ML20084P163
| ML20084P163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1984 |
| From: | Lang G WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084P102 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8405170432 | |
| Download: ML20084P163 (24) | |
Text
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RELATED CORRESPONDENCE
, UNITED STATES OF AMERfCA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKEV USNR!
BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of *g4 g g CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL
) 50-401 OL ~v%
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN
, MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
i i
AFFIDAVIT OF GLENN E. LANG 4
County of Allegheny )
) ss.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania )
GLENN E. LANG, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says as l l
follows:
I
- 1. My name is Glenn E. Lang. My business address is P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230. I am employed by the Westinghouse Electric
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[ Corporation as a principal engineer in the Instrumentation and Control Systems i
Licensing Group in the Nuclear Safety Department of the Nuclear Technology i'
Division (NTD). I have served in this capacity since March 1982.
- 2. I was graduated from Grove City College in 1965 with a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering and Michigan State University in 1966 with a H.S.
degree in Electrical Engineering. For the past nine years I have been employed by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in the areas of accident ,
analysis and instrumentation and control evaluations. Included in the work on l instrumentation and control evaluations are the following: post accident a monitoring instrumentation; control and protection system interaction, and emergency response capability evaluation._ My work has also involved the direction of licensing efforts on the Westinghouse Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System (DHD15).
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- 3. I make this Affidavit in support of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Contention VII (Steam Generators). I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and believe them to be true and correct. This Affidavit describes the DMIMS installed at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (" Harris Plant") and adoresses several questions raised by the Joint Intervenors.
DMIMS in the Harris Plant
- 4. The DMIMS continuously monitors the reactor coolant system for the presence of loose parts. An advanced microprocessor based system design, employing digital technology, automatically actuates audible and visual alarms if a signal exceeds the preset alarm level.
- 5. The sensors are high sensitivity piezoceramic accelerometers which produce an electrical charge proportional to acceleration. These signals are transmitted to a charge preamplifier inside containment where conversion is made to a voltage signal. The voltage signal is transmitted to a signal conditioner in the DMIMS cabinet which is located outside containment. The signal is then transmitted to the Monitor Board for analog to digital conversion for processing channel impact data.
- 6. The DMIMS for the Harris Plant will include two sensors located on the l
outer shell of each steam generator, one above and one below the steam generator tubesheet. Figure 1 shows the recommended mounting locations.
- 7. Operating experience has demonstrated that if metallic impacts occur, the resultant acoustic signal will most likely be in the frequency range of 2 KHz to 10 KHz. The DMIMS accelerometers have a linear response between 0.005 KHz and 20 KHz, enveloping this signal frequency range. The sensitivity of the DMIMS system is designed to be capable of detecting metallic impacts with l
e S
L
. kinetic energy of 0.5 foot pounds or less. Tests have been performed on the l
system yielding acceptable responses for 0.25, 0.5,1.0, and 2.0 pounds at a Westinghouse plant, using the DMIMS similar to that to be installed at the Harris Plant. Furthermore, a laboratory test using 30 pounds has been performed. This test showed that the DilIllS produces acceptable responses for 30 pounds.
- 8. In operation, the DMIMS analyzes the content of each signal rather than only relying on impact signal amplitude, thus virtually eliminating false system actuation. Discrimination against normal or anticipated background noise is provided by use of a floating threshold so that small impact signals above background, but below actuation setpoint, can be investigated by the system prior to the onset of potentially adverse conditions.
- 9. Class lE equipment for nuclear power generating stations is defined as that equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures
) comparable to the 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines. Since the DMIMS does not serve a Class 1E equipment function, as defined above, it, therefore, need not be a Class 1E system. Furthermore, the DMIMS meets the electrical interface criteria described in Regulatory Guide 1.133.
- 10. The DitIMS equipment inside containment, however, is designed to remain functional even during an operating basis earthquake and anticipated radiation exposures. Data base calibration is made prior to plant startup. Periodic online channel checks and channel functional tests are incorporated into the
- DMIMS design to ensure reliability.
I a
- 11. A brief discussion of the Harris Plant DMIllS is presented in the FSAR at Section 4.4.6.4. Furthenaore, a detailed evaluation of the Harris Plant Df1IMS is presented in the attached excerpts frora letter. LAP-83-508, dated October 28, 1983, from M. A. McDuffie to Mr. Harold R. Denton (Attachment 1 j hereto). The discussion is provided under DSER Open Item 30 (DSER Section 4.4.8, pages 4-47 and 4-50). Included in the letter is a (a) systera description; (b) operational procedures; (c) licensee experience with Loose Parts lionitoring Systems, and (d) evaluation for conformance to Reg. Guide 1.133. Westinghouse provided information to CP&L to assist thera in preparing
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this response to the NRC.
Plant Applicability
- 12. There are 15 domestic nuclear plants and 13 non-domestic nuclear plants which utilize a DMIllS similar in configuration to that installed at the Harris Plant.
L L:
'Glenn E. Lang V n
Sworn to and subscribed before me
, this / f % ay of May, 1984.
C &h~ Notary Public '
s' LORRAINE M. PIPLICA. NOTAEY Pustic
! N04R0EVILLE B000. ALLEGHttY COUNTY lty CorxMMUHs pgggtC 14.19s7 gestwr. Penns Associat -- ' "--
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0142G/ GEL /5-84
Figure 1 DMIMS SENSOR LOCAT10NS C
E 8
l 4
0 Sensors will be l located along these 10 two lines and CL Tubesheet
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Primary Primary i
Outlet Y Inlet Nozzle Nozzle
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- ATTACHMENT 1
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- ' 3 t:.2wv u- -n. j SERIAL: LAP-83-508
. . n OCT 281983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
! Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory-Commission Wasilington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER. PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50 400 AND 50-401 RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power & Light Company hereby transmits one original and forty copies of additional information requested by the NRC as part of the safety review of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The cover sheet of the attachdnt sunnarizes the related Open Items addressed in the attachment along with the corresponding review branch and reviewer for each response.
In response to Draft Safety Evaluation Open Item 30, we are transmitting Westinghouse Drawing No. 2342D26, Rev. 1, "DMIMS Accelerometer Details," and Drawing No. 1606E41, Rev. 2, " Recommended Incontainment Equipment Installation," to assist the NRC Staff reviewer.
As this submittal contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Electric Corporate, it is supported by a previously submitted affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the owner of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(!t)' of Section 2 790 of the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the Application for Withholding or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit should reference CAW-83-55 and should be addressed to R. A. Wiesemann, Manager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, Westinghouse Electric Ccrporation, P. O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvannia 15230.
We will be providing responses to other requests for additional information shortly.
Yours very truly, omSNAC5tGNED B1 M. A. Mc0UFFIE M. A. McDuf fis Senior Vice President j
Nuclear Generation MAM/ccc (8345JRE)
Enclosures cc: Mr. B.C. Buckley (NRC)
- Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. T. L. Huang (NRC-CPB)
- Dr. Phyllis Locchin Mr. G.F. Maxwell (NRC-SENPP) Mr. John D. Runkle Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Travis Payne (KUEU) Mr. G. O. Bright ( ASLB)
Mr. Daniel F. Raad (CHANGE /ELP) Dr. J. H. Carpencer (ASLB)
Mr. R. P. Gruber (NCUC) Mr. J. L. Kelley ( ASLB)
Chapel Hill Public Library l Wake County Public Library .
bec: Mr. H. R. Banks Mr. L. I. Loflin
- Mr. C . S . Bo hanan Mr.1. L. Mayton, Jr.
Mr. J. R.' Bohannon Mr. C. L. McKenzie Mr. H. R. Bowles Mr. S. McManus Mr. C. Carmichael (2) Mr. C. H. Moseley, Jr.
Mr. G. S. Ca shell Mr. R. M. Parsons
' Mr. N. J. Chiangi Mr. J. J. Sheppard l Mr. A. B. Cutter Mr. Sheldon D. Smith Dr. T. S. Elleman Mr. A. C. Tollison Mr. G. L. Fo rehand Mr. R. A. Watson Mr. J. F. Garibaldi (Dasco) Ms. M. A. Weaver (Westinghouse)
Mr. J. L. Ha rness Mr. J. L. Willis
- Mr. T. A. Baxter (Shaw, Pittman, Dr. J. D. E. Jeffries Potts & Trowbridge) l Mr. I. A. Johnson Mr. S. A. Laur File: HI/ A-2D
- l File: E-X-0509 *
- Denotes parties which have received the proprietary information.
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ATTACHMENT LIST OF OPEN ITEMS /NEW ISSUES, REVIEW BRANCH AND REVIEWER iuxiliary Systems Branch /N. Wagner Open Item 372(10)
Containment System Branch /J. Huang Op en It em 63 Core Performance Branch /T. L. Huang Open Item 30 Radiological Assessment Branch / S. Block open Item 172 Reactor Systems Branch /E. Marinos open Item 213
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Shearon. Harris Nuclear Power Plant i
DSER open Item 30 (DSER Section 4.4.8, pages 4-47 & 4-50) l l Evaluate the Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) to be installed at SHNPP for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.133 and provide a commic:nent to supply a final design report on the LPMS.
Re sponse:
The loose parts monitoring system used at SHNPP is the Westinghouse Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS). This system has been used previously i
at other plants, such as Virgil Summer Nuclear Station.
The following information is provided as input to the format requested.
I. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
! A. There are 10 loose parts monitoring sensors (accelerometers) located in pairs to provide for sensor redundancy. Each of the 5 pairs of sensors are located on equipment (reactor vessel, steam generators')
to monitor natural collection regions of the primary system where loose parts are likely to be found. Specific location details are provided in Attachment 1.
B. Detailed sensor and preamplifier specifications are provided in Attachments 3 and 4. The sensor and charge preamplifier are j designed to operate in normal containment environment.
! C. Sensor mounting details are provided in Attachments 1 and 2.
i D. As noted in B above.
E. A complete functional and theory-of-operating description is available in the equipment instruction manuals. Pertinent portions of these descriptions are provided in Accachment 5.
The capability exists to record information from any of the 10 sensors.
II. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES A Loose Parts Monitoring System as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.133 is one element of an overall effort to prevent loose parts from either entering the reactor coolant system or breaking free f rom the structure within the reactor coolant system. The preoperational vibration testing of the reactor internals during hot functional testing (refer to FSAR l
Section 3.9.2.4), as well as the post hot functional test inspections of l the reactor vessel and its internals, will verify that flow induced
, vibration will not produce loose parts in the reactor coolant system.
I Subsequent to hot functional testing, maintenance procedures f or work on
the reactor coolant pressure boundary and refueling will include closeout instructions. Such instructions may include steps for parts and tool inventory and reconstruction of dismantled squipment.
Personnel involved in work on the reactor coolant pressure boundary and refueling and fuel-handling operations will be trained in the importance j I
of proper steps for closecut, tool and material inventory control, and the need for reporting loose objects known or suspected to have been dropped into the reactor coolant system.
During operation of the SENPP, the MIMS will be used to detect the presence and determine the significance of objects impacting on the reactor coolant system.
The subsections which follow decribe the preoperational and startup i testing, normal operations, and surveillance for the SENPP.
A. Preoperational and startup testing The initial testing of the system after installation will include the f ollowing tests and checks:
- 1. Signal conditional calibration: each channel contains a signal conditioner which is calibrated to operate with the accelerometer installed in its channel and to accommodate the alara levels and the typical background noise level.
- 2. Calibration of accelerometers: this calibration will be performed with the sensor removed from the reactor vessel or steam generator. This calibration consists of mounting the accelerometer on a vibration calibrator, vibrating the accelerometer at a predetermined f requency and acceleration, and measuring the output of the channel with a voltmeter. Such a test will also be used for an operational check of a channel subsequent to fuel load and at refueling or maintenance outages.
l
- 3. System tests: during the startup of the MIMS, the system will be tested with the accelerometer installed. The test will be performed by impacting the outside of the reactor vessel or steam generator and observing the response at the MIMS cabinet. This test will be performed under cold shutdown conditions.
- 4. Alarm level: An initial alarm level will be selected prior to power operation based on the recommendations of the
- manufacturer. Daring power escalation testing, the background noise level _ will be monitored to determine if the alarm level should be modified to avoid unnecessary alarms.
l B. Normal operation Activities anticipated during normal operation include diagnostic tests of the MIMS, channel checks of the sensor channels, response to events identified by the MIMS as impacts, and reinitialization of the MIMS should power be interrupted for a prolonged period of I
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time. The other activities which may be performed during normal operation include modification of the alert setpoint of each of the sensor channels, readout of data on impact events identified by the MIMS, and aural monitoring and recording of each of the sensor channels. The diagnostic tests include internal checks of the circuit and logic used to analyze sensor signals, checks of channel integrity and internal CPU power supply, and checks of the keyboard and displays.
These can be performed automatically by the MIMS or manually initiated. The channel integrity test sequentially monitors the voltage output of each channel; if the voltage of the channel is not
! within the proper range, the channel is assumed to be inoperable by the MIM's CP G This channel integrity test, whether initiated manually or automatically, will be used to satisfy the channel check recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.333, Section C.3(2)(b) .
In addition, the MIMS wil include a fungtional check of the logic circuits used to determine if the noise contains the signature of an impact. This test will be conducted on the components within the MIMS cabinet in the control room and would exclude "f unctional j
testing" of the sensor, the associated charge amplifier, and cabling. CP&L considers it to be impractical to inject a " test signal" at a sensor; this would require an impact on the reactor vessel or a steam generator. CP&L also considers it impractical to test the charge amplifier; this would require containment entry and installing a temporary accelerometer lead to the charge amplifier to insert an appropriate " test signal." The integrity cabling to the 4 MIMS cabinet is determined from the channel check described above.
l Based on these considerations, CP&L believes the functional test, as described above, is adequate to determine the operability of the l MIMS.
Additional surveillances which will be performed are a weekly aural monitoring of the operable channels and a quarterly ceasurement of l the background noise level on each channel.
Appropriate procedures or qualified personnel using P.echnical information provided by the manufacturer will be used to perform manual activities.
.C. Hasponse to alarms As discussed in Section I, upon detection of noise which matches the l
signatura programmed into the MIMS for a loose part, the MIMS will l automatically record the channel number, date, tLae, and saximum amplitude for the event. An indication above the setpoint will actuate an alarm on the main control board. Data on events exceeding the alarm point are retained for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the data can be obtained from the MIMS by a display or a printer. The MIMS is designed *o preclude alarms during operation of the rod drive system; however, other routine events or anticipated transients any cause alarms. Operating procedures will provide instruction for the response to an alarm. The procedures will l
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l direct the operators to review other indications for integrity of i the reactor coolant pressure boundary and the integrity of the fuel
! record information on the status of the reactor coolant system at the time of the alara, note other events such au pump starts or .
l transients which were concurrent with the alara, and provide this I
information in an alara event report to the plant's Technical l
Support Group by the beginning of the next working day. \
i The Technical Support Group is responsible for diagnosiv Uf the alaras. The purpose of the diagnosis is to correlate diverse c, information from sources such as process instrumentatica'with the MIMS alara and determine if a loose object exists. The diagnosis of 3 an alara event report may include review of any additional alarus, y' l
j analysis of the background noise, comparison of the bac'cground noise with earier measurements, and review of the status of the reactor
- coolant system concurrent with the alara. '
)
j Additional f actors which may be used to. confirm the existence or j absence of a loose object are the g.eometry of the collection area i being monitored, flow conditions in the collection areas, impact l
acceleration, and the location and number of channels which shbw
- concurrent events. Records of alaru report reviews will be
! maintained for future reference. j ;\ s s
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If the diagnosis concludes that a loosa object is present, the j( '
significance of the object with respect to the integrity of the reactor coolant system and the fuel will be determined.
i Reports of the determination that a loose object has been identil1&d will be made to the NRC in accordance with the reporting
{ requirements of the Technical Specifications for the SENPP.
! III. LICENSEE EXPERIENCE WITH LPMS ,
Since SHNPP is not an operating plant, ne prior operating experience is available with this system. A s ?
l l hs IV. EVALUATION FOR CONFORMANCE TO REG. GEDE 1.133 h-The following items address each regulatory position item noted in 3) '
Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.133. g l C.I.a Sensor location. Sensors will be, as described in Attstelutent 1, located to monitor natural collection regious. SENPP complies \ ith
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C.1.a. , ,
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j, C.I.b Systen sensitivity. The Westisshaussi system'has been tested .
extensively in actual operation as well n 'tr. the laboratory. The MyG .
is capable of detecting kinetic energy of.less thin '.125 foot poun'dsen 3 distances greater than 18 feet from the transducer. Tees,prevnclybie.
performed with .25, .5,1.0, and 2.0 pound masses at vkrioub, heights. tb s future test, incorporatir.g larger masses (to 30 pounds) 'is ,preJently under consideration. SENPP meets the intant of C.L.b.1 (
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C.I.c Otannel separation'.. Yach inscriments' tion channe) Qansor, l
hardline cabling, and preamplifier) within hantainment',ts Mectrically and physically independent. Independence is maintained] Pard 4h thewhich J
4 -
l signal conditioners to the connection panel, outside coccain.nent, SENP? complies with ,'
- , is readily accessible during full-power operation.
s C.I.c. '(
i C.1.d Data acquisition system. De MDIS continuously monitors all. ) * >
i
, .: x active channels and provides for the recording of all sensor signals Ain
! digital f orm when an alert level is exceeded.
i'
, r tee \ processed digit,al (impact) data is, stored in non-volatile memory and 1 printed out every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or on operstar request. The system also j n s provides immediate audio .and visual monicoting of all impact signals, s 'i SENPP complies with C.I.d. i y,s
'C2. e Alert level. The system incorp' orates an adjustable alert level
'x' for each sensor. Continual monitoring provi, des for actuation of the J
Y,4 alarm system if any impact above the preset alert level is detected.
- J
\ Criteria for establishing an alert level are discussed in Attachment i
- 5. SENPP complies with C.I.e. , ,
C.L.f Capability f or sensor chaenel operability tests. The MIMS l
- provides for periodic (online) channel _ check to verify operability, as s
sammarized below.
- 1 i
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- 1. Audio: each chat.sel may be ~ aurally monitored to verify presence of .
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(normal) background noise.
- 2. Raw signals: are available at the connection panel for f requency or
=cime domain analysis. s,
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i 3. Self-tes t: implemented on operator ince'rventios' m
I I ' a. Module test: a simulated impact signal is sent to each
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detection network. The netsrsk must respond with the' proper '
amplitude to pass the test.'
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- b. Integrity test: the voltage sent t'o the charge preamplifiers is If the voltage is out of tolerance (due to el measured.
aisadjusted or defective signal conditioner, field cable, or g I 7 charge preamp), that channel is displayed for appropriate s7
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action. s ,
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- 4. Channel functional testing consists of the tests described in
)
Sections 3a and 3b.
d , , j, .' 3
- 5. Channel calibration is performed ar. the signal conditioner by using
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' the system's internal oscillator.f At ccavenient intervals (i.e. ,
refueling outage) various weights,daould be used to yerify alars' detection through the entire sys' car. (See II.~5 for Iitrcher
- B discussion of the above items.) t /s , g
- i s \
- s SENPP i meets the intent of C.1.f . ,
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y C.1.g Operability for se skic and environmental conditions. The MIMS was designed for Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) conditions. All MIMS hardware has been procured under engineering design specifications that require performance under normal, non-accident, environmental
. conditions. Field exeriences have confirmed the MIMS adequacy under normal operating radiation, vibration, temperature, and humidity environments at operating plants.
The sensor is hermetically' sealed and employs stainless steel sheath and A NEMA-4 Rexolite radiation-resistant insulator at the connector. SHNPP meets enclosure is employed for preamp components and connectors.
r the lucent of C.1.g. ,
Col.h Osality o5 ' system components. This item recommends that a
! replacement program be established f or those parts that are anticipated to have a limited service life. The only components of the MIMS chat are inaccessible during normal operations are the sensors, the charge amplifiers, and the , cable inside containmen't. With the exception of cabling, the balance of the system is located in the control room and is readily accessible f or maintenance or part replacements. CP&L will evaluate the failure race of the components inside containment when a suitable amount of operating experience is attained at SENPP.
Replacement schedules will tben be defined such that there is a high s
confidence that at least one sensor channel on eachReplacements collection area of will l be available until the end of the next fuel cycle.
items in the MIMS cabinet will be done on an as-needed basis. This approach is considered acceptabid bdcause the MIMS is not required to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the integrity of the fual. SENPP complies with C.1.h.
- C.1.1 System repair. 11tring plant aperating conditions, all system
' equipment that is outside of containment would be normally accessible, i.e. ,. all equipment except sensors, preamplifiers, and containment cabling. This equipment has ea'sy access and allows for replacement and repair of edifunctiotiing compo'nents. Instruction manuals provide informatics on troubleshooting, drawings and diagrams, and replacement parts.
,9 In-All equipment outsids containment will be in lov radiation areas.
containment items (sensors, preamplifier) vi V rava ceability for
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I' dismantling and installation.- SHNPP coral' es itfi C.I. : .
C . 2' Establishing thej alert level.
TL c day , ' wel is established during baseline restit.g of the MIMS. W e systes uses an impact algorithm ~ ti discriminate impact signals f rom normal hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical noise generated by an operating plant.
Potential f alse alert signals resulting f rom plant maneuvers are minimized by the following:
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- 1. Control rod inhibit: automatically inhibits alarm actuatioi, during rod stepping.
- 2. Ramote inhibit: may be switched manually to inhibit alarm detection
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during plant testing.
- 3. Test position (keylock switch): eliminates (remote) alarm signals by mechanically defeating signals sent to the remote alarm.
The MIMS alert logic provides for the alert level to be a function of normal steady-state operating conditions. In addition, the system l
automatically compensates for the different levels of background noise
- found at each sensor location. The patented floating setpoint feature is unique to the Westinghouse Digital Metal Impact Monitoring system.
Procedures for responding to an alarm will require that plant transients concurrent.with an alarm are noted in the report of the alarm (refer to Item II.C above). SHNPP complies with C.2.
i C .3 Using the data acquisition modes. The philosophy of the system is to continuously provide online detection of loose parts. The self-test f escure (actuated automatically every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and manually at operator intervention) performs channel operation checks.
Aural monitoring of all channels is possible with operator intervention. Outputs from the signal conditioners are readily l available so that measurement of bachgrond noise can be performed. The j
i only calibration required by the system is at the signal conditioner.
An internal oscillator is provided to adjust the amplifier to design specifications. Impact detection may be verified by impacting the j
external surf ace with specific weights f rom known distances.
The automatic data acquisition mode is discussed in Section II.C. The alarm points established for'the MIMS during startup testing will be reported to the NRC in the startup report required by the SENPP Technical Specifications. The surveillance performed on the MIMS will be as specified in the SHNPP Technical Specificaton; the surveillance proposed is as described in Section II.B above. The response by plant personnel to an alarm condition is discussed in Section II.C above.
SENPP meets the intent of C.3.
C.4 Content of Safety Analysis Reports.
C.4.a Refer to Attachment 1.
C.4.b Refer to Attachment 5.
C.4.c The only expected major source of extraneous noise during normal steady-state operation is the movement of the control rods.
C.4.d Acquisition of quality data is assured by' the location of the sensors, proper calibration and testing of the MIMS, and the ability of the MIMS logic to discriminate noice which is not indicative of a metallic impact on the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
C.4.e Ref er to At tachment 5.
C.4.f Refer to C.5 below.
I
C.4.g FSAR Section 7.5 illustrates process indication that' will be available in the plant and recorded. This data will be used as appropriate to determine if there is a correlation with an alarm on the MIMS and other system parameters. A correlation may substantiate the validity of the alarm or confirm the integrity of the reactor coolant system and fuel. Refer to Section II.C above f or additional discussion.
C.4.h Refer to Section II.A above.
C.4.1 Refer to Chapter 12.0 of the FSAR for a description of the ALARA program for SENPP. As discussed above, to the extent practical components of MIMS are located in accessible areas. The notable exceptions are those items which must be attached to, or in close proximity to, the the reactor coolant system.
C.4.] The training program for licenses operators will address the operation of the MIMS.
C.'4.k Refer to C.1.g.
SHNPP meets the intent of C.4.
l C .S Technical specification for the Loose Part Detection System. The proposed Technical Specifications for SHNPP are listed in Chapter 16 of the FSAR. CP&L is currently developing a revision to the FSAR to address Rev. 4 of the NRC Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Sappip Systems. This revision will address the MIMS. The revision is scheduled to be submitted to the NRC staff in the second quarter of 1984. SENPP meets the intent of C.S.
C.6 Notification of a loose part. The notification of the confirmation of a loose part will be made to the NRC in accordance with the Technical Specifications for SENPP. SHNPP complies with C.6.
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- 1
ATIACHMENT 1-Digital MIMS: Installation Instructions (Sensors)
The f ollowing is the procedure f or locating the Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System sensors.
STEAM GENERATOR SENSOR LOCATION PROCEDURE
- 1. Locate the centerline of the tube sheet. Af ter locating the centerline of the tube sheet, measure 30 inchen up on the aanway side of the hot leg of the steam generator. The secondary side transducer is to be located at this elevation no less than 10 degrees and no more than 90 degrees from the centerline of the tubeline of the steam generator.
- 2. Ihe primary side transducer is to be located on the aanway side no less than 10 degrees and no more than 90 degrees from the centerline of the cdseline 30 inches down f rom the center of the tube sheet.
- 3. Items one and two above must be vertically aligned with respect to each other.
- 4. The sensor location is to be chosen to maximize the distance to any discontinuities such as nozzles, penetrations, or weld seams. The distance to the discontinuity should be measured from the sensor loction to the outside edge of the' reinforcement of the opening.
REACTOR VESSEL SENSOR LOCATION PROCEDURE (Top)
- 1. Locate the three lif ting lugs on the Reactor Vessel Head. Select the two most readily accessible. Af ter selecting the two lif ting lugs to be used, locate a point on the side of the lug that will allow a 1.250 inch spotface that does not interfere with the lifting rod connected to the lug . At this point the sensor will be located. Do the same on the other previously selected lif ting lug.
(Bottom)
- 1. Locate two instrument tubes on the bottom of the vessel that are readily accessible.
- 2. Uhe the mounting hardware supplied to mount the sensors on these tubes.
TRANSDUCER MOUNTING NOTES l
- 1. Westinghouse provides a reactor vessel bottom transducer mount for attachment of each R. V. bottom-mounted transducer. These mounts are to be attached to the instrumentation tubes by tightening the clamping
bolts of the mount to a torque of 18515 inch-pounds. The accelerometer is then attached to the mount and tightened to a torque of 100 inch-pounds.
- 2. The customer is responsible f ar preparing the surface and mounting the R.V. top and steam generator mounted accelerometers. A 0.25-inch-28UNF-2B x 0.75-inch minimum, full-thread hole is required at each transducer )
location. Additionally, a 1.25-inch diameter spotface surface is !
required. Finish on the spotface surface should be 32 m'eroinches. The threaded hole should be perpendicular to the surface within 1005 inch.
- 3. Care must be taken to prevent damage to the extension cable. A minimum ind radius of 3 inches is required.
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VIBRATION TEST CO R POR ATION EQUIPMENT,
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MOdel RCA.2TR semote Charge Preamplifier a - - .. -m.-~~~.---,---m- -
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"T5meidedel RCA-2TR is a two-wire Remote ducers, and receives its power from the Charge Preamplifier designed for use with Series 22 Instrument, or other suitable anyof the Unholtz-Dickie Series 22 Instru- constant current source.
rnents. The RCA-2TR combines the advan-
' vf a very low noise level with the in addition, the RCA-2TR is rated for sence and simplicity of a conversion continuous operation to 100'C with mini-
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- am is independent of normal input m al degredation in performanc a. For
- ablo lengths. The very low output impe- operation over this wide temperature dance of the RCA-2TR permits long cable range, a constant current power supply uns of standard RG/U coaxial cable to the having a voltage capability of 30 V DC 33rics 22 Instrument without reduction in nominal is required. Bias voltage readjust-tip- 'l to noise ratio due to cable-generated- ment is rarely necessary, even at the 100* C 1r. . , cable-pick up, o r cable-loading extreme. The RCA-2TR is also radiation-affsets. The RCA-2TR is intended for resistant and has been used successfully in aparation with piezoelectric type trans- nuclear power plants.
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'HYSICAL DESCRIPTION l NPUT CONNECTOR: BODY MATERIAL:
l Stainless Steel #304 iicr( 33-01
)UTPUT CONNECTOR: BULKHEAD MOUNTING THREAD:
NC with Rexolite or Halar insulator 1/2-28 NEF (two mating HEX nuts supplied HMENSIONS:
.15 } 9es overall length
.5 i( .s body length
.625 inches body diameter See Performance Specifications cn back page.
ATTACHMENT W, PAGE 1
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, ' PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS
, CONVERSION GAIN: MAXIMUM OUTPUT CURRENT:
1 mV/pC - 1, -3% (typically 0, -2%) 1 mA when operated from a 4*mA source.
l GAIN CHANGE: FREQUENCY RESPONSE: !
( ass than 1% for source capacitance up to +2% f rom 0.2 Hz to 50 kHz with input shunted by t
i500 pF (typically 2500 pF). Typica!!y less than l
rto less than 10 megonm at 20* C (+2% at 2 Hz at 1% from 20* C to 100* C with fixed source 100* C).
capacitance.
INPUT IMPED ANCE: OPERATING TEMPERATURE:
C ypically 0.25 F snunted by 22 megonms 5* C to 100* C (40* F to 212* F) sdecreases slightly at 100*C).
OUTPUT IMPEDANCE: NOISE:
! Less than 50 ohms (typically 25 chms) .005 pC rms + .001 pC rms/1000 pF source capacitance, referred to input, for 10 Hz to 4AXIMUM OUTPUT VOLTAGE: 20 kHz BW. Low frequency noise components N peak for the following bias voltage conditions: increase somewhat at 100* C.
o 10 - 14 V DC (obtained from standard D22 instrument 4 mA supply when RCA- POWER SUPPLY:
2TR operating temp. is within 40*F Series 22 Instrument provides 4 mA constant to 100*F range) current source with 21 V DC nominal voltage e 10 - 23 V DC (supplied by 4 mA constant capability, allowing full 5 V peak output within current source with 30 V DC nominal preamp temperature range of 40*F to 100*F.
voltage capacility, permitting RCA- RCA-2TR operation over entire rated tempera-2TR operation over entire rated ture range requires 4 mA constant current temp. range). source with 30 V DC nominal voltage capability.
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ATTACHMENT H, PAGE 2 L
UNHOLTZ-DICKIE CORPORATION Barnes industrial Park
- 6 Brookside Drive
- Wallingford. Connecticut
- 06492
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3- . t a 4 I l 1 f L i i .i t i 1 4 l [ ATTACHMENTS 2 and 2 contain proprietary i' information and are not included with.the 1
- excerpts submitted with this Affidavit]
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i ATTACHMENT 5 {:* Equipment Description PURPOSE ) } The Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) detects the presence of 4 metallic debris in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) of pressurized water reactors when the debris impacts against the internal parts of the RCS. Metallic impacts within the RCS generate a pressure wave within the coolant. l The pressure wave is detected as an acceleration by strategically placed accelerometers that are part of the MIMS. Other sources of pressure waves, j such as pumps starting and control rods working, 'are also present in the 1 RCS. The MIMS differentiates between pressure waves caused by metallic l impacts and other pressure waves by comparing the detected acceleration to a typical signature of a metallic impact. Pressure-vave-caused acceler' a tions that are not caused by metallic impacts are l ignored. Detected metallic impacts are recorded on the system's event
- recorder and initate an alarm indication.
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION l The MIMS comprises three digital circuit boards housed in a common drawar with ' associated controls, indicators, and power supplies; 10 remotely located accelerometers and related signal processing devices; and a connection panel with a loudspeaker and thermal printer. The accelerometers and their related l signal processing devices are mounted in pairs to maintain the impact monitoring function in the event that an accelerometer fails in service. l Figure 1 shows the major functional subsystems of the MIMS. i
- Pressure waves in the reactor coolant are detected as accelerations of the l vessel external wall by strategically placed accelerometers. A charge l preamplifier associated with each accelerometer provides a low-impedance 4 representation of the detected acceleration.
t j A signal conditioner is provided for each charge preamplifier. The signal i conditioner provides energizing current' for the preamplifier, filters the i preamplifier output to remove high frequency noise and signals outside the ! frequency range of interest (above 20 KHz), and scales the received accelero-
- meter signal. The scaled and filtered acceleration signal from the signal conditioner is an input to the impact monitor on the Metal Impact Monitor .
5 (MIM) circuit board, to the audio monitor on the utility circuit board, and to l a son.itor jack on the connection panel. i The signal conditioners also supply an integrity signal, which represents the current supplied to the charge preamplifier, to the integrity monitor, or the utility board for performance monitoring purposes.
4 There are five impact monitors on the MIM circuit board to accommodate five' l Each impact monitor contains its
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pairs of accelerometers mounted on the RCS. own microprocessor and functions under control of the Central Processor thit (CPU) . The acceleration signal from one of the channels, or a simulated signal f rom the impact simulator, is selected under CPU control. f ! The frequencies and relative amplitude of the selected signal are made available as inputs to the impact monitor micropiiocessor, which continuously l If it is j inspects the signal for the characteristics of a metal impact. the j determined that the accelerometer signal represents a metal impact, i microprocessor coanunicates this to the CPU along with the amplitude of the j detected impact. He CPU then commands the alarm control which lights an l alara lamp. The lamp remains lit until acknowledged by manual depression of
! the alam reset pushbutton.
I l The audio monitor on the utility circuit board receives acceleration signals from all 10 channels, and a simulated acceleration signal from the impact l One of these 11 signals is selected by a command from the CPU. j simulator. The selected signal is available for aural monitoring at the connection panel l loudspeaker, or it may be observed on an oscilloscope connected to the scope l
> jack provided. An audio volume control on the MIMS drawer front panel gives control of the signal level on the loudspeakar.
l The impact simulator on the utility circuit board operates under control of the CPU to produce simulated acceleration signa.ls for use in testing the ! MIMS. On command from the CPU, the simulator creates Thus, an output signal with the impact simulator j f requency and amplitude as required by the CPU. can simulate normal background accelerations as well as impacts of any desired j
- character. Me simulated acceleration signal is available as an input to the
! impact monitor and the audio monitor. Either or both ofThe these monitors will operation of the select the simulated input when connanded by the CPU.
impact monitor and audio monitor with simulated accelerations is identical to ! operation with an accelerometer output signal. 1 A deadman timer is provided in each impact monitor. This timer requires j updating f rom the CPU periodically (about every 2 minutes) as an indication The CPU to the impact monitor microprocessor that the CPU is still functioning. l sof tware requires that the deadman timer be updated by the CPU every minute. When the deadman timer times out in any impact monitor, it sends a CPU fail indication to the CPU f ail control. The CPU f ail control lights the CPU FAILED indicator lamp on the MIMS drawer front panel and disables the audio monitor. ' The CPU is a single-board computer that controls the operation of the MIMS. A printer, display and keyboard provide input and output capability for the CPU ! b oard. An event recorder (Data-Intersil printer) is mounced in the front of the connection panel. The printer functions under control of the CPU to provide a hard copy record of the functioning of the MIMS. An operator can request a printout of an event that resulted in an alarm indication. At the end of each day, the CPU automatically commands a printout which stsemarizes the day's activity. The summary lists all detected impacts and their intensity and duration. A self test is performed of the MIMS under CPU control at this time
- and the results of the self test are also recorded by the printer.
The CPU has a Burroughs Self Scan II alpha-numeric display which has six lines of 40 characters and provides current data on the status of the system, and displays the parameters of the most recent event detected by the MIMS. Operator-initiated requests to the CPU can call up status and event reports stored in memory for display. Whenever an operator command is entered in the system, the CPU board controls the display to present the changed control status, which remains until cancelled or replaced with subsequent data. The keyboard installed in the CPU provides a means of operator control over the MIMS. The keyboard provides two sets of keys: one on the left with 15
- keys for inputting numerical values and one on the right with 20 keys for inputting control commands. Depressing a control key causes the CPU board to command a status display for that f unction to appear on the display.
Modifications can be made to the display parameters by entering numerical data with the lef t set of keys. Depressing ENTER on the lef t set of keys loads the display parameters into the CPU board memory. Two print keys (PRINT DISPLAY and PRINT TIME) do not affect the CPU board operation or the display but merely cause it to command the printer to print the respective message. t d I j l l ___}}