ML20092A680
| ML20092A680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1984 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406190306 | |
| Download: ML20092A680 (2) | |
Text
r TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Ifd6*I:Ifes?Sif'S't'reei,*loweEW June 7, 1984
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A /. /s BLRD-50-438/82-65 BLRD-50-439/82-58 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CORROSION IN HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector Don Quick on September 3,1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCRs
'BLN MEB 8206 and WBN MEB 8201. This was followed by our interim reports dated October 4,1982 and May 25, 1983 A related deficiency has also been reported under 10 CFR 50.55(e) on the Essential Raw Cooling Water System as NCRs BLN NEB 8010 and WBN NEB 8017 Please note that TVA separated these NCRs and submitted a final report for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant on September.16, 1983 Enclosed is our final report for Bellefonte. A several week delay of this submittal was discussed with NRC-0IE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on May 15, 1984.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L.-
. Mille, '4anager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure oc (Enclosure):
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 0406190306 840607 PDR ADOCK 05000438 CMyi l
.A S
PDR WMCIALdf l l 1983-TVA 50TH ANNIVERSARY An Equal Opportunity Employer
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ENCLOSURE
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BELLEFONTE NUCLRAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
- CORROSION El HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM NCR BLN MEB 8206 BLRD-50-438/82-65, BLRD-50-439/82-58 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT
-Description'of Deficiency
~. The high-pressure fire protection (HPFP) system centains carbon steel piping.
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Experience indicated that such piping exposed to raw water may experience corrosion to such 'a degrec that pressure drops and flows fall outside design conditions in safety-related sections after some period of operation.
The HPFP system was designed in accordance with standard industry practice.
Our experience has shown that, in actuality, corrosion in carbon steel piping used in raw water systems causes greater pressure drops than would have been calculated using standard
_ustry practice.
Safety Implications
' Functionability of safety-related system ce componatts could be jeopardized in a fire. if, due to inadequate water flow, the high pressure fire protection system did not perform its intended function of prorpt extinguishment.
1 Corrective Action TVA has completed the corrosion analysis of the HPFP system in safety-related areas in accordance with the criteria stated in Mechanical
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Design Standard DS-M.3.5-1, " Pressure Drop. Calculations for Raw Water i
Piping and Fittings." Two of the areas analyzed, the Auxiliary Building roof hoses and fire zone 8, have the potential to be
. adverselycaffected from a fire protection standpoint sometime during
.the life of.the plant with the Auxiliary Building roof hose area having a significantly greater. potential deficiency than fire zone 8.
Based on the results of this corrosion analysis, the following specific actions are being taken:
s I.
Testing shall be established fbr the roof. hoses on the auxiliary building as stated in FSAR Section 9 5.1.1, item 6.
The results g
-of the testing on the Auxiliary Building roof hoses will be used as representative of the total HPFP system. This is conservative since the pressure losses for the required flows is significantly. greater fbr the Auxiliary Building roof hoses than t
any other area protected by the HPPP system. For this reason, s
fire zone 8 will not be tested. The existing piping and hose connections on the roof will be used for this testing.
' II.
Testing will be performed every-three years. The testing will be used.to determine'the rate of system degradation and to
' veriff continued' system adequacy.
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III. - Tha t:ct requirements in -I abova havo been added to tha preop; rational test progran to verify the adequacy of tha system et pl nt ctart up.
Tha results of this preopsrational test
[6 program will establish the baseline data to monitor any future changes in the performance of the system.
System piping will be replaced or other corrective action taken if and/or when problems are identified during preoperational testing and/or fbture testing.
To prevent recurrence of this condition, TVA has issued Mechanical Design Standard b3-M.3.5.1 which requires that all fbture pressure drop calculations account for corrosion in raw water piping systems.
All safety-related and fire protection raw water piping systems at Bellefonte and other nuclear plants have been or are in the process of being evaluated using the criteria stated in DS-M.3.5 1.
Appropriate corrective actions will be implemented as required based on the results of these evaluations and/or field testing programs.
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