ML20085M928
| ML20085M928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1995 |
| From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20085M919 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506290407 | |
| Download: ML20085M928 (5) | |
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ATTACHMENT 2 UMERICK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50452 UCENSE NO. NPF 39 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST.
NO. 95-03-1 UST OF AFFECTED PAGES UNIT 1 2-1 B 2-1 9506290407 950619 PDR ADOCK 05000352 P
_._ _r 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND' LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS l
-THERMAL POWER. Low Pressure or low Flow l
2.1.1 THERMAL POWER shall not exceed 25% of RATED TnERMAL POWER with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure less than 785 psig or core flow less than 10% of rated flow.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.1 and 2.
i ACTION:
With THERMAL POWER exceeding 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the reactor vessel steam dome pressure less than 785 psig or core flow less than 10% of rated flow, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and comply with the requirements of i
Specification 6.7.1.
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THERMAL POWER. Hiah Pressure and Hiah Flow 2.1.2 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall not be less than 1.09 for two recirculation loop operation and shall not be less than 1.11 for single recirculation loop operation with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 785 psig and core flow greater than 10% of rated flow.
i APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.
ACTION:
With MCPR less than 1.09 for two recirculation loop operation or less than 1.11 for single recirculation loop operation and the reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 785 psig and core flow greater than 10% of rated flow, be i
in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.
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l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE 2.1.3 The reactor coolant system pressure, as measured in the reactor vessel steam dome, shall not exceed 1325 psig.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the reactor coolant system pressure, as measured in the reactor vessel steam dome, above 1325 psig, be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN with the reactor coolant system pressure less than or equal to 1325 psig within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 2-1
'2.1 SAFETY LIMITS
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BASES i
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The fuel cladding, reactor pressure vessel and primary system piping are the principal barriers to the release of radioactive materials to the l
environs. Safety Limits are established to protect the integrity of these barriers during normal plant operations and anticipated transients. The fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is set such that no fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated.
Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a step-back approach is used to establish a Safety Limit such that the MCPR is not less than 1.09 for two recirculation loop operation and 1.11 for single recirculation loop operation. MCPR greater than 1.09 for two recirculation loop operation and 1.11 for single recirculation loop operation represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity. The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers which separate the radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking. Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incre-mentally cumulative and continuously measurable.
Fuel cladding perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses which occur from reactor operation r
significantly above design conditions and the Limiting Safety System Settings.
While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable i
as that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations i
signal a threshold beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross i
rather than incremental cladding deterioration.
Therefore, the fuel cladding Safety Limit is defined with a margin to the conditions which would produce onset of transition boiling, MCPR of 1.0.
These conditions represent a signi-ficant departure from the condition intended by design for planned operation.
l 2.1.1 THERMAL POWER. Low Pressure or low Flow The use of the (GEXL) correlation is not valid for all critical power calculations at pressures below 785 psig or core flows less than 10% of rated flow. Therefore, the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is established by other means. This is done by establishing a limiting condition on core THERMAL POWER with the following basis.
Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low power and r
flows will always be greater than 4.5 psi. Analyses show that with a bundle flow of 28 x 10 lb/h, bundle pressure drop is nearly independent of bundle power and has a value of 3.5 psi.
Thus, the bundle flow with a 4.5 psi driving head will be grater than 28 x 10' lb/h.
Full scale ATLAS test data taken at pressures from 14.7 psia to 800 psia indicate that the fuel assembly criti-cal power at this flow is approximately 3.35 MWt. With the design peaking i
factors, this corresponds to a THERMAL POWER of more than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Thus, a THERMAL POWER limit of 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER for reactor pressure below 785 psig is conservative.
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i LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 2-1 I
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i ATTACHMENT 3
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UMERICK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-352 UCENSE NO. NPF-39
.i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST i
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NO. 9543-1 Letter, R. M. Butrovich (GE) to H. J. Diamond (PECO Energy),
"GE13 Single Loop Operation SLMCPR," dated June 12,1995
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l GENuclear Energy Ric'hard M. Butrovich Nx!earfuel-Americas fuelProject Manager GeneralBectnc Company P.O. B:x 780. MIC; A33 Wilmington. NC 284010780 910 675-E266 fx sr06751ss4 June 12,1995 cc: R. A. Hanvelt RMB:95-125 S. P. Congdon J. F. Klapproth
~ J. M. Cannody Mr. H. J. Diamond, Director Fuel & Services Division PECO ENERGY COMPANY 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Wayne, PA 19087-5691
SUBJECT:
GE13 Single Loop Operation SLMCPR
REFERENCE:
- 1. Letter, J. F. Klapproth to NRC-DCD, " Completion of GE13 Licensing Quali6 cation", December 30,1993.
- 2. Letter, J. F. Klapproth to R. C. Jones Jr., " Safety Limit MCPR for GE13 Fuel",
September 27,1994.
Dear Hugh:
In Reference (1) GE noti 6ed the NRC that the GE13 design fully complies with the GESTAR-II Amendment 22 acceptance criteria for new fuel designs. Reference (2) requested NRC approval of the generic GE13 SLMCPR (1.09) to facilitate utility implementation of GE13 Fuel. Prior NRC approval would allow future utility technical specification amendment requests to be treated as an administrative change.
Single Loop Operation (SLO)is considered as a special case for the Safety Limit MCPR. The uncertainty associated with the core flow measurement is greater for this case. It has also been demonstrated that SLO results in increased noise in neutron flux measurements. The SLMCPR for SLO is determined in the same manner as the reference SLMCPR value, accounting for the increased uncertainty in core flow and TIP/LPRM measurements.
The Single Loop Operation Safety Limit MCPR (1.11) may be applied to Limerick Units 1 and 2 and Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 with GE13 fuel. Transition cycles incorporating GE13 fuel are expected to be bounded by this analysis. The GE13 SLO Safety Limit MCPR analysis has been performed in compliance with Amendment 22 of GESTAR 11 and is documented in DRF A00-05616-1.
Very trul ' yours, t
R i t Butrovich