ML20086Q883

Informs of Review of Expansion Bellows Failure Incident as Requested in .Review Continuing Although Util Concludes Failure of non-class I Equipment Would Not Cause Flooding Such That Common Mode Failure of Equipment Occurs

ML20086Q883
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	09/01/1972
From:	Bauer E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20086Q885	List: ML20086Q883 ML20086Q914 ML20086Q918 ML20086Q933
References
NUDOCS 8402280587
Download: ML20086Q883 (2)

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PHICADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY EDWARD G. BAUER. JR. 2301 MARKET STREET VICE PRESiOENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL EUGENE J. BRADLEY PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL

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JOHN P. CAREY (215)841 4000 DON ALD BLANKEN 4" g 3f' :n-?,'~f gL 3 %

ALBERT R. BEAL . / '\ \<

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RUDOLPH A.CHILLEMI /,h% 's, \ \

E. C. KIRK NALL /+./ ^

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T. H. MAHER CORNELL [N~s \ "' . , '

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PAUL AUERBACH ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL

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Assistant Director for Boiling Water Reactors Directorate of Licensing f6 United States Atcmic Energy Commission Washington, DC 205h5

s  % [ Q { # [M Y Ref. Docket Nos. $0-277

$0-278

Subject:

Ponch Bottom Units Ho. 2 and 3

Dear Mr. Boyd:

1.s requected in your letter of Au<mst h,1972, we have reviewed the expansion bello'. c failure incident , nich recently occurred at Quad Cities Unit 1 a.,d have completed the evaluation of the Peach Bottem Units 2 and 3 facilities as requested in your letter.

The failure of non ': lass I equip.mnt, particularly in the circulating water systen and the firo orotection system would not re-sult in flooding :(nich >tould adversely affect Class I equipment. In the Peach Bottom desira the circulating tuter pumps located in the Intake structure are installed adjacent to the emergency service water pump rooms which contain the emergency service water pumps used for diesel generator cooling, the high pressure RER service water pumps, and firo pumps. These energency facilities are installed in a scismic Class I structure which is flood protected for the prob-able maximum flood. These facilities are isolated from the main condensers which are located in the turbine building.

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The condenscra are connected.to the circulating water piping using expansion jointe, Cn the condencer inlet side the exoansion

/I joint is installed bc'. men an electrical]y operated butterfly valve h

and the condenser. Tncre are no valves on the condenser outlet thus ih reverse flushing is noL possible with this layout.

N If a bellows should fail, the cafeguard equip..ent, located in the reactor building would not be affected since the reactor building .

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has been provided with water tight doors below Elev. 1358-09 (CD).

It is not reaconable to expect that the flood water resulting from the bellows failure wculd enter the reactor building since the Turbine Building ground level is at Elev. 1168-09 (CD).

Fire water systems and other non-Clacs I system piping routed through the engineered safeguards and recctor protection system equirment areas and ccmuartments were reviewed curing the design stages. Based on these reviews, certain design changes and modification works have been executed, such as providing emergency pump room separation by adding a dividing wall and re-routing of non-Class I piping frcn the emergency load center rooms.

The Peach Botton torus cavity and all Core Standby Cooling Systems (CSCS) pump rooms in the Reactor Building are leak tight up to Elev.

1118-0". All access doors to thecc rooms are marine type quick-acting bulkhead doors. These doors are normally closed. All piping penetra-tions between the roc:;s below Elev. 1118-09 are sealed. Flood drainage piping from each CSCS pump room is individually piped to building semps.

Instrumentation is ocavided to continuoucly monitor for and detect rising water level a; out 60 above the floor, with annunciation in the main control rocn. F auld leakage or flooding occur in any ono CSCS pump room, this will cat ironir the running cacability of the other CSCS pumps due to Lar separation and ?ratections afforded the other equionents, and the ultiplicity, recundancy, and diversity inherent in the Peach Ecttcm plent design for the CSCS.

Although we have concluded that the failure of non-Class I equip-ment would not causs flcoding such that ecmmon node failure of redundant equipment occurs, we are continuins our review efforts relative to flooding potential. arlier a similar design review was conducted and minor revision work auch as the installation of Class I separation walls in the emergency service water pumn roons has been initiated. No auditional problem areas have been uncovered.

Very truly yourc,

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