ML20087A069
| ML20087A069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1984 |
| From: | Thies A DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20087A056 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8403070331 | |
| Download: ML20087A069 (3) | |
Text
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Duxe POWER GoxeAxy Powna linxLuixo,Ilox nu180, CHAMLoTTu,N. C. 20242 7 p8 25
- 4. c. r wi e s cmrcutar vecc ones ormt January 20, 1984 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: RII:HLW 50-413/83-45
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Please find attached a response to Deviation No. 413/83-45 as identified in the above referenced inspection report. Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in this inspection report to be proprietary.
Very truly yours, 1
A. C. Thies l
l LTP/php Attachment cc: MEC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Palmetto Alliance 2135 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 8403070331 840222 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G
o DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Deviation:
l Commitments made in regard to the conduct of preoperational testing in Sections 14.2.1, 14.2.4.2 and Table 14.2.12-1, Pages 2, 3 and 4 of the FSAR specify that prior to commencing a preoperational test:
(1) Structure, system and component construction is essentially completed.
(2) The installation of structures, systems and components are verified to be acceptable and the structures, systems and components are turned over to the Nuclear Production Department for testing.
(3) Any prerequisites necessary for the testing are satisfied.
Contrary to the above, when the thermal expansion test was conducted during initini plant heatup, construction of all piping system supports and restraints had not been completed; final installation inspection and turnover of supports and restraints to the Nuclear Production Department had not been done; and, test prerequisites for thermal expansion testing had not been satisfied.
Response
(1) Duke admits the deviation as stated.
(2) The reason the deviation occurred is that a number of supports, that were to be tested, were not in their final d2 sign state as required by the FSAR.
Prior to the start of the test, assurances were received by Nuclear Pro-duction from Design Engineering that all piping supports required to adequately support the plant systems for Hot Functional Testing had been erected. Due to pipt.g support problems, i.e., hangers incomplete, not installed, or spring cans and snubbers not cold set, encountered during the first walkdown inspection of the test and from conversation with construction personnel, it was determined that while the plant systems were adequately supported for Hot Functional Testing, the piping supports were not in a completed condition that would satisfy the FSAR prerequisites for thermal expansion testing on ASME code piping. From McGuire Nuclear Station's experience with this test, it was assumed by the test coordinators that minor retesting and clean-up work would have to be donc during Pre-critical Heatup in order to satisfactorily complete the test. However, after all test data was obtained, it was realized by the test coordinators, station management and Design Engineering that an extensive review would have to be performed in order to determine if modifications performed on piping supports between Hot Functional Testing and final turnover would signif-icantly alter piping thermal expansion. This review would be necessary if credit were to be claimed for any or all portions of tests performed during Hot Functional Testing.
(3) The corrective action to be taken regarding this deviation is:
i Station Management, with recommendations from Design Engineering and the Nuclear Production Mechanical Maintenance Section, has determined a complete re-test of the aSME code piping thermal expansion will be performed during pre-critical heatup of the plant systems. The piping and supports will be inspected at the following reactor coolant system (NC) main loop temperature plateaus: Ambient, 250*F, 350*F, 450*F, and 557'F.
Any problem encountered during inspection, i.e.,
snubbers bottomed out, spring cans out of range, or piping expansion obstructions, will be resolved before proceeding to the next temperature plateau. Data obtained at these plateaus and Design Engineering's evaluation of any problems encountered will demonstrate the piping thermal expansion is within Design Engineering's limits for safe operation of the plant.
(4) Actions taken to avoid further deviations:
a) A revision to the FSAR, Section 3.9.2 and Table 14.2.12-1, regarding thermal expansion testing is currently being submitted. The revision will require monitoring of piping thermal expansion during both Hot Functional Testing and Precritical Heatup of Plant Systems. The piping and associated supports will be monitored during Heat Up for Hot Functional to identify snubbers bottoming out, spring cans out of range, damaged supports, pipe expansion obstructions, and any other
[
expansion problems which could be detrimental to the safe operation i
of the plant systems. The problems identified at tLis time will be resolved prior to fuel loading.
b) The ASME Code Piping Thermal Expansion Test in total will be performed during precritical heat up when the plant systems and associated supports are turned ovet to the Nuclear Production Department. Prior to final turnover, the plant systems will have undergone the N-Stamping process verifying the systems and supports are built to Design drawings and specifications and are acceptable for turnover. Performing the thermal expansion test during precritical heat up will ensure all l
the necessary prerequisites for testing are satisfied, i
)
(5)
Full compliance will be achieved before initial criticality on Unit One.
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