8/20/84 nachanical ard electrical a;uipnent 103a4 3.10 Seismic ard dynamic qualification cf Ccmplete 8 /20 /84 nochanical ard electrical equipent l

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ATDO8ert 1 (Cont'd)

DSER R. L. MITIL 'll CPEN SECTIOi A. SODGKZR n1M NUMBER SUETECT STATUS

[ErTER Dh2TD_l 103a5 3.10 -

.Seimic and dynamic qualification of Complete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103a6 3.10 Seimic and dynamic qualificaticn of couplete

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mechanical and electrical equipment 103a7 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification et Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103b1 3.10 Sei mic p d dynamic qualification of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103b2 3.10 Seismic and dynanic qualification of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical, equipment 103b3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualif':aticn ou

; plete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical eetignent 103b4 3.10 Seimic and dynamic qualification of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103b5 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualificatias of Caplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103b6 3.10 Seisnic and dynamic qualificaticn of Ca plete 8/20/84 mechariical and electrical equipnent 103c1 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103c2 3.10 Seimic and dynamic qualificaticn of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103c3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Caeplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent l

103c4 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualificaticn of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipnent 104 3.11 Environmental qualificatice of NRC Action mechanical and electrical equignent t

5 6

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ATDODENT 1 (Cont'd) 4 R. L. MITIL TO DSER A. SOMNCER WEN SECTICN ITDI NUMBE3t SUEL M S'DGUS IEr!TR DA2ED 105 4.2 Plant-specific anchanical fracturing Ccaplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) analysis 106 4.2 Applicability d seismic andd IDCA Complete 8/20/84 (Rev.1) i loading evaluation 107 4.2 '

Minimal post-irradiation fuel Canplete 6/29 /84 surveillance program 108 42 Gadolina thermal conductivity Ccuplete 6/29/84 equation 109a 4.4.7 1MI-2 Item II.F.2 Ccuplete 8/20/84 109b 4.4.7 1MI-2 Itan II.F.2 Complete 8/20 / 84 110a 4.6 Nnctional design cf reactivity Ccaplete 8/30 / 84 (Rev. 1) control systems 110b 4.6 Nnctional design cf reactivity Cczplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) control systens 111a 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Canplete 6/29 / 84 (ccuponents within reactor pressure bcundary) 111b 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Ccmplete 6/29/84 lcrzeponents within reactor pressure boundary) 111c 5.2.4.3 Preservim inspection program Ccaplete 6/29/84 (ctznponents within reactor pressure boundary) 4 112a 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Ccaplete 8/30/64 (Rev.1)

, leakage detection 112b 5.2.5 Reactor coolant gressure tz:undary Cczplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) leakage detection 4

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t ATDGMENr 1 (Cont'd)

D6ER R. L. MIT:1 TO CPEN SECTICN A. SOMN 3R ITTM NUMBER SUIL7ECT FDLTUS IETIER DCD 112c 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressuu 1:cundary Complete 8/30/ 84 leakai;p detection (Rev. 1) 112d 5.2.5 Reactcr coolant pressure Miad=ry Caplete 8/30/84 i

Isakage detecticri (Rev. 11 112e 5.2.5 Reactor ecolant pressure bcundary Canplete 8/ 30 / 84 leakage detection (Rev. 11 113 5.3.4 GE procedure applicability Ccuplete 7/18/84 114 5.3.4 Cagliance with NB 2360 d the Summe Caplete 7/18/84 1972 Addenda to the 1971 ASME Code 1 15 5.3.4 Deep wight ard Charpy v-notch tests Ccaplete 9/5/84 fcr cleane flange anterials (Rev U 116 5.3.4 Charpy v-notd1 test data for base Carplete 7/18/84 1

naterials as used in shell omrse No.1 4

j 1 17 5.3.4 Canpliance with NB 2332 of Winter 1972 Canplete 8/20 / 84 Addenda 'cf the ASE Code i

118 5.3.4 Imad factors ard neutron fluena for Ccyclete 8/20/84 surveil'ance capsules l

l I

119 6.2 1MI item II.E.4.1 Canplete 6/29 /84 i

120a 6.2 1MI Iten II.E.4.2 Canplete 8/20 / 84 6.2 1MI Iten II.E.4.2 Canplete 8/20 / 84 120b f

121 6.2.1.3.3 Use cf NURIC-0588 Canplete 7/27 / 84 l

122 6.2.1.3.3 Tungerature pecfile Canpleto 7/27/ 84 j

123 6.2.1.4 Butterfly valve cperation (post Canplete 6/29 / 84 accident) i t

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t-a ATIADMENT 1 (Cent'd) l-R. L. MITTL 'E

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DSER A. SGNENCE WEN SECTICM STA'!US IATID Dh21D l ITEM NUMBER SUILTECT 6.2.1.5.1. RPV shield annulus analysis Ctznplete 8/2'0/84

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124a

. (Rev. 1)

' l-124b 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysid Ccapleta 5/20/84' (Rev. 1) 4 124c 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Caglete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) l L,

125 6.2.1.5.2 Design drywell head differential Complete 6/15/84 6

i pressure 126a 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Caglete 8/20/84 vacu m breakers (and control roam 1

alamn) 126b 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Ccaplete 8/20/84 4 -

vacum breakers (and control rom alarnus) 127 6.2.1.6 Operability testing of vacutst breakers Caplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 128 6.2.2 Air ingestion Ccuglete 7/27/84 129 6.2.2 Insulation ingestian Cmplete 6/1/d

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),l 130 6.2.3 Potential bypass leakage paths Ca plete Administraticn of secondary contairt-Conglete 7/18/84 l!

131 6.2.3 i

ment genings i

Contairunent isolaticn review Caglete 6/15/84 132 6.2.4

's 133a 6.2.4.1 Containment page system Ca glete 8/ 20 /84

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133b 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Caplete 8/20/84 133c 6.2.4.1 Contairunent purge system Caglete 8/20/84 n F84 80/12 12-gs

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p ATDC!MNr 1 (Ccrit'd)

DSER R. L. MITIL 10 CEW SECTICN A. SOMNCER TITM NLMBER SUBJECT S1AIUS LLTIU DMm_

134 6.2.6 Centainnent Isakage. testing Ca plate 6/15/84 135 6.3.3 IPCS and LPCI injection valve Canplate 8/20 / 84 interlocks 136 6.3.5 ;

Plant-specific ICCA (see Section Ccuplete 8/20/84 15.9.13)

(Rev. 1) 137a 6.4 Control roon habitability Couplete 8/20/84 137b 6.4 Ccritrol roan habitability Ccmplete 8/20 / 84 137c 6.4,

~ Control roan habitability Ccmple te 8/20 / 84 138 6.6 Preservice inspection grogram for Canplete 6/29 / 84 Class 2 and 3 w ents 139 6.7 MSIV leakage control system Carplate 6/29/84 140a 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Ccuplete,

9/7/84 (Pav. 2) 140b 9.1.2 Spent fuel geol storage Ccmplete 9/7/84 (Pav. 2) 140c 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Ccmplete 9/7/84 (Rev. Il 140d 9.1.2 Sgant fuel pool storage Ccmplete 9/7/84 (Rev. 2) 141a 9.1.3 Spent fuel coolirg aid cleanup Ccmplete 8/30/04 syste (Rev. 1) l 141b 9.1.3 Spent fuel cooling and clearup Canplete 8/30/84 system (Rev. 1) j 141c 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool coolirg and clearup Complete 8/30/84 system (Rev. 1) l M P84 80/1213 - gs I

i i

ATDO9ENT 1 (Cont'd)

R. L. m TO DSER A. bODGCIR CPO4 SILTICH ITDt NtNBER Sulk 7ECT S1XItJS IEr!TR QCD 141d 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling ard clearup Ccaplete 8/30/ 84 (Rev. 1) system 1

141e 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling ard 9 earup Cenplete 8/30/84 1

(Rev. 1) systen 4

141f 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and clearup Cenplete 8/30/ 84 (Rev. 1) system 141g 9.1.3 Spent fue] pool cooling ard clearup Ccuplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) system 142a 9.1.4 Light load hardling systen (related Ccuplete 8 /15 / 84 to refueling)

(Rev. 1) 142b 9.1.4 Light load handlirg systen (related Ccuplete 8/15/84 to refueling)

(Rev. 1) 143a 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handling Caplete 9/7/84 143b 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handlirg Caplete 9/13/84 144a 9.2.1 Station service wter system Conplete 8/15/84 (Rev. 1) 144b 9.2.1 Staticr$ servia water systen Ccmplete 8/15/84 (Rev. 1) 1 144c 9.2.1 Station service water systen Canplete 8/15 / 84 (Rev. 1) 145 9.2.2 ISI progran ard functional testing Closed 6/15/84 of safety ard turbine maxiliaries (5/30/84-coolirg syntans Aux.Sys.Mtg.)

146 9.2.6 Switches and wirirg associated with closed 6/15/84 HPCI/RCIC torus suction (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)

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ATmattDir 1 (Cont'd)

R. L. MITIL TO DSER A. SONNCER CPEN SECTIOi

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ITEM NUISER SUWECT SIAIVS

!EFID QA2D 147a 9.3.1 Congressed air systems Caglete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2)

Ccuplete 9/21/84 Compressed air systems 147b 9.3.1,,

(Rav. 2) 147c 9.3.1 Capressed air systens Complete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2) i i

147d 9.3.1 Cenpressed air systens Couplete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2) 148 9.3.2 Post-accident sanglirp system Couplete 9/12/84 (II.B.3)

(Pev. 1) 149a 9.3.3 -

Equipnent ard floor drainage system Ccaplete 7/27/84 149b 9.3.3 Equipsent ard floor drainage system Ccaplete 7/27 /84 150 9.3.6 Primary contairment instrunant gas Ccaplete 8/3/84 (Rev. 1) system 151a 9.4.1 Control structure ventilation system Ccaplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 151b 9.4.1 Control' structure ventilation system Ccmplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) i 152 9.4.4 Radioactivity acnitorirq elenents Closed 6/1/84 l

(5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)

153 9.4.5 Engineered safety features ventila-Ccaplete 8/30/84 tion system (Rev 2) i 154 9.5.1.4.a Metal rod deck ocristruction Canplete 6/1/ 84 classificiation 155 9.5.1.4.b ongoing review cf safe shutdown tec Action espability 156 9.5.1.4.c ongoing review cf alternate shutdown sc Action capability

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l ATDGMDrr 1 (Cont'd)

DSER R. L. MITn. 10 CPEN SECTICM A. SCHWENG R ITDt NLMBER SUBJECT STATUS LETER DnTED 157 9.5.1.4.e. Cable tray protection Ccaplets 8/20/84 158 9.5.1.5.a Class B fire detection system Cmplete 6/15/84 159 9.5.1,5.a Primary ard secondary power' supplies Ccaplete 6/1/84 for fire cetecticn systen o

160 9.5.1.5.b Fire water pap capacity Complete 8/13/84 161 9.5.1.5.b Fire water valve sapervision Ccaplete 6/1/84 162 9.5.1.5.c Deluge valves Cm plete 6/1/84 163 9.5.1.5.c Manual hose statim pipe sizing Ca plete 6/1/84 164 9.5.1.6.e Runote shutdown panel ventilation Ccuplete 6/1/84 165 9.5.1.6.g Dnergency diesel generator day tank, Ccaplete 6/1/84 protectim 1

i 166 12.3.4.2 Airborne radioactivity nonitor Ccmplete 9/13/54 positioning (Rev. 2) 167 12.3.4.2 Portable etntinuous air nonitors Cmplete 7/18/84 168 12.5.2 Equipment, training, and procedures Cmplete 6/29/94 for inplant iodine instrunentation 169 12.5.3 Guidance of Divisicn B Regulatory Cmplete 7/18/84 Guides 170 13.5.2 Procedures generation package Cmplete 6/29/84 sutaittal 4

I 171 13.5.2 TMI Item I.C.1 Complete 6/29/84

)

172 13.5.2 PGP Ccamitment Ccaplete 6/29/84 1

173 13.5.2 Procedures covering abnor:nal releases Cm plete 6/29/84 of radioactivity

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ATDCI9ENT 1 (Cont'd)

DSER R. L. MI'C. TO WIN SECTIOi A. SODOCER ITIM NLMBER SUBJECT SDmJS LEITE DCTD 174 13.5.2, Resolution explanaticn in FSAR of Canplete 6/15/84 TMI Items I.C.7 and I.C.8 175 13.6 Physical security Open 176a 14.2 i Initial plant test progran Caiplete 8/13/84 176b 14.2 Initial plant test program Caplete 8/13/84 176c 14.2 Initial plant test progran Caplete 7/27/64 176d 14.2 Initial plant test program Caplete.

8/24/84 (Rev. 2) 176e 14.2 Initial plant test gegram C m plete 7/27/84 176f 14.2 Initial plant test pecgram Cmplete 8/13/84 176g 14.2 Initial plant test gegram Cmplete 8/20 / 84 l

1/Sh 14.2 Initial plant test pecgram Cm.plete 8/13/84 17 ti 14.2 Initial plant test prcgram Canplete 7/ 27 / 84 177 15.1.1 Partiar feedwter heatirg Conglete 8/ 20 / 84 (Rev.1) i 178 15.6.5 IDCA resulting frm spectrun cf NRC Action postulated piping treaks within RO 179 15.7.4 Radiolcgical ecmsequences cf fuel NRC Action handlirg accidents 180 15.7.5 Spent fuel cask drcp accidents NRC Action 181 15.9.5 TMI-2 Item II.K.3.3 Ccaplete 6/29/84 182 15.9.10 TMI-2 Item II.K.3.18 Caplete 6/1/84 183 18 Hope Creek DCMR Caplete 8/15/84 O

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ATTACHMDrf 1 (Ccnt'd)

R. L. MIT:L 10 DSER A. SOflOCIR CPEN SECTIOi ITEN NLMBER SQUECT STA115 IETIER DMTD 184 7.2.2.1..e Failures in reactor. vessel level Ccaplete 8/1/ 84 (Rev 1) sensing lines 185 7.2.2.2 Trip systen sensors ard cabling in Ccaplete 6/1/84 turbine building l

186 7.2.2.3 Testability d plant protection Cauplete 8/13/ 84 (Rev. 1)

[

systens at pcwor 187 7.2.2.4 Lifting cf leads to perform surveil-Ccaplete 8/3/84 lance testing 188 7.2.2.5 Setpoint nothcx$ ology Casplete 8/1/84 189 7.2.2.6 Is3]ation devices Couplete 8/1/ 84 5

190 7.2.2.7 Regulatory Guide 1.75 Couplete 6/1/ 84 1

191 7.2.2.8 Scram discharge volume Canplete 6/29 / 84 192 7.2.2.9 Reactor acde seitch Canplete 8/15 /84 (Rev.1) i 193 7.3.2.1.10 Manual initiation cf safety systems Canplete 8/1/84 194 7.3.2.2 Standard review plan deviations Ccmplete S/1/84 (Rev 1) 195a 7.3.2.3 FreezMrotection/ water filled Canplete 8/1/84 instrument ard sangling lines and cabinet tangerature control 195b 7.3.2.3 Freeze-protection / water filled Canpleto 8/1/ 84 instrument ard sanglirg lines and cabinet taperaturn control 196 7.3.2.4 Sharing d comon irstrument taps Ccmplete 8/1/ 84 197 7.3.2.5 Micrtprocessor, nultiplexer ard Couplete 8/1/ 84 (Rev 1) ccmquter systana M 784 80/1218 - gs

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DSER R. L. MIT:L 10 )

- @fN SEXXICN A. SOMNCR l

ITEN NLNBER SUIRECT S'UES IETIER DCTD 198 7.3.2.6, 1MI Itsa II.K.3.18-AIE actuation Ca plete 8/20/d4 19 9 7.4.2.1 IE B.tllatin 79-27-Ioss cf nelass Cmplete 8/24/84 IE instrumentatica ard control power (Rev. 1) system tus during cperation.

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200 7.4.2.2 Rarote stutdown systen Canplete 8/15/ 84 (Rev 1) 201 7.4.2.3 BCIC/hPCI interactions Caplete 8/3/84 202 7.5.2.1 Level measurenant errors as a result Carpleta 8/3/84 of environmental tangerature offacts cn level instrunentation reference leg 203 7.5.2.2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Canplete 8/3/84 I

204 7.5.2.3 IMI Item II.F.1 - Accident nonitoring Canplete 8/1/84 205 7.5.2.4 Plant process canputer systen Canplete 6/1/84 206 7.6.2.1 High press.tre/ low pressure interlocks Canplete 7/ 27 / 84 207 7.7.2.1 HILBs and consequential control systen Canplete 8/24/S4 failures (Rev. 1) 208 7.7.2.2

.titiple control systen failures Canplete 8/24/84 (Rev. 11 209 7.7.2.3 Credit for ncrt-safety related systens Canplete 8/1/84 in Chapter 15 cf the FSAR (Rev 1) 210 7.7.2.4 Transient analysis recording systen Canplete 7/27/84 211a 4.5.1 Centrol rtzi drive structural naterials Canplate 7/27/84 211b 4.5.1 Centrol red drive structural materials Carplete 7/27/84 211c 4.5.1 Centrol red drive structural traterials Carplete 7/27/84 l

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DSER Open Item No. 5 a, b and d ( EEER Se ct io n 2. 4. 5 )

MAVE IMPACT AND RUNUP DN SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE i

The applicant has analysed the wind waves that would traverse F

plant grade coincident with the Piti surge hydrograph and runup on safety-related facilities.

These calculations were based on the assumption that wind waves would be generated in the Delaware Estuary and progress to the site.

As the surge level would begin to rise, resulting from the approaching eye of the postulated hurricane, the wind speed would progressively change direction from the southeast clockwise to the west.

Neves encroaching on the southern end of the Islar.d would be depth-limited (i.e., the waves would " feel" bottom and thus become shallow water waves) by plant grade elevation on both the Salem i

and Hope Creek sites.

These depth-limited ( shallow water) waves will impact and runup on the southern and western faces of the safety-related' structures in the power block.

The applicant har stated that the southern f ace of the Reactor Building and the Auxiliary Building 'are designed for a flood protection level of 38.0 f t asl or 3.2 f t above the maximum calculated wave ruaup height of 34.8 f t asl and the other exposures of safety-related structures have a flood protection i

level of 32.0 f t mal or 1 f t above the maximum calculated wave runup height of 31.0 f t mal.

The staf t has requested the applicant to provide additional information on the waves that impact on the river face of service water intake structure.

The waves impacting cn this face of the structure are not reduced in height ( depth-limited) as those that traverse plant grade.

As indicated in Section 2.4.1, the applicant states that all accesses to safety-related structures (doors and hatches) are previded with water-tight seals designed to withstand the head of water' associated with the flood protection levels.

But, the applicant has not indicated whether the water-tight doors are designeo to withstand either the cambined loading of facts of both static water level and the dynamic wave impa ct or, a s cited in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.1.4 of this report, the impact of a barge propelled by winds and waves associated with a I

nydrologic event that floods plant grade.

Based upon its analysis according to SRP 2.4.5, the staf f concludes that -the flood protection level of El. 38.0 f t asi for the southern face of the Reactor Suidling and Auxiliary Suilding and El. 32.0 f t asl for the remaining safety-related structures within the power block usets the rc,quirements of Regulatory Guide 1.59.

Until additional information and analysis

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itr 14 :J O t. t y 4 t o fer t' DSER Open Item No. 5 a, b and d (Cont'd) are available, the staf f cannot conclude that the flood pro-i tection level of El. 32.0 f t asl for the Service Water Intake Structure asets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.59.

based on its analysis, the staf f cannot conclude that the plant f

meet.s the requirements of GDC 2 with respect to the hydrologic aspects of Probable Maximum Surges and Seiche Flooding.

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Respo_nse_

i The requested information for the service water intake structure has been provided in the responses to the following NRC questions:

QUESTION NO.

INFORMATION PROVIDED 240.8 Wave runup elevations 240.9 Wave impact loads 240.8 & 410.69 Flood protection As a result of discussions with the NRC staff, the response to Question No. 410.69 has been revised and the following summary calculations have been revised and are attached:

1.

Analysis of overtopping of Service Water Intake Structure 2.

Runup on the East Face of the. Service Water Intake Structure 4

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[EV.h HCGS FSAR QUESTION 410.69 (Section 9.2.1)

I Provide a figure (s) in the FSAR which shows the protection of the station service water system from the flood water (includ-ing wave of fects) of the design basis flood.

1

RESPONSE

4 The general arrangement of the intake structure is provided in Fig ures 1. 2-4 0 a nd 1. 2-41.

Section AA of Figure 1.2-41 is reproduced here as Figure 410.69-1 which identifies the wate.-

tight areas and the walls and slabs designed to accommodate flood loads.

As described in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.5, the south and west exterior walls of the intake structure are sub-ject to a maximum wave run-up elevation of 134.4 feet due to the probable maximum hurricane (PMH).

Such waves could overtop I

the roof of the western portion of the structure at elevation 128 feet.

However, a rigorous analysis has been performed to determine the depth of water in the low area (elevation 122.0 feet) af ter wave impact and to confirm that water does not enter the building through the air intake control dampers (bottom elevation 128.5 feet). Therefore, flood water will not enter into the dry area of the intake structure.

On the north side of the intake structure, the maximum water level will be only slightly higher than the still water elevation (113.8 feet) during the PMH.

According to Table 2.4.6, the maximum wave elevation for the north side of the intake structure is 26.3 feet MSL (elevation 115.3 feet) due to a postulat.ed mul-tiple dam break. Therefore, flood protection of the north exterior wall to elevation 121.0 feet is adequate.

On the east side of the intake structure, the maximum wave run-up elevation due to the PMH equals 121.97 feet.

This ele-vation is due to a It wave traveling in the direction of Fetch "A".

Fetch A, which is rotated about 15 degrees fran Fetch I (as shown in Figures 410.69-2 and 410.69-3 ), is chosen to maxi-mize the wave run-up elevation.

Since this elevation is lower than the bottom of the HVAC exhaust opening, flood water will l

not enter the intake structure from the east side of the building.

In addition the following assessments have been made to confirm the adequacy of the structure and interior components for the overtopping wave:

4 a.

The exterior walls are designed to withstand the flood loads including the dynamic wave action of facts, b.

The roof hatches at both elevations 122.0 and 128.0 feet have been sealed (caulking, gaskets, etc.) to prevent any. intrusion. of water.

The hatch covers are keyed into

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RESPOllSE - cont'd pp,4 the openings to prevent any adverse slippage due to wave 1,nduced loadings.

All seismic Category I components except for the travel-c.

ing water screens are located within the dry arsas of the structure.

d.

The traveling water-screens, located in the " wet" area between column lines B and C have electric motors which are fully protected against the flood water level, A condition was postulated where suspended moisture e.

enters the dry areas nf the structure.through the air intake control dampers.

It has been assessed that all of the Seismic Category I components subjected to this environment will continue to function as required.

Section 3.4.1 and Table 3.4-1 have been revised for clarifica-tion.

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'O' dope Creek Generating Station Analysis of Overtoppina of Service Water Intaka Structure 1.

Wave Cagulations Wave knights and periods as well as stin-water levels and runup o

elevations are as given in Table 2.4-10e of FSAR (Amendment 5, April 1984).

n.

Overtopping' Celculations Overtopping rates were calculated for west face and south face o

where top of van elevations are 128.5 and 122.0, respectively.

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Equations from Weggel (1976) were used for the overtopping o

calculations.

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see' where E was taken as 1/27 in order to maximize the value of Q,*

o (see Figure 6 of Weggel's paper) oC was taken as 0.06 in order to maximize Q (see Equation 4 of o

Weggel's paper).

Conserv.tive assumptions in calculating overtopping rates were:

o It was assumed that waves attacked normal to the van of the structure.

It was assumed that the train of waves was made up of an 11 i

waves.

It was assumed that wave height was constant along the crest.

l Calculated overtopping rate was increased to allow for viad speed o

using Equation (7-n ) of the 1977 edition of the U. 5. Army Corps of Engineers Shore Protection Manual.

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In making the wind adjustamat the factor vg was assumed to be 2.0 for onshore winds greater than 60 mph. The angle 0 was 90'.

o Af ter adjustasat for wind the overtopping rates were adjusted for angle of attack by multiplying the overtopping rate by the sia of ths'dagle between the fetch vector and the wall.

III.

Nasinua sater surface elevations were calculated by backwater calculatica starting from the sorth and of the roof.

The separate overtooping rates were added and the total was assumed o

to flow off the top of tha structure at the north end.

Critical depth was assuand to occur at the dovastream and of the o

chanaal and was calculated as fll$f Sc =L 322 where Q is the rate of flow from the west side ia efs/ft.

The backwater calculation assumes a, gradually varied steady flow.

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at the north end.

o The calculations showed that fetch 3 was the critical case. The total flow rate for fetch 3 was 0.5 cis/ft from the west and 14.7 cfs/ft from the south end.

The maximum water surface elevation reached was 126.9 for the fetch o

3 condition which is well below the critical 128.5 elavation at which flow could enter the air intakes.

IV.

A separate calculation was made considering a surge generated by flow coming over the south and of the building.

The depth of flow and velocity of flow shead of the surge resulting from the previous surge had to be assumed. Yelocity ahead of the surge was assumed to be sere r since that condition maximises the surge height. Depth ahead of the surge was assumed to be 1.0' and does not have a really significant affect on the height of the following surge..The resulting elevation of the crest of the generated surge was 126.9 which is below the 123.5 alevation at which water can flow into the air 1staka.

Y.

A check was made to see if flow could surge into the air intakes as a result of plunging from the roof at elevation 124.5.

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loss coefficients of 0.5 ct the catrasco to the air intake oposias

.o and 0.5 at the bend (see attached sketch were assumed).

Velocity at the edge of the 128.5 elevation roof section was o

calculated assuming critical depth there and was increased by 501 for1 reasons of conservancy.

The velocity approaching the entanace to the air intake chahr was o

calculated using the energy equation and neglecting losses.

Lossen incurred by turbulence sad impact of tk jet entering water o

posded on top of elevation 122.0 were neglected.

Mesdioss through the screens was neglected.

o The m'awi=== elevation achieved was calculated to be 126.3 or well o

below the 128.5 elevation at which water could flow into the building.

A separats analysis was made using a one-dimensiemal mana=eum o

approach. The presence of the louver, on top of the outer wall was neglected. A velocity of 26 feet per second was assumed to occur over the top of the lower outer wall whose top elevation is at 124.0. This velocity was calculated assumias that the total potential energy in a wave ruaup to 134.4 would be converted to i

kinatic energy at elevation 124 without energy loss. The one-dimensional energy analysis, assuming a flow rate of 5.75 cfs/ foot indicates that the water surface within the intake could rise to elevation 127.0 which is below the 128.5 elevation at which veter could flow into the service-water intaka structure. The assumption of a flow rate of 5.75 efs/ foot is very conservative since that is the total overtopping rate from the west side of the structure for the critical fetch conditions assuming the wave strikes moraal to the structure wall.

The total pressure of the air intake fans equals o

4.5 inches of water.

The maximum elevations of 126.3 feet and 127.0 feet given above result in margins of 2.2 and 1.5 feet respectively with respect to the 128.5 feet elevation at which water could flow into the building.-

Therefore, l

there is sufficient margin to accommodate a rise in water level due to fan suction pressure.

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References 1.

Wegge1. J.'R., " Wave evertopping Equation" Proceedings of the 1976 Coastal Engineering Conference.

j 2.

Jackowski, R. A. (Editor) Shore Protection Manual U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, O m tal Engineering Research Center, 1977.

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Calculation S amary Ruaup on tbs East Faca of the Service Eater Intake Structure 1

l Mope Crack Generatina Station l

t 1

The attached Figure 1 shows the fetches considered for wave runup on the service water intaka atmeture (SWIS). Fetch A, which has an animuth of 119*,

is 4800 feet long over the island and passes between the Salen Flant and the Hope Cr6ek Generating Station. The wave front from Fetch A approaches the eac,t van of the service water intake structure at an oblique angle equal to 35' (see Figure 1).

l Under design conditions, hurricane generated wves approaching the SWIS wouM be tripped by passage over the dike at the edge of the island. The top of this dike is at elevation 108 feet (FSE&G Date).

Incident ukva heights, wave lengths, and stin water lavels are assumed as given in Table 2.4-10A of the FSAR. For Fetch A conditions, we have assumed that the incident wave characteristics, atin water level, and wind speed are the same as for Fetch 1.

Thus, the incident wave has a significant wave height of 10.8 feet, period of 6.4 seconds, and a laagth of 180 feet.

The corresponding wind speed is 108.6 aph and the still water level is n2.1 feet (PSE&G Datus). The ground elevation 6f the island is 101 feet (PSF 4G Datw), which makes the water depth equal to 11.1 feet (n2.1 - 101.0 feet).

Because the dike at the edge of the island would trip an large waves and because the water depth is shallow over tha island, it is reasonable to assume i

that the weve approaching the SWIS along Fetch A would have a significant height equal to the one generated by a 108.6 aph wind over an unituited fetch and for a water depth of 11.1 feet. Thus, the significant uve height at the east van of the SWIS would be 4.7 feet according to Figure 3-21 of Reference l

1.

The one percent wave height is 7.05 feet (1.5

  • 4.7 feet). The rctio of maximum (11) waves to the significant wave height is taken to be 1.5 and was obtained from Reference 2, for shallow water wave generation approaching steady state conditions, inchding a 301 increase to account for data sentter.

l To determine the runup of this wave on the east van of the SWIS, a wave runup coefficient of 2.0 was chosen in accordance with the results presented in Reference 3 and shown in Figure 2, for a wave approach normal to the structure. This runup coefficient was further modified, taking into consideration the oblique wave approach for the wave propagation along Fetch A.

For a wave approach angle of 55*, a wave runup reduction of 301 ms estimated based on the results presented in Reference 4 (see Figure 3). This reference was cited by Mr. Jolm Ahrens of the Coastal Engineering Research Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as applicable to the conditions under investigation (Reference 5).

Thus, the 11 wave runup would be 9.87 feet (2.0

  • 0.70 8 7.05 feet) and the runur elevation would be 121.97 feet (FSE&G Datum) (n2.1 + 9.87 feet).

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kEFSEENCES l

1.

5. 3. Army Corps of Engineers, Shore Protection Manual, Coastal Engineering Essearch Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 3rd Edition,1977.

l 2.

Bretschneider, C. L., " Field Investigation of Wave Energy Loss of Shallow Water Ocean Waves" Technical Memorandum No. 46, Beach Erosion Board, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, September 1954.

3.

Losada, M. A., and L. A. Gimenez - Curto, " Mound Breakwaters Under Wave Attack", Proceedings of the International Seminar on Criteria For Design and Construction of Breakwaters and Coastal Structures, Department of the Oceanographical and Ports Engineering of the University of Santander, i

Spain,1980, p.127-238.

i 1

4.

Tautenhain, E., S. Rohlhase and M. W. Partenschy, " Wave Run-up at Sea Dike Under Oblique Wave Approach", Proceedings of the Eighteenth Ccastal i

Engineering Conference, Volume I, November 14 to 19,1982, Cape Town, Espublic of South Africa, published by the American Society of Civil l

I Engineers, New York.

5.

Personal Communication between J. P. Ahrens of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Coastal Engineering Research Center and S. L. Hui of techtel Civil and Minerals Incorporated, dated October 9,1984.

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_._.._._...i gp Question 230.8: Question 230.6 addressed the January 9,1982 magnitude 5-3/4 New Brunswick, Canada earthquake and the effect of the New Brunswick earthquake on the Hope Creek site. The revised FSAR discusses the 1982 New Brunswick earthquake sequence and states "the 1982 Miramichi earthquake sequence was not out of character with the region's previous earthquake history" (FSAR, p. 2.5-80). Is the New Brunswick region more seismically active than the Hope Creek site area? Compare seismic activity rates and recurrence models derived for alternative size regions around both of these areas. (See, for example, the Shearon Harris SER, NUREG-1038 or the Millstone Meeting Summary contained in a February 1,1984 letter from W.

Counsil to B. Youngblood).

Response

The seismic activity rates and recurrence models for several alterna-tive sized regions surrounding the ' Hope Creek site and the epicentral region of the January 1982 Miramichi, New Brunswick earthquake have been compared. This comparison was done in the following manner:

1) earthquakes listed in Table 2.5-1 of the FSAR for which no magn 7cides were available (i.e. historical events prior to about 1950) were converted from Intensity to magnitude using Nuttli

~

and Herrmann's (1978) relationship b = 1.75 + 0.51, (1) m 2) other seismicity data (i.e. events listed in Earth Physics Branch Files or North Eastern U.S. Seismic Network Bulletins) where were used to characterize magnitude scales other than mb seismic events, were considered to be numerically equivalent for purposes of this analysis.

3) a recurrence model was constructed for both the Hope Creek region and the area surrounding the New Brunswick magnitude 5.7 event of the form:

m

.x m m.

z.,

7..

o e,

Log N( yM) = a - bM 4

2 and normalized to 10 mi for direct comparison of earthquake density in a 5 x5* area centered about both the Hope Creek site and the New Brunswick event (see Figure 1 and Table 2).

. 4) a qualitative comparison of a l'x1' area about both areas was

- also madt to reflect the relative numbers of instrumentally recorded earthquakes of _ varying magnitudes over equivalent recording periods at both sites (see Tables 3 and 3A).

Discussion:

A 5'x5 area surrounding the Hope Creek site and the Miramiehl, New Brunswick magnitude 5.7 earthquake epicenter was selected as being broad enough to represent seismicity on a regional level.

Events )M = 4.0 were compiled from Table 2.5-1 of the FSAR for-g Hope Creek and from data file's of the Earth Physics Branch, Dominion Observatory,(see Table 1) for the Miramichi region (Adams, 1984, personal communication), not including the January 9,1982 Miramichi event or its aftershocks. Table 2 provides a summary of the recurrence parameters for both areas and the recurrence curves are shown on Figure 1.

The f act that the population density in central New Brunswick is low and that earthquakes have only been routinely recorded in that region for the last decade or so may reflect an even greater difference in i

seismicity between Miramichi and the Hope Creek site.

As a further comparison between the two areas, a 1 x1

area, centered on the Hope Creek site and the Miramichi 1982 epleenter, was selected and earthquakes occurring within both the areas were determined. Ar. earthquakes have been instrumentally recorded since 2

about 1930 in eastern Canada, this date was used as the low cut off in both data sets available. Table 3 shows the comparison; for the Hope Creek area, there has been a total of 8 events since 1930-2 events i

between magnitudes 2.0-2.9; 5 events.between magnitudes 3.0-3.9 and one' event between magnitude 4.0. and 4.4.

The. I'x1' region s

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g surrounding the 1982 Miramichi epicenter, on the other hand, shows a greater number of events (25) than Hope Creek, not including the 1982 Magnitude 5.7 event and af tershocks. There have been recorded

- (since 1930) 14 events of magnitude 2.0-2.9 (Shearon-Harris SER); 4 between magnitudes 3.0-3.4; 5 events between 3.5-3.9; 1 earthquake between magnitude 4.0 and 4.4 and i event between magnitude 4.5 and 4.9. Table 3A list those events used in this comparison for both 1

areas.

It appears that the Hope Creek site is within an area of significantly lower seismicity than for the Miramichi, New Brunswick Region.

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TABLE 1 Earthquakes y,. M, = 4.0 Used in a 5 x 5 Comparison Between the Ho$e Creek Site and Miramichi, N.B.

[

Hope Creek (See Table 2,5-1 of the FSAR)

Miramichi, N.B.

Date N. Lat.

W.Long Magnitude (M, )

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22 May 1817 46.0 69.0 5.0 09 Jul 1824 46.5 66.5 4.5 08 Feb 1855 46.0 64.5 4.5 22 Oct 1869 45.0 66.2 5.0 27 Feb 1874 44.8 68.7 4.0 31 Dec 1882 45.0 67.0 4.5 22 Mar 1896 45.2 67.2 4.0 21 Mar 1904 45.0 67.2 5.0 15 Jul 1905 44.3 69.8 4.5 14 May 1908 44.0 65.8 4.0 08 Aug 1908 46.3 67.6 4.5 11 Dec 1912 45.0 68.0 4.0 13 Jan 1914 45.1 67.2 4.5 27 Jul 1915 44.0 65.0 4.0 12 Jun 1917 49.0 68.0 4.0 02 Jul 1922 46.5 66.6 4.5 08 Feb 1928 45.3 69.0 4.5 04 Jan 1930 46.7 65.8 4.5 30 Sep.1937 45.5 65.8 4.5 17 May 1938 49.0 68.0 4.0 22 Aug 1938 44.7 68.8 4.0 23 Jun 1944 49.4 67.8 5.0 29 Jun 1950 49.5 67.4 4.5 28 Jun 1951 49.5 67.0 4.0 19 Sep 1951 49.3 66.3 4.5 24 Jan 1953 49.4 66.0 4.5 14 Sep 1953 49.4 65.3 4.5 21 Oct 1958 49.2 68.5 4.0 25 Mar 1962 47.5 66.0 4.0 14 Jan 1966 48.9 67.7 4.0 30 Sep 1967 49.3 65.9 4.5

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TABLE 2 RECURRENCE PARAMETERS -

4 2

N/10 mi 2

Region

. Area (mi )

. b' M=

4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 -

g 0 0 4

0.67 Hope Creek (5 x5 )

9.2 x 10

-0.03 0.01 0.002 New Brunswick (5 x5 )

8.1 x 10 0.02 0.01 0.003 0.0007 0.85 0

4 (w/o Miramichi Events)

\\

TABLE 3 SEISMIC EVENTS WITHIN A 1 x1 AREA CENTERED ABOUT THE HOPE CREEK SrfE AND THE MIRAMICHI MAGNITUDE 5.7 EPICENTER Hope New Creek Brunswick Magnitude (1930-1980)

(1930-1981) 2.0 - 2.9 2

14 3.0 - 3.9 5

9 4.0 - 4.4 1

1 4.5 - 4.9 0

1 TOTAL 8

25 i

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TABLE 3A

~

Earthquakes Used in a 1 x 1 Comparison Between the Hope Creek Site and Miramiehl, New Brunswick Hope Creek North West

. Magnitude

  • Date Lat.

M Intensity.

15 Nov 1939 39.6

-75.2 V

4.2 11 Aug 1954 40.3 76.0 IV 3.6 20 Jan '1955 40.3 76.0 IV 3.6 23 Jan 1962 (

39.8 75.9 I-U 2.5 11 Feb 1972 39.7 75.7 II 2.7 28 Feb 1973 37.7 15.4 VI 3.8 m" 10 Jul 1973 Near Willmington IV 3.7 02 May 1980 40.2 75.0 IV 3.7 Miramichi, New Brunswick -

(14 events between M = 2.0-2.9 are taken from the Shearon-Harris SER,1983) g Date Lat.

M Magnitude (M )

g 04 Jan 1930 46.7 65.8 4.6 15 Jun 1938 46.5 66.8 3.3 04 Aug 1957 46.5 67.0 3.7 29 Jan 1961 46.3 66.9 3.8 31 Jan 1962 47.5 67.1 3.5 4

l 25 Mar 1962 47.5 66.0 4.0 01 Aug 1963 46.8 66.5 3.0 17 Oct 1964 47.6 67.2 3.9 27 May 1965 46.9 66.6 3.3 1

24 Oct 1977 47.0 67.0 3.0 28 Nov 1981 47.0 66.6 3.7 i

  • converted from MM Intentisy to magnitude using mb = 1.75 + 0.51, (Nuttli and Herrmann,1978) l l

F_

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m -.

.,:.z:::,-a.a..= = =::::. :.y :. ; ::,:= =.. w.o..,1

_=.= x,.= =~.

=..,a.=a=w.

.~a.-

....-___,_,_.a__.,_

REFERNCES

- Adams, J.; May 17,1984; Personal Communication.

t l=

Basham, P.W., Welchert, D.H. and Berry, M.J.,1979; Regional Assessment of Seismic l.

Risk in Eastern Canada; BSSA, Vol 69, No. 5, pp.1567-1602.

I U.S.N.R.C., Shearon Harris Safety Evaluation Report; 1983; NUREG-1038.

\\

Nuttli, O.W. and Herrmann, R.B.,1978; Credible' Earthquakes for the Central United States; Report 12, Misc. Paper S-73-1, U.S. Corps of Engineers, Waterways Exp.

Station (Vicksburg).

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7 Magnitude Recurrence Curves Figure 1 6

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{ev. S us4 secs rsan ppISTIon 430,ss (secTION 9.5.4)

Provide additional justification to support your statement to the plant site by truck, or barge.

In your discussion include sources where diesei quality fu'el oil is available and distances travelled from the source to the plant.

Also discuss how fuel oil will be delivered onsite under estremely unfavorable environmental. conditions.

(SRP 9.5.4, Part I)

M diesel generator fuel oil storage tank till connecti in Section 9.5.4.2.6.

The total capac e

SDG fuel of e tanks and day tanks is ent for seven i

are e rated fu indicated in days of SDG operatio an this period, additional Section 8.3 for a ERA and truck or barge.

The fuel can be delivered plant a ed about 44 miles from nt in supply-depot i Under extremely unfavorable enviro Pensauk tons, deliveries would be made by truck.

(;NssA.T T)

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b-4 1

ENSERT Q TO

%30 W 1

f k site flooding (i.e. flooding above plant grade elevation) is a highly unlikely event.

The highest historical high water was 97.5. feet (P5 Datus), recorded November 1950, 4 feet below plant grade.

As an estuarine, site flooding is l

primarily a result of the effects of tide combined with severe storms.

The tidal cycle being approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in duration would reasonably be expected to contribute to site or local flooding for only a few hours.

This would afford the opportunity to refuel the fuel oil storage tJ(anks within a few hours of any scheduled refueling.

Severe site flooding to the design flood level is due to the I

PMB as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.59.

Precise track position and forward speed (27 knots) as well as other assumptions are necessary to develop the flood levels calculated for the design basis event.

A description of the ar:alysis is presented in Section 2.4.5.

1 forward speed of 27 knots would cause the hurricane to move over 300 miles past the site in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

The maximum winds are assumed to extend 39 nautical miles.

The forward travel speed is a critical parameter in the cal-culation, as this is what causes the large ve'lume of water to.be first forced into the Delaware and then carried up the estuary past the site.

Even in the event that the stora shou?d stall, flood water will tend to drain out the bay as the forcing function is no longer available to push water into the bay.

There would also be a further reduction of flood waters due to the tidal change.

It would be unrealistic as to expect site flooding to persist for more thanJY hours.

Upon continuous operation of the diesel generators for any J. day period, a new fuel oil shipment will be delivered.

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Question-430.88 con't While extremely adverse wind, weather and tidal conditions at the Bope creek site could-interfere with diesel oil delivery for approximately 24-36 hours, it,would be a very improbable situation that would preclude delivery by all of the possible avenues (truck, barge or helicopter) for as long as 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />.

i There are three key factors which support this conclusion.

First, while any stors can remain stationary for an extended period, one in an adverse position (onshore) will lose its energy source and be eroded by surface friction.

Secondly, any storm remaining offshore where it can retain all or some of its energy source l

will be in a position either to cause unusually low tides following the initial surge, or at least to provide shelter from the maximum winds because of the long fetch over the lower Jersey peninsula.

i Thirdly, the storm surge capable of seriously flooding the area is an enormous wave and it will not maintain site area flooding condition for prolonged periods (24-36 hours) even if the driving j

j force continues.

l-The following,is a brief description of three storm variations:

Burricane stationary in the least favorable position (see A.

Figure 430.88-1)

A hurricane in this position is largely cut off from oceanic

[

moisture and it is subject to frictional erosion of its wind speeds.

It will decay into a wet, showery situation with modest wind speeds within 12-24 hours.

Hurricane stationary off the coast (see Figure 430.88-2)

B.

A hurricane anywhere off the coast would continue to receive a substantial portion of its energy and it would not be affected However, its location would by friction of the land surface.

preclude the fetch necessary to drive water directly into the bay, and the flow over the peninsula would moderate the winds at the site.

The initial surge should drop within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />sThe and would probably be followed by an abnormally low tide.

clouds and showers associated with the storm might last 24-36 hours.

If the PMH were to stall directly south of the Delaware Bay Inlet, westerly winds could cause high water build-up at the entrance to the bay.

It would require a continuous wall of water approximately 12 feet high to maintain flooding conditions at the site.

A prolonged ever.t (24-36 hours) of this type would be highly improbable.

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Question 430.88 cont'd C.

Extra-tropical storms These storms are much larger than hurricanes, and at times they do remain stationary for very long periods.

However, much of the above reasoning remains valid for them also.

A stationary storm in the unfavorable position needed to generate strong southeasterly winds would be subject toisurface friction, and it would lose much of its energy, although in a different way.

The sharp contrast between the cold polar air and the tropical' maritime air from which such storms are generated would gradually.

disappear hnd the air would become hc'mogenous around the

~

circumference of the low pressure area.

Such storms weaken slowly.over a period of 24-36 hours.

Storms off the coast can maintain their energy source very well, and they may remain vigorous for three or four days.

However, if the storm produced a major surge while reaching the vicintly of the site it would then generate a' period of very low water.

Adverse weather could last for neveral days, in the sense that the winds might be high and precip-itation could continue, but transportation of fuel (or lube oil should not be a problem.

j,

,J,.

r;,de M Baseduponpreviousdiscussion[,theprobablemaximumfloodwould conservatively pass after one day.

This would leave 3.5 days of fuel supply in the tanks after providing for a conservative half day to permit settlament of postulated sediment in the tanks.

l The normal method of fuel transport would be by tank truck.

Should any event preclude delivery by truck, the 3.5 days of remaining fuel will provide ample time to arrange an alternate delivery method.

These could include barge or helicopter delivery.

The refill line extends to the station barge slip.

There are sufficient refineries and military installations within a reasonable distance of the station to assure the credibility of these methods of delivery.

Among the available privately owned helicopters, a Sikorski 561 has a minimum lift capacity I

of 7500 pounds.

This equates to 918 gallons of diesel fuel in drums.

This quantity of fuel would permit two fully loaded diesels to operate for approximately 85 minutes.

Military helicopters with greater lifting capacity would also be available.

Similarly, the commitment to refuel with a remaining five day fuel supply provides ample time to clear roads of any credible Getty, Texaco snowfall or to arrange an alternate delivery method.

and the Sun 011 Company have refineries within a 75 mile radius of the site.

Comprehensive emergency plans are required by federal agencies

~

le FEMA and NRC..These plans require documentation in the form of

. letters of agreement and memornadum of understanding between the

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g-Question 430.88 cont'd nuclear utility and state and federal governments which provide The the use of resources of the various agencies involved.

availability of these resources provides additional assurance that-accidents and" acts of nature beyond design basis can be addressed.

The SDG fuel oil storage tanks are sized in accordance with the requirements of SRP 9.5.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.137 for a seven day supply of fqel oil to each redundant SDG following a LOCA or LOP.

Each pair of SDG fuel oil storage tanks contains sufficient fuel to operate a diesel engine for approximately seven days, six hours, based on the time depende'nt generator loading shown in FSAR Table 8.3-3.

During an actual shutdown under these conditions, i.e. LOP and flood, all four diesels would not be required to achieve and meintain cold shutdown.

Thus, for a realistic shutdown scenario there in fact would be approximately 14 days fuel oil available for required diesel operation.

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1 rgGURE V30 #P l 1

l R0PE CREEK GENERATING STATICH t

enshore Burricane - Wind Flows t

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Hope Creek Site j

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