ML20087N720

Discusses MARCH-HECTR Analysis of Effects of Selected Accident Scenarios on Equipment in Ice Condenser Containment

ML20087N720
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/24/1984
From:	Dandini V, Mcculloch W SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
To:	Larkins J NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
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ML19263A252	List: ML19263A251 ML20087N716 ML20087N720
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AIDuquerche. New Menico 87185 January 24 *1984 Mr. John Larkins Severe Accident Assessment Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 1130SS Washington D. C. 20555

Subject:

MARCH-HECTR Analysis of the Effects of Selected Accident Scenarios on Equipment in an Ice Condenser Containment Introduction Camp, et. al., in their report. MARCH-HECTR Analysis of Selected Accidents in an Ice Condenser Containment. describe the pressure / temperature environment, in the Sequoyah containment, resulting from hydrogen burns precipitated by several accident sequences.

The report is currently undergoing review for publication approval.

The HECTR runs described in the report also included temperature calculations for several three generic surfaces representative of safety equipment at locations inside containment.

The temperature calculations and results were not included in Camp's report.

This letter will summarize the results of those temperature calculations.

Description of Surfaces Three surface types were considered in each of three different locations inside containment.

The locations were:

the upper compartment, the upper plenum, and the lower compartment.

The surface types were:

thin walled aluminum (.125 inch). thick walled aluminum (.67 inch) and the.25 inch thick steel cover plate from a Barton pressure transmitter.

Scenarios Four basic accident sequences with variations on each were considered.

These tour sequences are given in Table 1.

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-2 January 24, 1984 Table 1 HECTR Sequoyah Analysis Basic Accident Sequences Description Secuence SD Small break LOCA (<2" dia) with ECCS failure 2

SD Intermediate break LOCA (2" i dia 1 6") with 1

ECCS failure SH Intermediate break LOCA with failure of low 1

pressure recirculation system TML Transient with failure of power conversion, secondary steam relief and auxiliary feedwater system.

l S H and TML sequences were Several variations of the S D.

1 2

considered along with a few for'the S D sequence.

1 Results The results of the surface temperature calculations are given on the enclosed work sheets.

Surfaces 4, 8, and 17 are the thin-walled component, surfaces 5. 9 and 18 are the thick-walled component and surfaces 6, lo, and 19 are the pressure transmitter cover plate.

Three conditions were considered:

initial temperature (Ti), peak temperature (T ) and p

temperature increase (AT = Tp - Ti).

The initial temperature is the temperature at the initiation of the first In cases where no values for Ti and AT are given, no I

burn.

burns occurred in the compartment where the surface is located and T is the result of the LOCA environment and burns in p

other compartments within the containment building.

An explanation of the color coding is given in Table 2.

Table 2 Sequoyah Work Sheet Color Codes Green Bordered Box Ti 1 440K Red Sc2dered Box Tp 1 440K 50K 1 A T < 200K Blue Box 100K i & T < 200K Orange Box Pink Box A T g 200K 9

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Particular attention was given to those analyses which calculated a peak temperature of 440K (332*F) or higher.. This temperature is representative of maximum LOCA qualification temperatures for safety equipment, and higher temperatures generally exceed the level to which operability has been denbnstrated.

Those cases which resulted in peak temperatures l

of 440K or greater are described in Table 3.

When known.

approximate probabilities of their occurrence per reactor year are also given.

These probabilities refer only to the accident l

sequence and are independent of such factors as the amount of zirconium reaction and code parameters.

Table 3 Accident Cases Resulting in High Peak Temperatures (with hydrogen ignition limit set at 8% unless specified) i GAli Description Probability

• S D Cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless specified) 4.8x10-6 2

S DX, failure of air recirculation fans 8.6x10-9 t

A.01 2S DFX (modified). failure of one fan 1.2x10-8 A.02 2

and one spray train S DF. spray failure 1.6x10-8 A.03 2

S DFX. failure of sprays and fans 2.9x10-ll A.04 2S DF with convective heat transfer 1.6x10-8 A.05 2

coefficients increased by a factor of 5 A.06 6% hydrogen ignition limit 4.8x10-6 A.13 Upper Plenum Ignition Failure Standard S D w/35% Zr reaction 4.8x10-6 D.00 2

l C.00 CLASIX Combustion Parameters 4.8x10-6 w/TVA source term 4.8x10-6 C.01 HECTR Combustion Parameters W/C.00 source term C.02 COMPARE Combustion Parameters 4.8x10-6 w/C.00 source term D.00 100% Zr reaction, core melt 4.8x10-6 D.01 Containment vented D.02 Partial oxygen depletion E.00 37% Zr reaction w/ partial core melt 4.8x10-6 3.5x10-6 5 D Cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless noted) 1 F.01 Partial oxygen depletion 3.5x10-6 3.5x10-6 G.00 37% Zr reaction

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Case Description Probability S H Cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless noted) 1.3x10-5 1

Standard S H sequence H.00 1

H.01 Partial oxygen depletion S HF, failure of spray recirculation 3.0x10-6 1.01-1 1.04 1800 see into accident.

Investigates effects of ice condenser modeling parameters S HF, heat transfer coefficients 3.0x10-6 1.05 1

increased by a factor of 5 S HF w/ partial oxygen depletion 3.0x10-6 1.06 1

S HF, 100 % Zr reaction, core melt 3.0x10-6 J.00 1

with vessel breach J.01 J.00 with containment venting J.02 J.00 with partial oxygen depletion S HF, 37% Zr reaction, partial core 3.0x10-6 K.00 1

melt K.01 K.00 with partial oxygen depletion TML cases (with 75% Zr reaction unless noted)

L.01 TMLU, failure of Chemical Volume and lx10-6 Control System with partial oxygen depletion M.00 TMLB', fan and spray failure, 4x10-7 recovered at 8440 sec into accident M.01 M.00 with partial oxygen depletion N 00 TMLB', no recovery, 100% Zr reaction, 1x10-6 core melt. 124 ignition criterion N.01 N.00 with containment venting N.02 N.00 with partial oxygen depletion 0.00 TMLB', 27% Zr reaction, partial core 1x10-6 melt O.01 0.00 with partial oxygen depletion P.00 TMLB'. 65% Zr reaction, partial core 1x10-6 melt P.01 P.00 with containment venting l

JL These probabilities were obtained in a private communication with SNLA personnel involved in PRA analyses.

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S D Cases 2

The 5 D case with 75 percent zirconium reaction has been

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widely used as a quasi-standard design basis for hydrogen burn analysis (a small diameter LOCA with failure of emergency core cooling).

This scenario.is considered in cases A.00 and C.00.

Both cases indicate acceptable ccaponent temperatuies/(axcept

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for the thin-walled ~:omponent in the uppar plenum in C.00).

Comparison of the.two cases illustrates the sensitivity to hydrogen source terms. ' Case _C.00 uses a source term; f rom a TVA The analysis while the A.00 case uses a MARCH source term.

A.00 case has no bu'cas in the lower compartment and the C.00 case'-has one.

Yet, the A.00 casefaas higher peak surface temperatures.

The somewhat surprising resul't of high temperatures in the i

absence of local burns is moreratamatic in cases A.01 through A.04 in the lower compartment.

In all four cases, burns in the upper compartment result in temperatures exceeding 440K for the thin-walled component in the lower compartment.

Similar peak i

temperatures occur for the transmitter cover plate in three of the four cases.

Reference to Table 3 shows that these four 4

casec involve the failure of the air recirculation fans'and/or This underscores the importance of the containment sprays.

these engiraered saiety features (ESFs).

The failure of these ESFs results in a very hot environment in the upper compartment and upper plenum,l a's evidenced by the high peak temperatures there.

and large temperature increases (some exceeding 200K)

The occurrence of high peak' temperatures in the absence of local burns is only.associatad with the few S D cases 2

mentioned.

Cases A.05 and A.03 are similar except that heat

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transfer coefficients for tbe h.05. case are increased by a factor of 5 thus, component. surface temperatures are higher for this case.

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In case A.13 tha upper plenum igniters are assumed to have failed..Because hydrogen isn't burned in the upper plenum, more in available tot combustion elsewhere.

This results'in two burnslin the'goser compartment and higher surface temperatures.

3 The B.00.cas'e is the same as the A.00 case but with zircor.ium oxidatio6 limited to 35 percent.

Surprisingly, though lessih'jdroden is released in the B.00 case, surface temperscures in the,1cwer compartment are slightly higher.

This is due to a change in the timing of events, such as ice melting and steamlinjection. brought about by the way MARCH handles the 35,&eteent..tirconium reaction limit.

Though the temperature, difference's between the A.00 and B.00 cases are small,-the thin-walled component did exceed 440K for the B.00 scenario.

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f January 24, 1984 Mr. John Larkins The C.xx cases use a source term from a CLASIX analysis Three separate HECTR runs were made using this done by TVA.

source term and the combustion parameters from three hydrogen combustion codes: HECTE, CLASIX, and COMPARE.

The cases and The results l

corresponding parameter sets are given in Table 4.

for these cases indicate moderately differentstemperatures.

Table 4 C.xx Case Combustion Parameters i

Code Parameters Gale HECTR C.00 CLASIX C.01 COMPARE C.02 The D.xx cases are core-melt scenarios.

They assume 100 percent zirconium reaction.

The resulting temperatures in the lower compartment are quite high.

However, it is not possible to separate the effects of hydrogen combustion from the effects brought about by the vessel breach.

The E.xx cases are also core melt scenarios, but the core is assumed to be quenched in some way after 35 percent The only high tempera-zirconium reaction and vessel breach.

ture occurs in the upper plenum for the thin-walled component.

Lower compartment temperatures are noticeably lower than for the D.xx cases.

Several S D cases result in no excessive temperatures.

2 Cases A.06 through A.09 were run varying the hydrogen ignition limit between 6 and 10 volume-percent.

Cases A.10 through A.12 were run to check sensitivity to combustion completeness and flame speed.

Case A 14 investigated the effects of oxygen Case A.15 assumes depletion of the containment atmosphere.

removal of the ice condenser doors.

As with case A.14 E.02 examines the effects of oxygen depletion.

S D Cases 1

This scenario is the subject of the F.xx and G.xx cases, all of which result in high surface temperatures in the lower compartment but nowhere else.

The F.xx cases assume 75 percent sitconium reaction.

Though results for the F.00 case are not I

available, the F.01 case, which investigates the effect of indicates very high peak temperatures for the oxygen depletion, Examination thin-walled model and the transmitter cover plate.

of other cases investigating oxygen depletion shows little When difference with the corresponding non-depleted case.

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.-j large temperature differences do exist between corresponding surfaces, the higher temperatures normally occur for the,non-i depleted case.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the temperat;res for the P.00 case would be at least as high as those of the F.01 case.

The G.00 case assumes 37 percent zirconium reaction.

Though this amount is only half that of the F.xx cases, temperature rises and peak temperatures are comparable.

As with the A.00 and B.00 cases, this is brought about by differences in the timing of the ice melting and steam injection.

S H Cases 1

This scenario is covered by the H.xx cases.

Both the base and oxygen depleted cases show high temperatures resulting trom a large number of burns in the lower compartment.

S HF Cases 1

This scenario is the S H sequence with the failure of 1

a spray recirculation.

It is covered by the I.xx through K.xx The 1.xx cases are for a degraded core while the J.xx

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cases.

and K.xx cases deal with core melt (J.xx for 100 percent zirconium reaction and K.xx for 37 percent).

Comparison of the I.xx and H.xx cases shows generally similar results for lower compartment temperatures.

As expected, the loss of spray recirculation results in generally higher temperatures in the upper compartment and upper plenum.

For the core melt scenarios, temperatures in the lower compartment are about the same.

However, temperatures in the As other two compartments are much higher for the J.xx cases.

expected, due to the smaller amount of zirconium oxidized in the K.xx cases, there are fewer burns; there are none at all in the upper compartment.

TML Cases These scenarios are covered by the L.xx through P'.xx cases.

The L.xx and M.xx cases show high temperatures in the upper plenum but not the upper compartment.

Temperature rises in the l

l Iower compartment are quite. low; however, peak temperatures are high.

This is because the proburn environment in that compartment is such that initial temperatures are near or above 440K.

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The N.xx through P.xx cases deal with core melt (N.xx, 100 percent zirconium reaction: 0.xx, 27 percent: P.xx, 67 percent).

None of the cases show excessive temperatures in the lower com-partment.

There are no burns there.

Temperature rises and and upper plenum peak temperatures in the upper compartment tend to follow the amount of zirconium oxidized with the 100 reaction scenario resulting in the highest temperatures l

percent reaction the lowest.

There are no burns in and the 27 percent the upper compartment for the 0.xx (27 percent reaction) cases.

General Summary One of the more interesting results of the HECTR runs is with few exceptions, the peak temperatures for the thin

that, and thick walled aluminum components bound the peak temperature for the transmitter cover.

Another somewhat surprising result is that, even in the absence of local burns, components can, in some circumstances, For the TMLU and TMLB' cases, reach high temperatures.

surfaces in the lower compartment can exceed 440K prior to burn J.

initiation.

For sequences involving local burns, high peak temperatures

(>440K) are generally the result of temperature rises in excess There However, the converse isn't necessary true.

of 100K.

are several instances in which temperature changes in excess of 100K do not result in high peak temperatures.

It must also be pointed out that there are several instances in which temperature rises of less than 100K lead to high peak surface Significantly, these occur in the lower temperatures.

compartment (see cases C 01 D.00, D.01. F.01, G.00, H.01, I.06, J.00, J.01, J.02, K.00, K.01, L.01, and M.00).

Some general observations can be made for each compartment for sequences in which burns occur.

The upper compartment is relatively mild for 5 D scenarios, S D and S H sequences.

2 1

1 gets hot for the S HF and TMLB' sequences.

In the S HF 1

1 It scenario, the sprays have failed and in the TMLB' sequence, if not all, heat loss of power prevents the use of most, removal systems (in the TMLB' sequence, power is eventually restored).

The upper plenum is hot for the 5 HF. TMLU and 1

TMLB' sequences.

The lower compartment, where most of the safety equipment is located, is hot for nearly all sequences scenarios.

In terms except some 9 D variations and the TMLB' 2

of the number of cases for which the component surface temperatures exceeded 440K. the lower compartment has the most.

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i*.*a 19 Mr. John Larkins January 24, 1984 Finally, the relative probabilities of these events should Tl be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, the 5 D event with.75 2

percent zirconium reaction has become the quasi-official standard scenario for the industry when considering hydrogen burns.

The A.00 and C.xx cases analyzing this event indicate generally acceptable surface temperatures.

The approximate probability of such an accident is 4.8x10-6 per reactor However, there are other sequences, with comparable year.

probabilities, which do result in high surface temperatures in the lower compartment.

These are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5 Probabilities of Sequences which Produce High Component Temperatures Secuence Probability ner Reactor Year 3.5x10-6 5D 1

1.3x10-5 SH 1

5 HF 3.Ox10-6 1

TMLU 1.Ox10-6 a

In view of these probabilities, consideration of these sequences may be warranted.

Conclusion The primary conclusion to be drawn from the analyses presented here is that excessive temperatures, i.e.,

temperatures above those at which the operability of equipment has been demonstrated, are the likely result of some accident scenarios which have similar probabilities to the S D 2

sequence which doesn't precipitate such high temperatures.

i Thus, we feel that in consideration of equipment survival, it is necessary to demonstrate that either (1) equipment can survive the higher temperature, (2) a spectrum of probable scenarios, at least including those considered here, fail to produce excessive temperatures in the specific plant being treated, or (3) the safety related equipment is adequately protected from full exposure to the possible hydrogen burns.

We intend to follow this letter with a formal SAND /NUREG report.

Your comments on the content and conclusions of this letter are welcome.

We hope the information here will be l

helpful in your consideration of the potential consequences of L !

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Mr. John Larkins January 24. 1984 4

hydrogen burns.

Please call us for any additional information or clarification you need.

Sincerely.

t_-.4.Lt_.

5 Vincent J.

ndini C//u (.0) he i s

W. H. McCulloch Safety Systems Assessment Division 6445 VJD:WHM:6445:bjt:205Q Copy to:

USNRC W. Farmer USNRC K. Parczewski USNRC H. Garg USNRC C. Tinkler 6411 J. Linebarger 6427 M. Berman 6427 A. Camp 6440 D. Dahlgren 6445 B. Bader 6445 W. McCulloch 6445 V. Dandini l

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faniels 8ste W8 dias. Agency /Peet) y H. Garg, EQB/DE j

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K. Parczewski, CEB/DE g

C. Tinkler/R. Palla CSB/DAI g

N. SU GIB/ DST 4

P. Worthington, CHEB/DET/RES g

Mtten Fue Note and Retum t e..I For Clearance Per Conversation As Requested For Correction Prepare Aepy F

Circulate For Your Information See Me i

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Investigste s'gnature Wination Justih RD4ARAS I

Attached Is an infomal draft report from SANDI A on Equipment Survival in an Ice Condenser Plant.

Please review and provide marked-up or written -

comments by COB March 28, 1934 4

l 90 9007 use this form as a RtcCR0 of approvets. eencurrences, disposals, sleerences, and similar actions FEDeL M org spmotel, Agensy/ Post)

Room No.46eg.

126E John T. Larkins rsone ns.

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