ML20084K140
| ML20084K140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1984 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| RDC-102(84), NUDOCS 8405110117 | |
| Download: ML20084K140 (2) | |
Text
.
6 W
s y i
t P o. box 5000 - CLEVELAND, oHlo 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - lLLUMINATING BLDG.
- 55 PUBLICSO A E Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN VICE PflESIDENT NUCLE A R Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, II inois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Hos. 50-440; 50-441 ASME Code Class I Fittings
[RDC 102(84)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as our final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning certain ASME Class I fittings procured by Pullman Power Products and furnished to the Perry Nuclear Power Project.
Mr. F. Jablonski was first notified on March 28, 1984, by Mr. P. Martin of The Cleveland Electrical Illuminating Company that this problem was being evaluated.
This report contains a description of the deficiency, an analysis of safety implication, and corrective action.
Description of Deficiency The SP44 contractor and SP527 fabricator have, in some instances, provided
" block forged" fittings for use in ASME Section III Class 1 piping systems.
Supply of such fittings was not authorized by the Owner as required and the Engineer did not consider the ef fect of the " block forged" configuration (as it af fects thermal fatigue and flexibility) in his ASME Class 1 piping analysis.
These fittings typically have extreme section thicknesses and/or abrupt changes in section thickness.
Analysis of Safety Implications A postulated failure in'the area of one or more of the E32 MSIV Leakage Control System fittings with associated single failure of the inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (s) could result in a radiological release in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines.
A failure in the area of the N22 Main Steam Drain System fittings will result in a small line break in the drywell area, as postulated in the PNPP FSAR, Section 6.2.1.1.3.3.5.
This break would not affect safe operation or result in a radioactive release of any consequence.
No failure is postulated for the G33 Reactor Water Clean-Up System fitting bs due to their acceptability "as-is".
A 8405110117 E40427
[g DR ADOCK 05000
(
Mr. Jime G. Kapp1:r April 27, 1984
- s Corrective Action Taken Review of documentation and field inspection has identified a total of fourteen (14) block forged fittings in ASME Class 1 piping systems and these have been identified in site Nonconformance Reports.
The four (4) fittings found in the E32 MSIV Leakage Control System will be replaced immediately due to the ready availability of acceptable replacement fittings and the difficulty of qualification analysis.
The Engineer has performed an evaluation of the ef fects of the block forged fittings supplied for use in the G33 Reactor Water Cleanup and N22 Main Steam Drain Systems. This involved the use of two-dimensional heat transfer analyses to provide thermal data which could then be used to perform ASME Class 1 fatigue analyses.
Both stress and fatigue evaluations were performed using ASME Section III NB-3600 analytical techniques. The component geometries used in the evaluations were taken from samples of the fittings in question. The results of these evaluations are as follows:
1.
While the detailed thermal analycis of the four (4) G33 fittings indicated an increase in thermal stress due to the block forged geometry, the calculated f atigue usage factors were still well below the ASME Code allowable of 1.0.
These fittings may be used "as-is".
2.
Thermal analysis of the six (6) N22 fittings also showed increases in the thermal stress due to geometry. While revised stress evaluations have shown that the fatigue usage factors are still well below ASME Code limits, they are very close to the NRC break exclusion limits applicable to this piping subsystem. As a result, the Owner has chosen to rework these fittings by grinding to reduce the excess wall thickness in the transverse cross-section, thereby providing additional margin for future reanalysis.
Corrective action is expected to be complete by October 1,1984.
Please call if there are any additional questions.
Sincerely, fr s4 &
4 Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:pab cc:
Mr. M. L. Gildner USNRC, Site Office Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339