ML20084S355

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RO 50-254/76-36:on 761202,cooling Water Suction Header Common to Both RHR Containment Cooling Loop 1A & Diesel Generator 1 Cooling Water Pump Airlocked.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Maint Procedures Will Be Revised
ML20084S355
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/30/1976
From: Flasch M, Kalivianakis N
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
NJK-76-484, RO-50-254-76-36, NUDOCS 8306160700
Download: ML20084S355 (3)


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7 December 30, 1976 S-J,s,yx,}^,lf,3/7,,g,g r

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J. Keppler, Regional Director -L_ g Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region ill U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Reference:

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-254, DPR-29, Unit 1 Appendix A, Sections 3.5.B.2 and 6.6.B.2.b Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report No. RO 50-254/76-36 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.2. .

Very truly yours, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1

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& $5 I N. J. Kalivianakis Station Superintendent NJK/FJG/lk ,

cc: G. A. Abrell .

. 582 Q%h 0 h y 3' 1977 -? -

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. .. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT -

,7~. CONTROL :l l l l l l l (PLEASE PCBNT ALL CEIUlf*E3 INFEM ATION) 1 6 AME tcENSE NUMBER Y TYPE 01 I il tl ol A! D!1 l l 0 l 0 l-! 0l Ol Ol 0l 0 l-l 0 l'0l l4l1 l1 l1 l1 l l0 l 3 l 7 89 14 1S , 25 PG 30 31 32 CATEGORY T S DOCVET NUMDfR .

EVENT DATE REPORT DATE 01 CONT l 7 8 57 l

58 l M 59 M

60 l 015l 0l-l0 l2 l5 l4 l l 1 l 2 l 0l 2 l 716l l1 l 2 l 3 l 017l 6l 61 GU 69 74 75 00 EVENT DESCRIPTION gg l The cooling water suction header common to both the IA RHR containment cooling loop l 7 89 80

][ l and Diesel Generator I cooling water pump was air-locked. This resulted in a loss l 7 89 UO 3E l of flow throuch these lines. At 7:30 n.m. on December 2. 1976. the 1A RHR Service l 7 89 80 DE l water pump was started; but, it failed to indicate any flow or pressure. An l 7 89 I g l operator was dispatched to investigate the cause but could find (cont' on attachment)80l 7 89 PwE 80 DE CODE COMPONENT CODE SlJ R R VOLATON EE I ci r i La]

7 89 10 lP lU lM lP l X l Xl 12 d43 ll l0 l715 l [N j 11 17 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION '

gg l (Proximate Cause-Procedure inadequacy) The IB RHR Service water pump was found to havej 7 89 BO BE l an air line connected to the pump casing. This line had been used to pressurize the l 7 89 8:)

QE l underside of the numn packino with service air to facilitate packino removal. Air l STA US  % POWER ' OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY OfSCOVERY DESCAPTON 7

1 B-W 9 10 l0 l9 l 6 l l 12 13- -

NA l 44 W 45 46 l NA l 80 RELE SED OF SE AMOUNT OF ACTMTY LOcATON OF RELEASE 55 LzJ Lzl I NA l l NA l

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  • B0 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMDER TYPE DESCRPTON DE l 0l 0 l 0 l [Z J l NA l

7 09 11 12 13 00 PERSONNEL INJUA!EC NUMBER DESCRPTON 3E l0l0l0l l NA . l 7 89 11 12 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES DE l "A l I 7 89 80 l LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY

! TYPE DESCRIPTON l D E L zl 1 N( l 7 89 10 , 80 PUBLICITY

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l 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS gg l (CAUSE DESCIPTION CONTD) had leaked through the IB service water pump suction valve, l 7 89 -

00 I.1001-18, and had pressurized the' common header. . No procedures bxisted to incorporate

@ l the operat ions dept. Involvement in using the service air system to facilitate packing l 7 89 repairs. 80 NAME: Michael P. riasch 309-654-2241 (ext. 247)

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no apparent reason for the lack of flow; therefore, surveillance was performed to take the'IA RHR containment cooling loop outfof service. IA and IB RHR service water pumps serve the lA RHR containment cooling loop. .

While testing Diesel Generator 1, which serves lA RHR containment cooling l loop, the ger.erator tripped from high engine temperature. This was caused i by lack of flow through the diesel generator cooling water pump.

Investigation of the system arrangement by the shift foreman revealed that the common suction header serving both the 1A RHR containment cooling loop and the Diesel Generator 1 cooling water pump was pressurized with air. The header was promptly vented. At 10:05 p.m. on December 2, 1976, the 1A RHR service water pump and the Diesel Generator 1 cooling water pump were tested and found to operate satisfactorily.

During the period that the lA RHR containment cooling loop suction header was airbound, the IB RHR containment cooling loop was operational. Additionally, Diesel Generator 1/2 was operational.

Although Diesel Generator I tripped on motor high temperature while being tested, the trip would not have occurred if the control switch had been in the normal AUTO-START mode.

There are no safety implications and the health and safety of the public was not affected by this occurrence. (R0 50-254/76-36)

Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence When the 1A RHR service water pump did not meet flow specifications, the immediate action taken by the Unit 1 operator to test the diesel generators, the core spray systems, and the alternate RHR containment cooling loop was appropriate. -

A maintenance procedure will be instituted which will specify that future pump and valve nacking removals requiring service air assistance will be acknowledged by the operations department. This will permit the operations department the opportunity to more thoroughly vent those systems which could become air-locked due to Icaking isolation valves, s Failure Data The use.of service air by the maintenance department to assist in pump and valve packing removal is a common time-saving procedure. This method has been used in the past on the RHR service water pumps with no previous instances of air-locking the pump suction header. A procedure specifying complete venting of all affected piping af ter similar jobs in the future will preclude any recurrences of this type.

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