ML20085M546
| ML20085M546 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1995 |
| From: | Rosenblum R SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506290240 | |
| Download: ML20085M546 (4) | |
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A Southem Califomia Edison Company 23 PARKER STREET IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92718 MICHAm o M. ROSENBLUM TELtPMows vKs Parsecewv
?weBeeSSO U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Sir:
Subj ect:
Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Reply to a Notice of Violation San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
References:
(A) Letter, Mr. A. Bill Beach (USNRC) to Mr. Harold B. Ray (Edison), dated June 2, 1995 (B) Letter Mr. R. W. Krieger (Edison) to Document Controi Desk (USNRC). Licensee Event Report No.
2-95-005, dated May 8, 1995 (C) Letter Mr. R. W. Krieger (Edison) to Document Controi Desk (USNRC), Licensee Event Report No.
2-95-006, dated May 8, 1995 Reference A provided the results of a special inspection (50-361/95-06 and 50-362/95-06) conducted by Messrs. J. Russell, D. Desaulniers, and E. Brown on April 10-14,1995, at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3.
The enclosure to Reference A transmitted a Notice of Violation. This letter provides Edison's reply to the subject Notice of Violation.
The Notice of Violation in Reference A contained two violations: (1) failure to follow procedures for termination of shutdown cooling which led to the inadvertent transfer of reactor coolant from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the refueling water storage tank; and, (2) failure to follow procedures for verifying that dissolved oxygen was within Technical Specification limits prior to exceeding 245 degrees F.
The cover letter of Reference A states in part "... Your response may reference... previously docketed l
correspondence..."
Edison's failure to follow procedures durina the termination of shutdown cooling was previously reported to the USNRC in a voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2-95-005 (Reference B).
Reference B provides the reasons for the violation (personnel error), the corrective steps which have been taken (counseling, issuing directives on procedure compliance and control room command structure, management oversight presence, and procedure revision), and the corrective steps that will be taken (ongoing evaluation of control room command structure).
Full compliance was achieved on April 6,1995, when operators closed valve 2HV9379, terminating the flow diversion.
Edison's failure to verify that dissolved oxygen was within Technical Specification limits was previously reported to the USNRC in LER No. 2-95-006 (Reference C).
Reference C provides the reasons for the violation (personnel the corrective steps that have been taken and the corrective steps error)ill be taken (same actions as for LER that w 2-95-005 noted above).
Full compliance was achieved on April 6,1995, when the RCS dissolved oxygen was restored to Technical Specification limits.
9506290240 950616 PDR ADOCK 05000361 Q
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DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK To improve formality and professionalism in the control room, on May 30, 1995,
.a special letter (attached) was issued from Mr. R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation, to all site personnel. We are currently 1mplementing other command / control and communication enhancements, and look forward to discussing our ongoing efforts at improving Operations performance and communications at the July 10, 1995, Edison-NRC Management Meeting at Region IV in Arlington, Texas.
If you have any further questions, please contact me.
Sincerely, hi p
Attachment:
cc:
L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV A. B. Beach, Dire: tor, Division of Reactor Pronects, NRC Reaion IV K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Fie' d Office, NRC Region IV J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3
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May 30,1995 1
SITE PERSONNEL
SUBJECT:
SONGS 2/3 ControlRoom Area Access and Conduct Standards of conduct vary from place to place. One would expect the business atmosphere to be more formal and quiet in an Air Traffic Control Center than it might be in a pizza parlor. We are all aware that work in the Nuclear Industry is held to a higher standard than other professions.
Nowhere is the standard higher than it is in the SONGS 2/3 Control Room. SO123-0-15 defines this standard. You may have noticed an increased formality in the Control Room and this letter outlines our expectations. We make a distinction between the Control Room itself and the Control Room Area. The Control Room is the single room where we operate and monitor the Units 2 and 3 reactors. The Control Room Area also includes the other nearby rooms generally within the Security card reader.
ACCESS:
Security access to the Control Room area is only granted to individuals who might need to conduct business in this area. You should only go there to conduct that business and should leave the area when that business is completed or ifit is significantly delayed. Professional conduct is expected at all times.
Do not enter the Control Room, itself, without obtaining permission from the Control Room staff.
We have placed ropes at the entrances as a reminder of this requirement. The only exceptions to this policy are individuals identified on the 12-Hour Manning Sheet and NRC Inspectors. In situations where the Control Room is closed to normal business due to critical activities in progress, a sign at each entrance door willindicate the restriction. To avoid disrupting the Control Room activity, please contact the Shift Superintendent ifit is necessary to enter in these conditions.
The Control Room staff needs to have free access to the control boards to view status or operate equipment. Obtain approval from the Control Room personnel prior to approaching the control boards or blocking their view of the boards. Typically, visitors will remain behind the PMS console. Visitors must also limit their conversations and activities to those related to the Control Room tasks at hand. Side conversations should be taken outside of the Control Room.
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PHONE CALLS:
Phone calls are the largest source of distraction to the Control Room. Requests for information should be routed elsewhere. Plant status information is available from the Equipment Control staff at 86391 or by online computer data using PMARS or ET. Work Authorization information is available from the Work Process Control Operator at 86209 or from the online computer system. Phone calls to the Control Room should be limited to PROVIDING infortpation either about an evolution in progress or about an urgent situation requiring immediate Opirator action.
Most emergencies, such as personnel injuries, are best handled by contacting Emergency Preparedness at 86911. Paging can be handled within the requestor's division, through the Outage Control Center during outages, the NOA at 86413, or the Unit 1 Control Room at 86201.
SYSTEM TESTING:
Testing and surveillance of equipment can be very disruptive ifit brings in repeated or unexpected Control Room alarms Every effort should be taken to minimize such distractions in the performance of such testing. Often this is accomplished by " sliding the annunciator link" during I
testing.
OBSERVERS:
There are activities, such as going critical or draining to midloop, that create great interest in the work force. As a result, there are often many people who wish to observe the activities in the Control Room. This can be very distracting at exactly the time when distractions should be most avoided. Unless you are contributing to the success of the evolution by being there, please observe from the TSC.
We regret any inconvenience caused by these policies and request that you support our efforts to ensure formality and professionalism in the Control Room.
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R. W. KRIEGER i
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