ML20085A307
| ML20085A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1983 |
| From: | Baxter D, Baxter T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ALAB-729, NUDOCS 8307050271 | |
| Download: ML20085A307 (16) | |
Text
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June 29, 1983 g
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' g' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g
N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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d[ffy3 bl BEFORE THE COMMISSION 0
9-1983 s c.
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I In the Matter of
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C; METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket h E
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(Resta 08 (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
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LICENSEE'S PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE TO ALAB-729, CONDITION NO. 5 In its decision on design issues, the Atomic Safety and i
l Licensing Appeal Board imposed the following condition:
Licensee shall submit to the Commission prior to restart a proposed long-term solution to the steam generator bypass logic problem.
See pp. 163-64, supra.
ALAB-729, 17 N.R.C.
slip op, at 176 (May 26, 1983).
Licensee herein submits its proposal in response to Condition No. 5 of the Appeal Board's decision.
The Licensing Board Decision l
The reliability of the emergency feedwater ("EFW") system at TMI-l was the subject of extensive inquiry through Licensing Board Question No. 6.~1/
See LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C.
1211, 1353-1375 (1981).
One of the Licensing Board's concerns was for inad-vertent isolation of feedwater by the steam line rupture detection system.
Therefore, the Licensing Board required 1/
No party raised EFW reliability as a contested issue.
Once raised by the Licensing Board, however, UCS pursued the matter with cross-examination, proposed findings of fact, and appeals.
O!oooN9 PDR
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!.' l l
. that prior to restart, the Licensee propose for Staff approval, a long-term solution to the steam generator bypass logic problem for imple-mentation as soon as possible after restart.
Prior to restart, the Staff shall certify to the-Ccmmission that the Licensee has made reasonable progress in initiating its program for the long-term solution.
Id. at 1374 (1 1064).
1 In response to the Licensing Board condition, Licensee submitted to the Staff on August 2, 1982, a description of the modifications made to the Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System ("MSLRDS") and to the EFW System in order to prevent an inadvertent isolation of feedwater flow to the steam generators.
See Attachment A hereto.
In short, Licensee's proposed solution was to add cavitating venturis to tue EFW System and to delete the MSLRDS signal to the EFW system.
The Staff has reviewed Licensee's proposal and, on November 10, 1982, issued a Safety Evaluation finding that the proposed modification is acceptable and satisfies the Licensing Board condition.
See Attachment B hereto.
The Appeal Board Decision Condition No. 5 of ALAB-729, quoted above, appears to repeat the Licensing Board condition that Licensee propose a long-term solution to the steam generator bypass logic problem, but requires that Licensee submit its proposal to the Commission rather than to the Staff.
See ALAB-729, slip op. at 162-164.
Licensee hereby submits its proposed long-term solution, previously reviewed and approved by the
F l
, +
l Staff, to the Commission and requests that the Commission affirm the Staff's finding that the Licensing Board's condition has been satisfied.~2/
While the condition imposed by the Appeal Board only requires Commission, rather than Staff, review of Licensee's proposal, elsewhere in its decision the Appeal Board " recommends" that prior to acceptance of Licensee's proposal, the potential for containment overpressurization as a result of MSLRDS failure be evaluated.
ALAB-729, slip op at 36, n.59.
Of course, Licensee's proposal addresses this concern with respect to emergency feedwater isolation.
The Appeal Board raises for the first time, however, its concern for over-pressurization of containment if the MSLRDS fails to isolate main feedwater during a steam line break accident.
Id.
This concern is clearly unrelated to the Licensing Board's concern for inadvertent feedwater isolation, and goes beyond the scope of the proceeding.-3/ Accordingly, the Appeal Board's recommendation should be left for Staff consideration outside of the restart proceeding-4/and 2/
In response to an exception by UCS challenging the Licensing Board's delegation to the Staff of responsibility to review Licensee's proposal and certify reasonable progress,to the Commission, Licensee argued that the Staff's assigned task here was fully consistent with its designated role in the certification process established in the Commission's August 9,
1979 Order and Notice of Hearing.
See Licensee's Brief i
in Opposition to the Exceptions of Other Parties to the Atomic 1
I Safety and Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision on Plant Design and Procedures, Separation, and Emergency Plan-ning Issues, at 116-119 (May 10, 1982).
3/
The Appeal Board recognized that a main steam line break accident is outside its purview.
ALAB-729, slip op. at 88.
4/
For example, Licensee's probabilistic risk assessment for TMI-l would provide an appropriate means for evaluating the scenario posed by the Appeal Board, m#.
e should not be a consideration for lifting the suspension of the TMI-1 license.
Conclusion Licensee has proposed, and in fact already implemented, a solution to the concern raised by the Licensing Board.
Pursuant to the Appeal Board's condition, Licensee submits its proposal, already approved by the Staff, to the Commission.
The Appeal Board's new recommendation for a further evaluation of the potential for containment overpressurization during a main steam line break accident should not be a condition of restart.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F.
Trowbridge, P.C.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 822-1090 Dated:
June 29, 1983
c hhriaz CPU Nutleer l
IE ys P.O. Box 480 Mw a
Middletown. Pennsylvania 170s 717-944-7621 Wnter's Direct Dial Number.
August 2, 1982 5211-82-153 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
John F. Stolz Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Main Stemmline Rupture Detection Syste= Design Changes In its Partial Initial Decision (PID) on design (See PID 1060-1064) the Atomic Saf ety and Licensing Board (ASLB) required that GPUN investigate design changes to the Main St==14ne Rupture Detection System (MSLRDS).
The changes are to prevent unnecessary isolation of feedvater under single failure conditions.
A description and evaluation of the changes to the MSLRDS is attached.
This is submitted for NRC approval as requested by the ASL3 (PID 1064).
Sincerely,
,/
D Eubil Director, TMI-1 HDH:WS:vj f Attachment cc:
R. C. Haynes R. Jacobs "ATI'ACHMENT A"
7-ATIACIDfE2C 1 Main Steamline Rupture Detection Syste= Design Changes I.
INTRODUCTION The Main St===14ne Rupture Detection System (MSLRDS) is actuated on low steam generator pressure (below approximately 600 psig) and automatically closes the Emergency Feedwater (EW) and Main Feedwater (MW) control valves to isolate feed flow to the depressurized steam generator.
If subsequently pressure rises above 600 psig in a steam generator the EN associated with that steam generator is restored.
This MSLEDS action prevents overpressurization of conta4mnant from st= =14ne breaks in containment.
The ASL3 was concerned that the MSLRDS would block all feedwater, including IW, to the steam generators in certain scenarios when it should not be blocked.
II.
SOLUTION The proposed solution to the above concern consists of _the addi:ics of cavitating van:uris and the deletion of the MSLRDS signal to the Emergency Feedvater System.
Lov OTSG pressure, which actuates the MSLEDS, can result from either a severe overcooling or a main steamline break event.
The original design required operator action to bypass MSLRDS to prevent a loss of heat sink if a lov OTSG pressure condition developed and single f ailure then bloexec ::.
The addi: ion cf the cavitating venturis to the EW System and removal of the MSLRDS fro = the E W valves =14minates operator action to provide m :o the in ac: OTSG in the even of a single failure.
Since the venturis also li=i: EW flow, the MSLRDS is no longer required for EW and need not be up graded to saiety grade (?ID 1037e) since it is *14=4n=ced.
III.
SAFETT EVALUATION Deletion of the MSLEDS from the EW valves does not affect any of the ? sir acceptant criteria.
The basis for this judgment is as follows:
The MSLRDS was installed to prevent overpressurization of the containment due :o a Main Streamline BrJeak (MSL3).
Removal of the MSLRDS fro = the EW valves vill make DII-1 feedvater isolation functionally the same as TMI-2 in 1:s response to a MSLB.
The DII-2 MSL3' analysis was reviewed and approved by the ERC (See Dil-2 FSAR, Chap.15, Appendix 3).
The DfI-2 analysis is bounding for D.' -1 ior :he fellowing reasons:
a)
The TMI-1 venturis limit total flow to a lover flow ra e than the TMI-2 van:uris (1150 GPM vs. 1250 G?M), and b)
TMI-1 cannot have a double OTSG blowdown i= containmen:
(limiting pressurization accident for TMI-2) because the main steam isolation valves are stop check valves for TMI-1.
(
Deletion of :he.MSLRDS from the M valves does no increase the prob-amil1:7 of occurrence of a stene"ne break acciden:.
The consequences of :he accident, as analyze'd in the DiI-2 75AP, have not been increased, "ATDGMENT A"
Recctor Building ovarpraecurisstion doas not occur and :ha rsquired hea: removal ccpab4'4 :y to prsvent fusi damago is providad.
Specifically, fuel da= age will not result, off-site doses will not be increased, a=d steam genera:or tube l
integri:7 vill not be compromised.
The conclusions are confirmed in :he Restar:
Report, See: ion 8.3.9 which ref arences the M-2 FSA?., Chapter 15, Appendix 3.
EW flow is continued throughout the referenced analysis.
Addition of cavita:i=g venturis to the EW system limits the ~h E W flov at TMI-1 and assures tha:
the referenced TMI-2 analysis is bounding for M-1.
Turther= ore, the systems, l
setpoints and/or plant conditions that are utilized in the referenced analysis are applicable to both M-1 and TMI-2. (The ELC was also advised of the THI-l desi,gn modification in Met-Ed response to IE 3u11e-" 80-04 May 9, 1980 Til 228).
The referenced M -2 analysis assumed l' M shu:down margin and demonstrated that the core does not return ro criticality and that the fuel rods do no: violate a DN3R of 1.0.
Other assumptions made in the referenced a=alysis are more severe than those allowed by M-1 Tech. Specs., most no: ably power level (2772 MR),
and RCS flow (100".).
The design pnWg f actor of 1.78 used in DC-2 analysis exceeds the curren: design peaking factor for TMI-1.
Tne referenced stea=line break analysis also demonstrated acceptable offsi:e doses and showed :ha: OTSG tube stresses resulting from the accident are acce::able.
Tube stress :endi: ions were evaluated in 3AW-1588.
The results of :his evalua: ion bound the O.~.-1 IW system desizn with the HSLEDS signal deleted fro: :ne r:. valves.
Other considerations and/or questions:
Overfilling of the OTSG is an issue which has been raised and is documented in the Res:ar: Repor:, Supplement.1, Part 2, Question 2.
The analysis presented in the M-1 FSAR did not take credit for EW isola:icn via :he MSLP.DS signal.
The IW flow ra:e assumed was 1500 GPM to one (1) OTSG at 600 PSIG (the MSLRDS set noint), this assumed flow is 2-b time the fiev rate available te one (1)
OTSG from the THI-l IW system with cavitating ven:urf.s ins:M'ed.
F17'ing of the OTSG from the 50% operating range took 6.6 minutes using these assumptions.
Therefore, the operator would have (with the ven:uris installed and a fully opened control valve) approximately 16 inutes to :erninate an overfill condition due to IW flow.
The revised design therefore allows sufficient time for the operator to terminate IK.
As discussed above, deletion of the MSLRDS signal to the EW valves does not introduce any accident or malfunctions not previously evaluated, nor does it increase the 14k=14 hood of occurrence or consequences of any acciden: analyzed in the TMI-1 FSAR.
In conclusion, this modification does not in:roduce any accident er salfunctions not previously evaluated, nor does it increase the likelihooc c:, occurrence or consequences of any acciden as analyzed in the TMI-1 FSAR.
No safe:y =argins will be reduced as a result of the modification.
Tur hermore, :,ne revised design O SG improves the reliability of the EW System to deliver flov to the in.ac:
and will no: create a containment overpressuri=azion or OTSG over:,:.11. cond ::.on.
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UNITED STATES "MTACHMEND B" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 9,
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November 10, 1982 Docket No. 50-289 Mr. Henry D. Hukill Vice President GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Dear Mr. Hukill:
In its Partial Initial Decision (PID) on design issues, dated December 14, 1981,. the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) for the TMI-l restart proceeding specified that GPUN propose for staff approval a long term solution to the problem of the Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System (MSLRDS) isolating all EFW flow in the event of a failure (paragraph 1064). The Board also specified that the staff review your solution and certify to the Commission that you have made reasonable progress in initiating the solution.
The staff has reviewed your submittal dated August 2,1982 wherein you propose the addition of cavitating venturis in the EFW lines and subsequent removal of the MSLRDS signal from the EFW valves. We find your proposed solution acceptable. We understand that this modification has been completed. Hence, the: Board condition as specified in paragraph 1064 is satisfied.
Our Safety Evaluation is enclosed.
Sincerely, Jo n F. Stolz, Chief 0 rating Reactor 3 Branch #4 ivision of Licensing
Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
r GPU Nuclear Corporation 50-289, TMI-l Mr. R. J. Toole Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Manager, TMI-l Fox, Farr and Cunningham GPU Nuclear Corporation 2320 North 2nd Street P. O. Box 480 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Ms. Louise Bradford
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board TMIA U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio 1011 Green Street Washington, D. C.
20555 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Boar'd Panel Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. D. #5 Washington, D. C.
20555 Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320
- Docketing and Service Section Earl B. Hoffman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dauphin County Commissioner Washington, D. C.
20555 Dauphin County Courthouse Front and Market Streets Chauncey Kepford Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 Judith H. Johnsrud Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Union of Concerned Scientists 433 Orlando Avenue c/o - Harmon & Weiss State College, Pennsylvania 16801 1725 I Street, N. W.
Suite 506
- Judge Gary J. Edles, Chainnan Washington, D. C.
20006 Atomic Safety and Licensina Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Steven C. Sholly Washington, D. C.
20555 Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
J. B. Lieberman, Esq.
Dupont Circle Building, Suite 1101 Berlock, Israel & Lieberman Washington, D. C.
20036 26 Broadway New York, New York. 10004 Dr. Walter H. Jordan 881 W. Outer Drive Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Linda W. Little 5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Ms. Gail P. Bradford Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York 245 W. Philadelphia Street York, Pennsylvania 17404 John Levin, Esq.
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Box 3265 i
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
sem'Asvurwutwuwew e
cuurtrwtueuu u
Federal Er Ency Managem:nt Agency Mr. Thomas Gerusky ATTN:
Doc et Cicrk Bureau of Radiation Protection 1725 I Street, NW Department of Environmental Resources
- Washington, DC 20472 P. O. Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Karin W. Carter, Esq.
505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357 9'
Gr enu r
flu Washington, D. C.
20007 G. F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Dauphin County Office Emergency Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Preparedness 1800 M Street, N.W.
Court House, Room 7 Washington, D. C.
20036 Front & Market Streets Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 Mr. E. G. Wallace Licensing Manager GPU flaclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 William S. Jordan, III, Esq.
Ms. Lennie Prough Harmon & deiss U. S. fl. R. C. - T"I site 1725 I Street, N'd, Suite SOS P. O. Box 311 Washington, DC 20006 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Ms. Virginia Southard, Chairman Citizens for a Safe Environment 264 Walton Street Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Mr. David D. Maxwell, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Board of Supervisors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comi sion Londonderry Township Washington, D. C.
20555 RFD#1 - Geyers Church Road Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Mr. C. W. Smyth Supervisor of Licensing TitI-l GPU Nuclear Corporation Regional Radiation Representative P. O. Box 480 EPA Reoion III Middletown, Pennsylvania 170i7 Curtis Building (Sixth Floor) 6th and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Mr. Richard Conte Governor's Office of State Planning Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-1) and Development l
U.S.N.R.C.
ATTN:
Coordinator, Pennsylvania P. O. Box 311 State Clearinghouse Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 P. O. Box 1323 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120, 1
GPU Nuclear Corporatic 50-289, TMI-l
- Judge John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Judge Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 t
- Judge Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 tir. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator U. S. N. R. C., Region I G31 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Board of Directors P.A.N.E.
P. O. Box 268 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
- Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop EW-529 Washington, D. C.
20555 1
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aIo UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k..v /
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 l
DOCKET NO. 50-289 Introduction The TMI-l Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System (MSLRDS) which is actuated by low steam generator pressure (.below approximately 600 psig),
automatically closes valves in the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system
{
and Main Feedwater system to isolate feed flow to the affected once l
through steam generator (OTSG). Because of the Board's concern that a failure of the HSLRDS could isolate all EFW flow, the Board specified that the licensee propose for staff approval, a long term solution to this problem for implementation as soon as possible after restart (ASLB PID dated December 14, 1981, paragraph 1064).
The Board also specified that the staff certify to the Commission that the licensee has made reasonable progress in initiating the long term solution.
By letter dated August 2,1982, the licensee proposed its solution to the above problem.
Discussion and Evaluation The licensee's proposed solution to the above problem consists of the addition of cavitating venturis:in the EFW lines and then removal of the MSLRDS signal to the EFW isolation valves.
In order to justify removal of the MSLRDS signal from the EFW isolation valves, it must be demonstrated that the protection for which this signal is needed (namely a main steam line break event) is no longer required.
Other conditions such as effect on steam generator overfill also. require consideration.
It is the licensee's position that deletion of the MSLRDS signal from the EFW valves does not affect any of the FSAR acceptance criteria.
The licensee provides the following basis for this position.
The MSLRDS was installed to prevent overpressurization of containment due to a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).
Removal of the MSLRDS signal from the EFW valves will make the TMI-l feedwater isolation functionally the same as TMI-2 in its response to a MSLB.
The TMI-2 MSLB analysis was previously reviewed and approved by the NRC and the TMI-2 analysis is bounding for TMI-l for the following reasons:
a)
The TMI-l venturis limit total flow to a lower flow rate than the TMI-2 venturis (1150 GPM vs 1250 GPM), and b)
TMI-l would not be subjected to a double OTSG blowdown in containment (the limiting pressurization event for TMI-2) because the TMI-l main steam isolation valves are stop check valves.
. ~
The staff recently completed a review of the licensee's analysis of a main steam line break with continued feedwater addition on THI-l in response to IE Bulletin 80-04 The staff's evaluation which was issued July 21, 1982, concluded that there was no potential for containment overpressu-ri za tion resulting from a MSLB with continued emergency (auxiliary) feedwater addition because the main feedwater system isolates and emergency feedwater flow restrictors (cavitating venNris) limit flow to the affected steam generator.
It was also concluded 7) that EFW pumps will not experience runout. conditions and thereby.te'danfaged,
- 2) that no return to criticality occurs and 3) the DNB.R ratio remains greater than 1.3 in the event of a MSLB with continued EFW flow.
- Hence, the staff concludes that removal of the MSLRDS signal from the EFW valves will not adversely affect the ability to withstand a MSLB.
With regard to a steam generator overfill concern, the licensee had previously provided a steam generator overfill analysis (supp.1, part 2, question 2, Restart Report) which with the conservative assumptions of 1) flow through all three EFW pumps directed to one OTSG,
- 2) no EFW flow restrictors installed, and 3) the control valve fails full open and no credit is taken for the MSLRDS signal to isolate EFW on low OTSG pressure; indicated approximately 10 minutes (assumed best estimate EFW boiloff) was available for operator action before OTSG level would' reach the top of the shroud from an initial level of 50% on the operating range.
The licensee calculated that a minimum of 6.6 minutes would be available for the operator to take action if a conservative rate of EFW boiloff were assumed.
The staff reviewed this anal. sis and the options available to.the y
operator to terminate the overfill condition and concl'uded that operator action could be performed in thd time available (NUREG-0680, p 1-2).
With the addition of the cavitating venturis, maximum EFW flow would be reduced by a factor of 21/2 resulting in fill times approximately 21/2 times those previously analyzed, or 25 minutes for the best estimate boiloff assumption of 16 minutes for the conservative bolloff assumption. Hence, since additional time would be available for operator action with cavitating venturis, we conclude that the proposed modification to remove the MSLRDS signal of EFW valves will not adversely affect the ability to control an overfill transient.
l Conclusicr; Because the deletion of the MSLRDS signal from the ERI valves does l
not affect the ability to withstand a MSLB accident and because, with the addition of cavitating venturis in the EFW lines, sufficient time is.
available for the operator to tenninate an overfill condition due to contilued EFW addition, we conclude that the proposed modification is acceptable and satisfies the Board's condition in paragraph 1064 of the December 14, I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Proposal in Response to ALAB-729, Condition No. 5" were served this 29th day of June, 1983 by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the parties on the attached Service List.
+
Thomas A.
- Baxter, P.C.
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k
In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST l
Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Atcmic Safety and Licensjng Appeal Washington, D.C.
20555 Doarti Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatlory Cmmission Ccmnissioner Victor Gilinsky Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ivan W. Smith, Esquiro 01 airman Camissioner Janos K. Asselstine Atomic Safety and Licensm9 Doard x
g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission U.S. Mtclear RegulatoryLCouelssion Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
2055.T ^
s Conndssioner John F. Ahearno Dr. Walter II. Jordan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 03nmission Atomitf Safety and Licensing Doard Washington, D.C.
20555 Panel 881 West Outer Drive Conmissioner 'Ihcmas M. Roberts Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission
.s Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Linda W. Little '_
'i s
Atcmic Safety and Licensing Doalt!. u' Docketing and Service Section Panel x
Office of the Secretary 5000 llermitage Drive'
~
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Raleigh, Tbrth Carolina 27612.
' W washington, D.C.
20555
"~
3 m
James M. CutcIlin,, IV Es x
Office of the Execuib quire Gary J. Edles, Esquire Ingal Director y d1 airman-U.S. Ntelear Regulatory Conmission L l
Atmtic Safety and Idcensing Appeal Washing' ton, D.C.
20555 Doard
?,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission John A.IIcvin, Esquiie Washington, D.C.
20555 Assistant Counsel l
Pennsylvania Public Utilty ConrdcW.;,9n Dr. John II. Buck P.O. Don 3265 V'
Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal
!!arrisbntg, ~ Pennsylvania 17120 Doard Panel
- N o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Robert"Adler, Esquire Washington, D.C.
20555 Ass,igant Attorney Gen 6xal 50Q Executive !!ouse P.0; Dox,2357 11arrisburg, Pennsylvanf.a 17120
Jordan D. Cunningha, Esquire 2320 North Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110' Ms. Iouise Bradford
'IMI AIERP 1011 Green Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Harmon & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Steven C. Sholly Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1101 Washington, D.C.
20036 ANGRY /'IMI PIPC 1037 Maclay Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17103 Willian S. Jordan, III, Esquire Harmon & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Chauncey Jepford Judith H. Johnerad Enviromental Coalition on Nuclear Power
433 Orlando Avence State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Marjorie M. Immodt R. D. 5 Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320
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