ML20086A611
| ML20086A611 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1995 |
| From: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OLA-3-I-MOSBA55, NUDOCS 9507030309 | |
| Download: ML20086A611 (9) | |
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DOCKETED 44 USNRC g pExhibit-,page ._ of 0q;
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April 19, 1990 M"$
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0FFICE OF SECRETARY ELV-01545 00CKETING & SERVICE 0342
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Docket No. 50-424 49 TR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
$.- ATTN: Document Control Desk 2 Washington, D. C. 20555 i,k,Q* -o .-
y !j ' ~ Gentlemen:
I I V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT 4 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT i LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMER I'
t i In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power 20, Company 1990. hereby s j enclosed report related to an event which occurred on March J
i Sincerely, O J..$ bAi
)i W. G. Hairston, III WGH,Ill/NJS/gm
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1990-006 xc: Georcia Power Comoany
' Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. R. M. Odom Mr.. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Comission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
. Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector Vogtle NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMIS$10N DR DO O O 0424 O PDR Co-nu.eL4-3 i
Docket No. ## - "5<4 4 -3 Official Exh. No. M+ 6f h !he matter of G pc ,4 ,1, ,
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On 3-20-90, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was operating at 100%
power.
At 0820 CST, the driver of a fuel truck in the switchyard backed into a support for the phase insulator 'C" for the Unit 1 Reserve AuxiliaryThe in; Transformer f ault . (RAT) 1A.Both Unit 1 RAT 1A and Unit 2 RAT Unit2BIHigh Diesel Side and Low S tripped, causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP). l 1
Generator (DG) 1A and Unit 2 DG2B started, but DG A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was DG were out of service for maintenance. The Reactor Coolant declared and the site Emergency Plan was implemented.
l System heated up to 136 degrees F from The90 degree initial F before notifications the not were DG was em started at 0856 CST and RHR was restored.
made within the required 15 At minutes due to the loss of power to the Emergency i
0915 CST, the SAE was downgraded to an Alert Notification Network (ENN).
after onsite power was restored.
- The The direct cause of this series of events was a cognitive personnel error.
truck driver failed to use proper backing procedures and hit a support, causin ,
the phase to ground fault and LOSP. The most probable cause of the DGIA !
was the intennittent actuation of the DG jacket water temperature switches.
- Corrective actions include strengthening policies for con improvements in the ENN system.
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w w w nn Exhibit $_1,page.2. Of1 l A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT i .
This event is reportable per: a) 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), because an
,i ' unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurre Actuation System Sequencer started, and b) Technical Additionally, Specification 1
i gs e f 4.8.1.1.3, because a valid diesel generator failure y
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B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT
? @ Unit I was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0% rated thermal power.
The reactor had The been shut down since 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled refueling outage d% reactor core reload had been completed, Reactor the in
&"1 f permission from the control room to begin the final tensioning.
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Coolant System (RCS) level was being maintained atThemid-loop j
fi Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump in service for decay heat remov 4
' !{: :;; temperature of the RCS was being maintained at approximately
,I 90 degrees F.
l Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in progress, some b .
equipment configurations.
was out of service The and several systems we Train B Reserve Auxiliary i a required 36 month maintenance inspection.
l 1 Transformer (RAT IB) had been All removed non-lE switchgear from se l
, Train A RAT 1A through its alternate supply breaker.
l was being powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) b All Steam Generator (S/G) nozzle dams had been
- from the switchyard. removed, but only S/G's 1 and 4 had their primary
- Maintenance personnel were in the process of restoring the primary m
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RCS level was being mainta1ned at mid-loop for valve on S/G's 2 and 3. in addition, the pressurizer j
repairs and the S/G manway restorations, manway was removed to provide an RCS vent path.
i C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT l
On March 20, 1990, at approximately 0817 CST, a truck driver with a se l escort entered the protected area in a fuel truck.
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the plant operating staff, the driver was a Georgia PowerTheCompan i
belonging to a service group used to perform various plant services.
i driver checked the welding machine that was in the a
- did not need fuel.
backing out of the area when he hit a support holding the p insulator for RAT 1A.
fault, and the transformer breakers tripped.
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f id i At 0820 CST, botn Unit 1 RAT 1A and the Unit 2 RAT 28 High to theSide and L
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sy breakers tripnd causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP) lass IE j Unit 1 Train A Class IE 4160 volt Bus 1AA02, the Unit 2 Train The B C Unit I J @%) Bus 2BA03, and the 480 volt busses supplied by 1AA02 and 2BA03.
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Train 8 Class IE 4160 volt bus IBA03 also lost power since RAT 1A wasThe l l { U~ :
f feeding both Trains of Class 1E 4160 volt busses.
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the associated ESF Actuation System Sequencers to send a start signal t DGIA and DG2B started and
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Further description of the j t one Unit I and one Unit 2 Diesel Generators.
sequenced the loads to their respective busses. 50-425/1990-002.
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Unit 2 response to this event is provided in LER j
> One minute and twenty seconds after DGIA started and sequenced the lo This again caused an undervoltage l
the Class IE bus, the engine tripped. The UV signal is a maintained signal j
(UV) condition to class IE bus 1AA02.However, since DGIA was coasting d at the sequencer.
j shutdown logic did not allow the DG fuel racks or starting air solenoids to This properly caused the engine starting logic For l open and start the engine.
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' to lock up, a condition that existed until the UV signal was reset.
- this reason, DGIA did not automatically re-start after it tripped.
l After the trip, operators were dispatched to the According to the engine operator,control several panel to l
j investigate the cause of the trip.The operator briefly reviewed several instrum annunciators were lit. In order to restore emergency read-outs and detected no immediate problem.
l power, the operator reset the annunciators without delaying to evaluat i record the annunciators that were present. During this time, a Shift Supervisor (SS) and a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) went to the The sequenc SS l
j panel to determine if any problems were present on
- energizing the power supply to the sequencer. solenoid The engine to energiz This happened 19 minutes after the DG tripped the first time. After started and the sequencer sequenced the available loads as designed.
! I minute and 10 seconds, the breaker and the engin l described above. By this time, operators, a maintenance foreman The and the initial i diesel generator vendor representative were in the DG room.
l report was that the jacket water pressure trip was the cause of the trip.
l This report was discounted because the maintenance foreman and vendor
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representative observed that the jacket water pressure at the
- about 32-13 PSIG.
' PSIG. Also, the control room observed a lube oil sensor malfunction alarm.
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- Fifteen minutes after the second DGIA trip, DGIA wasThe started engine from the en l $q control panel using the emergency start breakglass button.When the DG is s i fg a started and loads were manually loaded. However, all alarms -- i l 4 1 e; f
< emergency mode, all the trips except four are bypassed.Durin ._,
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l by the personnel either at the control room or at the engine contro b The only alarms noted by the control room operator assigned for DG C' i
were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil level high/ low v
- neither of which would have tripped the diesel. ~
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l i At 1040 CST, RAT 1B was energized to supply power to 4160 volt p bus l
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i 1AA02 was tied to RAT 18.
l , gi A Site Are: Emergency was declared at 0840 CST, Thedue Emergency to a loss of all -
offsf te and onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes.
Director signed the notification form The usedshift to infom offsite government clerk attempted to agencies of the emergency at 0848 The CST. initiate offsite notific shift clerk then went to but found it inoperable due to loss of power.the back-up ENN Due to the loss of power, which rendered the primary Emergency 0857 CST.
O Notification Network (ENN) inoperable, and some mis-comunication, the initial notification was not received by all agencies until 0935 CST.
The Emergency Director instructed personnel All work wastoaccomplished complete various and task restoring containment and RCS integrity.
maintenance personnel exited containment by 1050 CST.
The SAE was downgraded to an Alert Emergency By 1200 at 0915 CST after res CST, plant of core cooling and one train of electrical power.
conditions had stabilized with both trains of electrical power beingAfter supplied from an offsite source (RAT 1B).and local governme all agencies were notified by 1256 CST.
D. CAUSE OF EVENT Direct Cause:
1.
The direct cause of the loss of offsite Class 1E AC power was This was a the fue truck hitting a pole supporting a 230kV line for RAT 1A. There were cognitive personnel error on the part of the truck driv contributed to this personnel error.
- 2. The direct cause of the loss of onsite Class IE AC power was the failur l of the operable DG, DGIA, to start and load the LOSP loads on buss O,i IAA02.
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The direct cause of the failure of the primary ENN system in theThe =r p primar 3.
[ control room was the loss of electrical power to Unit 1.
ENN in the control room is powered from Unit 1 Class IE AC power.
Therefore, when Unit 1 lost Class 1E AC electrical power, the primary b I
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ENN in the control room did not work. @
(k y .2 f Root Cause: *
- 1. The truck driver met all current site training and qualification @
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. ' requirements, including holding a Class 2 Georgia driver's license.
' However, site safety rules, which require a flagman for backing O_
vehicles when viewing is impaired, were violated.
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- 2. The determined.
root cause for the failure of DGIA has not been con after the first trip because the annunciators were reset before condition was fully evaluated.
can only be postulated,The butsecond it wastrip most likely the same as that which occurred at the end of the caused the second trip. This logic allows the DG to timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. The block achieve operating conditions before the trips become active. The O logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seco In conducting an investigation, temperature along with other trips.the trip conditions that were could be duplicated by venting 2 out of 3 Jacket water temperatureTh sensors, simulating a tripped condition. The most likely cause 4
both the annunciators and the 70 sec. trip time.
, of the DG trips was interinittent actuation of the jacket water
( temperature switches.
l Following the 3-20-90 event, all three jacket water te l Switch TS-19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197Switch degrees F, which l was approximately 6 degrees below its previous setting.
! TS-19111 was found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees Switch TS-19112 was F, which was approximately the same as the original setting.found Switch to ha; l
degrees F below the previous setting and was re-adjusted. i TS-19112 also had a small leak which was judged toThe be acceptable switches wereto
- support diagnostic engine tests and was reinstalled.rec s
calibration technique. '
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i l 9 During the subsequent test run of the DC on 3-30-90, one of theThis m ap i ,If's tripped and would not reset. 2s.
.VA switches (T5-19111) lure because it subsequently mechanically reset. [r,-
l M W an intermittent fai This switch and the leaking switch (TS-19112) were replaced with new ~
- 3 All subsequent testing was conducted with no additional
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problems.
U) l A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine l ;h The purpose of this test was to determine the ] =
s.g starts was conducted.
actual jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine j i
.( in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts The I-without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90. o T' ;
test showed that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approxima J f
j 156 degrees F and remained steady.
Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures),
special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runsA were performed under various conditions.
I control test program.
systems of both engines have been subjected started at least 18 times each and no failures In addition, or problems an undervoltage have occurred during any of these starts. start test without air roll wa and loaded properly.
Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the jacket water high temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 3-20-90.
E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT The loss of offsite power to Class IE bus IBA03 and the failure of DGIA to start and operate successfully, coupled with DGIS and RAT IB being out o service for maintenance, resulted in Unit I being without AC power to both With both Class IE busses deenergized, the RHR System Class IE busses. Based on a noted rate of could not perform its required safety function.
rise in the RCS temperature of 46 degrees F in 36 minutues, the RCS water would not have been expected to begin boiling untti approximately I ho 36 minutes after the beginning of the event.
j Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch were '
completed well within the estimated I hour and 36 minutes for the p onset of boiling in the RCS. A review of information obtained from the
- and grab sample i Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS)is event, no As a result of th Ol 1 i
analysis indicated all normal values. increase in radioactive relea environment occurred.
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l~!; Additiona'l systems were either available or could have been made available
).~ to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant:
.j The maintenance on RAT IB was completed and the RAT was returned to ~
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2 service approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> into the event. g*
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, 2. Offsite power was available to non-1E equipment through the generator oQ step-up transformers which were being used to "back-feed" the Unit I Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) and supply the non-IE busses. Provided
IBA03 could have been powered by feeding through non-IE bus INA01.
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- 3. The Refueling Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually i establish gravity feed to the RCS to maintain a supply of cooling water to the reactor.
Consequently, neither plant safety nor the health and safety of the public was adversely affected by this event. A more detailed assessment of this O event and an assessment of the event had it occurred under more severe circumstances will be performed and included in a supplemental LER. l F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. A management policy on control and operation of vehicles has been established.
- 2. Temporary barricades have been erected with signs which direct authorization for control of switchyard traffic to the SS.
- 3. The Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) diesel start and trip logic has been modified on Unit I so that an automatic ' emergency" start will occur i
upon LOSP. Therefore, non-essential diesel engine trips are blocked upon LOSP. The Unit 2 DG's will be modified by 4-30-90.
- 4. The DG1A test frequency was increased to three times per week until 4-20-90 when the test frequency will be changed to once every 7 days in accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.8-1. This frequency 2
will be continued untti 7 consecutive valid tests are completed with no Including the more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tes~ts.
two valid failures of this event, there have been a total of four valid
.t failures in 69 valid tests of DGIA as of 1157 CST cn 3-20-90.
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erature switches have been replaced. In addition, $
) O 5. ThedefectiveDGtembeconductedatWyleLaboratoriestoinvestigatethe g
- a test program will j -l e reliability of this type of temperature switch under various conditions. IA This program is designed to aid in determining the failure mode of the
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,,j suspect switches. [
l ]co j 6. A back-up ENN system powered from the AT&T system, which previously
'l existed and was operational for South Carolina agencies, has beenInstructi l : extended to include Georgia local and state agencies.
?
j been given to Emergency Directors and Comunicators concerning useo of
, j ' the emergency comunication systems.
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- 7. Further corrective actions will be addressed in a supplemental LER.
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', G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION I , 1. Failed Components:
i Jacket Water High Temperature Switches manufactured by California Controls Company.
il Model fA-3500-W3 j
i, 2. Previous Similar Events:
i None
- 3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:
! kesidual Heat Removal System - B Diesel Generator Lube Oil System - LA l Diesel Generator Starting Air System - LC
- Diesel Generator Cooling Water System - LB
! Diesel Generator Power Supply System - EK l
Safety Injection System - BQ j
13.8 kV Power System - EA 1460 volt non-lE power system - EA 1460 volt Class IE power system - EB Chemical and Volume Centrol System - CB Containment Building - NH
' 480 volt Class IE Power System - ED Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE Radiation Monitoring System - IL l '
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