ML20093E361

Suppls 840717 Application for Amend to License NPF-25, Providing Addl Justification for Proposed Changes,Simplified Schematic of Piping of Seal Inventory & Details & Calculations Supporting Leak Rate Criterion

ML20093E361
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	10/03/1984
From:	Schnell D UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20093E364	List: ML20093E361 ML20093E373
References
ULNRC-938, NUDOCS 8410120073
Download: ML20093E361 (9)

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-  ; . UNION - ELECTRIC COM PANY

- ISOS GRATIOT STREET ST. Louis, Missouri MAsLsNG ADDRESS

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. S .*f.~. ~ '" ' . October'3, 1984 =r.touS =Y2o'8 i==i=S c.

Mr.-Harold:R.-Denton, Director ~

ULNRC"938

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,0ffice' of Nuclear' Reactor Regulation

.U.S.LNuclear, Regulatory Commission

..Wa'shington,-DC-20555 -

Dear Mr.=Denton:

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 REVISION-TO' TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.6.1.2 AND

-3/4.6.1.2 BASES g .

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Reference:

~ ULNRC-875.. dated 7/17/84' This-submittal 1provides further information on the referenced . application for: 1 Amendment - to : Facility Operating

< License No. NPF-25 for.the Callaway Plant, Unit-1. ' Attach-

. ment 1 provides additional justification-for the proposed changes which supplements the. discussions in Enclosures ~A and B ofithe' reference.. Attachment.2'provides'a simplified schematic-of:the. piping'providing'the? seal inventory. . Attachment 3 details the calculations supporting the leak rate acceptance criterion ~forrthe ESW; valves iniquestion. AttachmentL4 provides'thel requested changes, revised'since the referenced cca '

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submittal per initial Staff review and a reverification of the supporting calculation for-the-leak, rate acceptance criterion.

'The. proposed-changes would become effective for Union.

.. Electric implementation'upon:NRC approval.- The attachments-serve ~to facilitate. Staff review.

Ve truly yq rs,

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Q3 gab oh Donald Schnell p ' GGY/lkr )

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_ ' Attachments 1 - 4 5

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STATE OF MISSOURI )

) SS CITY OF ST. LOUIS )

Robert J. Schukai, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is General Manager-Engineering (Nuclear) for Union Electric Company;.that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his

' knowledge, information and belief.

I By k O ( ( LL b Ro6ert . ch ai General ana r-Engineering Nuclear SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 3M day of h , 198 GAq!

GARDAkJ. PFA[F NOTARY PUBLIC. STATE OF VISSOURI NY COMMISSIO?# EXPIRES APRIL 22,1985 ST. LOUIS COUf4TY.

a. .

cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M. Street, N.W.

Washing ton, D.C. 20036 Nicholas A. Petrick Executive Director SNUPPS S Choke Cherry Road Rockville, Maryland 20850-John H. Neisler Callaway Resident Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RRil Steedman,-Missouri '65077 William Forney Division of Projects and Resident Programs, Chief, Section lA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III' 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Bruce Little Callaway Resident Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RR$1 Steedman, Missouri 65077 -

Joseph J. Holonich, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop P-316 Washington, D.C. 20555 ..

Ron Kucera, Deputy Director Department of Natural Resources I P.O. Box 176 l

Jefferson City, Missouri 65012 i

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4 ATTACHMENT ONE Union Electric proposes to test the containment isolation valves serving ~the containment air cooler supply and return ESW

. lines with water (hydrostatic) in lieu of an air test medium o ' because of the following design provisions:

1. There is.a; source of sealing water.

2. The system boundary inside containment is designed to engineered safety feature criteria.

3. The acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 100 are satisfied.

As stated in SRP 6.2.6: " Hydrostatic testing of containment isolation valves is permissible.if the line.is not a potential containment atmosphere leak path, and may be found acceptable if it can be demonstrated in accordance with the-requirements of Section III.C of Appendix J, that a liquid inventory is available to-maintain a water seal (while assuming the single failure of any active component) during the post-accident period. Limits

. for liquid leakage should be assigned to these valves based on analysis and included in the plant Technical Specifications."

The ESW system'is a closed ESF system inside containment and, given any active component-failure in the short or long term, no radioactive leakage (liquid or air) from the containment would result. The Callaway SER (NUREG-0830) confirms the acceptability of the ESW piping inside of the containment to serve as a passive boundary against leakage. Page 6-16 contains "It should be noted that the essential

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the following statements.

service water lines to and from the containment air coolers should actually be considered under GDC 57 because they are neither part of the reactor coolant boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere. However, the essential service water system--because it is designed and constructed to-Safety Class 3 instead of Safety Class 2--does not meet the precise-requirement of a " closed system" inside containment (SRP Section 6.2.4.11.9) which is_necessary, in addition to an isolation valve outside containment, to ensure two containment isolation barriers. Therefore, the applicant has imposed the GDC 56 requirements for one isolation valve'inside containment and one_ isolation valve outside containment. The isolation valves for each essential service water system penetretion are powered from the same power source to ensure the single-failure-proof' design of the essential service water system. The staff has reviewed the-isolation provisions of the essential service water system lines and finds them acceptable."

With respect to-the system not meeting the precise requirements of a closed system inside containment, the effects of a passive failure are addressed as follows.

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Passive failures in ESF systems are postulated during.the

- .long term post-accident phase in accordance with FSAR Section 3.lil-and in accordance with NRC guidelines. When passive failures are; postulated in the long term (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />), no single E active failures need-be considered; therefore, the ESW pumps and Lall valves would-be operable. .As noted in FSAR Section 3.1.1.4,

. passive component failures when applied to fluid systems mean-i  ; abnormal leakage from a single sprung flange, a single pump seal

failure, orla single valve stem packing failure, and not from a piping failure. This definition of a passive failure is in

, agreement with the NRC staff-position stated in Issue 47 of NUREG

-0138.-

The NRC staff has previously accepted the use of water

' contained in piping systems as seal water systems meeting the

intent of Appendix J,Section III.C. This section of Appendix J allows hydrostatic testing of containment isolation valves served by a seal system.provided that the valve leakage rates do not exceed Technical Specification limits and that the fluid seal-water system inventory is sufficient to assure a sealing function-for 30 days. Appendix J does not imply that the seal system is to be pressurized to 1.1 Pa following an accident. The fluid j' contained'in the ESW piping inside containment meets these F requirements.

r HIf the SRP criteria are used to determine the allowable leakage rate (assuming a single active failure), there would be

no depletion of the contained fluid and the volume would last.

indefinitely since there would be no air leakage into the system to force the water out. In the case of a credible passive failure-(during the~long term) of a sprung containment air cooler flange, airfleakage into the piping would occur if the ESW pumps wereLturned off. Turning the pumps off would not be necessary since, in postulating only a passive. failure, the containment

j. isolation valves would be operable and the pumps could continue to perform their function. Union Electric is' proposing a Technical Specification leakage limit for these valves of 7000 ml/hr when pressurized to 1.10 Pa.

This limit ensures that a.30 day water volume will be

! , available in'the piping system. The water volume from the air cooler to the nearest containment isolation valve would be depleted in 30 days if the leakage rate were greater than 7166 al/hr. It should be noted that the pressure in an isolated air cooler train would approximate the containment atmospheric

[ pressure which would be near atmospheric pressure after 1 day,

which is the earliest time a passive failure is postulated. If L surveillance testing' demonstrated leakage greater than-7000 ml/hr for any of these four valves, then a violation of containment

, integrity would exist and the ACTION statement of Technical-f Specification 3.6.1.1 would be entered. Repairs would be effected and the leakage limit satisfied prior to entering mode 4, hot shutdown.

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ATTACHMENT THREE CALCULATION

SUMMARY

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I. .Inside diameters of piping between points A-and B of attachment.two:

Nominal Diameter ID -

14 inch (standard 13.25 inch 0.375 inch wall thickness)-

10 inch (Schedule 40) 10.020. inch 8 inch (Schedule 40) 7.981 inch 6 inch (Schedule 40) 6.065 inch

- II .~ Pipe lengths between points A and B for the four pipe diameters:

Nominal Case Diameter Length

1. From EF-HV-33 to containment 14 inch 153.88 ft.

coolers A and C 10 inch 43.91 ft.

8 inch 36.46 ft.

6 inch 32.70 ft.

2.- From EF-HV-45 to containment 14 inch 140.78 ft.

coolers A and C 10 inch 46.98 ft.

8 inch 42.73 ft.

6 inch 34.15 ft.

3. From EF-HV-34 to containment 14 inch 8.85 ft.

coolers B and D 10 inch 314.88 ft.

8 inch 31.31 ft.

6 inch 32.71 ft.

4. From EF-HV-46 to containment 14-inch 10.35 ft.

coolers B and D - 10 inch 310.20 ft.

8 inch 33.38 ft.

6 inch 35.90 ft.

III. Water inventories (volumes) for the four cases from Section II above:

Case Volume 1 190.6 cubic feet 2 182.2 cubic feet 3 198.3 cubic feet 4 198.5 cubic feet t

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-2' IV. -Allowable leakage rate for 30 day seal (using minimum

, - volume f rom Case 2) :

-182.2 cubic feet - 28,317 ml/ cubic foot- = 7166 ml/hr 30 days _ _

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day _

Thus, for conservatism, the limit has been set at 7000 4

ml/hr.

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.4 ATTACHMENT FOUR'

" MARKED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS , BASES, AND FSAR

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