ML20085E956
| ML20085E956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1994 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20085E940 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506190138 | |
| Download: ML20085E956 (6) | |
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I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES i
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9506190138 950303 PDR ADOCK 05000313 P
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3.8,15 Storage in the spent fuel pool shall be restricted to fuel assembl'es' l
l having initial enrichment less than or equal to 4.1 w/o U 235.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
3.8.16 Storage in Region 2 (as shown on Figure 3.8.1) of the spent fuel pool l
shall be further restricted by burnup and enrichment limits specified in figure 3.8.2. In the event a checkerboard storage configuration is deemed necessary for a portion of Region 2. vacant spaces adjacent to i
the f aces of any fuel assembly which does not meet the Region 2 burnup l
criteria (non-restricted) shall be physically blocked before any such fuel assembly may be placed in Region 2.
This will prevent inadvertent fuel assembly insertion into two adjacent storage locations.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
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3.8.17 The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained (at l
l all times) at greater than 1600 parts per million.
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Detailed written procedures will be available for use by refueling personnel.
These procedures, the above specifications, and the design of the fuel handling i
equipment as described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety, if no change is t eing made in core geometry, one flux monitor is sufficient.
This permits maintenance on the instrumentation.
Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition, t
The requirement that at least one decay heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat i
and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel at the refueling temperature (normally 140*F), and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.(1) r The requirement to have two decay heat removal loops operable when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core, ensures that a single failure of the i
operating decay heat removal loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability.
With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating decay heat removal loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
The shutdown margin indicated in Specification 3.8.4 will keep the core subcritical, even with all control rods withdrawn from the core.(2) Although the refueling boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the core keff s 0.99 if all the control rods were removed from the core Only a few control rods will be removed at any one time during fuel shuffling and i
t Amendment No. 17, &&, 47, 74, 107 59a 153, 141 I
l replacement.
The keff with all rods in the core and with refueling boron concentration is approximately 0.9.
Specification 3.8.5 allows the control i
room operator to inform the reactor building personnel of any impending i
unsafe condition detected from the. main control board indicators during fuel movement.
The specification requiring testing reactor building purge termination is to verify that these components will function as required should a fuel i
handling accident occur which resulted in the release of significant i
fission products.
L Because of physical dimensions of the fuel bridges, it is physically impossible for fuel assemblies to be within 10 feet of each other while being handled.
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Specification 3.8.11 is required as: 1) the safety analysis for the fuel handling accident was based on the assumption that the reactor had been j
shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.(3); and, 2) to assure that the maximum design heat l
load of the spent fuel pool cooling system will not be exceeded during a full core offload.
Specification 3.8.14 will assure that damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool will not be caused by dropping heavy objects onto the fuel. Administrative controls will prohibit the storage of fuel in locations adjoining the walls l
at the north and south ends of the pool, in the vicinity of cask storage area and fuel tilt pool access gates.
Specifications 3.8.15 and 3.8.16 assure fuel enrichment and fuel burnup l
)
limits assumed in the spent fuel safety analyses will not be exceeded.
Specification 3.8.17 assures the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool l
l will remain within the limits of the spent fuel pool accident and criticality analyses.
REFERENCES (1)
FSAR, Section 9.5 l
(2)
FSAR Section 14.2.2.3 (3)
FSAR Section 14.2.2.3.3 t
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i Amendment No. 66, 67. 76 59b l
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t MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i
1 i
I Y
a t
0,b441 he-spent fwQ-sh4ppte9-cosk-sho11-nct be cor-r4 ed by the-An444or-y Bu44d i n g : rone-pen 44c g t h e e vokot4en-4 f t h e p era-4w4 c a c k d rop 3 cident and tb^ cranc design by ^PEL and N9C revic nd appr0 val The prevision: Of Speci'ication: 3.0.3 are not applicable.
l 3.8.1516 Storage in the spent fuel pool shall be restricted to fuel assemblies l
having initial enrichment less than or equal to 4.1 w/o U-235.
The j
provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
3.8.1617 Storage in Region 2 (as shown on Figure 3.8.1) of the spent fuel pool l
shall be further restricted by burnup and enrichment limits specified in Figure 3.8.2. In the event a checkerboard storage configuration is j
deemed necessary for a portion of Region 2. vacant spaces adjacent to the f aces of any fuel assembly which does not meet the Region 2 burnup criteria (non-restricted) shall be physically blocked before any such fuel assembly may be placed in Region 2.
This will prevent inadvertent fuel assembly insertion into two adjecent storage locations.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
3.8.1218 The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained (at l
all times) at greater than 1600 parts per million.
Basei Detailed written procedures will be available for use by refueling personnel.
These procedures, the above specifications, and the design of the fuel handling equipment as described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety, if no change is being made in core geometry, one flux monitor is sufficient, This permits naintenance on the instrumentation.
Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition.
The requirement that at least one decay heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and meintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel at the refueling temperature (normally 140*F), and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.(l)
The requirement to have two decay heat removal loops operable when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core, ensures that a single failure of the operating decay heat removal loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability.
With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating decay heat removal loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
The shutdown margin indicated in Specification 3.8.4 will keep the core subtritical, even with all cor. trol rods withdrawn from the core.(2) Although the refueling boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the core keff s 0.99 if all the control rods were removed from the core, only a few cor. trol rods will be removed at any one time during fuel shuf fling and j
\\
Aste+
1An-e*4ept i o n t o 3. 8.15 i c 9r e n t e d f o r t h e pe r i od o f O c t obe r 15, 1991, thsough-J+nuary 31. 1992, for the movement of two spent fuel rods M411:ing : l' t+a-+h4ppi.ng-sas4n Amendment No. 14. 66, 67. 74. 407, 59a 163, 441
replacement.
The keff with all rods in the core and with refueling boron concentration is approximately 0.9.
Specification 3.8.5 allows the control room operator to inform the reactor building personnel of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.
The specification requiring testing reactor building purge termination is to verify that these components will function as required should a fuel handling accident occur which resulted in the release of significant fission products.
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Because of physical dimensions of the fuel bridges, it is physically impossible for fuel assemblies to be within 10 feet of each other while being handled.
Specification 3.8.11 is required as: 1) the safety analysis for the fuel handling accident was based on the assumption that the reactor had been l
shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.(3); and, 2) to assure that the maximum design heat load of the spent fuel pool cooling system will not be exceeded during a full core offload.
Specification 3.8.14 will assure that damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool will not be caused by dropping heavy objects onto the fuel.
Administrative controls will prohibit the storage of fuel in locations adjoining the walls at the north and south ends of the pool, in the vicinity of cask storage area and fuel tilt pool access gates. unt!' the reviez spect'ied in 3.8.15 ts-completed.
&pecificetter 3.S.15 ::cere that the : pent fuel cc k drop eccident s+nnot
)
ossur prior te completten Of tac "RC ct:f: revica cf this potential eccident end the completion Of any medi'icaticn: that may be neces:Ory to j
preclude the ac-sident er mitigate the consequences.
Uper ::tisfactory sempletten of the NRC*: eview, E pes 444sa t i e r 3. S.15 c h e l ' be-dekted, Specifications 3.8.1514 and 3.8.1644 assure fuel enrichment and fuel burnup l
limits assumed in the spent fuel safety analyses will not be exceeded.
Specification 3.8.1248 assures the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool l
will remain within the limits of the spent fuel pool accident and criticality analyses.
REFERENCES (1)
FSAR, Section 9.5 (2)
FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3 (3)
FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.3 Amendment No. 66, G7, 76 59b l