ML20086P132
| ML20086P132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/1995 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-BR-0177, NUREG-BR-0177-N95-1, NUREG-BR-177, NUREG-BR-177-N95-1, NUDOCS 9507260168 | |
| Download: ML20086P132 (5) | |
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Sealed Source & Device Newsletter f * %,\\
f US. Nuclear Courtesy of the NUREG/BR-0177 l
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Regulatory Scaled Source No.95-1 i
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Commission Saferv Section June 1995 With technology constantly changing and the need to protect public health and safety,it is imperative that communications between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement State programs and also between these regulatory authorities and users of radioactive sealed sources and devices be open and cooperative. The NRC Scaled Source Safety Section (5555)is pnwiding this newsletter to promote such communications.
TEC/INICAL ISSUES Possessors of Berthold model LB 7400 series devices that were received during 1991 or 1992, and who have not been contacted by 10 CFR Part 21 Report of Defect by Apgee Apgee or Berthold, should contact Mr. Bud Corporation for LB 7400 Series Devices Smith of Appee/Berthold directly at j
(412) 378-1900 for more information. In j
Argee Corporation has informed NRC of a addition, possessors of these devices who hav6 potential defect in the shutter mechanisms of not received instructions for testing for the i
Berthold model LB 7440 and LB 7442 devices defect should not attempt to test their devices containing cesium 137 or cobalt 60 and until first contacting Apgee/Berthold for
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distnbuted between 1991 and 1992. ne assistance.
l manufacturers preliminary analysis indicates I
the defect to be proceduralin nature in which Troxler Gauges Wth Disconnected Source flux residue following welding of the shutter Caps (Update) l was not cleaned. The flux residue apparently acts as a catalyst, and when subjected to a Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) has humid environment causes corrosion and completed its investigation of a Troxler Model l
swelling of the shutter. As the shutter swells, 3401 nuclear gauging device whose source cap friction mercases. caus ng movement of the became separated from the source rod, shutter to operate with high resistance. In releasing the contained scaled source. As part some cases.,the shutter may swell enough t of its investigation, swr 1 also anahzed the completely impede movement and become source rods of four additional Troiler model stuck m the open position. Appec/Berthold 3401 gauges; one. was cracked aEProximately has distributed a bulletin to all potentia:!v I.80 about its circumference; one showed affected users of these devices with specific signs of a worn weld; and two showed no signs instructions on how to test for the defect. To of cracks.
date. nearly all users contacted have re..
sponded, and oser 11 percent of the devices During the investigation swr 1 determined the 1
involved have indicated evidence of the defect.
folkswinE' Appec/l erthold continues to receive responses he source rod failed in a brittle manner, and. in combination with the manufacturer,is analyzm; the data to serify and determine the The crack originated on one side of the e
extent of the defect. and to determine the rod due to an applied bending load, and l
appropriate course of action.
extended in progressive steps over time.
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1 9507260168 950630 i
he rod did not fait catastrophically propagation is not known. One possible cause because of a one-time load.
is misuse of the device by forcing the rod into General Radioisotopes Products (GRP)
Pool-Type, Cobalt-60 Irradiator Sources the medium to be tested, without first insert-Scaled Source and Rosemount/Kay-Ray I'ound with Possible Surface Corrosion e liardness testing determined that the ing a rigid tube into the medium to protect Source llolder Returned Mith Nordion's source surveillance program identi regmn of crack amtiation was sub-the rod. His action is contrary to the manu-Contammation Levels Abo e 0.005 pc:.
fied surface corrosion on several sources stantially hard, as cornpared with the facturer s instructions and should not be
[185 Bql(Update) installed at a Sterigenics pmi-type irradiator region of the melded area.
performed.
De analysis of the source holder from a fa.cility. A visua.l mspection using underwater video cameras identified the sources exhibit-e ne rod and cup for all gauges analyzed he manufacturer and the State of North
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Rosemount/Kay Ray Model 7063 level gauge, were constructed using 440C hardenable Carolina were provided with copies of the containing a Model 6082 GRP (2.0 curie (74 ing the corrosion as Model CKCLSA, GBq) ori inal activity) cesium-137 scaled c balt40 sources manufactured by Amershar chrome steel.
diaft report and indicated the following:
8 SwRrs determination of the rod and weld s urce has been completed by SwRI.
and installed in September 1993. Nordion's WelJ joint material was a Type 308 e
preliminary analysis indicates the corrosion t.
e stainless steel welding rod. His material material and joint configuration were he localized pitting. In addition. Sterigenics' has a hardness value considerably lower c rrect for these devices. Ilowever, the During the investigation. Sw RI determmed the analysis of the pool water and water chem-than the Type 440C source rod material.
manufacturer has changed the rod and fol! mng characteristics of the source and istry, including chloride values, determined weld material and joint configuration holder,.
the water to have a low pli value, but all ethi Corrosion pits were noted on the surface several times in the past. Only devices parameters were within acceptable ranges. A e
of the rods, but corrosion was not with serial numbers 13330 and below were He sealed source was a doubly encap-wipe test of the sources revealed no removabl e
beheved to have caused the failure, manufactured in this configuration.
sulated, stamless steel, cesium-137 source, contamination, but identified the corrosion with an original activity of 2 0 Ce products to be iron.
Use of these type devices without the (74 GBq).
e SwRl's conclusion was that the rod failed in a brittle manner from a combination of events.
rigid tube is not a normal use condition All sourecs exhibiting the corrosion are be-I:irst. ~f)pe 440C hardenable chrome alloy and users should not perform this e
He form of the cesium-137 is believed to heved to be from the same production batch.
steelis a difficult material to weld which operation. Consistent use of the rigid be cesium chloride.
^**'. sham International. UK, checked severa requires a pre-and post-weld heat treatment tube will reduce the possibility of the additional batches and has found none that it appeared from the analysis that the post-soujcc rod encountermg a severe bending ne source holder was constructed of an
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e r er rep that nly t batch heat treatment was not performed. Second.
aluminum alloy instead of stainless steel, shipped to Sterigenics is believed to exhibit the selection of weld joint configuration (only De manufacturer and/or the State will as originally reported-the surface affect. De 38 sources installed e
one side of the joint ground to provide a bevel issue a bulletin or information notice to from the 1993 shipment have been removed groove) caused a region of high heat mput provide additional information and/or Minimal evidence of corrosion was noted from the Sterieenics facihty and returned to e
during preheat and welding. His, combmed instructions on this issue.
on the inner surface of the source holdei Amersham International. UK. for additional
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with the use of a weld joint material (Type 308 Ilowever, no evidence of corrosion was analysis. Amersham estimates that its analysi stamiess)of considerably lower hardness ne manufacturer, the State, and SwRI all noted on the inner or outer surfaces of will be completed by the end of July 1995. at caused a microstructural stress concentration.
believe the joint configuration currently the source encapsulations.
which time additional informatian will be hird, surface features of the source rod employed for these devices (thr,caded and seal
..nmoed indicate it was subjected to a severe bending welded source cap) will substantia!!y reduce, if load tactual magmtude of applied load could -
not chmmate, the possibility of the source cap ne outer source encapsulation was a
Amersham has m. dicated that three firms not be determmed). His load caused an separating from the rod.
sectioned for analysis, and indicated good initial crack to form in the area of the tran-weld 9uality and no evidence of cracks or currently use this source modct. He firms were identified as RTI with facihties m New sition from the hard, heat-affected zone to the Readers of this article should be aware of the pits.
Jersey and North Carolina: Isomedix, with soit weld material zone. Continued bending possibility of crack initiation and subsequent facilities in !!!inois and Ohio: and Sterigenics.
loads caused the crack to propagate over time failure of these devices because of repeated SwRI's conclusion was that the subject source with facilities in Illinois. North Carolina, and and eventually fully circumsent the rod.
bending k> ads. It is important that users of was not leaking or damaged because of two sites in California. Amersham determines causing separation.
these devices ensure they are used in environmental use conditions. Ilowever, that sources from the 1993 production batch accordance with the manufacturer's instruc-removable contamination levels greater than were installed only at Sterigenics facihties.
SwRI believes that the analysis of the other tions and the user's license conditions, in 0.005 pCi(185 liq) were noted on the source gauges further indicates all gauges manu-addition,if users suspect their gauge's source holder and inner and outer surfaces of the Sterigenics continues to monitor its facility fo factured in this manner would be susceptible rod has been subjected to a severe bending outer source encapsulation. After a cleaning further signs of corrosion and/or leaking to crack formation. His is supported by the kiad or may be cracked, the rod should procedure, no forther removable contami-sources, as well as monitoring Amersham's fact that one of the other rods mspected also immediately be inspected by an appropriately nation was noted. A helium bubble leak test and Nordian's analysis.
o contamed a crack.
quahlied and licensed facility. Users should further confirmed the source was not leaking.
not attempt to perform. or be advised to Although the source of the removable con-Quality Assurance Requirements for De exact cause of the bending loads that perform, their own inspection, unless tamination coald not be determined. it is Itadiographers resulted in crack initiation and subsequent adequately qualified to do so.
thought to be a result of the original manu-NRC issued Ilulletin 95-01. -Quality facturing or installation process.
Assurance Program for Transportation of 2
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i Radioactive Material." to all NRC radiog.
OA programs by developing and using written i
raphy hcensees in non-Agreement States. His procedures in accordance with the NRC Although Bulletin 95-01 is written specifically SwRI was approved and merk on this task bulletin describes the failure of some NRC approved program; and (3) register mth NRC for radiography licensees, the requirements began on February 20.1995. De first radiography licensees to have and implement as users of Type B packagings. used in stated above would be applicable for non-dehverable for this task (the test and analysis radiography licensees who also conduct plan) was accepted on June 6.1995, and SeRI NRC-apprmed Quahry Assurance (QA) transportation activities.
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activities for the transport of radioactive was given approval to proceed with the testing '
i progrsms for transportation of radioactive material.
material. It also desenbes actions that should It should be noted that Agreement State radi-phase of the task on this date.
be taken to be in comphance with the general license prmisions nf 10 CFR 71.12. NRC ography licensees must also comp!y with the Publication of Regulatory Guide 6.9 SwRI has completed its investigations of the 5
requirements of 10 CFR 7L12 when working Troxler gauge source cap failure and the radmgraphy licensees are required to provide in non-Agreement States under the reciprncity De 5555 reviewed all comments received Rosemount/Kay-Ray contaminated sealed responses to NRC regardmg questions provisions of 10 CFR 15020. His includes concerning Draft Regulatory Guide DG-6002 source. and is currently working to issue attached to the bulictm.
Agreement State radiography licensees who and made all appropriate changes to the technical reports for each of these. Flease see transpori radmactive matetial as a private guide. ne guide was finalized and issued in the " Technical Issues" section of this He objective of the bulletin is to remind NRC carner into. or through, a non-Agreement February as Regulatory Guide 6.9. *Estab.
newsletter for more information concerning radiography Ucensees operating in non.
State, and/or conduct licensed activities in a lishing Quahty Assurance Programs foi the the results of these investigations.
1 Agreement States that their transportation non-Agreement State. Actions that Agreement Alanufacture and Distribution of Scaled activities usually require NRC-approved QA State radiography licensees must take before Sources and Devices Containing Byproduct Ouestions concerning this contract or the programs. Res'e activities involve transport.
they perform transportatien activities in non.
Material? Persons located in Agreement current task should be directed to Doug
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or deliserv to a carrier for transport, of Agreement States include:(1)obtain NRC States who wish to obtain copies of the Broaddus, the contract techmcal monitor, at hcensed material in hpe 11 packaging.
approval of transportation OA programs and guide should contact Lloyd Bolling at (301) 415-5847. In addition. if you believe that i
Examples indude trarisport of radiography (2) implement tramportation OA programs by (301) 415-2327. All others may contact a particular device or scaled source may be a devices to and from work sites and shiprnent developing and using written procedures in Haci Kime at (301) 415-7216.
candidate for testmg under this contract (e g.
of radmgraphy sources to source supphers.
accordance with the NRC approved program.
product design is questionable vis i vis its
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As required by 10 CFR 71.12 and Changes to 10 CFR 32.52 and 32.56 mtended or actual conditions of use, or the NRC hn noted that these are NRC radiog.
49 CFR 173.471. Agreement State radiography pr duct has potentialinherent problems).
raphy licensees who may be performing licensees must register with NRC as users of Reporting Requirements please mform the S555 so that the product trinspirtation activities withou' having an Type 11 packagings used. regardless of whether On January 19.1995. NRC published, in the may be considered for future testing.
3 NRC-approved QA program for transpor.
they perform transportation activities only in fedeml Regrster, changes to 10 CFR 32.52 and tation. Furthermore. the results of inspections Agreement States, or in both Agreement and 32.5,6. De changes reheve vendors of certain Scaled Source and Deu,ce Registration performed by NRC showed that numerous non-Agreement States.
devices, used under the general license, from Assistance Contract NRC radiography bcensees havmg OA having to send copies of Material Transfer programs had serious shortcomings in the Agreement State radiography licensees who reports to each NRC Regional Office. Vendors Fm hpm Iwh im Co m i
implementation of their programs. In most conduct transportation activities exclusively in are still required to send these reports to the tion has been under cm.; ict to assist the instances procedures used to implement their Agreement States, but who may occasionally Director. Office of Nuclear Matenal Safety y,p;,,,.ith the evaluation of SSAD reviews 5555 w transportation OA programs were either ship radiography sources via common or and Safeguards (NMSS). ne changes were s duties include evaluation of infor-incomplete, not available for inspection. or contract carrier to source supphers, are not n t pubhshed for public comment since they mation submitted by vendors in support of were not properly followed. OA records, required by NRC regulation to have their OA address Agency practice and procedure and their application for safety review for their which document the results of required QA program approved by NRC. Ilowever, these meet the exemptions of the Admmistratne product. to determine if the product meets activities. were also found to be incomplete, li:ensees may still be required to obtain Procedere Act.
applicable NRC star:dards and licensing inaccurate, or missing.
approval of their OA program from the requirements.
respective Agreement State (s)in which they He pnwisions of 10 CFR 71.12 provide for perform transportation actmties.
ONGOING PROJECTS During their reviews. it may be necessary for the issuance of a generallicense to NRC Jupiter personnel to contact appheants for additional information or clarification.
bcensees in transport or dchver to a carrier Requests to be registered as users of packag-Scaled Source and Deu.ce (SS&D) Test.ing for transport. hcensed material in a packaging ings, as well as for NRC approval of OA Contract Ouestions concerning the contract or con-for which a Certificate of Compliance has programs for transportation. should be sent to been issued by NRC. Ilu!!etin 95-01 describes Mr. Robert L Baer. Chief. Source Con-p As reported in the last issue of the newsletter.
the tests recommended in Task 2 were divided g"' 415~
i for NRC licensees the actions that must be tainment and Devices Branch. Office of into eight task orders and submitted to SwRI 3~
taken to comply with the general license Nuc1 car Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S.
f for development of technical proposals. SwRI provisions of 10 CFR 71.12. Actions that NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington.
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"'I radiography hcensees must take before they DC 20555-0001. If there are any questions submitted proposals for each of the eight task perform transportation activities include:
concerning this matter. please contact Romas orders. Because of cost and time factors it NMSS has contracted Oak Ridge National il)obtain NRC approval of transportation Matula at (301) 415-7873 or John Jankovich at was decided to proceed only with Task Order Laboratory (ORNL). Ilealth Sciences GA programs;(2) implement transportation (301) 415-7274-One for the testing of industrial radiographic Research Division. to assist in the manage-t equipment. A resised proposal submitted by ment of the NRC General license Database 4
i 5
m-
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(GLDU) 'Ihe GLD'3 contains the complete located in both Agreement and non-name and address of all NRC general Agreement States, and general licensees licensees and an inventory of all the devices located in NRC jurisdiction, to obtain they possess under the general license. Under information not Scluded in the received the contract. ORN1's duties include assisting NRC with the updating of the GLDD with reports. In addition. ORNL may need to information such as the Material Transfer contact Agreement State regulatory reports. submitted m accordance with authorities with questions concerning 10 CFR 32.52 and 3tS. received from vendors general-distribution licenses issued by the and general licensees.
State. Questions about the contract or contractor should be directed to Ms. Cheryl In the performance of its duties, the Barnes, the contract technical monitor, at contrtetor may need to contact sendors.
(301) 415-7870.
If readers of this newsletter need answers to specific questions, or have information that they believe will be valuable to other users and regulators of sealed sources and devices we encourage them to provide this information to the SSSS. We will review the submitted information;if we find it to be within the scope of this newsletter, the information will be covered in a future issue. Send all questions, comments, requests for back issues, or articles to Kim Randall or Doug Broaddus of the 5555 at: SS&D News /ctrer. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mai! Stop T-8 FS.
Washington. DC 20555-0001. or FAX (301) 415-5369.
Printed on recycled
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Federal Recycin:g Program l
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