ML20086G373

Intervenor Exhibit I-MOSBA-71,consisting of Presentation to Region II on Plant Site Area Emergency Held on 900320

ML20086G373
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/17/1995
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
References
OLA-3-I-MOSBA71, NUDOCS 9507140273
Download: ML20086G373 (12)

Text

- - .. ___ _ _ _

T-/l/DS&9 - 7/

l DOCHETED Exhibith,pagfl.SQRQQ PRESENTATION TO REGION II

% D -6 P3 '43 ,

NUCLEAR-RESULATORY COPMISSION OFFICE OF SECRETARY ON 00CKETING & SERVICE V06TLE SITE AREA EERGENCY BRANCH ,

MARCH 20, 1990 AGENDA e OPENING REMARKS C. K. MCC0Y e EVENT REVIEW TEAM CRITIQUE G. BOCKHOLD e IRUCK/ SWITCHYARD e 0FF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS e PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY O e COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATE / SITE e MID-LOOP OPERATIONS e DIESEL IESTING/0PERABILITY G. BOCKHOLD e QUARANTINE COMPONENTS G. BOCKHOLD e UNIT 2 G. BOCKHOLD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n- 424-e t .4 -34 Docket f.ofo- 42 5-c a . 3 Official Exh. No. T- m + - -) I ,

in tht, matter of 6 eM e4 n 1-i Suff IDENTIFIED App! cant RECEIVED w intervenor & REJECTED Contg Oftr Contractor DATE O 7- I7-4 T Other - Witness S e,%fdeel

- Reparter C ^% -

92 PROJECT 9507140273 950517 gDR ADOCK 05000424 PDR

Exhbit ,page of O

1 INITIATING EVENT l l

FUELING TRUCK STRUCK INSULATOR SUPPORT INSIDE THE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD CAUSING A FAULT TO l

THE 1A RESERVE AUXILIARY IRANSFORMER.

e DIRECT CAUSE IRUCK DRIVER AND ESCORT WERE INATTENTIVE l TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE TRUCK.

e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES CONTROL OF VEHICLES NEAR VULNERABLE AND

() -

SENSITIVE AREAS NOT ESTABLISHED.

MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT STAGED INAPPROPRIATELY.

THE USE OF GROUND-GUIDES INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA WAS NOT CLEAR. ,

k 2

O 92 PROJEC) 006205

_.._. . _ . . _ - . . . . _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ , . . . . . . . . - - - - _ ~ . _ _ _ ~ _ . _ , _ . . . _ _ _ . . . ~ . . . . _ _ . . . _ _ . . . _ . _ - -

~ _.

i ntroffice correspond:n e GeorgiaPower A i

O 1 Exhibit ,page _ of DATE: March 27, 1990

. RE: Vehicles In Perimeter Area FROM: G. Bockhold Jr.

T0: Site Personnel Due to the recent plant event of March 20 1990, the following shall be implemented immediately:

All vehicles within the Perimeter Area (PA) in which the driver does not have rearview visibility OR that are larger than a pickup truck, are required to have a fTigman at all times then the vehicle is backing up.

O Additional policies / procedures on this issue will be forthcoming.

d&6I p*

3 e O .

92 Pft03t[CT 006206

(

O Exhibit- ,page of-EER6ENCY PLAN IMPLEENTATION DURING THE EMERGENCY, OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS

. HERE LATE AND/OR DELAYED BEYOND THE 15 MINUTE TIME LIMIT. ,

e DIRECT CAUSES POWER TO THE PRIMARY ENN (IE EMERGENCY POWER) WAS LOST.

ALL EMERGENCY AGENCIES WERE NOT INCLUDED ON THE BACKUP ENN. (BURKE COUNTY AND GEMA ADDED 4/6/90)

' "'"'8""' c^"SES O '

CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATORS AND SUPERVISORS WERE NOT FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CAPABILITIES. (PRIMARY ENN IN ISC HAD POWER FROM THE SECURITY SYSTEM DIESEL.)

THE SERIES METHOD OF NOTIFICATION CONTAINED UNSATISFACTORY DELAYS.

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DID NOT ENSURE PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF OFF-SITE AGENCIES.

AMPLIFYING INFORMATION WAS NOT PROVIDED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. .

k N .

O 92 rRO3ECT 207 o

Interoffice Correspondence Geo:3iaPower A DATE: April 4,1990 Exhibit ,page_ of RE: Emergency Notification Network (ENN) Communication j

FROM: George Bockhold, Jr. j T0: Emergency Directors (ED) and Comnunicators To ensure that ENN consnunication, is timely, Emergency Directors will ensure that the following improvements are implemented: ,

)

1. Innediately upon the declaration of an emergency, the conmunicator (Shift Clerk) will perform a roll call  :

to detennine the operability of the ENN while the message is being prepared by the ED.

2. Burke County and GEMA is in the process of being added to the backup ENN and this will be installed and tested within the next few days.

3. The ED will personally ensure notifications are timely and problems are resolved. The ED will assign extra personnel or use TSC facilities to solve communication problems as necessary.

4. The TSC uses different power supplies than the Control Room and TSC comnunication systems may be operable when Control Room systems are not.

Since Burke County must respond quickest to most emergencies, ED's will ensure that Burke County receives the highest priority for ENN i notifications.

j We are investigating improved consnunication hardware and techniques.

In the meantime, your personal attention to ENN conmiunications must ensure 4

that we do not have the problems that we experienced on 3/20/90.

e b.

b ,*

. 1 G0/g* .-(*

) s 5 .  :

O

• 92 FRO 3ECT 006208 i

O Exhibit ,page Of EERGENCY PLAN IPFLEENTATION DURING THE EMERGENCY, SITE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED IMPROVEMENT.

e DIRECT CAUSE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE FOR THE SITUATION OF NOT EVACUATING THE SITE. (GENERAL MANAGER'S MEMO OF 4/6/90) o CONTRIBUTING CAUSES THE INITIAL PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES.

PERSONNEL WERE ALLOWED TO RE-ENTER THE PROTECTED AREA.

PAGE ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE DIFFICULT TO HEAR IN SOME PLANT AREAS..

4 -

THE COMPUTER GENERATED PRINTOUT DID NOT ALLOW QUICK IDENTIFICATl0N OF PERS0h'NEL.

]

THE EMERGENCY DIRECT 0rt FAILES TO PROVIDE

! GUIDANCE AFTER DECIDING NOT TO EVACUATE i PERSONNEL.

I j ..

u i

6 l 92 Pft03ECT 006209

GeorgiaPower A Int:roffice Correspondence ODATE: April 6,1990 Exhibit- ,page. of_

RE: Accountability During Erargencies Log: NOV-00426 FROM: G. Bockhold, Jr.

TO: All Emergency Directors and Site Personnel Intheeventofsiteemergencyconditions$wswillimplement the following revised procedures. These changes will enhance personnel accountability and safety and ensure better information flow for employees. They will also provide flexibility to the plant when rasponding to emergency situations.

When the Emergency Director (4Dhe,9kes an emergency classification, he will make the appropriate 4ene-endsyfge'anWDuncement on the plant PA system. He will directesiteApersonnol tu the appropriate. locations.

He or she If you can notthear4he+pager-reportsto,your sppervisor. e will direct you appropriately. Nonna11y non-essential personnel will report to the Admin.- Building-atuttorium.or.-parking lot. David Phillips, the Financial: Services 75cpervisory-has authorttydo coordinate with the ED and control the disposition of non-essential personnel.

Odnhisabsence,theseniorpersonpresentwillcontacttheSecurity Captain for additional assistance.

Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel should report insnediately to the appro9riate facility. OthereshiftspursDhnel, supervisors, and managers on4 site should report initially to the 4SC.ma-Overflow personnel will assemble in the maintenance machine shop area. .

When directed by the ED, the security department will initiate accountability. The security department cannot account for personnel l

who fail to logajatadhe_appropriata EllF (e.g., control room. TSC, er OSC) so it is essential me comply with the Id's instructions as j soon as possible.

Your assistance implementing thess instructions will ensure l

j we manage emergencies better and provide plant personnel with sufficient

• j information to keep them informed of abnormal plant activities.

l Thankyouforyourassjpance.

b l

i GB/ erd 7 l

i \ xc: Department Heads NM 92 PRO.7Ec7 006210 i

,._ ._ _.__ . _ _ . . _ , . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ - _. _ - _ ._ _ . _ _ _ . _ . - ~

O Exhibit , page of

- EER6ENCY PLAN IPPLEENTATIOJ COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND ISC NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED.

e DIRECT CAUSES IHE STATUS LOOP TELEPHONE BRIDGE WAS NOT OPERABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER, lO i

)

1 4

a

! l 4

e e

1

8 i

1 l0 -

i 92 MtOJECT 006211

- - - - - - - - - , . - - , , . . - - --.- , - c-- - ..-----,-.n.n,em e- m --e w-, .- - - ,-e., , , , . , . ,-,-,,-,-e-, .-,n ,-,, -- , , ,, - . , , - . - , , - - - .. -- , - , . - - -

l l

MID-LOOP OPERATIONS ACTIONS TO RESPOND TO LOSS OF CORE COOLING AT MID-LOOP SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

i e DIRECT CAUSE I

J THE " LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL" PROCEDURE SHOULD PROVIDE IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR A LOSP CONDITION.

Id b -

e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES

[stooroe.

THE " LOSS OF RHR" PROCEDURES ARE TOO NARROWLY Nio./,ep Ga FOCUSED FOR MODE 5 & 6 CONDITIONS. fa. N4reA 84Eg 1 -

DIRECTIONS FROM THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR i HERE NOT ALWAYS EXPLICIT.

I i

=*

9 .

l 1

O 92 PROJECT 006212 l

1

DIESEL TESTING j

O- Exhibit- ,page of

^

• NORMAL 36 MONTH DVERHAUL AND INSPECTION

• SPECIAL TESTIN6

.la ,

lE

3/20 EVENT IN OVERHAUL l 5 STARTS, IROUBLESH00 TING SENSOR CALIBRATION

! LOGIC TESTING E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING MULTIPLE STARTS (14)

UV RUN TEST 6 MONTH RUN SURVEILLANCE DIESEL OPERABLE SENSOR CALIBRATION LOGIC TESTING E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING LUBE OIL DCP RUN MULTIPLE STARTS (5) DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL UV RUN TEST 6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE DIESEL OPERABLE HI JACKET WATER RUNS (3)

DCP UV RUN TEST 18SUCCESSFULSTARTS 19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS Srner.s

//f?Rouencxtrs 10 gicreay

• 2evisto/Dernneo CAL. Trac. g g, g,g g,g

(~ e h erogen ARPs (fM'C4 Reser)

L + ,ep,y,a4 2 Acr Aoss %

92 PROJECT

• %sr MTri fx4 rat % df , ALL SitccEssoGL -

cnx, xovc, %reie

^

file c.xtosin y i- .

l 4

i QUARANTINE COPPONENTS Exhibit ,page_ of _

TEPPERATURE SWITCHES l

e .1A PROBABLE TRIP CAUSE JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE (2/3 LOGIC) 1 INTERMITTENT ,

1 POST CALIBRATION LOW (186*F & VENTING) e 1A OTHER TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 1 LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE (SLUGGISH) e IB TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 4 JACKET WATER TEMP (VENTING) 2 LUBE OIL TEMP (VENTING & CALIB.)

O PRESSURE SWITCHES 1

e 1A 1 LUBE OIL PRESSURE (TRIPPED) 2 LUBE OIL PRESSURE (CONSEaVATIVELY REPLACED) e IB 2 LOGIC (WOULD NOT TRIP ENGINE) 1 h/K 0llAur){ - '

& ,rw % % ygg

- Temm A fea6esr kroiar

• Aa n % ,o G o Aie Gus arr' 11 Ce &hy L brs's .

O c.6 h/C fff6/WK lNSWA'ONaa., s,c riaa A> ' -

o Pon.y be Ecccwex.LeeMAI ,, ,,, e ,

006214

llU Y'D' NO "f#

y Dirsti O .,

met. --,pageO of it UNIT 2 e UNIT 2 TRIP UNIT 2 RAT B TRIP /PRrMARY DIFFERENTIAL IRIP i

i TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSE PROPER i

o CAUSE 1

j -

DIFFERENTIAL RELAY CT SET 3000/5 vrCE 2000/5 i e CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1

TEST THE REMAINING RELAYS ON UNIT 2 l l

• 1 '

UPDATE SWITCHYARD DRAWINGS BASED ON AUDIT t -

CLARIFY EXISTING POLICIES FOR SWITCHYARD l f

i l

l i

l r*

12 . .

O 92 rytOJECT 006215 ,

l

--- . - - - .-. . - _ . - - .--- --