ML20087C316
| ML20087C316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1984 |
| From: | Letsche K KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8403130029 | |
| Download: ML20087C316 (83) | |
Text
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'84 FR 12 mi:56 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION._
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
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In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Decket No. 50-322-OL-3*
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(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
)'
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SUFFOLK COUNTY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION MOTIONS ON CONTENTIONS 24.B, 33, 45, 46 AND 49 LILCO has filed separate Motions for, Summary Disposition of five contentions -- 24.B, 33, 45, 46 and 49.
Each motion is very brief (less than five pages) and merely repeats, in a narrative format, the statements of material facts as to which LILCO con-tends there is no dispute, which are annexed to each motion.
Those statements are also repeated, usually word for word, in
, Affidavits attached to the motions.
LILCO also submitted a Memorandum of Law in support of its motions on Contentions 45, 46 and 49.
No sucn memorandum was submitted by LILCO with respect to the motions on Contentions 24.B and 33.
This memorandum sets forth the basis of Suffolk County's opposition to all five LILCO motions, and the County's response to LILCO's Memorandum of Law.
Annexed hereto are separate Statements of Material Facts as to Which There Exist Genuine Issues to Be Heard concerning each of the contentions at issue.
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I' We first discuss cach of LILCO's Motions, and then we address j.
LILCO's Memorandum of Law relating to Contertions 45, 46 and 49.
At the outset, however, the County highlights several matters.
First, LILCO, as the proponent of the instant motions, has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
In this regard, the record must be viewed in the light-most favorable to Suftolk County, the opponent of the motions.
See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2',
ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977);
Dairyland Power Cooperative (Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor),
LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982).
Second, the County in opposing LILCO's motions is not sub-mitting affidavits.
It is not required to.
10 CFR @ 2.749(a).
The County demonstrates hereafter that while it does not contest the specific factual assertions of LILCO, these assertions are often irrelevant and, more important, do not in fact come to grips with the contentions. Thus, as demonstrated hereafter, even assuming the correctness of LILCO's " material facts," there exist
.other facts which are in dispute and which are material to the contentions.
Thus, the LILCO motions must be denied.
I.
Respopse to LILCO's Motions A.
Contention 24.B LILCO's Motion concerning Contention 24.B suffers from three basic defects:
first, LILCO mischaracterizes the documents it asserts constitute " agreements"; second, LILCO ignores several of the factual' issues raised in Contention 24.B and fails to demon-strcr.e how they are addressed in the purported " agreements"; and,
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third, LILCO ignores the legal issues-raised in Contention 24.B and fails to demonstrate that the Board can make the findings necessary to entitle LILCO to a decision as a matter of law.
1.
LILCO mischaracterizes the documents it asserts constitute " agreements" The letter dated August 10, 1983 from David Schweller to Charles Daverio, which is relied upon by LILCO as its " agreement" with DOE-RAP, states merely that DOE-RAP "will respond to requests for radiological assistance."
It neither states nor implies that DOE-RAP employees will fulfill all the roles assigned to such individuals in the LILCO Plan, or that all the functions and ser-vices assigned to DOE personnel in the LILCO Plan will in fact be performed or provided by DOE personnel.
While the Schweller letter may reasonably be characterized as an " agreement" for DOE to do something if requested to do so in the event of a Shoreham emergency, it cannot be characterized as an " agreement" for DOE to do what LILCO has asserted in its Plan will in fact be done by DOE.
Thus, while the County does not contest LILCO's assertion that the Schweller letter is a copy of an agreement with the Department of Energy (see Statement of Material Facts as to Which LILCO Contends That There is no Genuine Issue to be Heard on Contention 24.B, para.
1, and Weismantle Affidavit, para. 1), the document itself belies the accuracy of LILCO's characterization that the agreement is "for performance of services required as part of the offsite response" under the LILCO Plan.
Thus, LILCO clearly has failed to meet its burden under Section 2.749 to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of fact.
Furthermore, the Schweller letter contains a provision which explicitly contradicts the assertions in the LILCO Plan concerning functions'which "will be" provided by DOE.
The Schweller letter states:
DOE radiological assistance will be limited to advice and emergency action for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.
Radiological. emergency assistance will be terminated as soon as the emergency situation is under control. - Therefore, responsibility for post-incident recovery, including further action for the protection of individuals and the public health and safety, should be assumed by the appropriate Federal, State or local government, or private authority as soon as the emergency conditions are stabilized.
The LILCO Plan explicitly assumes that DOE personnel will perform several functions throughout the emergency (i.e.,
both before and afterLemergency conditions may be " stabilized"), and assumes con-tinued DOE personnel involvement during recovery and reentry, since the Recovery and Reentry portion of the LILCO Plan is depen-dent upon the availability of dose projection information to be provided by DOE-RAP.
See Plan at 2.2-3; 3.6-4; 3.6-8; 3.9-1; Section 3.5; OPIPs 2.1.1 at 21-24; and 3.10-1, all of which are included in Attachment 1 hereto.
Thus, the Schweller letter states tnat DOE in fact will not perform several of the functions p
assigned to DOE by LILCO in its Plan.1/
The proposal submitted by Impell to LILCO and the purchase order related to that proposal, which, LILCO asserts, constitute 1/ See also Attachment 5 to the LILCO Motion for Summary Disposition on Contention 45, at 5, which states "it should be noted that RAP serves an emergency functica and that it would not normally be involved in extensive decontamination or other recovery activities."
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an " agreement" by Impell'to fill the position of Radiation Health
. Coordinator, suffer from similar defects.
See discussion in
'section.2 immediately below.
In addition, LILCO has failed to establish that a proposal and a purchase order constitute an
" agreement" as required by NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and II.C.4, particularly when such proposal and purchase order are not con-tained in the LILCO Plan-that has been submitted to t: Tis Board --
i.e.,
Revision 3.
Thus the County contends that the fact asse.rted by LILCO.-- that the " agreement" with LILCO "will be included in future revisions" of the LILCO Plan (see LILCO Statement of Material Facts on Contention 24.B, para. 5) is not relevant to
'the resolution of Contention 24.B.
2.
LILCO ignores several factual issues raised in Contention 24.B Contention 24.B plainly states on its face'that LILCO has tailed to obtain agreements "which identify the services to be provided, the criteria for their implementation or the arrange-ments for exchange mf information, or which obligate them to per-form.the functions for which they are relied upon by LILCO."
In
- its motion ar.d attachments thereto, LILCO completely ignores this portion of Cor.tention 24.B.
LILCO has provided no evidence, or even discussion, of how the documents it characterizes as
" agreements" address those matters.
Accordingly, since LILCO's motion.does not even address portions of the contention, it clearly is not entitled to summary disposition.
In fact, as is plain from a review of the purported " agree-ments,":neither-the Schweller letter nor the Impell proposal
e contains such information; if anything, based on that fact (which is not disputed by any-materials submitted by LILCO), summary disposition _on Contention 24.B should be granted to Intervenors.
In any event, it certainly cannot be suggested that there are no facts material to Contention 24.B in dispute.
The LILCO motion simply ignores the factual issues that are raised in that conten-tion.
There is, thus, a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the purported " agreements" identify the services to be provided, the criteria for their implementation, arrangements for exchange of information, or obligate DOE-RAP or Impell to perform tha func-tions for which they are relied upon by LILCO.
See attached Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Exist Genuine Issues to be Heard Concerning Contention 24.B for a complete listing of the facts at issue which remain in dispute and whicn must be re-solved by the Board before it can rule on Contention 24.B 3.
LILCO ignores the legal issues raised in Contention 24.E LILCO's motion quotes thc sections of 10 CFR which are refer-enced in Contention 24.B and asserts -- without discussion, ex-planation, argument, or legal analysis -- that its purported
" agreements" " satisfy the requirements" of those sections and NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and II.C.4.
Clearly, LILCO's bald assertion fails to constitute the demonstration required for sum-mary disposition under 10 CFR 5 2.749.
LILCO has failed to demon-strate how its purported " agreements" meet any of the specific requiremdnts of the regulations which it references in its motion; in fact, as noted in part 2 above, the documents relied upon by LILCO on their faces fail to meet the requirements of Section II.A.3 of.NUREG 0654 since they do not include the identification of services to be provided, criteria for their implementation, arrangements for exchange of information, or an obligation to perform the functions relied upon by LILCO.
Furthermore, LILCO's motion must fail because LILCO has not demonstra'ed that the documents it characterizes as " agreements" permit a finding that the LILCO Plan or the protective actions contemplated therein can or will be implemented as required by 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10.
Indeed, the purported " agreements" relied upon by LILCO raise a substantial issue of material fact, since they do not obligate DOE or Impell personnel to perform the functions LILCO. assumes will be performed, and which are necessary for the proposed implementation Hof the LILCO Plan.
Without such. agreements, there can be no
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finding of reasonable assurande that the LILCO Plan ' complies with
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Sections 50.47(b)(9), 50.47.(b)(10) or 50.47(b)(ll) which are cited in Contention 24.B.
LILCO-Chus'has failed to establish a legal s
basis for summary dispo~di' ion in' its favor on' Contenticgn 24.B.
t B.
Contention 33-
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LILCO's motion for summary disposit. ion o'f. Contention _33 is s
based on one argument: 'in LILCO's view the contention "is predi-cated upon an-erroneous interpretation of-NUREG 0654, 6 II.F.1.d."
LILCO Mot' ion at 3 and 4.
LILCO asserts in its motion that the refarenced section of NUREG 0654 "does not require dommunications between the Shoreham facility and the DOE-RAP field monitoring x
teams; instead itJrequires communications between Uhe.Shoreham e
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facility and the licensee's, i.e.,
LILCO's radiological monitoring teams."
LILCO Motion at 3.
LILCO provides no legal or other basis for its assertion concerning the interpretation of Section II.F.1.d of NUREG 0654.
In fact, the provisions of that section and common sense make clear that LILCO's interpretation is in error.
Section F of NUREG 0654, entitled " Emergency Communications,"
sets forth the criteria for satisfying the planning standard that there exist provisions "for prompt communications among principal response organizations Criterion 1.d cited in Contention 33 states that each plan shall include:
d.
Provision for communications between the nuclear facility and the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility, State and local emergency operations centers, and radiological monitoring teams.
The introduction-to Criterion 1 states that plans must include
" titles and alternates for both ends of the communication links,"
that there shall be " establish [ed] reliable primary and back-up means of communication," and that " systems should be selected to be compatible with one another."
The language in subpert F.1.d contains no statement or even implication that it only. refers to communications between the nuclear facility and the licensee's radiological monitoring teams provided for under the. licensee's onsite emergency plan.
To the contrary, the requirement is for communications between the nuclear facility and:
(1) the licensee's EOF; (2) effsite
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EOC's;S! and (3) radiological monitoring teams.
There is no basis for LILCO's assertion that the requirement in subpart F.1.d is limited only to communications between the Shoreham facility and the L7LCO radiological monitoring teams.
That subpart plainly re-quires that there be communications between the facility and all radiological monitoring teams relied upon for implementation of the Plan, as well as communication links between offsite EOCs and monitoring teams.
Finally, the interpretation proposed by LILCO would be illog-ical, despite LILCO's argument that offsite monitoring teams "by design operate independently of the LILCO monitoring teams."
The mere fact that such teams are intended to operate independently does not support an argument that there is no need for communica-tions between those teams and personnel who are directing the emergency response (i.e.,
those in command and control at the EOC) or personnel familiar with plant conditions (i.e.,
those at the Shoreham facility).
Indeed, the fact that there are licensee monitoring teams as well as " independent" non-licensee teams indi-cates a desire that input from both groups be available to persons responsible for directing and implementing the emergency response.
To suggest that such individuals only need to be able to communi-cate with the licensee's, as opposed to the " independent" teams, makes no sense and is without basis in NUREG 0654.
2/Of course NUREG 0654 refers to State and local emergency operations centers since plans for every other licensing proceeding have been sanctioned and are to be implemented by State and local governmental entities.
In this case, however, the LILCO EOC is proposed as a substitute for State and local EOCs.
LILCO has also failed to establish in its motion that there are no material facts in dispute concerning Contention 33.
As it did in its motion concerning Contention 24.B, LILCO ignores factual issues that are explicitly raised in Contention 33, as well as legal issues that are raised in that contention.
Specifi-cally, the contents of the Affidavit of William F. Renz in support of LILCO's motion fails to address any of the following facts, all of which are plainly at issue in and thus material to Contention 33:
1.
Whether there are any means of direct communication between the Shoreham facility and DOE-RAP monitoring teams.
2.
Whether there are any means of direct communication between the EOC and DOE-RAP monitoring teams.
3.
Whether the Plan providea for any radio communications between DOE-RAP monitor-ing teams and the EOC or between such teams and the Shoreham facility.
4.
Whether the LILCO proposal for one means of communications between DOE-RAP moni-toring teams and the Brookhaven Area Office, and a separate means of communications between the EOC and the Brookhaven Area Office consti-tutes an adcquate means of communications between the EOC and DOE-RAP monitoring teams.
5.
Whether the so-called " provisions at the EOC for the DOE-Brookhaven Area Office personnel," which are not identified in the Plan or in the Renz Affidavit, include any means of communications with DOE-RAP field monitoring teams.
6.
Whether the possible movement of DOE-Brookhaven Area Office personnel "to another location outside the EPZ" if the Brookhaven Area Office were evacuated provides any means of communications between DOE-RAP monitoring teams and the EOC or the Shoreham facility.
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7.
Whether the alleged " mobility" of
" DOE's communications apparatus" constitutes the provision of communications between DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the EOC or the Shoreham facility.
Thus, even assuming the truth of the facts asserted in Mr. Renz' affidavit,3/ such facts do not permit a finding that there are no issues in dispute that are necessary to a ruling on Contention 33.
On the contrary, each of the facts listed above must be resolved by this Board before it can make a ruling on Contention 33.
Clearly, LILCO has failed to establish that the provisions of the LILCO Plan satisfy the requirenents of NUREG 0654 Section II.F.1 by including reliable primary and back-up means of communi-cations between the DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the Shoreham facility and the EOC.
LILCO has also failed to establish that there is no dispute as to whether a finding that appropriate offsite accident and dose assessment actions, including those i
necessary to determine the appropriate protective action recom-mendations, can.or will be taken promptly.
Such findings are necessary in order to determine that LILCO complies with 10 CFR @$
50.47(b)(9) and 50.47(b)(10), an issue explicitly raised in Contention 33, which must be resolved by the Board before it can rule on Contention 33.
C.
Contention 45 In its motion concerning Contention 45, LILCO relies pri-marily on a-general description of the DOE-RAP program contained in a paper (which is Attachment 5 to its motion) for its assertion 3/The County contends that the statements in the Renz Affidavit are either irrelevant or raise additional issues of fact to be resolved.
that there are no facts material to Contention 45 in dispute with respect to DOE-RAP.
In making this argument, LILCO ignores the fact that the general description upon which it relies says nothing whatsoever about the individuals who are expected to per-form offsite accident and dose assessment functions under the LILCO Plan.
Indeed, even the statements contained in that general description -- that " RAP draws upon... trained and experienced
... personnel with specialized competence within the overall areas of health physics, reactor safety, fire protection, public infor-mation and medicine,"
"a typical team... would include appropri-ate personnel from S&EP's radiological staff," and "other BNL specialists in the field of medicine, public information and security may be included as necessary" -- are not sufficient to permit a finding that the LILCO Plan identifies by title or quali-fication the DOE-RAP personnel who are expected to perform the offsite accident and dose assessment functions assigned to DOE-RAP under the LILCO Plan.
See also discussica in Section II below.
Thus, the following material facts pertinent to Contention 45 remain in dispute:
1.
Whether the description of the DOE-RAP team at page 3.5.2 and Figure 2.1.1 of the LILCO Plan identifies by title or qualifi-cation the individuals from DOE-RAP who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions under the LILCO Plan.
2.
Whether the contents of pages 6-7 of to the Weismantle Affidavit include any identification by title or quali-fication of the individuals from DOE-RAP who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions under the LILCO Plan.
3.
Whether the contents of the Impell
' proposal satisfies the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a that the personnel who are expected to perform offsite functions under the LILCO Plan are identified in the Plan.
-Without resolving these disputed issues, this Board cannot make the findings required for a ruling on Contention 45 -- that is, that'LILCO has complied with NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a.
- Accordingly, LILCO has failed.to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary disposition of Contention 45.
D.
Contention 46 Contention 46 raises three issues:
(1) whether the Plan identifies an individual from DOE-RAP or from LILCO's outside consultant who will be responsible for assuring continuity of t'echnical, administrative and material resources; (2) whether DOE-RAP _and consultant personnel are capable of providing prompt i
and continuous services (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) for a protracted period; and (3) even assuming adequate initial staffing,'whether DOE-RAP and the 4
LILCO consultant are capable of augmenting initial response on a continuous basis.
All.these issues must be resolved in LILCO's favor before there can be a finding of compliance with'10 CFR 6
'50.47(b)(1) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.l.e and A.4.
LILCO bases its motion concerning Contention 46 on (1) an assertion in the Plan-that the " RAP Team Captain will ensure capa-bility for extended response periods," (2) the general descrip-tion of-the DOE-RAP program referenced above with respect to Contention ~45 (Attachment 1 to LILCO Motion on Contention 46), (3)
- a. statement in the Impell proposal concerning 24-hour availability
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of one of the individuals expected to fill the position of Radiation Health Coordinator, and (4) an assertion that DOE-RAP activities during the Three Mile Island emergency show DOE's capa-bility for an extended response.
Even if each of these assertions A
by LILCO.were taken as true, there remain issues of material fact in dispute that must be resolved before Contention 46 can be ruled upon.
LILCO's assertion in the Plan that the RAP Team Captain will
" ensure capability" for extended response periods does not con-stitute compliance with the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.4 that the Plan shall specify "the individual... who will be responsible for assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, and material)."
LILCO does not provide a means by which this Board could determine that the " capability" which the RAP Team Captain "will ensure" will constitute the technical,
- administrative and material resources necessary to implement the LILCO Plan.
See also discussion in Section II below.
Similarly, the statement that "the RAP Team Captain" will ensure such capa-(
bility does not permit the Board to determine the title of the individual in DOE who is expected to be "the RAP Team Captain" who would implement the LILCO Plan.
And, neither the LILCO Plan nor the Impell proposal contains information enabling this Board to determine the title of an indi-vidual from Impell who will be responsible for Assuring continuity of technical, administrative and material resources relied upon by LILCO for implementation of its Plan.
Thus, the first issue raised in Contention 46 remains in dispute.
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The statements contained in the general description of DOE-1 e
RAP, and in the Schweller Affidavit atts.ched to LILCO's motion concerning a " sustained response" and the alleged availability of resources from other DOE contractor facilities, do not provide this Board with the evidence necessary for a finding that DOE-RAP is capable of providing prompt or continuous 24-hour services of the type and nature required under the LILCO Plan for a protracted period of time.
The same is true with respect to the statement in the Impell proposal that Impell would " provide a primary and four alternates" and " ensure tnat one of these individuals would be maintained in a ready status at all times."
Thus, the material fact which forms the basis of the second portion of Contention 46 remains in dispute despite the assertions of LILCO in its motion and attachments thereto.4/
Finally, Contention 46 also raises the factual issue of whether there is a provision or capability for augmentation of initial staffing on a continuous basis as required by 10 CFR @
50.47(b)(1) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.l.e and A.4, even assum-I ing initial staffing by DOE-RAP and Impell were cufficient.
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Neither the LILCO Motion nor the attachments thereto eliminate the dispute over.this factual issue.
There is no indication in the Plan, or in the affidavit or any of the other materials submitted by LILCO that either DOE-RAP or Impell have the capability of augmenting on a continuous basis any initial staffing of the func-tions assigned to them under the LILCO Plan.
4/LILCO's statement concerning events during the Three Mile Island emergency are plainly irrelevant and should be disregarded by the Board.
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Thus, the LILCO motion fails to establish that the Board has a factual basis, not in dispute, upon which to base a finding that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) or NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.4 or II.A.l.e have been satisfied by LILCO.
Moreover, without the capability of I
finding that such requirements have been complied with, the Board is unable to make the further finding required to resolve Contention 46 that LILCO has complied with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(9).
E.
Contention 49 Contention 49 raises several issues concerning the implemen-tation of OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
LILCO's motion fails to address the factual issues raised in that contention.
Therefore, even taking as true the facts which LILCO contends are not in dispute, the Board could not rule at this time on Contention 49.
First, in mischaracterizing the contention as challenging the capabilities of DOE personnel (see LILCO Motion at 2), LILCO attempts to divert the Board's attention from the issues actually raised in Contention _49.
That contention does not challenge DOE personnel -- it challenges the LILCO procedures which identify the
-method to be used under the LILCO Plan to'obtain various calcu-lated results which are necessary input to protective action recommendations.
Whether it is DOE persennel who are expected to
.use those procedures, as cpposed to other individuals, is
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irrelevant.
It is the LILCO procedures which are at issue.
See also discussion in Section II below.
Second, LILCO's discussion of certain calculations referenced in OPIP 3.5.2 (for the plume exposure pathway) ignores the issues raised in the contention concerning both the data which are y
necessary.for such calculations, and specific deficiencies alleoed to exist in that procedure.
Furthermore, other than a cavalier remark'that dose projections for the ingestion pathway can be done at a " leisurely pace" (Motion at 4), and an assertion that calcu-lations.for the ingestion pathway "use similar data to the plume pathway procedure" (Daverio Affidavit, para. 10), LILCO's Motion fails altogether to address the fact issues raised in Contention 49 concerning OPIP 3.5.3.
Third, Mr. Daverio's assertions that OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 "will be tested by LERO and DOE personnel in NRC/ FEMA-cbserved excrcises," and that "Any problems revealed by those exercises will be cor'ected" (Daverio Affidavit, para. 12), are beside the r
point and should be disregarded by the Board in ruling on the pending motion.
Clearly, such a statement could be made in response to every single issue raised by Intervenors in this pro-ceeding; however, the fact that there may be exercises or plan revisions in the future cannot be used by a licensee to bootstrap its way out.of litigating specific issues admitted into the pro-ceeding by the Board.
Thus, Suffolk County takes issue with para-graph 12 in LILCO's Statement of Material Facts on Contention
'49, and submits that it should be disregarded by the Board.
-Fourth, LILCO's Statement 11 should also be disregarded by the Board.
That. statement -- "The ingestion oathway procedure is used by numerous emergency response groups around the country" --
even if true, is irrelevant to Contention 49 for the reasons dis-cussed in Section II below.
m In cur..,
even if LILCO's facts were taken as true, fourteen material issues remain in dispute and bar this Board from ruling on Contention 49.
The issues are set forth in the Attached Statement of Material Facts as to which There Exist Genuine Issues to be Heard Concerning Contention 49 and will not be repeated here.
Without a resolution of each of those facts, this Board cannot find reasonable assurance that LILCO has complied with 30 CPR @ 50.47(b)(9).
The LILCO Motion therefore fails to demon-strate that LILCO is entitled to a ruling in its favor on Contention 49.
II.
Response to LILCO's Memorandum of Law A.
LILCO's Summary Dispostion Motions on Contentions 45, 46 and 49 Are Improper Attempts to Obtain Board Reconsideration of the Admission of these Contentions As noted above, LILCO has submitted in support of its motions on Contentions 45, 46 and 49, a " Memorandum of Law" in which it argues that the County, as a matter of law, is not permitted to litigate the issues presented in these contentions pertaining to DOE / RAP.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of LILCO's Motions for Summary Disposition on Phase II Emergency Planning Contentions 45, 46, and 49, February 14, 1984 (hereafter, the "LILCO Memorandum").
The merits of LILCO's arguments are discussed in Section II.B below.
However, the County urges this Board not to consider the LILCO Memorandum at all or the arguments contained therein.
The essence of LILCO's position in the LILCO Memorandum is that the DOE / RAP portions of these contentions cannot be litigated in this proceeding.
However, LILCO has already had the opportunity to contest the admissibility of these contentions.
Thus, it is entirely improper for LILCO now, more than six months after admis-sion of ti.ese contentions, to attempt to oppose litigation of these iso 2es.
A brief review of the history of this proceeding makes clear the impropriety of LILCO's present efforts.
On July 26, 1983, Intervenors filed " Revised Emergency Planning' Contentions."
On August 2, 1983, LILCO filed Objections to Intervenors' " Revised Emergency Planning Contentions" (here-after, "LILCO Objections").
With respect to Contention 49, LILCO stated.it had "no objection" to admission.
LILCO Objections at 51.
With respect to Contentions 45 and 46, LILCO interposed the following oojection:
The County suggests in these contentions that the DOE personnel to be provided under the FRMAP program must be iden-tified specifically.
DOE will respond in an emergency at Shoreham pursuant to the letter of agreement between DOE and LILCO to provide such services (Attachment 2).
It is unnecessary that DOE designate now the names of people who might respond in the event of an emergency that may take place years hence or that may never happen.
Consequently, this contention should not be admitted.
LILCO Objections at 50.
This objection is similar to several of the arguments now made by LILCO in its summary disposition motions en Contentions 45 and 46.
On' August 19, 1983, this Board issued its Special Prehearing Conference Order in which, at page 19, it specifically admitted Contentions 45, 46 and 49.
Although the order contained no
specific discussion of the LILCO objections to Contentions 45 and e
46, the Board noted:
Where we have, without discussion, admitted a contention over objection of LILCO or the Staff, the Board has speci-fically considered and rejected the objection.
Adyust 19 Order-at 2-3 (emphasis supplied).
LILCO had'an oppor-3 tunity after August 19 to object to the Board's ruling (see 10 C.F.R.
S 2.751a(d)), but it did not do so.
Therefore, with respect to Contentions 45, 46 and 49, the situation is as followJ:
LILCO agreed to admission of Contention 49; LILCO_ objected to Contentions 45 and 46 but lost; LILCO failed to seek' timely _ reconsideration of the Board's August 19 ruling.
If LILCO believed that the County was barred from litigating Contentions 45, 46 and 49 merely because they involve DOE-RAP as it now argues in its Memorandum, it should have raised that objec-tion back in August,_when the admissibility issue was addressed.
.It did not and it' offers no reason for failing to have done so.
It is entirely too late now -- more than 6 months later -- to
. argue that those contentions are inadmissible.
The Board has al--
ready ruled on the issue and that is the law of the case.
Since this Board has indicated that it will adhere to the " law of the case" principle (see ASLB Memorandum and Order Denying Suffolk County Motion for Leave to File Contentions Regarding Onsite Emergency Planning, August 5, 1983, p. 6), LILCO's untimely effort to relitigate the admission of these contentions must be rejected.
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B.
The Board Must Reject LILCO's Arguments That the DOE-RAP Program Cannot Be Considered in Ti.is Proceeding LILCO asserts that "an NRC licensing proceeding may not be used to litigate the adequacy of the Department of Energy (DOE)
Radiological Assistance Program" and that for this reason, "as a 4
matter of law," LILCO is entitled to summary disposition on Con-tentions 45, 46 and 49.
LILCO Memorandum at 1.
There are several reasons why this LILCO argument must be summarily rejected.
First, none of these contentions allege an inad'equacy "in the DOE-RAP program."
LILCO in its Legal Memorandum asserts baldly that the contentions do allege such an inadequacy but LILCO fails to state with the necessary " particularity" (10 C.F.R. 2.730(b))
how, in fact, the contentions allegedly assert such an inadequacy.
In fact, Contentions 45, 46 and-49 allege inadequacies in the LILCO Plan and procedures, a mattar which clearly is open to liti-gation under the NRC's rules.
Second, LILCO'seems to argue that since LILCO has chosen in its Plan to rely on the DOE-RAP program for performance of certain functions necessary to comply with 10 C.F.R.
@ 50.47(b), the County is not permitted to challenge LILCO's compliance with NRC
-regulations.
This LILCO argument means that whenever a licensee decides to use DOE-RAP assistance, the licensee can unilaterally remove issues involving such assistance from a Licensing Board's jurisdiction.
This is absurd.
There is nothing in 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b) which supports such an interpretation.
Further, under the Atomic Energy Act, an intervenor is specifically entitled to contest the licensing of a plant and a licensee's compliance with 9 --
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7.
3 NRC regulations.
So long as the Intervenor challenges no regula-e tion (10 CFR 2.758), there is no basis to assert that a licensee's compliance with a.particular regulation is somehow outside the proper scope of an adjudicatory proceeding.
The NRC's emergency planning regulations are not prescriptive in terms of how a licensee should attempt to comply with the Section 50.47(b) planning standards.
Rather, the licensee is afforded flexibility in devising a plan for compliance.
The pertinent question in any adjudication is whether the means de-vised by the licensee in a particular instance are satisfactory to meet the regulatory requirements.
Many utilities perform all dose assessment functions themselves, or rely on state or local govern-ments,without any explicit reliance in their plans on DOE-RAP assistance.
In those instances, the dose assessment issues clearly are open to litigation.
LILCO, however, for reasons that only it-can know, has sought to comply with Section 50.47(b) by a different means -- by relying solely on DOE-RAP, thereby asserting that DOE-RAP, in effect, is a part of LILCO's alter ego LERO, and an integral, front-line part of the LILCO Plan.
The County does not suggest that LILCO is barred from
~ attempting to meet regulatory requirements by reliance on DOE-RAP.
The County does suggest, however, that it is entitled to challenge LILCO's compliance with Section 50.47(b), and that LILCO cannot prevent such a challenge by attempting to hide behind DOE-RAP.
Moreover, LILCO cannot use its reliance on DOE-RAP as a method of foreclosing this Board's examination of LILCO's compliance with the regulations as raised by Intervenors' contentions.
The County and other intervenors are er. titled to contest LILCO's, compliance e
with the regulations; if LILCO seeks to demonstrate compliance through use of outside entities, that is no basis for arguing that the County is barred from challenging LILCO's asserted compliance.
In this regard, LILCO cites NUREG 0654, pages 27-28 (LILCO
. Memorandum at 3), which states that response plans should contain provisions for " integration" of DOE-RAP assistance.
The NUREG
. guidance does not address, however, the complete reliance on DOE-RAP which is proposed under the LILCO Plan.
Further, nothing in the NUREG prevents an intervenor from contesting the workability and adequacy of the alleged integration -- and this is precisely
-what is contested in Contentions 45, 46 and 49.
Because of defects in LILCO's Plan, the DOE-RAP resources are not effectively integrated into the LILCO Plan.
It is entirely proper to litigate this deficiency.
Further, the County has no problem with the role of federal agencies being defined generally in the National Radiological Emergency Plan.
See LILCO Memorandum at 3-4.
However, the con-tentions do not involve that federal plan at all.
Rather, the contentions involve only LILCO's Plan.
Accordingly, these LILCO
" legal" arguments simply have no bearing on the admitted contentions.
Finally, for several pages, LILCO provides a historical sketch of federal emergency assistance programs.
See LILCO Memorandum at 4-9.
LILCO never links this " history" to Contentions 45, 46, and 49.
It is simply irrelevant and provides no support at all for LILCO's motion.
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i e The foregoing demonstrates clearly that LILCO's legal e
" arguments" must be rejected.
In the alternative, LILCO argues that the alleged " rules" governing federal agency response to radiological. emergencies are. entitled to a presumption of validity and that, on this basis, the County should have to file its tecti-mony first.
See LILCO Memorandum at 10.
Of course, this argument has the same defects as the previous ones:
the County is not challenging the adequacy of the DOE / RAP program tut rather the adequacy of LILCO's Plan.
Thus, LILCO's entire argument is off point.
Assuming arguendo the validity of LILCO's theoretical argu-ment, each of the cases LILCO cites (LILCO Memorandum at 20) as precedent for this argument relates to adjudicatory actions in the context of individual challenges to those actions.
Thus, they simply are not on point.
In Lewis v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (D.C. Mass.
-1977), plaintiffs had requested that federal officials be enjoined from.using a certain formula which had been devised for the pur-poses.of distributing funds under the Local Public Works and Capital Development and Investment Act.
The Court held that the formula used was consistent with the wide discretion provided by the statute and that regulations and procedures promulgated under statutory authority are presumed valid.
The issue in Lewis was the validity of the procedure used in developing the formula.
This precedent clearly does not apply to the present case where the issue is the adequacy of LILCO's Plan and LILCO's integration of the DOE / RAP assistance into the LILCO Plan.
L
~.
o Similarly, in Parsons v. 'Jnited States, 670 F.2d 164 (Ct. C1.
1982), the proceeding was an aciudication of an individual grie-vance concerning the validity of recording procedures used by the Air Force Retirement Office.
Plaintiff alleged that the records office inaccurately recorded her deceased husband's voluntary withdrawal from the retired service family protection plan.
The Court held that the actions cf the officers were entitled to a presumptior of good faith and legality which plaintiff failed to rebut by offering evidence of her own.
Agcin, the subject of this litigation was the adjudication of an individual claim and the presumption of validity was attached to the specific actions of
. officials in adjudicating the claim.
Again, LILCO's " precedent" is not on point.
Individual official action is also subject of United States
- v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S.
1 (1926), which is a case based on the validity of specific sales by the designated custodian of enemy property under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act during World War I.
The sales of certain patents by the custodian were held to be valid, and absent evidence to the con-
-trary, the custodian was entitled to the presumption that his actions properly. discharged his duties.
Id. at 14-15.
Accordingly, the foregoing cases do not support LILCO's sweeping assertion that the burden is on Suffolk County to first
' file testimony on Contentions 45, 46 and.49 because no federal official action is being challenged by Suffolk County.
In the emergency planning proceeding, LILCO has the burden of proving the adequacy of its plan.
Because the regulations require it to
a provide specific information on the resources to be used in imple-e menting its plan, LILCO also bears the burden of going forward with itu testimony.
III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, LILCO's Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 24.B, 33, 45, 46 and 49 should be denied.
Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 J
Q ),
f 1
Herberg H.
Brown f
Lawrence Coe Lanp%r Karla J.
Letsche KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 Marchj{#
Attorneys for Suffolk County 1984 3
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4 ANNEXES t
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. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE EXIST GENUINE ISSUES TO BE HEARD CONCERNING CONTENTION 24.B Suffolk County contends the exist genuine issues in dis-pute concerning the following facts which are material to a ruling on Contention 24.B.
The LILCO Motion referenecd herein is LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 24.B, dated February 13, 1984.
'l.
Whether the " radiological assistance" referenced in the August 10, 1983 letter from David Schweller to Charles A. Daverio at Plan, App-B-1-(Attachment 1 to LILCO Motion), includes all the functions assigned to DOE personnel in the LILCO Plan.
2.
Whether the following provisions in the Schweller August 110, 1983 letter mean that DOE will not perform some of the func-
.tions LILCO assumes in its Plan will be performed by DOE personnel:
DOE radiological assistance will be limited to advice and emergency action essential for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.
Radiological emergency assistance will be terminated as soon as the emergency situation is under control.
There-fore,' responsibility for post-incident recovery, including further action for the protection of individuals and the public health and safety, should be assumed by the appropriate responsible Federal, State or Jocal government, or private authority as soon as the emergency conditions are stabilized.
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3.
Whether the Schweller August 10, 1983 letter constitutes an agreement by DOE to provide radiological assistance services in the context of an offsite emergency response under the command and control of a private utility rather than an appropriate gov-ernmental entity.
4.
Whether the Schweller August 10, 1983 letter constitutes an agreement by DOE to provide radiological assistance of the scope, and nature, in the manner, and at the times and places directed by employces of LILCO.
-5.
-Whether the Schweller August 10, 1983 letter relied upon by LILCO as an agreement to satisfy regulatory requirements, identifies the services to be provided, the criteria for their implementation or the arrangements for exchange of information, or obligates DOE to perform the functions for which DOE is relied upon by LILCO in the Plan.
6.
Whether the Schweller August 10, 1983 letter constitutes an agreement that satisfies the requirements of NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 nd II.C.4.
7.
Whether the Impell proposal and the LILCO Purchase Order comprising Attachment 2 to the LILCO Motion constitute an agree-ment between LILCO and Impell.-
8.
Whether a proposal to provide personnel, that is not contained in the LILCO Plan, constitutes an agreement that meets the re'quirements of.NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and II.C.4.
L
9.
Whether the Impell proposal's reference to providing
" personnel for the position of Radiological Health Coordinator" who would be required "to respond" in the event of a Shoreham accident, to " report" to the EOC, and "to help coordinate Radio]ogical Health related activities" constitutes an agreement for Impell personnel to perform all the functions assigned to the Radiological Health Coordinator under the LILCO Plan.
10.
Whether the Impell proposal relied upon by LILCO as an agreement to satisfy regulatory requirements, identifies the services to be provided, the criteria for their implementation, or obligates Impell personnel to perform all the functions for which the " Radiation Health Coordinator" is relied upon by LILCO in the Plan.
11.
Whether the Schweller August 10, 1983 letter and the Impell proposal, individually or together, provide assurance that the following functions could or would be implemented as set forth in the LILCO Plan, in the event of a Shoreham accident:
accident assessment dose assessment accident projection dose projection recommendation of protective actions to the Director of Local Response radiological monitoring for the public and LERO workers radiological decontamination fc the public and LERO workers radiological protection and exposure control for the public and LERO workers ingestion pathway protective action recommendations implementation of ingestion pathway protective actions recovery functions reentry functions
- i
- includes some of the portions of the LILCO Plan which. indicate.the assignment by LILCO of the above functions to DOE-RAP and/or the-Radiation Health Coordinator.
12.
Whether the Schweller letter and the Impell proposal permit a finding of compliance with 10 CFR
$ 50.47(b)(9),
50.47(b)(10) and 50.47(b)(11).
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE EXIST GENUINE ISSUES TO BE HEARD CONCERNING CONTENTION 33 Suffolk County contends that there exist genuine issues in dispute concerning the following facts which are material to a ruling on Contention 33.
The Renz Affidavit referenced h'erein is the cne attached to~LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 33, dated February 13, 1984.
1.
Whether under the LILCO Plan there is any means of direct communication-between the Shoreham facility and DOE-RAP field monitoring. teams.
2.
Whether under the LILCO Plan there is any means of direct communication between the EOC and DOE-RAP field monitoring teams.
3.
Whether the LILCO Plan provides for any radio communica-tions between DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the EOC.
4.
Whether the LILCO Plan provides for any radio communica-tions between DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the Shoreham facility.
5.
Whether having one means of communications between DOE-RAP field. monitoring teains and the Brookhaven Area Office (Renz Affidavit, para. 1), and a separate means of communications between the EOC and the Brookhaven Area Office (Renz Affidavit, para.
2, 3)-constitutes an adequate means of communications-between the EOC and DOE-RAP field monitoring teams.
e 6.
Whether the " provisions at the EOC for the DOE-Brookhaven Area Office personnel" (Renz Affidavit, para. 6),
include any means of communications with DOE-RAP field monitoring teams.
7.
Whether the possibility of moving DOE-Brookhaven Area Office personnel "to another location outside the EPZ" if the Brookhaven Area Office were evacuated (Renz Affidavit, para. 6 and 7),'provides a means of communications between DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the EOC or the Shoreham facility.
8.
Whether the alleged mobility of " DOE's communications apparatus" (Renz Affidavit, para, 8), constitutes the provision of a means of direct communications between DOE-RAP field moni-toring teams and the EOC or the Shoreham facility.
9.
Whether the provisions of the LILCO Plan include reli-
.able primary and backup means of communications that are compat-ible with one another, between the DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the Shoreham facility and between the DOE-RAP field monitor-ing teams and the EOC.
10.
Whether there is assurance that necessary and appro-priate offsite accident and dose assessment actions, including those necessary to determine the appropriate protective action recommendations, can or will be taken promptly in light of tb provisions of the LILCO Plan for the communications between the DOE-RAP field monitoring teams and the EOC.
e STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE EXIST GENUINE ISSUES TO BE HEARD CONCERNING CONTENTION 45 Suffolk County contends that there exist genuine issues in dispute concerning the following facts which are material to a r'uling on Contention 45.
The Affidavits and Attachments refer-enced herein are those attached to the LILCO Motion for Summary
' Disposition of Contention 45, dated February 13, 1984.
1.
Whether the description of the DOE-RAP team at page 3.5-2 and Figure 2.1.1 of the LILCO Plan, iSee LILCO Attachment 1 and Weismantle Affidavit, para.
2,
- 3) identities by title or qualification the individuals from DOE-RAP who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions under the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
2.
Whether the general description of the DOE-RAP program (see-pages 6-7 of LILCO Attachment 5) or the following statement in the Schweller Affidavit (para. 1), includes or constitutes the identification by title or qualification of the individuals from DOE-RAP who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions under the LILCO Plan in the event of a 3
Shore'am emergency:
When a call for an emergency response comes in, the Captain immediately forms a RAP Team of 5-6 individuals from a pre-established list of members of the radiological staff of the Brookhaven National Laboratory Safety and Environmental Protection Division.
Other BHL specialists in the fields of medicine, public information, and security may be included as necessary to deal with the nature of a specific incident.
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- 3. ~Whether the proposal from Impell (LILCO Attachment 6) satisfies the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.2.a that the personnel who are expected to perform offsite functions under the LILCO Plan are identified in the Plan itself.
6 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE EXIST GENUINE ISSUES TO BE HEARD CONCERNING CONTENTION 46 Suffolk County contends that there exist genuine issues in dispute concerning the following facts which are material to a ruling on Contention 46.
The Affidavits and Attachments refer-enced herein are those attached to the LILCO Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 46, dated February 13, 1984.
1.
Whether the assertion by LILCO in the Plan at 3.5-2 (LILCO Attachment 3) that "the RAP Team Captain will ensure capability for extended response periods" constitutes the speci-fication of the individual who will be responsible for assuring continuity of technical, administrative, and material resources.
2.
Whether the " capability" allegedly to be ensured by the RAP Team Captain will include all technical, administrative and material resources assumed under the LILCO Plan to be forthcoming from DOE-RAP.
3.
Whether the LILCO Plan before this Board (Revision 3) identifies an individual from Impell who will be responsible for assuring continuity of all the technical, administrative and material resources assumed in the LILCO Plan to be forthcoming from the Radiation Health Coordinator.
4.
Whether the statement that "the Brookhaven Area Office, drawing upon the resources of Brookhaven Lational Laboratory for personnel, is prepared to provide a sustained response" (Schweller Affidavit at para. 2) means that DOE-RAP is capable of providing the services expected of DOE-RAP under the LILCO Plan, promptly or continuously (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) for a protracted period.
~'
- 5.
Whether the alleged availability of " resources from other DOE contractor facilities" (Schweller Affidavit at para. 2) means that DOE-RAP is capable of providing the services expected
'of DOE-RAP under the LILCO Plan, promptly or continuously (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) for a protracted period.
6.
Whether.the actions of persons who were members of a DOE-RAP team during the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 have any relevance to the services expected to be performed by DOE-RAP under the LILCO Plan.
7.
Whether DOE-RAP has the capability of providing on a prompt and continuous (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) basis for a protracted period, the services expected of DOE-RAP under the LILCO Plan.
8.
Whether DOE-RAP has the capability of augmenting on a continuous basis any initial staffing of the functions assigned to it under the LILCO Plan.
9.
Whether DOE-RAP has the capabilities referenced in para-graphs 7 and 8 above in light of its other obligations to provide assistance to other facilities and governmental entities.
10.
Whether the Impell proposals "to provide a primary and four alternates" and to " ensure that one of these individuals would be maintained in a ' ready status' at all times" (LILCO at 1) means that Impell is capable of providing the services expected of the Radiation Health Coordinator under the
-LILCO Plan, promptly or continuously (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) for a pro-tracted period.
11..
Whether Impell has the. capability of providirig on a prompt and continuous (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) basis for a protracted period, the services expected of the Radiation Health Coordinator under the LILCO Plan.
12.
Whether Impell has the capability of augmenting on a continuous basis any initial staffing of the Radiation Health Coordinator position under the LILCO Plan.
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4 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL PACTS AS TO WHICH THERE EXIST GENUINE ISSUES TO BE HEARD CONCERNING CONTENTION 49 Suffolk County contends that there exist genuine issues in dispute concerning the following facts which are material to a ruling on Contention 49.
The Affidavits referenced herein are those attached to the LILCO Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 49, dated February 13, 1984.
1.
Whether the data, relating to radiation releases and mathematical wind dispersion models referenced in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Daverio Affidavit, which, under the LILCO Plan, must be communicated from the Shoreham site or the EOF to the EOC, and then from the EOC to the Brochhaven 'Ac a Office, are complex.
e 2.
Whether the calculated results required under the LILCO Plan and OPIPs could be obtained if there were an inaccurate communication of the data referenced in paragraph 1 above, or other data required for such calculations.
3.
Whether the Shoreham site-specific default values con-tained in software referenced in paragraph 3 of the Daverio Affidavit, or their use, would result in accurate calculations of dose projections under the procedures in the LILCO Plan.
4.
Whether the calculated results required under the LILCO Plan and OPIPs could be obtained using the manual backup dose projection procedure referenced in paragraph 4 of the Daverio Affidavit, if there were an inaccurate commur.ication of the data referenced in paragraph 1 above or other data necessary for the making of such calculations.
m 5.
Whether the data, relating to whole body dose rates and
?thyroid doses referenced in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Daverit Affidavit, which, under the LILCO Plan must be communicated from field survey teams to the Brookhaven Area Office and then to the EOC, are complex.
6.
Whether the calculated results required under the LILCO Plan and OPIPs could be obtained if there were an inaccurate communication of'the data referenced in paragraph 5.above or other data necessary~for the making of such calculations.
7.
Whether the calculated results required under the LILCO
~
Plan and GPIPs could be obtained if any of the data referenced in paragraph 5 above were missing, or not communicated to the Brookhaven Area Office and then the EOC.
8.
Whether OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 contain provisions for dealing with missing data or communications failures.
9.
Whether the required calculations under the LILCO Plan and OPIPs related to ingestion pathway dose projections require unrealistically accurate communications of complex data from the Shoreham site or the EOF to the EOC, from the EOC to the Brookhaven Area Office, from field monitoring teams to the Brookhaven. Area Office, or from the Brookhaven Area Office to the
- EOC.
3
' )
e 10.
Whether OPIPs 3.5.2 or 3.5.3 contain any provisions for converting measurements'from one unit to another for use by per-sonnel at the EOC or the Brookhaven Area Office in obtaining the calculated results required under the LILCO Plan.
. hether an assertion by a LILCO employee that "any prob-11.
W lems revealed by" exercises proposed to be conducted sometime in the future "will be corrected" (see Daverio Affidavit, paragraph
- 12) permits a finding that there is reasonable assurance that the procedures in the LILCO Plan before this B5ard (Revision 3) will provide reliable data for use in making protective action recommendations.
12.
Whether availability of equipment, expertise in dose calculation, proximity of Shoreham to the BNL facility, or actions at'TM1, referenced in the Schweller Affidavit, paragraphs 1-4 mean that LILCO OPIPs 3.5.2 or 3.5.2 (a) do not require accurate communication of complex data in order to obtain the calculated results required under the LILCO Plan, or (b) contain provisions for dealing with missing data, communications failures, or the necessity of converting measurements from one unit to another.
13.
Whether OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 will provide reliable data for use in making protective action decisions.
_4_
e 14.
Whether OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 provide reasonable assur-ance that there is an adequate method under the LILCO Plan for assessing the potential consequences of an offsite telease of radiation.
9 ATTACHMENT 1 1
1
O THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE LILCO PLAN, REVISION 3 y
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. Department of Energy - Radiological Assistance Plan 1
~2 Department of Energy - Radiological Assistance Plan 3
(DOE-RAF) provides personnel and equipment to LERO 4
for radiologict.1 accident and dose assessment 5
functions, independent from those of the utility.
6 Included in their response are:
7 3
o Field Monitoring Teams 9
10 o
EOC Coordination Personnel (Sce Page 11 No.2.1-3 of Section 2.1) 12 13 o
Field Sample Analysis 14 I
15 o
Aerial. Radiological Monitoring 16 I
17 o
Radiological Controls Expertise / Advice 18 19 o
DOE-RAP Equipment Maintenance 20 l
21 This initial DOE-RAP response will consist of 22 approximately eight persons under the direction of 23 the RAF Team Captain.
The dose assessment personnel 24 will'reprot to the Local EOC, and the field 25 monitoring _ teams will report to BNL.
Should BNL be 26 inaccessibir. the field monitoring teams will report 27 to the Locs.1 EOC.
Upon mobilization and arrival of 28 additional. DOE-RAP pefsonnel and resources, the Local 29 DOE-RAP Team will relocate to the DOE-RAP 30 Headquarters, when established.
One individual will 31 remain at the Local EOC to act as a liaison.
32 33 Response by the Department of Energy (DOE) can be 34 expanded to fit the needs of the situation by drawing 35
~
on capabilities made available from government 36 laboratories such as Bettis, Knolls, Argonne and Oak 37 Ridge.
38 39 The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is 40
=aintained in a constant state of readiness for 41 assistance in emergencies.
NEST is a DOE operation 42 and consists of personnel and equipment drawn from 43 Andrews Air Force Base, the Lawrence Livermore 44 Laboratory (LLL), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 45 Sandia Laboratories, and EG&G, Inc., a DOE 46 Contractor / Laboratory.
This capability incorporates 47 2.2-3 REV. 2
3.5 Accident Assessment 1
2 To organize and coordinate efforts to confirm or 3
determine the offsite radiological consequences of an 4
emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 5
(SNPS).
Activities which are required under this 6
function include, but are not limited to, the 7
following:
8 9-
. determine the magnitude and projected path of 10 o
radioactive releases into the air, water or 11 onto the ground and vegetation 12 13 o
depleying field radiological assessment 14 resources 15 16 correlating the SNPS estimations of possible 17 o
offsite radiological consequences deter =ined 18 by actual field measuremants 19 20 Refer to Accident Assessment and Protective Action 21 Responsibility Matrix, Figure 3.5.2 for organization 22 responsibilities.
23 24 A - Site Actions 25 26 Initial accident assessment of the emergency and 27 evaluation of the radiological release will be 28 performed by SNPS personnel.
Based on plant 29 parameters and atmospheric dispersion model, SNPS 30 will determine the projected dose value.
Upon 31 declaration of an emergency in any event class, 32 SNPS's initial notification and recommended 33 protective actions will be transmitted through a 34 dedicated phone system or its backup as outlined in 35 Section 3.4 - Comtunications.
36 37 B - Offsite Actions 38 39 Independent dose assessment of the emergency at SNPS 40 will be performed by the Department of Energy 41 Radiological Assistance Plan (DOE-RAF) personnel.
42 The headquarters for the United States Department of 43 Energy (DOE), Region I, assessment and monitoring 44 team are located at Brookhaven Area Office (BHO),
45 l
3.5-1 REV. 2
1 approximately six miles from SNPS.
A DOE-RAP 1
representative will report to the Local EOC to act as 2
a liaison between the local EOC and the DOE-RAP 3
Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) teams and 4
l Radiological Accident Assessment staff.
5 6
Twc Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) teams, 7
consisting of two individuals per team from DOE-RAP, 8
will be dispatched as necessary to perform offsite 9
radiological surveys, see Downwind Survey Procedure 10
-(Procedure 3.5.1).
The estimated deployment time for 11 the Offsite Radiological Survey-(ORS) is one hour.
12 The survey teams will obtain their Offsite 13 Radiclogical Survey (ORS) teams Lits at BNL.
These 14 teams will be equipped with radiation survey 15 instruments, air samplers with Silver Loaded Silica 16 Gel filters, and equipment to take water, soil tad 17 vegetation samples for laboratory analysis.
The 18 objectives of this surveying will be to provide data 19 for dose assessment, in conjunction with dosc 20 proj ections, to be used as a basis for protective 21 action recommendations.
These ORS teams will be 22 supplemented by additional teams from LILCO if 23 needed.
24 25 The level of :esponse with respect to offsite 26 ra'diological surveying will depend on the seriousness 27 of the accident.
The RAP Team Captain will have the 28 l
authority to determine the level of surveying 29 required and will ensure capability for extended 30 response periods.
The ORS teams will be dispatched 31 to perform offsite radiological surveys in the 32 downwir.d direction from SNPS.
Each team will be 33 directed by the Environmental Survey Function located 34
[
in the Local EOC, via radio communfcations.
He will 35 specify the distance from SNPS, the direction and 36 sampling location number in the ten mile EPZ to 37
. monitor radiation levels and obtain samples of air, 38 water, soil and vegetation.
These preselected 3o sampling sites are listed on Table 3.5.1 and keyed to 40 the Offsite Survey Map Figure 3.5.1.
Field data vill 41 be radioed back to the Environmental Survey Function 42 l
and all samples will be returned to the Local EOC, or 43 as directed, for laboratory analysis by DOE-RAP or 44 l
~SNPS labs.
45 i
3.5-2 REV. 2
-e Through SNPS, laboratory analysis is available at 1
the Radiation Management Corporation in Philadelphia, 2
PA., which offers a complete Radiological 3
Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) as does a
Public Service Electric and Gas in Maplewood, NJ.;
5 NUS Corporation in Rockville, MD., and Pittsburgh, 6
PA.; and Teledyne in Westwood, NJ.
Each of these 7
facilities has the capability to perform 8
thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) analysis, strontium 9
analysis, tritium analysis, gamma spectroscopy, gross 10 alpha, gross beta and iodine radiochemical analysis.
11 12 Dose Projection Methods 13 14 During an emergency at SNPS, the offsite 15 radiological impact of the accident will be assessed 16 through two separate means; environmental 17 measurements and predictive environmental models.
18 This section discusses how dose rates and cumulative 19 doses will be calculated.
See Procedure 3.5.2, 20 l~
Assessment and Dose Proj ection Procedure, to 21 4mplement these calculation methods.
Ingestion 22 pathway doses will be estimated using Procedure 3.5.3 23 Ingestion Pathway Assessment and Dose Projection.
24 25 The general formulas for dose rate and integrated 26 dose are modified from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 as 27 presented in Procedure 3.5.2.
All calculations are 28 based on the most it=iting factor, the child age 29 group.
30 31 The predictive environmental model is progracmed on 32 a portable computer.
Using information supplied by 33 Shoreham conservative default values dose projections 34 can be calculated within several minutes.
The dose 35 projection will be updated as additional data is 36 available.
37 38 Offsite radiological survey teams will relay whole 39 bodv' dose rates and iodine sample measurements back 40 to 'the-EOC or Brookhaven Area Dffice.
Based upon 41 i
proj ected duration of release, total integrated dose 42 will be calculated.
Survey teams will either remain 43 stationary;and update dose rates every few minutes or 44 else be deployed to provide information on plume
-45 boundary movements.
46 I
3.5-3 REV. 2 i
9' Depending on whether the results of the monitoring 1
. teams or computer model is considered more reliable,-
2 the dose calculations will be used as input to the 3
Protective Action decision making process (see 4
Section 3.6-and Procedure 3.6.1.)
5 6
The Radiation Health Coordinator will ensure 7
. staffing for a protracted period through the use of 8
two-12 hour shifts.
The Health Services Coordinator 9
is responsible for ensuring continuity of all health 10 services.
11 12 C
' Notification and Mobilization 13
~~~~
la During.an Alert the Director of Local Response and 15 the Manager of Local Response will report to the 16 Local EOC in Brentwood, which will then be 17
-activated.
As explained in Section 3.3, the County 18 Executive or his authorized designee will report to 19 the Local EOC if he chooses to participate.
All 20 personne assigned to the Local EOC will report to 21
~
the Local EOC.as well as DOE-RAF's assessment staff 22
- and coordinators.
DOE-RAP's survev teams will be 23
. mobilized and report to either their staging area or 24 the Local EOC for deployment by the Environmental 25 Survey Function.
Com=unications between the Local 26 EOC, SNPS and the EOF will be established to discuss 27 the incident potential, projected releases, 28 meteorological data, etc.
29 I
-3.5-4 REV. 3
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Table 3.5.1 Page 1 of 6 PRESEI.ECTED SAliPLING LOCATICNS The designation symbol is composed of three parts: distance from SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (5ESE2):
5 E3E 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LOCATION DESIGNATICN 1.
North Side Rd, 0.2 miles North of N. Wading River Rd.
2E1 2.
Intersection N. Wading River Rd. & Hulse Ave.
3E1 3.
Wildwood State Park Maintenance area, near tower 4E1 (Lilco designation - SD3)
-4.
Wildwood State Park, State Park Police Barracks 4E2 (Lilco designation - SDI) 5.
Intersection Sound Ave. & Cak Drive SE1 6.
Sound Ave.
0.7 mile Ea'st of Fresh Pond Ave.
SE2 7.
End of Edwards Ave., at L.I. Sound 6El 8.
Intersection Sound Ave. & Edwards Ave.
6E2 9.
Intersection Warner Dr. & Warner Ct.
7El 10.
Intersection Sound Ave. & Warner Dr., Saiting Hollow 7E2 Free Library 11.
Twomey Ave., 0.5 miles South of Sound Ave.
7E3 12.
Intersection Sound Ave. & Horton Ave. - NYS Research Farm SE1 13.
Osborne Ave. - 0.5 miles South of Sound Ave.
SE2 14.
Intersection Youngs Ave. & Osborne Ave.
SE3 15.
End of Roanoke Ave., L.I. Sound 9El 16.
Intersection Sound Ave. & Roanoke Ave.
9E2 17.
Intersection Reeves Ave. & Horton Ave.
9E3 18.
Intersection Sound Ave & Doctors Path 10E1 19.
Reeves Ave.
0.6 miles East of Roanoke Ave.
10E2 20.
Intersection Reeves Ave. & Roanoke Ave.
10E3 21.
Intersection Roanoke Ave. & Jeyce Dr.
10E4 22.
Intersection Remsen Rd. & Emerald La.
2ESE1 23.
Intersection Rt. 25A & Sound Ave.
3ESE1 24.
Hulse Landing Rd. & Sound Ave.
4ESE1 25.
Intersection Rt. 25A & Hulse Landing Rd.
4ESE2 26.
Fresh Pond Rd., 0.5 miles South of Sound Ave.
SESE1 27.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Rt. 25A SESE2 28-Intersection Rt. 25 & Tresh Pond Ave.
6ESE1 29.
Intersection Riley Ave. & Twomey Ave.
7ESE1 30.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Edwards Ave.
7ESE2 31.
Intersection Middle Rd. & Manor Rd.
8ESE1 32.
Intersection River Rd. & L.I.R.R., 0.5 Miles South of Rt. 25 SESE2 33.
Intersection Edwards Ave. & River Rd.
EESE3 34.
Intersection Nugent Dr. & Toppings P'th SESE4 a
l 35.
Intersection Mill Rd. & Middle ad.
SESE1 36.
Intersection old Country Rd. & Kroemer Ave.
9ESE2 l
37.
Intersection S. River Rd. & Forge Rd.
9ESE3 REV. O l
l
e Table 3.5.1 Page 2 of 6 e
PRESELECTED SAMPLINO LOCATIONS The designation symbol is composed of three parts: distance fren SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (5ESE2):
5 ESE 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LOCATION DESIGNATION 38.
Intersection Nugent Dr. & Pinehurst Blvd.
9ESE4 39.
Intersection Middle Rd. & Herton Ave.
10ESE1
- 40.
Intersection Osborne Ave. & Old Country Rd.
10ESE2 41.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Mill Rd.
10ESE3 4 2._
Nugent Dr. (Rt. 24W)-Rest Area, 1.0 miles E. of Pinehurst Slvd.
10ESE4 43.
Intersectic: Moriches-Riverhead Rd. (Rt 51) & Speenk -
11ESE1 Riverhead Rd.
44.
Intersection Wading River - Manorville Rd & Rt. 25A 2SE1 45.
Interaection Rt. 25 &_Line Rd (Gate #25) 4SE1
- 46.
-Route 25, 0.5 miles West of Rt. 25A
-SSE1 47.
Swan ~ Pond Rd., 0.3 miles East of Line Rd.
SSE2 48.
Intersection River Rd. & Swan Pond Rd.
6SE1 49.
River Rd., entrance to Swan Lake Golf Club, 6SE2 1 mile E. of Wading River - Manerville Rd.
50.
Intersection River Rd. & Connecticut Ave.
7CE1 51.
Intersection Connecticut Ave. & Mill Rd.
75E2 52.
Intersection Jones Rd. & Primrose Path SSIl 53.
Intersection L.I. Expressway & Halsey Manor Rd.
8SE2 54.
Intersection Port Jeffersen - Westhampton Rd. & Eastport 95El Manor Rd.
55.
Intersection East Port Manor Rd. & Jodi Dr.
10SE1 56.
Intersecticn Moriches-Riverhead Rd (Rt. 51) &.old Moriches 11SE1
'Riverhead Rd.
57.
Riverhead Rd.,1.3 miles Scuth of Old Moriches Rd.
11SE2 58.
Port Jeffersen - Westhampton Rd. & Moriches - Riverhead Rd.
11SE3 59.
Rt. 25A, 0.5 miles East of Randall Rd.
2SSE1 60.
Intersection Long Pond Rd. & Stephen Dr.
3SSE1 61.-
Intersection Rt. 25 & Wading River - Manorville Rd.
4SSE1
.62.
Intersection Pananeka Trail & Tarkill Tr.
4SSE2 63.
Intersection Wading River - Mancrville Rd. & Swan Pend Rd.
SSSE1 7
64.
Intersection Wading River - Manorville Rd. & Schultz Rd.
SSSE2 65.
Intersection Line Rd. & Wading River - Manorville Rd.
6SSE1 66.
Schultz Rd.-l.0 mile North of North St. at entrance to N.Y.S.
6SSE2 Greyhound owners & Breeders Assec.
67.
Intersection Mill Rd. & L.I.R.R.
75SE1 08.
Intersection North St. & Raynor Rd.
7SSE2 69.
Inte'rsection Center Moriches Rd. & North St.
75SE3
- 70.. Port Jeffersen-Westhampten Rd., 0.2 miles Northwest of SSSE1 Halsey Manor Rd.
71.
Intersection Chap-ans 31vd. & Pqrt Jeffersen - Westhampton Rd.
SSSE2 O
REV. O
Table 3.5.1 f
Page 3 of 6 PRESELECTED SAMPLING LOCA!!ONS The designation symbol is composed of three parts: distance fr:m SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (SESE2):
5 ESE 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LOCATI2N DESIGNATICN 72.
South Manor P.S. - South St., 0.2 miles East of Wading River Rd.
SSSE3 73.
Intersection South St. & Dayton Ave.
SSSE4 74.
Intersection Hot Water St. & Halsey Manor Rd.
95SE1 75.
Intersection Chapmans Blvd. & Het Water St.
9sSE2 76.
Intersection Bauer Ave. & South St.
95SE3 77.
Intersection Wading River Rd. & Country Club Dr.
95SE4 78.
South Manor Dayton Ave. School - Dayton Ave., 0.8 miles 95SES South of South St.
79.
Intersection Railroad Ave. & Chapmans Blvd.
10SSE1 80.
Intersection Wading River Rd. & Jerusalem Hollow Rd.
10SSE2 81.
Intersection Moriches - Middle Island Rd. & Pine Hill Pkvy 10SSE3 82.
Intersection North Pine St. & Clancy Rd.
11SSE1 83.
Rt. 25A at entrance to SNPS 251 84.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Old Saddle Rd.
451 85.
Intersection old Saddle Rd. & Elizabeth Way 551 86..
Intersecti:n Gull Dip St. & Pine Bark Rd.
552 87.
Intersection Nor.h St. & North Weeks Ave.
851 88.
Intersection Carleton Dr. and Sleepy Hellos Dr.
SS2 89.
Intersection Moriches - Middle Island Rd. & Titmus Dr.
951 90.
Intersection Moriches - Middle Island Rd. & Birch Hollow Dr.
952 91.
Intersection Avendale Dr. & Waldorf Dr.
953 92.
Intersection L.I. Expressway & William Floyd Pkwy.
954 93.
Intersection Heriches - Middle Island Rd. & Dayton Ave.
1051 94.
Intersection Victory Ave. & Barnes Rd.
10S2 95.
Intersection Moriches - Middle Island Rd. & Weeks Ave.
1053 96.
Intersection Tit =us Dr. & Greve Dr.
1054 97.
Intersection Sunset Dr. & Wm. Tioyd Pk-y.
1055 98.
Intersection Southaven Fireplace River Rd. & Norwood Dr.
1056 99.
Entrance to USAR Center en Rt. 25A, 2SSW1 0.3 miles East of William Floyd Pkwy.
100. William Floyd Pkwy., 1 mile North of Whiskey Rd. Int.
3SSW1 101.
Intersection Randall Rd. & Bradley Dr.
3SSW2 102.
Intersection Whiskey Rd. & Randall Rd.
4SSW1 103.
Intersection Whiskey Rd. & Ridge Rd.
4SSW2 104. Randall Rd., 0.5 miles North of Rt. 25 SSSW1 105. Ridge Rd., 0.7 miles North of Rt. 25 SSSW2 106. Wood Lots Rd., 0.5 miles South of Whiskey Rd.
SSSW3 107. Intersecticn Smith Rd. & Medford Rd.
6SSW1 108.
Intersecticn Rt. 25 & Smith Rd.
6SSW2 109.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Wading River-Hollev Rd.
6SSW3 e
REV. O
e Table 3.5.1 Page a of 6 PRESEI.ECTED SAMPLING LOCATICNS The designation symbol is composed of three parts: distance from SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (5ESE2):
5 ESE 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LOCATION DESIGNAT CN 110. Intersection William Floyd Pkwy. & Longwood Rd.
7SSW1 111. Longwood H.S. - Intersection Smith Rd. & Longwood Rd 755W2 112. Intersection Wading River - Hollow Rd. & Cullen La.
75SW3 113. Intersection Longwood Rd. & Wading River - Hollow Rd.
8SSW1 114. Intersecticn Middle Island Rd. & Bartlett Rd.
8SSW2 115.
Intersection Broadway or Moriches Rd. & L.I. Expressway 95SW1 116. Intersection Yaphank Ave. & Main St.
9SSW2 117.. Intersection Shannon Blvd. & Valerie Ct.
95SW3 118.
Intersection Yaphank - Middle Island Rd. & Shannen Blvd.
95SW4 119.
Intersection Granny Rd. & Ashton Rd.
95SW5 120. Intersection Part St. & Yapank Rd.
10SSW1 121.
Intersection Sills Rd. & Long Island Ave.
10SSW2 122.
Intersection Mill Rd. & Hilldcyn Rd.
10$5W3 123.
Intersection Mill Rd. & Bellport Ave.
10SSW4 124. Intersection Rt. 25A & East St.
25W1 125.
Intersection Randall Rd. & Cooper St.
35W1 126.
Intersectien. Wading River - Hollow Rd. & Ridge Rd.
45W1 127. Wading River - Hollow Rd.,1.0 mile North of Whiskey Rd.
4SW2 128.
Intersection Whiskey Rd. & Wading River - Hellow Rd.
SSW1 129. Rocky Point Rd. - 1.0 miles North of Whisk'ey Rd.
SSW2 130.
Intersection Whiskey Rd. & Currans Rd.
6SW1 131.
Intersection Whiskey Rd. & Rocky Point Rd.
6SW2 l
132.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Middle Island Rd.
,.75W1 I
133..
Intersection Miller Pl. - Yapank Rd. & Rocky Point Rd.
75W2 134.
Intersection Miller Pl. - Yaphank Rd. & Whiskey Rd.
75W3 135. Intersection Wiskey Rd. & Miller Place-Middle Island Rd.
75W4 136. Middle Island J.H.S. en Yaphank - Middle Island Rd.,
85W1 0.5 Miles North of Longvoed Rd.
l 137.
Intersection Rt. 25 & Church La. (across frem entrance to 85W2 l
Union Cemetary) 138. ' Intersection Lakeview Dr. & Lake Ter.
85W3 139. Intersection Westfield Rd. & Northfield Ed.
85U4 140.
Intersection Mt. Sinai - Coram Rd. & Ceram - Swe:eytown Rd.
85W5 141.
Intersection Gray Ave. & Seymour La.
95W1 142. ~ Intersection Gray Ave. & Adams La.
95W2 j
143.
Intersection Middle Country Rd. (RT.25) & Homestead Dr.
95W3 144. Ceram P.S. - Mt. Sinai - Ceram Rd. & W. Denis La.
95W4 145.
Intersection Pine Rd. & Segouia Dr.
95W5 146.
Intersection Mill Rd. & Granny Rd.
10SW1
[
147. Intersection W. Yaphank Rd. & Sey= cur La.
10SW2 l
l REV. O l
e Table 3.5.1 Page 5 of 6 PRESELECTED SAMPLING LOCATIONS
~ The designation symbol is co.Tposed of three parts: distance from SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (5ESE2):
5 ESE 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LCCATICN DESIGNA7ICN 148. Coram Plaza Shopping Center parking lot - Int. Rt. 112 &
10SW3 Ceram - Yaphank Rd.
149.
Intersection Patchogue - Mt. Sinai Rd. & Route 112 10SW4 150.
Intersection Rt. 112 & Milton St.
115W1 151.
Intersectica Patchegue - Mt. Sinal Rd. & Old Town Rd.
11SW2 152. Intersection Norman Ave. & Suffolk Down 2WSW1 153.
Intersection Rt. 25A & Harding St.
3W5'd1 154.
Intersection Rt. 25A & Landing Rd.
4WSW1 155.
Intersection Broadway & King Rd.
4WSW2 156.
Intersection Rocky Pt.- Rd. & Wood Rd.
SWSW1 157. Intersection Rt.25A & Rocky Point Rd. - Point Plaza Shepping SWSW2 Center 158. Intersection Rt. 25A & Patchogue Dr.
SWSW3 159. Radio Ave.,1.0 mile south of Town Ave.
6WSW1 160.
Intersection Radio Ave. & Town Ave.
6WSW2 161.
Intersection Henry Ave. & Henearly Dr.
7WSW1 162. Intersection Helme Ave. & Miller Place Rd.
7W5W2 163. Intersection Miller Pl. Rd. & Miller Pl. - Yaphank Rd.
7WSW3 164.
Intersection Canal Rd. & Mount Sinai - Coram Rd.
SWSW1 165.
Intersection Canal Rd. & Strathmore Ct.
8WSW2 166.. Intersection Mt. Sinai - Ceram Rd. & Plymouth Ave.
8W5W3 167.
Intersection Bunthorne La. & Wylde Rd.
SWSW4 168. Intersection Mt. Sinai - Ceram Rd. Patchogue - Mt. Sinai Rd.
8WSWS 169.
Intersection Patchegue - Mt. Sinal Rd. & Fine Rd. -
9WSW1 Tanglewood Hills Mall 170.
Intersection Canal Rd. & Chestnut St.
9WSW2 171.
- ntersection Mt. Sinai Ave. & Wheat Path E.
9WSW3 172.
- ntersection Hallock Ave. & Nescenset Rd. (Rt. 347) 9WSW4 173.
Intersection Pine Rd. & Howe Rd.
ICWSW1 174.
Intersectica Locust St. & Wilment Turn 10WSW2 175.
Intersection Rt. 112 & Washingten Ave.
10WSW3 176.
Intersection Jayne Blvd. & Roosevelt Ave.
1CWSW4 177. Jefferson Shopping Plaza parking lot - Rt. 112 between ICW5W5 Grand Ave. & Crescent Dr.
178. Intersection Soundview Dr. & Highland Dr.
2W1 179. Intersection Friendship Dr. & Alma Rd.
3W1 180.
Intersection Magnolia Dr. & Locust Dr.
4W1 181. End of Hallock Landing Ed., at L.I. Scund 4W2 182.
Intersection Rocky Point Landing Rd. & Walnut Rd.
SW1 183. End of Amagansett Rd.
SW2 REV. 0 i
6-
--w----
_----a.
n---
---.-aw
Table 3.5.1 Page 6 of 6 PRESELEC E0 SAMPLING LOCATICNS The designation symbol is composed of three parts: distance from SNPS (miles),
direction and sampling location number.
Example (5ESE2):
5 ESE 2
Miles Direction Location No.
LOCATICN DESIGNATION 134.
Intersection North Country Rd. & Wedgewood La.
6W1 185.
Intersection Long Beach Dr. & Rocky Point Rd.
6W2 186.
Intersection Miller Pl. - Yapank Rd. & Echo Ave.
7W1 187. North Country Road P.S., Lower Rocky Pt. Rd. &
7W2 North Miller Pl.
108.
Intersection Pipe Stave Hollow Rd. & North Country Rd.
SW1 189. Intersection North County Rd. & Vidoni Dr.
9W1 190.
Intersection North County Rd. & Mt. Sinai - Coram Rd.
9W2 (Mt. Sinai Fire Dept) 191. End of Pipe Stave Hollow Rd., at L.I. Sound (Parking Lot at 9W3 Cedar Beach) 192.
Intersection Crystal Brook Hollow Rd. & Pine Hill Rd.
10W1 193.
Intersection Oakwood Rd. & Winston Dr.
10W2 194.
Intersection old Homestead Dr. & Sands La.
10W3 195.
Intersection End of Winston Dr., at L.I. Sound ICW4 RE7. 0
't.
The decision to imple=ent protective actions will 1
be based in part on USEPA Protective Action Guides 2
(PAGs).
Table 3.6.4 lists the protective actions 3
that may be reco= mended to offsite authorities by 4
the SNPS E=ergency Director or Response Manager for 5
various emergency phases (keyed to approximate time 6
periods following an emergency) as a function of 7
exposure pathways following the onset of a 8
radiological emergency.
The initial recocmendations 9
concerning Protective Actions will be made by SNPS 10 to LERO.
11 12 If ti=e permits, the Health Services Coordinator 13 will direct the independent correlation between 14 projected doses at the time of an e=ergency and the 15 recot= ended actions given in Table 3.6.1.
- However, 16 these projected doses to the population sectors 17 under consideration are influenced by such factors 18 as the kind and amount of release, release duration, 19 and weather conditions.
Projected doses are 20 compared with the proj ected public radiation 21 exposure of the populace being considered for 22 evacuation, and with the proj ected exposures if the 23 sa=e population were sheltered (taking into 24 consideration the shelter shielding factors given in 25 Table 3.6.5 in order to determine which reco== ended 26 action in Table 3.6.1 is preferable).
Decails of 27 this process are presented in Procedure 3.6.1, 28 Protective Action Recommendations.
Figure 3.6.1 29 illustrates the process by which the decision is 30
=ade to take shelter or evacuate.
Sheltering and 31 Evacuation protective actions will be implemented by 32 designated zones of the pluce exposure pathway EPZ, 33 as shown in Appendix A, Figure 3.
34 35 The Director of Local Response, based on the input 36 fro = SNPS and the Radiation Health Coordinator, 37 DOE-RAP, and based on advice from NRC and FEMA 38 l
representatives and the State and County 39 representatives should they choose to participate, 40 will make the final decision regarding which 41 protective action will be i=ple=ented.
42 43 C - Protective Actions - Imple=entation 44 45 Individual Protective Actions 46 47 The most i==ediately available resources for 48 orotection from exposure by inhalation of airborne 49
' radioactive material, is the use of many readily 50 available household and personal ite=s.
Ma:erials 51 such as toilet paper, bath towels, handkerchiefs, 52 REV. 2 o
3.6-4
]
4 o
bedding caterials 1
o cots / sleeping bags 2
o medication 3
o infants' supplies 4
o clothing 5
o toile:_ articles 6
7 Food, Milk, Water, and Livestock Feed Control 8
9 This_ protective action entails controlling. food, 10 milk, water, and livestock feed supplies which may 11 have becoce contaminated.
These actions are 12 potentially necessary for the entire ingestion 12 exposure pathway EPZ.~ Controls are designed to keep 14 radioactive =aterial out of the human. food chain and 15 from being consumed by people bo:h in and out of the 16 ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
17 18 Daring a radiological e=ergency, the Radiation 19 Health Coordinator will be responsible for the 20 coordination of ingestion pathway sampling and dose 21 assessment activities.
In this capaci:y, he will 22 coordinate the activities of the RAP Tea = Captain, 23 the Environmental Survev Function and the Dose 24 Assess =en: Function.
The Dose Assessment Function 25 will develop ingestion pathway protective actions 26 proposals for the review of the Director of Local 27 Response.
Based on these proposals, the Director of 28 Local Response will decide whether to reco==end 29 orotective actions.
The Radiation Health 30
' Coordinator will be responsible for communicating 31 reco== ended protective actions to farms, food 32 processors and other food chain establishments.
The 33 Coordinator of Public Infor=ation, moreover, will be 34 responsible for co==unica:ing such infor=ation to 35 the general public.
36 37 Utili:v Protective Actions 38 39 Should the evacuation of.SNPS nonessential site 40 personnel be necessary, LERO will be informed to 41 al'_ow for :he imple=entation of traffic control.
If 42 a public evacuation is in-progress, the evacuation 43 route used bv site eersonnel will be via the access 44 road to Route 25A w'st, south on :he Willia = Floyd 45 e
Parkway and wes: on the Long Island Expressway.
46 REV. 3 3.6-8
o 3.10 Recovery /Re-Entry 1
2 The purpose of this section is to describe the details of 3
off-site recovery /re-entry operations for the restoration of 4
the area to its pre-emergency conditions following a 5
radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
6 The operations arc to be implemented in accordance with the 7
general plans for recovery and re-entry contained in Procedure 8
3.10.1, Recovery /Re-Entry, which identifies the tasks to be 9
performed, the responsible individuals, and re-entry sequences 10 in accordance with the radiological conditions of the affected 11 area.
12 13 When the Response Manager at the EOF declares that the site 14 conditions are controlled, a Recovery Action Committee will be 15 appointed by the Director of Local Response, in accordance with 16 Procedure 3.10.1.
17 18 A - Recovery Action Committee 19 20 The Committee, as described in Procedure 3.10.1, Section 21 5.1, is chaired by the Manager of Local Response and is 22 staffed with key individuals from LERO who are capable of 23 mobilizing required resources, evaluating the data obtained 24 pertinent to the re-entry operations, and making the 25 necessary decisions.
The Recovery Action Committee will 26 also plan and implement actions for the restoration of the 27 affected areas to-their pre-emergency conditions.
28 29 E - Operations 30 31 The Recovery Action Committee supervises the re-entry 32 operation to return the population to their homes and 33 employment by performing the following tasks:
34 35 a.
With Procedure 3.10.1 Attachment 1 as guidance, 36 coordinates area radiological surveys,. evaluates data, 37 and identifies the areas to be re-entered.
38 39 b.
Mobilizes all required resources, manpower, and 40 equipment necessary for re-entry and coordinates the 41 operation uhich includes transportation, traffic 42 control, and communications.
43 44 c.
Determines whether all utilities are functioning, that 45 food supplies are adequate and that the evacuation 46 effects on public health and sanitation are mitigated.
47 48 3.10-1 Rev. 3
q Lo d.
In conjunction with LILCO, prepares and issues announcements to the public information media (newspapers, radio,. television) and to Relocation Centers specifying areas which may be re-entered.
Ensures establishment of an organization to estimate e.
total population exposure on a continuing basis.
s 4
V 3.10-2 Rev. 3
l
'o 3.11 Long Term Operations 1
2 Long Term Operations are comprised of the estab-3 lishment of Federal assistance, a radiation 4
monitoring program and a medical follow-up after 5
protective actions are relaxed.
6 x
7
-Responsibilities 8
9 s
>Dae Health Services Coordinator has primary respon-10 sibility for recommending protective actions; for 11 overseeing the total related radiological program; 12 and'for modifying,. relaxing and discontinuing 13 protective actions.
14 15 Federal-Assistance 16 17 Recovery operations commence as soon as the situa-18 tion is_ stabilized and as explained in detail in 19
.Section 3.10.
LERO functional coordinators will 20 assess the situation and would then submit data to 21
'the Director of Local Response who would request the 22 Governor to ask the President to declare an 23 Emergency or Disaster.
If such a request is made 24
((}
and granted,~the Federal assistance which will then 25 be provided would be administered by the Federal 26 Radiological Preparedness Coordination Committee in 27 accordance with procedures adopted for use in 28 administering Federal aid.
The LERO will support 29 Federal assistance with the resources identified in 30.11.1.
31 32 In instances where a Presidential declaration is 33 either not requested or granted, specific types of 34 Federal assistance may be provided by individual 35 Federal agencies acting within their own statutory 36 authorities.
37 38
_ Radiation Program 39 i
40 l
A radiation monitoring program for contaminated areas 41 vill'be established by the LERO based on recommenda-42 tions from the Radiation Health Coordinator.
This 43 monitoring program may be long-term depending upon 44 the type, levels and extent of the contamination.
45 The monitoring will also take into account the nature 46 of the contamination as well as the area affected.
47 Future activities affecting release radiation 48
- (venting'ecc.) will also require monitoring.
49 t
3.11-1 REV. 0
[\\
~
g i
THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE EXCERPTS FROM LILCO OPIPs, REVISION 3 l
l f
l i
o OPIP 2.1.1 Page 12 of 79 t.
Page 8 of 73 POSITION' DEFINITIONS (continued)
Emergency Position 1 Radiahion Health Coordinator Activation Level:
Alert through General Emergency Response Location:
Lecal EOC Responsible to:
Director of Local Response for radiological accident assessment / PAG recommendations Health Service Coordinator for all other radiological controls / protective aspects of LERO response.
Reshonsibilitztes:
a.
Coordinating the radiological assessment activities of the LERO.
b.
Providing radiological accident assess-ment results and PAG recommendstion to the Director of Local Response.
c.
_ Coordinhting the radiological protection and exposure control activities of the LERO.
d.
Ensuring that the response activities under his direction are occuring rapidly and in concert with the overall LERO r
effort.
e.
Ensuring adequate reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies are readily avcilable, f.
Providing status reports to the Health Services Coordinator.
Representative Titles of Individuals Designated to Fill This Position:
Representative Outside Consultants Rev. 2 10/12/83
OPIP 2.1.1 Page 21 of 79 Page 17 of 73 POSITION DEFINITIONS (continued)
E=ergency Position:
RAP Team Captain Activation-Level:
Alert through General Emergency Response Location:
Local EOC Responsible to:
Radiation Health Coordinator Responsibilities:
a.
Coordinating radiological accident assessment activities for the LERO.
b.
Reviewing calculations performed by the Dose Assessment function for accuracy and applicability.
c.
Formulating PAG recommendations based on assessment results and reviewing these recommendations with the Radiation Health Coordinator.
d.
Intetfacing with the SNPS Dose Assessment personnel to exchange information and compare assessment results.
e.
Cooperating with other LERO coordinators to ensure all activities undertaken by LERO personnel are conducted with ade-quate knowledge and protection based on the radiological conditions anticipated or. prevailing at the time.
f.
Ensuring that adequate reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies are readily available.
g.
Providing status reports to the Radiation Health Coordinator.
Representative Titles of Individuals Designated to Fill j
This Position:
Rev. 2 10/12/83
E O PIP 2.1.1 Fage 22 of 79 At t ac hment 2 Page 18 of 73 POSITION DEFINITIONS (continued)
E=e rgency Position :
Dose Assessment Function Activation Level:
Alert through General Emergency Response Location:
Local EOC
. Responsible to:
RAP Team Captain -
Conducting radiological accident dose Re sponsibilities :
a.
assessment procedures for the LERO.
b.
Coordinating with the Environmental Survey Funcion in the direction and utilization of the LERO Survey Teams.
Providing the RAP Team Captain with dose c.
assessment information to support PAG recommendation development.
Rep resentative Titles of Individuals i
Designated to Fill This Position:
(
Rev. 2 10/12/83
o OPIP 2.1.1 Page 23 of 79 Page 19 of 73 POSITION DEFINITIONS (continued)
Emergency Pos'ition:
Environmental Survey Function Activation Level:
Alert through General Emergency Response Location:
Local EOC t
Responsible to:
RAP Team Captain Responsibilities:
a.
Coordinating the field activities of the LERO Survey Teams.
b.
Receiving / recording field survey results and relaying this.nformation to the LERO Dose Assessment staff.
c.
Providing status reports to the RAP Team Captain.
Rep re sentative Titles of Individuals Designated to Fill l
This Position:
4..-
r Rev. 2 10/12/83
d OPIP 2.1.1 Page 24 of 79 io Attach =ent 2 2
Page 20 of 73.
POSITION DEFINITIONS (continued)
Emergency Position:
Survey Team Members Activation Level:
Alert through General Emergency Response Location:
Brookhaven National Laboratory Staging Area / i field Locations as directed by the Environ-mental Survey Function Responsible to:
Environmental Survey Function Resnonsibilities:
a.
Conduct field radiological dose assess-ment surveys under the direction of the Environmental Survey Function, b.
Conduct field radiological assessment environmental sampling as directed by the Environmental Survey Function.
Representative Titles of Individuals Designated to Fill l
This Position:
6 Rev. 2 10/12/83
a 4
EPC OPIP 3.10.1 Page 1 of 8 u
Approved:
Effective Date
+0 PIP 3.10.1 RECOVERY /REEhTRY 1.0
_ PURPOSE This procedure provides (1) decision-making guidance for the initiation of recovery operations and the implementation of evacuee re-entry into evacuated areas and (2) guidance for the formation and operation of the Recovery Action Committee.
2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 The Director of Local Response is responsible for initiating the recovery /re-entry operation.
2.2 The Manager of Local Response is responsible for implementing this procedure and is the Chairman of the Recovery Action Committee.
3.0 PRECAUTIONS Special situations requiring temporary re-entry require implementation of Section 5.5.
4.0 PREREQUISITES The prerequisites for the formation of the Recovery Action Committee are:
4.1 An evacuation has been implemented for part or all of the 10-mile EPZ.
4.2 Conditions at the SNPS site have been declared stable and safe by the SNPS Response Manager / Emergency Director.
4.3 No furthsr releases of radioactivity having offsite con-sequences are expected, as determined by the SNPS Response Manager / Emergency Director.
4.4 Radiological conditions in the evacuated area have been determined by the Radiation Health Coordinator to be stabilized.
Rev. 3
OPIP 3.10.1 Pcge 2 of a b
5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Recovery Action Committee The Director of Local Response directs the formation of the Recovery Action Committee.
This committee is conv2ned prior to recovery /re-entry to gather infor=ation to assist decision making regarding recovery /re-entry and to imple-ment re-entry upon authorization by the Director of Local Response.
5.1.1 Composition of the Committee The Director of Local Response will ensure that the Recovery Action Committee is staffed by the following LERO members:
a.
Manager of Local Response - Chairman b.
Health Services Coordinator c.
Evacuation Coordinator d.
Support Services Coordinator e.
Coordinator of Public Information f.
Radiation Health Coordinator g.
- Others, see Sect on 5.1.2 i
5.1.2 Additional committee members may participate if available.
They are:
a.
FEMA Representative b.
DOE Representative c.
State Representative d.
County Representative 5.2 Tasks and assigned responsibilities of the Recovery Action Committee members are as follows:
Task Responsible Individual a.
Administration Manager of Local Response b.
Air Monitoring Radiation Health Coordinator c.
Ingestion Pathway Radiation Health Coordinator Sampling d.
Environmental Media Radiation Health Coordinator Survey e.
Laboratory Analyses Radiation Health Coordinator i
f.
Re-entry Area Radiation Health Coordinator Identification g.
Public Dose Commitment Radiation Health Coordinator i
l Rev. 3
o OPIP 3.10.1 Page 3 of ;
6 Task Responsible Individual h.
Environmental Health Services Coordinator Decontamination i.
Transportation Evacuation Coordinator j.
Traffic Control Evacuation Coordinator k.
Coc=unications Manager of Local Response 1.
Security Support Services Coordinator m.
Public Information Coordinator of Public Information 5.2.1 The Recovery Action Co==ittee will perform the actions identified in Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 of this procedure.
5.3 Initial Recovery /Re-Entry Actions 5.3.1 The Radiation Health Coordinator will:
a.
Direct that surveys of the affected area be initiated.
These surveys will include the following as appropriate:
1.
Air Monitoring 2.
Ingestion Pathway Sampling - Surface pater (including lakes, ponds, and sumps), potable water, milk, crops (vagetables, fruit), forage, fin fish, shell fish 3.
Environmental Survey - Ground, equipment, structures, vehicles Compare the results of the surveys with the c.
guidance contained in Attach =ent 1 (for re-encry) and Attachment 1 of OPIP 3.6.6 (for ingestion considerations).
d.
Advise the Manager of Local Response as to the results of the surveys and the indicated actions.
5.3.2 The Manager of Local Response will convene the Recovery Action Committee to discuss the status of tasks enumerated in Section 5.2 in preparation for re-entry.
Rev. 3
OPIP 3.10.1 Page 3a of 8 s
5.3.3 The Manager of Local Response will indicate to the Director of Local Response when all facets of the re-entry operation are determined to be ready.
5.3.4 The Director of Local Response will authorize the initiation of the re-entry operation.
5.3.5 The Support Services Coordinator advises the American Red Cross to begin deactivation of the relocation centers.
5.3.6 All Recovery Action Com=f* tee coordinators notify the members of the response organization that re-entry operations are ini*iated.
5.3.7 All Recovery Action Committee coordinators notify the members of the response organization that re-entry operations are initiated.
5.3.8 Either the Radiation Health Coordinator or the U.S. Environmental Drotection Agency Office of Radiation Programs in accordance with their FRMAP assessment functions estimates total population exposure.
5.4 Re-Entry - Permanent (Note:
Re-Entry / Temporary is detailed in Section 5.5)
The Recovery Action Committee gives consideration to the number of people that have been evacuated, the transpor-tation needs (including special), and the logistics at the relocation centers.
Re-entry actions may vary depending upon the specific emergency conditions.
Following are the three major re-entry scenarios:
5.4.1 The radiological emergency involved an evacuation but did not involve a radiological release.
The Manager of Local Response will direct the appro-priate Recovery Action Committee members to ini-tiate these tasks:
D.t. ermine that all utilities are functioning a.
i;. the evacuated area.
b.
Provide transportation for those who required it during evacuation.
Inform the public of LERO recom=endations to c.
re-enter the evacuated areas.
Rev. 3
~
OPIP 3.10.1 Page 4 of e b
5.4.2 The radiological emergency involved an evacuation and a radiological release; however, no contamin-ation is identified or the level is less than that described in Attachment 1.
The Manager of Local Response directs the appropricte coordina-tors to initiate these tasks:
a.
Determine that all utilities are functioning in the evacuated area.
b.
Provide transportation for those who required it during evacuation, Inform the public of LERO recommendations to c.
re-enter the evacuated areas.
d.
Place TLDs in pred(cermined, strategic locations throughout the evacuated area consistent with the locations utilized by SNPS as described in EPIP 2-6 and 2-15.
Determine exposure of these units as frequently as the results require.
Depending on the elapsed time that the e.
evacuees had been absent, emerger.cy food provisions may be supplied in cooperation with the American Red Cross mobile feeding facilities and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
5.4.3 The radiological emergency involved evacuation and a radiological release where the evacuseed area or a portion of it is determined to be contaminated beyond the levels stated in Attach-ment 1.
The Manager of Local Response ensures that the following tasks are performed:
Continue radiological surveys (per Section a.
5.3) and plot the data on a map so that those portions of the evacuated area that are contaminated are accurately defined.
These areas are not recommended for re-entry.
b.
Around those contaminated areas (as defined in the preceding paragraph), create a buffer zone with readily recognized physical boundaries and place personnel so that the returning population will ba advised of the Rev.
3.,
i OPIP 3.10.1 1
Page 4 a n# P s
possible exposure.
EBS messages will also advise the public of the physical boundaries of these areas.
c.
Survey the contaminated area (s) as much as possible with consideration of the degree of contamination and the safety of the Radio-logical Assessment Teams to determine the means of decontamination or other disposition.
The decision with regard to this area (s) is cade by the Director of Local Response.
d.
Vastes from decontamination operations are collected and safely transported from the affected areas.
e.
Based on the results of laboratory analyses of food samples taken from the affected area, the Radiation Health Coordinator =akes a comprehensive evaluation of the possible need to transport drinking water or food stuffs into that area.
f.
For areas not contaminated, proceed as described in Sections 5.4.2a-e.
5.4.4 The Recovery Action Committee will meet periodi-cally, as required by existing conditions, until the evacuated area is returned to normal.
The committee will consider problems such as addi-tional areas to be re-entered, the situation of evacuees not yet permitted re-entry, and the mitigation of offsite radiological consequences.
5.5 Re-Entry - Temoorary There are situations wherein the evacuated zone must be re-entered by civilians either during the radiological emergency or after it--when the area has not been radio-logically cleared for re-entry.
Such situations may include the need to turn off/on utilities, attend to livestock, fight a fire, or other matters of a pressing nature.
In these instances, the individual (s) seeking temporary re-entry contact (s) the Health Services Coor-dinator at the Local Emergency Response Organization at the Emergency Operations Center in Brentwood.
o Rev. 3
i OPIP 3.10.1 Page 5 of 8 a
Use the following procedure for these situations:
5.5.1 The Health Services Coordinator considers the request to re-enter the evacuated area and makes his decision based on the latest radiological survevs, the circumstances involved, and the cost-benefit analysis provided by the NRC in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi.x I, Section IID.
CAUTION PERMISSION IS TO BE AUTHORIZED ONLY FOR A SPECIFIC DESTINATION AND TIME PERIOD.
5.5.2 The individual will be directed to report to a staging area near the destination.
The staging area will be advised of the special re-entry pe rmis sion.
5.5.3 The re-entering individual is assigned an escort with a vehicle to provide transportation and radiological monitoring capability.
5.5.4 The re-entering person is assigned personnel dosimetry, if necessary.
5.5.5 The group may not deviate from the designated destination nor the allotted time.
5.5.6 Upon exit, the individuals report to the Brentwood Emergency Worker Decontamination facility to be checked.
5.6 The Director of Local Response may halt or reverse the recovery /re-entry operaticn when a change of conditions warrants such actions.
' 6. 0 REFERENCES 6.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.86, " Termination of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Reactors,"
June 1974.
Rev. 3'
i OPIP 3.10.1 Page sa of 6 a
6.2 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix 1.
6.3 OPIP 2.1.1, Organization Implementation es Rev. 3 i
's OPIP 3.10.1 Page 6 of 8 6.4 OPIP 3.5.1, Downwind Surveying 6.5 OPIP 3.6.6, Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions 7.0 ATTACRMENTS 1.
Acceptable Surface Contamination Levels Rev. 2 10/14/83
i OPIP 3.10.1 Page 7 of 8 t
Page 1 of 2 ACCEPTABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS Average (2)(3)
Maximum (2)(4)
Removable (2)(5)
(1) 2 2
2 100 cm 100 cm 100 cm Nuclide U-nat, U-235 5,000'dpm (6) 15,000 dpm 1,000 dpm U-238, and alpha alpha alpha associated decay products Transuranics 100 dpm 300 dpm 20 dpm RA-226,- Ra-228, Th-230, Th-228, Pa-231, Ac-227, I-125, I-129 Th-nat, Th-232 1,000 dpm 3,000 dpm 200 dp2 Sr-90, Ra-223 Ra-224, U-232, I-126, I-131, I-133 Eeta-gamma emitters 5,000 dpm 15,000 dpm 1,000 dpm (nuclides with decay beta ga==a beta-gamma beta-gamma modes other-than alpha emission or spontaneous fission) except Sr-90 and others noted above NOTES:
(1)
Uhere surface contamination by both alpha-and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits established for alpha-and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides should apply independently.
i (2)
As used in this. table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation.
Rev. 0 5/9/83
OPIP 3.10.1
.i Page 8 of 8 Page 2 of 2 ACCEPTABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS (continued)
NOTES: (continue)
(3)
Measur=ents of average contaminant should not be averaged over more than 1 square meter.
For objects of less surface area, the average should be derived for each such object.
(4)
The maximum contamination level applies to an area of not more than-100 cm2 2 og (5)
The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm surface area should be determined by wiping that area with dry filter or sof t absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and assessing the amount of radioactive material on the wipe with an appropriate instrument of known efficiency.
(6) dpm-Disintegrations per minute
Reference:
Regulatory Guide 1.86, Termination of Operating License for Nuclear Reactors, Table 1.
Rev. 0 5/9/83
.['
i k
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
~
)
In the Patter of
)
)
LCNC ISLAND LIGHTING CCMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322 (0.L.)
)
(Emergency Planning)
Sbcreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Uni't 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Suffolk County Memorandum in Opposition to.LILCO's Summary Dispositien Motions on Contentions 24.B,-33, 45,.46 and 49 have been serveo on the following by U.S.
mail, first class, except where noted, this 5th day of March, 1984.
- Jan:es A.
Laurenson, Chairman Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
~
, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory-Commission 9 East 40th Street
. Washington, C.C.
20555 New York, New York 10016
- Dr. Jerry R.
Fline Howard L.
E14u, Esq.
' Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 217 Newbridge Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C.
20555
- Mr. Frederick J.
Shon
- W.
Taylor Reveley III, Esq.
_ Atomic' Safety and Licensing Board Hunton & Killiams U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 1535 Washington, D.C.
20555 707 East Main Street Richmond, Virginia 23212
. Edward M.:Barrett, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger General Counsel New York State Energy Office Long, Island Lighting Company Agency Building 2 250 Old Country -Road Empire State Plaza Mineola, New York 11501 Albany, New York 12223 By' Hand By Federal Express
1.,
Mr. Erian F.cCaffrey Stephen B.
Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shorcham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street F.C. Box 618 Riverhead, New York 11901 North Country Road Kading River, New York 11792 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Nora Bredes 1717 H Street, N.W.
Executive Eirector U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Shoreham Cpponents Coalition Washington, D.C.
20555 195 East Main Street Smithtown, New York 11787 Hon. Peter Cohalan Suffolk County Executive Marc W.
Goldsmith H.
Lee Dennison Building Energy Research Group, Inc.
Veterans Memorial Highway 400-1 Totten Pond Road Hauppauge, New York 11788 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154
- Eleanor L.
Frucci, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing MHE Technical Associates Board. Panel 1723 Hamilton Avenue U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Suite K Washington,'D.C.
20555 San Jose, California 95125 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney Joel Blau, Esq.
H.
Lee Dennison Building New York Public Service Commission Veterans Memorial Highway The Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller Hauppauge, New York 11788 Building Empire State Plaza Atomic Safety and Licensing Albany, New York 12223 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C.
20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jonathan D.
Feinberg, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Staff Counsel, New York State Public Service Commission Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.
3 Rockefeller Plaza David A.
Repka, Esq.
Albany, New York 12223 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Stewart M.
Glass, Esq.
Regional Counsel Federal Emergency Management Stuart Diamond Agency Environment / Energy Writer 26 Federal Plaza NEWSDAY New York, New York 10278 Long Island, New York 11747.-~
' i;.
4 Spence. Ferry, Esc.
James B.
Dougherty, Esq.
Associate General Counsel 3045 Porter Street, N.W.
6 Federal Emergency. Management Agency Washington, E.C. 20008 Uashington, D.C.
20471
- Fabian Falomino, Esq.
Special Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber
' Room 229 State _ Capitol-Albany, New York 12224
/
L G[
Karls J.
Letsche KIRKPATRICK,.LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 DATED:
March 5, 1984
- - ~ _ - _ _ _ __
.