ML20092E834

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Amends to TS Bases 3/4.4.1 Coolant Loops & Coolant Circulation, 3/4.4.9 Pressure/Temp Limits, & 3/4.5.2 ECCS Subsys
ML20092E834
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/06/1992
From:
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20092E754 List:
References
NUDOCS 9202180279
Download: ML20092E834 (23)
v • d • e


Text

_ _ _ _ _._.

a KD'ACilMENT (1)

TECilNICAL SI'ECIFICATION CllANGE l' AGES l

l l

9202180279 920206 i

fDR ADOCM 0500o337 PDR

I t

t ffACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORAT10N SYSTEMi FLOW PATHS SHU100VN LLfilll!Kt.QMQlI1QfLEQR_DELRAT10N 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A flow path from the boric acid storage tank via either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1,2.74 is OPERABLE, or b.

' The flow path from the refueling wster. tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 AND 6.

I ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVElllANCE BEQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on figure 3.1 1 when a flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks is used, b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, i

power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

GBD At Sa]D and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump sha ' be in pull-to lock and will not start automatically. At

> and less, HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Tech ical Specification 3.4.9.3.

p l

- CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 1 8 Amendment No. J/5. 146 i

L

t REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP SHUTDOWN LIMITING COND1110LL0lLOPERAT104 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump

  • in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABillTY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or hi h pressure safety injection purop OPERABLE suspendalloperationsinvovingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivlty changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE

status, gRVEILLAN(ERE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

t 4

At itL9 and less, the required OPERABLE HPS! pump sga[) be in pull-to lock and will not start automatically. At 7

and Icss, HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with ec teal Specification 3.4.9.3.

g, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. Jf).146

r TABLE 3.3 -

n

^>

r.M DIGINEEPED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTE MENTATION 5

n C

' MINIMM 4

TOTAL NO.-

CHMNIELS C!WWWELS APPLICABLE 7

FUNCTIONAL tMIT OF CHMWIELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES _ ACTION E

1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)9

-4 a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1~

2 1, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

-Contairment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 7*

c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 4

2 3

1,2,3(a) 7*

2.

CONTAllMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

Containment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 II 3.

CONTAllWENT ISOLATION (CIS)#

y a.

Mariual CIS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 I, 2, 3, 4 6

b.

Containment Pressure - High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 7*

5 3a Containment isolation of non-essential penetrations is also initiated by SIAS (functional units I a and j

I.c).

z When the RCS tempera re is:

(a) Greater tha.

the required OPERABLE HPSI pumps must be able to start automatically upon g

y;-

_ receipt SIAS

.g (b) Between and a transition region exists where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in g

pul on a c. Idown and restored to automatic status on a heatup, t

(c) At and less, the required OPDtABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start w

automat 1.

E 3SS*F i

3 a.

9 REACTOR COOL ANT SYSTEM i,

i g

COOL ANT LOOPS AND COOL ANT CIRCUt ATION H0i STANDE1 LM11LN12011LO!L101LONRA110N 3.4.1.2 a.

The reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Reactor Coolant Loop 811 and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.

2.

Reactor Coolant Loop #12 and at least once associated reactor coolant pump.

b.

At least one of the above Reactor Coolant Loops shall be in operation *,

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3**

ACTION:

a.

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b.

With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in baton concentration of the Reactor Coolant Syste'n and init'ete corrective action to return the required loop to operation within one hour.

}))RVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS 4.4.1.2.)

At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 At least one cooling loop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

All reactor coolant pumps may be de energized for up to I hour (up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for low flow test) provided (1) no operations are sermitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system

'oron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained 0

at least 10 f below s rA, n temperature.

A reactor coolant pump not be started with the RCS temperature less than or equal to 21 unless 1) the is less than or equal to 170 inches (and (2) pressurizer water level the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 f-0 above the RCS te ature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to sia.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 4 2 Amendment No. /f/)J 146

REACTOR COOLANT $YSTIM COOLANT LOOPS AND COOL ANT CIRCUL ATION SHUTDOWN i

LinillRIME1110LEOR_0PE%UDN 3.4.1.3 a.

At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Reactor Coolant Loop #11 and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.

2.

Reactor Coolant Loop #12 and jts associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant

pump, 3.

Shutdown Cooling loop #11*,

4.

Shutdown Cooling Loop #12*.

b.

At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation **.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*"# and 5"*#.

(

gllE:

a.

With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loops to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b.

With no coolant loop in o)eration, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation within one hour.

The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de energized for up to I hour provided (1) no operations are

>ermitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system soron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained 0

at least 10 f below saturation temperature A _re_ actor coolant pump tht11 not be started with the RCS temperature ygep ess than or equal to ud3P unless (1) the pressurizer water level slessthanor_equalto170 inches,and(2)thesecondarywateg temperature' of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 f above the RCS temp ature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to sia.

l

-See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 4 2a Amendment No. g g y,146

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE llMITS 1f REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

l 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4 2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and I

hydrostatic testing withe a.

A maximum heatup oft i

h;g m eat 5 aximum Allowable Heatuo Rate M

R':S Temnerature 3

p,,;J 0 f in any one hour period TNX to 3 3yx 10'F6/# F I

10 ? in any one hour period f 314' T)F. pl#r 4 #8'F

{

60 f in any one hour period pv3 F

y pp: 4 JmF' 4

>bSS*

\\

b.

A raaximum cooldown ofi i

i Maximum Allowable Cooldown Rate RCETemoeratureh2&F-

-loffinany_.onehourperiod N}0VF ~ 0 20 F in any one hour period 250'Me:Q0 F zgy.p A, itV*F t

10 F in any one hour period L<d78F 0

g jgvap 0

I c.

A maximum temperature change'of 5 F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System determine l

that the Reactor Coolant System remains acce) table for continued i

operations or be in at least HOT 51AND8Y wit 11n the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 0

. reduce the RCS T and pressure to less than 200 F and 300 psia, respectively,wiNinthefollowing30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

'4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during i

system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.1.2.The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimer.s shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H.

The results of these examinations shall be used to update figure 3.4 2.

4

[

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-23 Amendment No. J/HJ/f,158

- ~.

FIGURE 3.4 2a CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 HE ATUP CURVE.12 Et PY RE ACTOR COOL ANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPER ATURE LIMIT S 2$00 -\\ *N h *.*

.i #'

I ~I E_;._ _ !

b;f f_2fl5.~

'~5 25E.I

.:... ':== H E AT UP M-]g=gj ~~~~j [~~~'

' -= ^ -

~g - : -

1

-~~: 3.'-

1;

.! ~

- JNSEh"IiCE HYDROSTATIC TESTr 'N

.i

~~

i i

I-

, ~

\\

~

J. -

,I I

/

2000 i-

\\_

4

.. -+-

--u ---,

l--n

[

T k.-

~

f__,

,/

,[f'

-n

-+

~

! f5 mCORE CRITM: ALE g

_l

j.,. ;;

/

!?' !

  • 1500

/

',5 '

'/

f EE LOWEST.

E SERVICE ~

a

-I W

= T EMPER ATURE i

li/

, 1 H

= 60T

".i 4 ~,l.

/-

=1

-.s m

~~

,/'" --j ',

?

1000

.'.c's

---w'r' -':.

x RCS TEMP.

H/U RATE t

T' 70T TO 3134 54FF/1ilR f

/

, _._ g '

3 4'F TO 32PF

$10T/1 HR 500 e

32PF ssFF/1 HR

r--b MIN. SOLTUP TEMP. 70T:

n MAXIMUM PRESSURE FOR SDC OPERATION u

yL. _

s.>n -y-.

m.

9

's00 200 300 400 500 500

/

INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T '

C

' The mirdmum boltup temperature is the temperature of the reactor veuct flante, not it.c crolant temperature l

CALVERT Cliffs - UNIT 1 3 a 4 24 Amendment No. 1/5 146

,i erWe,"----yt-=

,em,g y-y P

- e sryr-u y7 4r.-

  • qw'N TJ w

rr es'r'

'1"*'?

^'1

-v 74 Y,ptg ve

--e-e g=C FP-eaw-+

.M t'P

-w-e-r e-w

--e-.am'>

p'tv=

flGURE 3.4 2a CALVERT Clif f S UNIT 1 HE ATUP CURVE RE ACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS FOR FLUENCE 63.25 x 1019 n/cm' AT THE INNER SURFACE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL 2500 j

7-7 i

=

.a'

._.gl: -__.. n.a ;..J {[ j

- j. -

~-

~"'-

i

-j

.u p

a:

.,...... -a

.,t...

_.. _._.1.

.-. _..7 _.. _.. -...

_.. -.. - b. E...

n

HEATUP J

-.. I.

=

l:

. = a[.w a -.

...-.. u. - 4...L._,l."_u. l:._..ip' L.

h-tu

.L uu.uu JU M'

M*:.

d 'M:

.. _ INSERVICE HYD, lRO. STATIC 1EST +I.

%. ~..

.'..n.

4.n..:

y

.g..

_. n,.

i.

..l.

l.

. [.

1 i

j:.3 i

~R i-t; a. 3- +- 0 ;a 2000

--4--

-t--

-4 Rh h

r

.u

' :t a

4=

j o

.r.

.n :.

.= im uu un :=uu

.. u 2..

1

u. u.

4

--... '. I db M-

!!ii.:!! i!: '.r!:!I ti!!!!. i.i! !ii! lli! !II! p!!!!.!!!!

..it !!!! :'

ii

.t..-

-e r!.j l:M; gjj;n qn-r= -~ d h !!,n u ;:n ..'t 1;n '.. u'. E

n u:'
n un U n

Mij u,u :u' n u...u:.a

2. ;u.

n

=

uu na m uu m...u u. o. .=.= g i: .=. ll!1 iji; IUt tH: u.4 i -i; ,1: i

9. : n

! I' !nt.u t.: n .U __. _' _.i1 cc _..+_ y. 1: a 1. 4,: un 5 i. l:, l-j t m -.L l.-.:

n :n. tm :p m 1500

- a - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " 4 :w-CORE CRITIC AL !!.': 't 4 - w LOWEST. : i a u o ..b - n --": ' M M... -t-a 5 -SERVICE a .b..... o-m

T EMPER ATURE _....i__._..C._......h..

.h. i. -.a_: t. L ....n...._. a 156 T.+o- ;Q- . i.. O . p. _.. t.. _g . q _.. - _.. .. o. g g pu ,,.:n,..: na !:n u. l 'l ,h a: - h. af.=.. uu :.. :. t.=.. . u. =2 aw. =au:. u u... ..u=

.. L.= ww===zu tu au D

m g ii; ' M ii

m

?: l' h !!!! 4.2_

i!
li
ji --+ La_p g
p 1}

=4:j!- a 1000 p i .=1. - p. u. n:

..: n:.

Q-p p u=p W t a. u p .n . uu].a. a au; =.=== u==u u. ..u..: ..: u .u. ..w.. O -. = u.a : D. t >y= -+- p p--+ p RCS TEMP. HlU R ATE 5 a L.. ...n_.., ;.;_ l = h Z t t' 1 i 1 -i - U h 70T TO 164T $3b4/1 HR i .. m o >1644 TO 328T 540T/1HR a:... - -"U..

4+--

. :. -:.. h; 4

r. - :. ' r. n...

-+- 500 l 1. 1 q .o >32BT TO 355T $10T/1 HR _n h.._.

n r

~ h....., MIN,T BOLTUP TEMP. 70 'F ; i i;.. ~ . -. _.t+ >355T s60T/1 HR a... _.... n : a. n n d u n. u. - + * -- +---4 *-- m, - .4 "not tin n u ': t.... n..:..n. inungu 4 4 n t: &.]*~.nM AXIMUM PRESSURE o. .~~ C U. o*t.'.i.'.*"'t* ~*t'; t 1 v. n. N ~ FOR SDC OPER ATION!... 11q! u.n. :li;. 'u. E !!h !El. !.:;.} jo m. 1 T !!: lij!,Wii [ t U.dili li ih / p! h: hii M u.. g 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 INDICATED RE ACTOR COOL ANT TEMPERATURE T ' T C 3/4424

4 4 / FIGURE 3.4 2b CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 COOLDOWN CURVE.12 EFPY RE ACTOR COOL ANT SYST 'M PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LlW S 2500 \\ ~~.i ~.~.3E.ihi3 K _ a=.-K.- k=;; _h=p --- --- 4 i --- ~_ , f ~.w - =.. : l-E; -- ~~~_ ) 3 f- <=.dE: INSERVICE tiYDROSTATIC TEST Q_jg __ wg g. lEl- ' ~ l 2000. j l h 4 f g' ~ 1 ) LOWEST--SERVICE 55i jy-COOLDOWNi I { TEMPER ATURE L 5 JL 1500 f 140 'F m

.1 f-f I

/ = f l l 1000 -/ ,f?~ RCS TEMPI C/O.R ATE' ~~ f o ' i i' / l / 5100T/1 HR. >250T 250T TO 170*F* 520T/1 HR! <1701 510T/1HR i a s $00 t -f t ~ c ' MIN. 8OLTUP TEMP. 70 'F MAXIMUM PRESSURE: ^ f FOR S,DC OPERATION - 0 ' 10 200 300 400 500 600 t INDICATED RE ACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T ' C l.

  • De mirumum boltup temperature 11 the temperature of the reactor vessel flange, not the coolart ternperature CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT I Amendment Vo. Jf) 146 3/4 4 24a m ' + - - y '7 wt M yw=r 1wg ryve p atr'wa wrymg-ves -twg ww w-nua-----a(T"P%**FW'4-hwWDf*'****e-'.pw're*--T*T 19 9r N'e'vr e-F T D-F4RT-'t M**-rD
      • -"-P*-

4"wNw ereWe+m*w-mew e w en w -eu=h-see-+ mas **-w*w-*-mon aew M T'=va**es'

FIGURE 3,4 2b 4 1 CALVERT CLirFS UNIT 1 COOLDOWN CURVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS 4 FOR FLUENCE $3.25 a 1019 n/cm' AT THE INNER SURFACE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL t 2500.z.u~ t -. C...;.. . n. ..cd.m a;. a ;n h!!

111 !.!!.;. 11.n..I;M.~*! !.". !:

i.t.}.1 + ; [? " T:.: rt! ". ; nt:

  • *:tt

!! q t.n_. n _". '.M.i .i * . ; ; t.i. LM.. J;. )'. L .t.. . u... u n. I.;. o.,.. l. ;.;;t. 1 +. }31 ;1 1 t ~. -........_.r;;m.;.;. a,a. t t r,.. ta ..t t; ;

n.;

.n tt*; t 14 1 1'1..; i g._l..u.. _t. i t.

o..

.t.. .. e. o

t..

<7 tut 3 :n "a t,. u.-:tct an Lp n. ."{.. + alN..S.E.R.VIC.E HY. DROSTATIC TEST. '; W t n+: i

  • m n

lit nut t .n: tnt t m ttt ten du r

g. m.n u.

.L.t i n: .m.. m. .... -.... -.x.. t .-. t .... ho.. . L..- 4;...

t...o

..a. ..m... .21.:_:.n_.v. .t.u..}.n..g u o.. ..L.t3 .i,:n 1... ...u...t _,i ._n :.. _t.t :t

n : n_.

_...u_n..u n.1.:.: : _u n.u h. d..t.t.ti.t. .n .n._. : t

t. t

...,.. ~.. .. o. n,.

a..
a..

..o. !.t :! D. 3-3 38 h.. 2 t im 1 t- *1* n + t-a1 e+ .m n-n to tra n-n: ne u, n" p . r. : + 2000 4 a na ... to.,.... ,,., -.i 4 m, o, m,1 1...., 4$. n. 14 .e ., T.

u...n,

. m. o..t.. t. o.o..,! ~ + .. ~ +.. _.. .L. . n,.,. m.-.,.,.,.,.,,,,,, 4 o t c..

n... =.

m.

m..o+..

.+ ,, -.4.. .u .o ... m.. 3_,..,._ u.,,,.4.. . e.. m.t.tyt4,..t.t L.j t.u, .,,..y o.. o. m 4 ++ ..u...._~.. a( y m,. .y ,m ~. .i +. o.- .,. e. -..~4 LOV EST ~ 4u 4 ,m .t 4 3. 4o. ...4 -.o - n!e u +t. ..~., E R VIC E ~.. _ +.. +. t e n- .-**t.-- . -.+ 4 t, - . t...- 1 a1 -..u. ..e. .u

u.. n+ to 1

. t.o.

u....u

..4.. ....h.. .n.. .... +.. o o. .+ -.. "... %.i, t .+ ..,.. t +. +.. ++ ~. ~ 4. COm.. O..LDO..W. -.N.. .i e 6 n. _1 e.. it:i.... ~~ TEMPER ATURE.. w.

nt tt.t t tt 14 nti tt
tt

-tti:

  • - t:
tt
t... a..

,z m-... 156 ,h 1.., ..._.~._.....F%..,,.,-._.3, .s , ~.. b

2....

.... a.. .t-a t.. .. t . t _A..

o. _

o. ..4 .u ..o t {. .e ! -.m. .o. 1500 ..... 3 m... ..,~. _ .., }.. lj}1, .a.. p.

t...p

.o.,. o . a,. . h. , g. t_. ;,;;t. p t{3 -. _ t;

o. g; gt g

.g g3 ,n n. p, op g;. up ,g;t- :a i.. r ~ :- .....u ... tw t,. _....,.t.. ..t.. .. t i .t.... 41 - 41. .m.......,t. .,..... o. g .. t.. .. - m.L _. 4 . ~.. ... ut. m o. t. . t... t... J.... ---t.. m............. . m..... . t. t.. = ...t ......a. ......4 ..t.....t....,~,.4... .. t.... .m... 4. .....m.. t .m ....m c r . 4. .. 3 _.. t... [... ~ ^. _. m.... ~. ..'..'.3... ..'3.". RCS TEMP. C/D RATE 1000.. ". ^ ~ .. Aa.. .4... p. ..a. . ~... _.. .t.. .t. >254T 5100T/1 HR m: =: t.. un : : a-- u- -n mn. :...nr 4 i .4 o ..p .. t. .m.:

n
y. _. m : u.n e =
n t;::. 254T TO 1844

$20T/1 HR .. + ..3... rj.. ...3 ......nnte q::= unh.:: nn

mr'

<184T 5104/1 HR u

c 500,. _...

,._.._..._...,...u...u...1.... .a.._ .. r.._.... t........ ,.., _.. ~ _... _.... _.. ....t. ......,~ ... ~._... 4 ~ .t-. ~.

t.....n..._.

.t ..m , 1. - mt-- 1. ..... m. 4 t... .m.. n. t . t. . _.....n... m m .e.. - .a.. _o....... .....a..m... .e .~.

n. m..)=. ~.tm"

.w. 'w, ... m. t 1; MIN. BOLTUP TEMP. 70 ',F t 4.. .. *.L...m ..m 1 m.a. I.t.,L. .t. .1...u.. !..m.. . +. -.. 4...- m. .+ m. .+....~: s +. - ++ ~n.!. .**i.- - - ~--- ...;a m. _h. .-{n dh.. ., n. .t.-.. ! unt t 11 t 1r m f i:# MAXIMUM PRESSURE *n.t-n h....t

rnent:-r t~- u :n+ m H++ + +-~+_+ + m..u n: n a

ttit m r,... a. E...R....n..i n a'441m 4

n...._.2 :

.=t E O 93 .... ~ _...u.t...t.3l uj..t .I.nt_t sm ...... t_u.u.,.a_M M.;t.M_t .t_' a -j

3..

y p I,,m t i.t., FOR SDC OPER ATIONE,. n : :: : ah .m_.ti.m._.:.a. .+_. 3 m}.. ... l p..lan g. 3 ..o..... ....m.,. n;..+ tn19 -4 ..,.p..... m p... t.,. (... i. .......-..m.q.-,g.... pi., .y p m .m en m. i l 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 l l t INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T ' T C t-I l t i 1 1 1 3/4 4 24a ... _ _ _ _. -. _.. _ _... -.. _. _. _.. ~ _. _, _. _. _ _,.. _ ..._-.-~._..,_._____m_.__

(t&e:) no+ M un,% kn. OPENSL6 flf PCrSwke. pfely l&tcNM potp $ mil hMe ih hm&Neh k yll-b hck. (, g[ ACTOR COOL ANT SY51tM DVERPRES$URE PROTIC110!LDSTEMS 1M11MLC0h01110!LEOFm0PlM1101 1 3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met: a. One of the follow ng three overpressure protection systems shall be in place: ggg 1. Two powe ratedreliefvalves(PORVs)withaGd(j[f @TMpi44*p +4 ) psia or wIth a 04ftwett4M-ef-s-4Wi and a 2. A f Reactor Coolant System vent of AReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)21.3squareinches,orvent 2 2.6 sq 3. b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps' shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by I locking shut their discharge valves, The HP$1 loop motor operated valves (MOVs)# shall be prevented c. from automatically aligning HPS) pump flow to the RCS by piscing their hand switches'in pull to override, d. No more than ont OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump ( with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of ollowing restrictions shall apply: 1. The total hi essure safety injection flow shall be limited to i gpm OR 2. A reactor coolant system vent of 2 2.6 square inches shall i exist. APPLICABillTY: When the RCS temperature is s m and the RCS is vented to < 8 square inches. ACTION: a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 5 days or depressurite and vent the RCS through a 2 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 18 hours; maintain the RC$ in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status, b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurire and vent the RCS througha22.6squareinchvent(s)within48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one OPERABLE PORV and a vent of 21.3 square inches has been established or both l PORVs have been restored to OPEpABLE status, i EXCEPT when required for testing. CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 4 26a Amendment No. J/#f) 146

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UjilIING CONDITION FOR OPERA 110N f(patinued) i c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate a RCS aressure transient, a Special Report shall be j prepared and su>mitted to the Commission pursuant to S>ecification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe tie circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence, 8 d. With less than two HPS! pumps disabled. place at least two HPSI puma handswitches in pull to lock within fifteen minutes And disa)1e two HPS! pumps within the next four hours. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs# not prevented from e. automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately place the MOV handswitch in pull to override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, And implement the action requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable. i f. With HPSI flow exceeding gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent o < 2.6 square inches exists, 1. Immediat ake action to reduce flow to less than or equal to gpm. 2. Verify t e excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4 2a or figure 3.4 2b. 3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1. g. The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. i EXCEPT when required for testing. 4 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26b Amendment No M,145

} ? REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HRY[lLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV-shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: i a. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation ~ channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to - entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE. b. Performsnce of a CHANNEL CAllBRATION on the PORV actuetion l channel at least once per 18 months. j t c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per -72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection. j d.- Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. 4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified to be open at least once per-l 12 hours

  • when the vent (s) is being used-for overpressure-protection..

t 4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety inje.ction pumps, except the above OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from i their electrical power suoply circuits or by verifying-their discharge valves are locked shut. The automatic open'og feature of the high pressure safety injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once-per 12 hours. c due OPEeAotA u,,+ slml/ fe MiGwD dhue h4m/w)Ich y -(ha pall-4-hc h a lensi usee pea 11. hun. 4 5 Except when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days. L l-CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4 26c Amendment No. M/J#,162 t <-----,we+w- -. - - <, = - -

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS q 1VRVEltlANCE REQMIRLMElls 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE *: a. At least once per 12 hours by verifyir.g that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed: Valve humber Valve Function Valve Position 1. HOV 659 Mini-flow Isolation Open 2. MOV-660 Mini-flow Isolation Open 3. CV-306 Low Pressure S1 Open Flow Control b. At least once per 31 days by: 1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open. 2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (regs, trash, cloihing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This v;sual inspection shall be performed: 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to estkblishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2. ( ine eas affected within containment at the completion of mi ainment entry when CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY is establishcd. d. Within 4 hours prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying, via local indication at the valve, that CV-306 is open. Whe x flow testing into the RCS is required at RCS temperatures of and less, the high pressure safety injection pump shall recirculate RCS water (suction from RWT isolated) or the controls of .555'F Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 shall apply. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. UE146 l

i ' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3-(< 1750 PSIA) AND 4 ~ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 -~ As a minimum, one-ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall-be OPERABLE:- a. One# OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the o refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4. ACTION:- a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours. b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. .pVEILLANCE_RE0VIREMENTS ,.5.3.1 The ECCS.=ubsystem shall be. demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable SurveilRce Requirements of 4.5.2. With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia. Between and a transition region exists where the OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull-to-lo on a cooldown and restored to automatic status on a heatup. At and less, the required OPERABLE-HPSI p 11 be in pull-to ock and will not start'automatical_ly. At and less, HPSI ump use will be conducted in accordance wi hnical Speci cation 3.4.9.3. SS*F l .I p CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. J//J/9/JfE/J/E,153

4 4 p.- 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM [ BASES c 3/4.4.1-COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant _is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.195 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above -the low level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant shutdown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time. In WDES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop-provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE. The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with. boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control. gfg,g The restrictions on starting a tor Coolant Pump during MODES 3, 4-and 5 with'the RCS temperature 5 are provided to prevent RCS -pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 (see Bases 3/4.4.9). For operation of the reactor coolant pumps the l following criteria apply: (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer (170 inches) and thereby providing a volume-for the primary l coolant to expand into and (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the indicated secondary water temperature of each steam generator is 0 less than or equal to 30 F above the Reactor Coolant System temperature, (3) limit t nitial indicated pressure of the pressurizer to less than or equal to psia. 3/4,4.2 SAF VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve 5 is designed to relieve approximately 3 x 10 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint.. The relief capacity of:a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety' limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. J//JJ/JJ/EJ/J/J,146

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTF3 BASES ( Operation within the appropriate heatup and cooldown curves assures the integrity of the reactor vessel against fracture induced by combinative thermal and pressure stresses. As the vessel is subjected to increasing fluence, the toughness of the limiting material continues to decline, and ever more restrictive Pressure / Temperature limits must q observed. The current limits, figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b, are for ,___cyJnd-4nchd4n9-J# Effective F_ull power Years (EFPY1 of oDeration @ ped wesen wee _.h #c ;we SMAce of Me AYA6 < esse / eP WWW9TcM7/d "'hd ine reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine thiiir a cesWs initial RT the results of these tests are shown in Section 4.1.5 o

  • theUFSAR.NDke;actoroperationandresultantfastneutron(E>lMev)

. N AW irradiation will cause an increase in the RT nT. The actual shift in 4 _/ N RTNDT of the vessel material will be establisned periodically during operation by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in UFSAR Table 4-13 and are approved by the NRC prior to implementation in compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. The shift in the material fracture toughness, as represented by abeno M RT iS calculated using Regulatory Guide 1.99 Revision 2. For M I'at the_1/4 T oos FT'nl the adjusted reference temp p e (ART) # '#a y ^ o CyttueN '. At the J 4 T position the ART value is J 2.5 f. These (values are used with ;

  • edures developed in the ASME Boiler and Pressure

/ Vessel Code, Section 111, Appendix G to calculate heatup and cooldown gypy ,glimits in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. To develop composite pressure-temperature limits for the heatup transient, the isothermal,1/4 T heatup, and 3/4 T heatup pressure-temperature limits are compared for a given thermal rate. Then the most restrictive pressure-temperature limits are combined over the complete temperature interval resulting in a composite limit curve for the reactor vessel beltline for the heatup event. To develop a composite pressure-temperature limit for the cooldown event, the isothermal pressure-temperature limit must be calculated. The isothermal pressure-temperature limit is then compared to the pressure-temperature limit associated with a cooling rate and the more restrictive allowable pressure-temperature limit is chosen resulting in a composite limit curve for the reactor vessel beltline. Both 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G and ASME, Code Appendix G require the development of pressure-temperature limits which are applicable to inservice hydrostatic tests. The minimum temperature for the inservice hydrostatic test pressure can be determined by entering the curve at the test pressure (1.1 times normal operating pressure) an ating the corresponding temperature. This curve is shown fore 2 EFPY on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b. g ,fg l lt CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-6 Amendment No. R5, 158 l

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM s 4 -BASES Similarly,10 CFR Part 50 specifies that coi? critical limits be 1. established based on material considerations. This limit is shown on the heatup curve, Figure 3.4-2a. Note that this limit does not consider the core reactivity safety analyses t ht actually control the temperature at which the core can be brought critical. The Lowest Service Temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures-above 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure (625 psia). This temperature is defined as equal to the most limiting RT for the balance of the Reactor Coolant System components plus 100 F,NDTper Article NB 2332 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and 0 Pressure Vessel Code. The horizontal line between the minimum boltup temperature and the Lowest Service Temperature is defined by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as 20% of the pre-operational hydrostatic test pressure. The 0 change in the line at 150 F on the cooldown curve is due to a cessation of RCP flow induced pressure deviation, since no RCPs are permitted to operate during a cooldown below 150 F, 0 The minimum boltup temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures below 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure. The minimum is defined as the initial RTNDT for the material of the higher stressed region of the reactor vessel plus any effects for . irradiation-per Article G 2222 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The initial reference temperature of the reactor vessel and closure head flanges was determined using the certified material test reports and Branch Technical Position MTEB 5-2. The maximum initial RTpT asghc ;5D2f5 btedw4ththestressedregionoftheclosure QagMF Mc!UM tempera 6u,o irinrument uncertainty i; -104-+-10 F - 0 E Howevei, fur 0 censervati:, : iWu-beltep t: p;rsttrre of 70 F i:-utilized. The design basis t. vents in the low temperature region assuming a water solid system are: A RCP start with hot steam generators; and, An inadvertent HPSI actuation with concurrent charging. Any measures which will prevent or mitigate the design basis events are sufficient for any less severe incidents. Therefore, this section will discuss the results of the RCP start and mass addition transient analyses. Also discussed is the effectiveness of a pressurizer steam bubble and a single PORY relative to mitigating the design basis events. ,y The RCP start transient is a severe LTOP challenge for a water solid RCS. Therefore', during water solid operations all 4 RCPs are tagged out of -service. Analysis indicates the transient is adequately controlled by placing restrictions on three parameters: initial pressurizer pressure and level, and the secondary em)erature difference W h these restrictions in place;,~ m,er o cay n_. _ve. .e.i(reasto s CALVER BM _ Amenpentyff AI8' .dwexe, us oesee -6 ea,,et w4 +se to en sg pop 3G i:mg A mwn], Jf at a e y kl+sq kupeeshee. usus ja p uge,L ge4cht deMcl hen / MI4ed h W Ucue At 5"* Ccahe, vesseI dempc40. w4 3 3 -za a at M -Zb. ~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES b 6aea shutdown-B-houM-or lord;"M the transient is adequately controlled wjthout the assistance of the PORVs. 4perat4ng procedures require'ttrat-l 0 pr4eg--normakeoldownsv-entr-y-4nte-19T-enable-t3N f-and-below)--wtM-not secur-uniii o nours after rGTtTUr'shuidvwn. -Th4s-restrictinn i s not-4ntended to delay-.cooldown-in-s4tua64 ens-where71ent-er-personnel-safety canciderations make avnnd444eus rocidown prudent. If-RCM-are-restored-in-response-to-a loss of-decay-heat removit whErdecay neat loacs7re - high-and-operater-actient-were either not-taken er ineffeetive-a-sinok PORV-wiM-ecoteet-the-Accend4*-G Limit e J ,G l j Ibord The inadvartant actuatinn ef-4nedlPSI pump in conjunet4on with ene-b \\ > sharg4ng-pump-4s-the -c:t-severs-ma&&-addtt4cn-overpressur4 cat 4en-tvent, Analyses wara nerformed for-a-single ll PSI pump.nd one-charging-punp k munminn nna PnRY availeMe-wittr-the existing. orifice orce-of-3,29 inb for the limiting caser-only-& single PuRv is consiBEred ave 44aMeJua to A f4 ere-was developed which shows-the

s. ingle _ failure critaria.

9 emlenlated RCS oressures-ver4us-time-ttrat witi occur assuming-HPSI-and charging pump mmes :nput4r-end ihe expansion uFthe-RCS-fgHoyino loss of g aemy heat remnval.J Sufficient overpressure protection results when the d -equilibrium pressure does not exceed the limiting Appendix G curve pressure. Because the equilibrium pressure exceeds the minimum end G limit for full HPSI flow, HPSI flow is throttled to no more p than # gpm indicated when the HPSI pump is used for mass addition. The HPSI ow limit includes allowances for instrumentation uncertainty, charging pump flow addition and RCS expansion following loss of decay heat removal. The HPSI flow is injected through only one HPSI loop MOV to limit instrumentation uncertainty. No more than one charging pump (44 gpm) is allowed to operate during the HPSI mass additi n. Qoh WI llmH (FEES sued t b# Comparison of the PORV discharge! curve with the Acritical pressurizer -pressure of@ psia indicates that adequate protection is provided by 0 a single PORV for RCS temperatures of 70 F or above uaheW al' mass input eher@is limited to $egpm.to allcw-for i: li-ited to 380 gpm. HPSI nnftcharging pump and sytt ns4en due te less cf di est remsval. Tusendo ao To provide single failure protection against a HPSI pump mass addition tr sient the HPSI loop MOV handswitches must be placed in pull-to-override so the valves do not automatically actuate upon receipt of a SIAS signal. Alternative actions, described in the ACTION STATEMENT, are to disable the affected MOV (by racking out its motor circuit breaker or equivalent), or to isolate the affected HPSI header. Examples of HPSI header isolation actions include; (1) de-energizing and -5 tagging shut the HPSI header isolation v ves; (2) locking shut and tagging all three HPSI pump discharge and (3) disabling all three HPSI pumps. Mikh hAf0NrnP7ec>46/c l l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT I B 3/4 4-8 Amendment No. JA5/JM,158 l l

t insert A The inadwrtent actuation of one HPSI pump in conjunction with one charging pump is the most severe mass - addition overpressurintion event. To preclude this event from happening while water solid, all HPSI pumps and two charging pumps are tagged out of service during water solid operations. Analyses were performed for a single HPSI pump and one charging pump, and the expansion of the RCS - water volume following loss of decay heat removal, assuming one PORV available (due to $1ngle failure 2 criteria) with the existing orifice area of 1.29 in, This mass addition, determined at the point when the RCS - reached water solid conditions, must be less than the capability of a single PORV to limit the LTOP event. Insert B A PORV trip setpoint of less than or equal to 429 psia was selected, The actual PORV trip setpoint is controlled by plant procedures and is calculated considering response time and total loop uncertainties. Total loop uncertainties include _ allowances for loop drift, calibration uncertainties and instrument device - uncertainties. The k)op drift was considered in the technical specification trip setpoint, which is an allowable value calculated per lastrument Society of America Standard ISA S67.04. 1 i-i

p _+ REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES ( Three 100% capacity HPSI pumps are installed at Ca W_ 7 N and (breakers racked out) at RCS temperatures less than or equal to that the remaining HPSI pump handswitch be placed in pull-to-lo Additionally, the HPSI pumfl{Dgpm when used to add mass to the RCS. to less than or equal t or ECCS testing and for response to LOCAs. Exceptions are provided zes. A pressurizer steam volume and a single PORV will p urization due to this actuation of full flow from a HPSI pump. Overpf I D and less by disabling transient will be precluded for temperaturesGN and by throttling the two HPSI pumps, placing the third in tull-to-lock hen it is used to add third pump to less than or equal toQ@gpm flgw mass to the RCS. g Note that only the design bases events are discussed in detail since the less severe transients are bounded by the RCP start and inadvertent HPS actuation analysis. RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as (I) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the i with the shutdown cooling system in follows:

ppropriate indication, (2) ling temperature indication is appropriate, operation, the shutdown coo exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of R 1

F 1 . g-i l L e Amendment No. JM,158 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT I B 3/4 4-9 i

  • EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES (A

Portions of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis. The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 2 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECC - QCA analyses. Minimum Q HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS. l Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions. At temperatures of and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. With excess ve RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could exceed a HPSI flow o gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by l controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling. This provides overpressure prot ion in the low temperature region. An analysis has been perfor which shows this flow rate is more than .1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. Jp3/JM,153

e, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS' BASES (Continued) I 1 l adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assumptions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the.HPT enable condition.- The Safety Injection Tanks provide imediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI pump. Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be i lated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than g or equal to gpm or an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2.6 square inches must be provided. 3/4.5.a REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT) The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses. I I' The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not - usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. t !lO CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT I B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. JEJ/J #,153 l E}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20092E834&oldid=4332989"