ML20092C676
| ML20092C676 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1995 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092C674 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9509130090 | |
| Download: ML20092C676 (4) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 79 AND 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. FPF-76 AND NPF-80 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-49_2 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNITS 1 AND 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated May 31, 1995, Houston Lighting & Power Company, et al., (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs)
(Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80) for the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP). The proposed changes would modify (by relocation to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)) TS 3/4.1.2.1, Boration Systems / Flow Paths - Shutdown, TS 3/4.1.2.2, Boration Systems / Flow Paths - Operating, TS 3/4.1.2.3, Charging Pumps - Shutdown, TS 3/4.1.2.4, Charging Pumps - Operating, TS 3/4.1.2.5, Borated Water Sources - Shutdown, TS 3/4.1.2.6, Borated Water Sources - Operating, TS 3/4.4.2.1, Safety Valves -
Shutdown, and the associated Bases.
By letter dated August 2, 1995, the licensee committed to incorporate the TRM, by reference, into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Accordingly, changes to the TRM would be controlled in accordance with the approved station procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
The August 2,1995, supplement is clarifying information that does not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 BACKGROUND
Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act") requires that applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses state TSs and that these TSs be included as a part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TSs include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control 9509130090 950905 PDR ADOCK 05000499 p
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settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls and states also that the Commission may include such additional TSs as it finds to be appropriate. However, the regulation does not specify the particular TSs to be included in a plant's license.
The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TSs in its " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (" Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22,1993), in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Act.
In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TSs to licensee-controlled documents, consistent with the standard enunciated in Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979).
In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board indicated that " technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety."
Consistent with this approach, the Final Policy Statement identified four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TSs, as follows:
(1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of i
or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. As a result, existing limiting condition for operation (LCO) requirements which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria in the Final Policy Statement must be retained in the TSs, while those LCO requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents. The Commission recently amended 10 CFR 50.36 to codify and incorporate these four criteria (60 FR 36953). The change to 10 CFR 50.36 is effective as of August 18, 1995.
I 3.0 EVALUATION 3.1 Chemical Volume and Control System
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The boration subsystem of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) is
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addressed by the following TSs:
TS 3/4.1.2.1 Boration Systems / Flow Paths - Shutdown TS 3/4.1.2.2 Boration Systems / Flow Paths - Operating TS 3/4.1.2.3 Charging Pumps - Shutdown
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h TS 3/4.1.2.4 Charging Pumps - Operating l
TS 3/4.1,,2.5 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown TS'3/4.1.2.6 Borated Water Sources - Operating The boration subsystem of the CVCS, including the charging pumps, is designed to maintain and control the chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in i
the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to ensure adequate shutdown margin. The current TSs have requirements for sources of borated water, flow paths to inject this borated water into the RCS, and charging pumps to provide the necessary charging head.
The boration subsystem of the CVCS, including the charging pumps, is not installed instrumentation that is used to detect and indicate in the control room a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
In addition, it is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of the type of design basis accident or transient analysis discussed in the background section (above).
Shutdown margin is a process variable which is an initial condition of various design basis accidents and transient analyses, however operability of the CVCS is not.
Limitations on shutdown margin are established and maintained by other TSs not affected by this proposed change.
The boration subsystem of the CVCS, including the charging pumps, is not a structure, system or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
Control and maintenance of boron concentration in the RCS is not part of the primary' success path for mitigation of a design 4
basis accident or transient. This function is provided by either the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or through maintenance of shutdown margin, as established by TSs not affected by the proposed change, which is adequate for the required safety function.
In summary, the requirements specified in these existing TSs do not satisfy the criteria for TSs, and may be relocated to the UFSAR such that future changes to these provisions may be made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
d 3.2 Pressurizer Code Safety Valves - Shutdown The pressurizer code safety valves (PSVs) operate to prevent the RCS from i
being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig.
The limiting condition for operation and surveillance requirements of the PSVs is addressed in TS 3/4.4.2.1.
The PSVs are not installed instrumentation that detects significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, nor are they a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of the type of design basis accident or transient analysis discussed in the background section (above).
- In Modes 4, 5, and 6, when the head is on the reactor, the RCS is protected by the overpressure protection systems, which is addressed in TSs not affected by this proposed change. The low temperature overpressure protection requirements ensure that the RCS is protected from pressure transients that could exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements." Therefore, the PSVs in Modes 4, 5, and 6, when the head is on the reactor, are not a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
In summary, the requirements specified in these existing TSs do not satisfy the criteria for TSs, and may be relocated to the UFSAR such that future changes to these provisions may be made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
On this basis, the staff finds that these requirements are not required to be in the TSs under 10 CFR 50.36 or Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act, and are not required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immedit.te threat to the health and safety of the public.
Further they do not fall within any of the four criteria set forth in the Commission's Final Policy Statement.
In addition, the staff finds that this change does not alter the limiting conditions for operation or surveillance requirements because the subject TSs and Bases will be relocated in their entirety to the TRM, and sufficient regulatory controls exist under 10 CFR 50.59 to assure continued protection of the public health and safety and that future changes to these requirements are acceptable. Accordingly, the staff finds that these requirements may be relocated from the TSs to the TRM.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 39441). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
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