ML20086G937
| ML20086G937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1975 |
| From: | Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Anthony Giambusso Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| AO-75-23, NUDOCS 8401130006 | |
| Download: ML20086G937 (2) | |
Text
e PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA.19101 (215) 041-4o00 Apri l 2 5, 1975 Mr. A. Giambusso, Di rector
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Di vi sion of Reactor Li censing Office of Nuc1 car Reactor Regulations s.,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D.C.
20555 D
A Dea r Mr. Giambusso:
Subject:
Abnormal Occurrence The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Walt Baunack, Region 1, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Unitec; States Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission on April 16, 1975. Written noti fication was made to Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 16, 1975.
In accordance wi th Section 6.7.2.A of the Technical Speci fica-tions, Appendix A of DPP-56 for Unit 3 Peach Bottom Atomic Power S ta ti on, the following report is being submitted to the Directorate of Reactor Licensing as an Abnormal Occurrence:
Reference:
License Number DPR-56 Technical Specification
Reference:
Table 3.2.A Report No.:
50-278-75-23 Report Date:
April 25,1975 Occurrence Date: April 16, 1975 Faci li ty:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D. #1, Delta, Pennsylvania 17314 Identi fication of Occurrence:
Failure of Main Steam Line High Flow switch dPIS-3-2-118D to t ri p.
Condi tions Prior to Occurrence:
Unit 3 at approximately 87% power.
Description of Occurrence:
During a routine instrument surveillance test, dPIS-3-2-1180 failed to trip.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
- 71 Binding cam follower.
l 0401130006 750425 PDR ADOCK 05000278 l
S PDR
Mr. A. Giambusso 50-278-75-23 April 25,1975 Page 2 Analysis of Occurrence:
Since this swi tch is part of a one-of-two-twice logic, and its companion swi tch was operable and would have tripped at the pre-scribed setpoint, th'c safety implications are minimal.
Corrective Action:
Investigation showed that some Glyptol used to hold the plunger adjustment screws in place had run into the cam follower arm pivot point causing increased friction. The swi tch and cam follower assembly was discontled, cleaned, reset, calibrated, and checked in accordance with the applicable surveillance test.
Failure Data:
One similar failure was reported as 50-278-74-33.
Very truly yours, h/A'W M. J Cooney f
Ass. Gen 1. Supe'intendent Generation Division cc:
Mr. James P. O 'Rei lly, Di rector Officc of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1 United States Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406