ML20086R427
| ML20086R427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1991 |
| From: | Zeringue O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1407 GL-88-20, NUDOCS 9201020049 | |
| Download: ML20086R427 (7) | |
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December 20. 1991 O J.' Iso',N l % nsIco Zeongue Vce h-s m y Owcrs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlement In the Matter of
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Docket floa. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLAfr" 'BFN) - INDIVIDUAL P!. ANT EXAii!NAT10ft OF EXTERNAL EVENTS (II' EEL) svd SEVEFE ACCIDENT VULNERAlilLITIES (GEN 111C LETTER 88-20, SUPPLEMENT 4)
Reference NRC Letter, dated.Iune 28, 1991, Ir.tiividual Plant Examine.tien of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4)
This letter describes the BFN program and schedule for completing the IPEEE. As requested by the referenced letter, Fnclosure 1 o
- Identifies the methods and approach selected for performing the IPEEE and,
- Identifies the milestones and schedule for performing the IPEEE and submitting the results to NRC.
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_ g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dece m ber. 20, 1091 A summary list of commitments contained in this letter is provided in.
If you have any questiona, please telephone R. k. liaron, Manager of Site Licensing, at (205) 729-7566.
Sincerely,
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J. Zeringue Subterited and sworn to before me on this,s[f/A day ofdtfM11991.
7 sg Hotary Public My Commtsaion Expirt.A "A"E" MC41040 04 Enclosures-cc (Enclosures):
HRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20?52 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Projcct Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, IN, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
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ENCLOSURE 1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION OF EXTERNAL EVENTS (IPEEE)
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT VULNERABILITIES Ceneric Lettsr No. 08-20, Supplement 4.
requests licensees address five external eventet 1)
Earthquakes, 2)
Internal fires,
- 3) High winds, 4)
External fl. code, and aransportation and nearby facility accidents.
In adtlitior., licensees are also requestod to confirm that no plant unique extorr.a1 events tJ'h the potential to initiate severe accidents are excluded f rom tbn IPEE% voletnic activity and a lightning induced lonr< of offsite power event wette provided as examples of these potenti.il plant unique external ev e n'. s.
Volcanic activity is not postulated in the vicinity of DFN and will not be considered in the BFN IPEEE.
DFN previously performed a study to addrens lightning protection. The study concluded that the current lightning protection echtme adequately protects the buildings containing safety related cornponert e.
Since the current lightning protection echeme is connidered edequate, lightning will be excluded from the PTH IPEEE.
here are no other known plant unique external events with the potential to initiate severe accidants.
The methods selected for perforfeing the IPEEE and the schedule for submittal of sumretry reports are described below.
The sureary reports will be coasiatont with the guidance of NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External E"enta (IPEEE).
Since the raethods selected have previously been approved by NRc for use in the IPEEE, a detal19d description of these methods is not required.
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ENCLOSURE 1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFH)
INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION OF EXTERNAL EVENTS (IPEEE)
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT VULNERABILITIES (CONTINUED)
8FN will conduct the seismie IPEEE using the seismie Margin Analysis (SMA) methodology developed by EPR!.
NPC approval of this methodology is contained in cenerie Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
l eFN is included in the scope of Unresolved Safety issue (US1) A-46, verific..*-a of seismie Adequacy of Equipment in operating Plante and is a member of the n., Pale Qualification Utilities Group (5000).
Generie l
Letter 88-20, supplement,. *ecommends the resolution of USI A-46 be coordinated with the IPEEE so tn ' the objectives of both activities may be accomplished with a single walkdown. " ort.
nrN concurs with this recommendation and currently intends to parts.- one walkdown to address both 051 A-46 and the seismie IPEEE.
The safety Evaluation for the resolution of Us! A-46 has not t% i received. UntilthissafetyEvaluationisreceivedandevaluated,IrH will be unable to identify the methods and approach for performing the seismic portion of the 2PREE or the completion schedule.
DFN will identify the methods and approach for performing the sot *1c portion of the JPEEE and submit a schedule for its completion within 120 daye from receipt of the StR for the resolution of US! A-46.
Internal Fires -
BFN will conduct the internal fires IPEEE using the Fire Induced Vui.crability Evaluation (FIVE) methodology.
This methodology allows the greatset use of the current 8FN Appendix R safe Shutdown Analysis program. NRC approval of this methodology is contained in its August =21, 1991 Safety Evaluation Report to the Nuclear Hanagement and pesources Council.--
BFN will complete the IPEEE for internal firen and provide a summary report to NRC prior to the restart of Unit 1, within one hundred twenty days af ter the restart of Unit 2 from its second refueling outage (Cycle 7 outage), and within one hundred twenty days after the rentart of Unit 3 from its first refueling outage following restart (Cycle 6 outage).
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ENCLOSURE 1
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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION OF EXTERNAL EVENTS (IPEEE)
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT VULNERABILITIES (CONTINUED)
BFH will conduct the high winde IPETE using the screening type approach outlined in Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
The first step will include the review of current meteorological data to determine if the 1976 Standard Review Plan (SRP) criteria are met for high winds, tornados, and tornado generated missiles.
NRC approval snis methodology is contained in Generic Letter 8R **, supplement 4.
BFN will complete the high winds IFEEE *;. all three units and provide a summary report to NRC wl&$*i.. one hundred twenty days after the restart of Unit 2 from +6. escond refueling outage (Cycle 7 outage).
EM '...a Floods -
BFH will conduct the external floods IPEEE using the screening type approach outlined in Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
The first step will include the review of current meteorological data and dam configurations to determine if the 1975 SRP criteria are met.
NRC approval of this methodology is contained in Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
HT? will complete the external floods IPEEE for all three units and provid6 a summary report to NRC within one hundred twenty days after the restart of Unit 2 from the second refueling outage (Cycle 7 outage).
Transportation and Nearby Faellity Accidents -
BrH will conduct the transportation and nearby f acilit y accidents IPEEE using the screening type approach outlined in Generic Lette 88-20, supplement 4.
BFN's compliance with the 1975 SRP criteria has recently been confirmed by the staff (Reference NRC's September 14, 1990 Safety Evaluation of the Effect of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Chemicals Transported by Barges on Control Room Habitability).
The first step will include the review of current transportation data to determine if the 1973 SRP criteria are still met.
NRC approval of this methodology is contained'in Ceneric Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
BFN will complete the transportation and nearby facility accidents IPEEE for all three units and provide a sunenary report to NRC within one hundred twenty days after the restart of t' nit 2 from the second refueling outage (Cycle 7 outage).
ENCLOSURE I BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION OF EXTERNAL EVENTS (IPEFrt i
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT VULNERABILITTr (CONTINilrni Unit 2 is ~"....uy in the middle of cycle 6 operation.
Unita 1 and 3 are in
...xtended outage. As such, Unit 2 is conaldered to.be the lead plant for the performance of the BrN ! PERE.
The Safety Evaluation for the resolution of USI A-46 has not been received.
In addition, aufficient time and permanent plant resources are not available to complete the Unit 2 speeltic (Internal fires) and site specific (external floods, and transportation and nearby faellity accidente) 2PREta prior to the June 1994 completion date requested by
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Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4.
The proposed BrN completion schedulen represent a good faith effort that will allow BrH to utiltre, to th? maximum extent possible, permanent plant personnel due to the leveling of manpower resources over a longer duration.
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ENCL.050RE 2 BROWNS FE'tRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
S!!is ARY OF COMMITMENTS 1
1)
BFN will complete the internal fires IPEEE and provide a summary report to NRC prior to the restart of Unit 1, within one hundred twenty days after the restart of Unit 2 from its second refueling outage (Cycle 1 outage), and within one hundred twenty days after the restart of Unit 3 l
from ite first refueling outage following restart (cycle 6 outage).
2)
BFN will complete the high winds, external floods, and transportation and nearby facility accidente IPEEE for all three units and provide a l
-summary-report to NRC within one hundred twenty days after the restart i
of Unit 2 from the second refueling outage (cycle 7 outage).
i 3)
BFN will identify the methodt and approach for performing the seismic t
portion of the trEEE and submit a schedule for ite complettore within 120 days from receipt of the SER for the resolution of t/81 A-46.
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Caronna Power & l.lght Company P O Bos 1%1 e Aaleigh N C 776N DEC 181991 O L VAUGHN v.t. nwo.n, Sliitl Al, N1 S.91323 NMw Sowet Depanment g cp {5g g TAC Nost:812% an/81297 United States Nuclear llegulatory Commission ATIliNTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Ill(UNSWICK STliAM lillicl'lIIC Pl. ANT, UNIT NUS.1 AND.'
DOCKliT NOS. 50 325 & $0 324/1.lCliNSli NOS. DPit-71 & Dl'It.n2 IlliSPONS!! TO NitC SUPPL.liMl!NTAl SA1:liTY INAl.UATION OF CP&l. Ill!SPONSli TO STATION Hl.ACKOUT ltUlf Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to the NitC Supplemental Safety livaluation of the Ilrunswick Steam lilectric Plant (BSlil'), Units I and 2, Response to the Station Blackout Rule. This supplemental safety evaluation (dated October 2.1991) requested that Carolina Power & l.ight Company (CP&l ) establish procedural controb to ensure that the control room temperature of 78" F used in the heat-up analysis would not be exceeded during normal power operation, land cause the I hour temperature af ter an SHO event to be above 120"F), and required Cl'Al. to submit confirmation of the resolution of this issue and present a schedule for its implementation in accordance with 10 CFit 50.63(c)(4).
As noted on page 3, Section 2.2.3 of this supplemental wately evaluation, CP&l. had performed an analysis which indicated the HSlil' control room temperature would remain below 118" F after one hour following an Silo event. This analysis assumed an initial control room temperature of 78" F, which was consistent with the guidance provided in NURIiG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews" Section 6.1.5.1. The analysis also contained a degree of conservatism since the intent was to provide reasonable assurance of the operability of equipment needed to cope with a station blackout. CP&l. has performed an analysis of the initial control room temperature which removes some of that conservatism. This analysis demonstrates that the initialization temperature could actually be as high as S5" F and the one hout temperature still remain below the specified NUM ARC 87 00, Section 2.7 value of 120' F s
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4 Carolina Power & Light Company will monitor control inom temperature to verify that j
the Control Room temperature is below 78"F. When the temperature is above 78T increased trending will commence as well as trouble shooting. If the temperature I
.wches 85T then trouble shooting activities will take place around the clock and correci: - actions will be implemented if necessary. The temperature will be measured with the unit c.. "ormal power operation and with the llVAC system operating normally as allowed by NUhin;'" 8744) Assumption 2.2.1(2).
Carolina Power & Light Company has pn..'.n.wiv verified by direct observation that the IIVAC system is capable of mainiaining the contro, mm less than or equal to 78" F under normal power operation. The purpose of monitorms *he temperature in the future is to identify potential malfunctions of the contic! room li' ' AC system.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to hir. S. D. Floyd at (00 544,901.
Yours very truly, i
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G. II, Vaughn GEV/JCP (cr sbo-r.wpf) cc:
hir. Dayne ll. lltown Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. N.11. Le i
Mr. R. L. Prevatte l
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