ML20084K054
| ML20084K054 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1974 |
| From: | Kalivianakis N COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Oleary J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084K057 | List: |
| References | |
| AO-50-265-74-24, NJK-74-285, NUDOCS 8305190133 | |
| Download: ML20084K054 (3) | |
Text
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Comr.-
citn Edison
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Ouid C Gen rating Statico J M.i Post Olhco Box 216 N
Cordova !!!inois 61242
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September 17, 1974
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4W Mr. John F. O' Leary, Director Directorate of Licensing Regulation U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Reference :
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30 Appendix A, Sections 1.0. A.4, 3 7. A.l.b, 6.6.B.l.a.
Dear Mr. O' Leary:
Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/74-24 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.
This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on September 9,1974 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on September 9, 1974.
This report is submitted to you in accordance with the require-ments of Technical Specification 6.6.B.l.a.
Very truly yours, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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g N. J. Kalivianakis 1
Station Superintendent NJK/LDR/lk Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations cc:
J. S. Ab el po2by e
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,W yo) 8305190133 740917 PDR ADOCK 05000265 7/$
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.O REPORT NUMBER: -AO 50-265/74-24' R
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REPORT DATE:-- September - 17, 1974 OCCURRENCE DATE:
September 7,1974
- FACILITY:
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Cordova,. Illinois 61242 i
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Suppression chamber water level high I
20NDITIONS : PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
. Unit.2'in startup mode, O MWe, HPCI and-RCIC surveillance testing 1
in progress. - Suppression chamber water level.at +3/4 inches prior to RCIC and HPCI surveillance.
- DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
At 2342 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00387 weeks <br />8.91131e-4 months <br /> on Septemb' r 7,1974, routine' HPCI~ surveillance-test-e ing was begun. ' Suppression chamber water level was less than + 1 1/2 inches.
During this. test, the HPCI _ minimum flow valve would not close -
- due tto ' the. thermal overloads preventing the contactor from closing.
With this evalve in the open position, water from the condensate storage
.tanksoflowed into the. suppression chamber and thereby exceeded the m2ximum suppression chamber limit of +2 inches specified in Technical
. Specification Section 3.7. A.1.b.
Operations' personnel manually closed ~
the. contactor: and thereby caused.the valve : to close.
The maximum-cuppression chamber. water level reached was +3 inches indicated.
.The '
water '1evel was immediately pumped. down and reached 0- inches indicated at.0125 hours0.00145 days <br />0.0347 hours <br />2.066799e-4 weeks <br />4.75625e-5 months <br />.on September 7, 1974.. The minimum flow valve was then.
auccess fully l operated ' from the ' control -room three times.
DESIGNATION OF' APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
Equip. ment Failure
~The'cause.of this abnormal. occurrence:1s attributed to the tripping-
'of thercontactor therma 1' overloads on:the HPCI minimum flow recirc
' volve'.
This allowed excessive water to flow. into the. suppression cham-
-bor'during HPCI~ testing and'thus. exceed-the. Technical Specification limit.
The 'apparenticause for the contactor failing,to: close :is attri-buted to possible dirty; contacts 4' s
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ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
Suppression chamber water level exceeded the limiting condition for operation by +1 inch fcr a period of approximately two hours.
This represented less than 1% over the allowable volume limitation.
In cddition,_the unit was in startup mode at 0 MWe.
The combination of the short duration of the incident, the relatively small increase over normal level, and the startup condition minimized any possible safety implications from this occurrence.
No threat to public health and cafety occurred and no excessive or unusual personnel exposures were oxperienced.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The initial corrective action to correct this occurrence was to stop the flow of condensate storage wated to the suppression chamber by manually closing the valve contactor and thus causing the HPCI minimum flow recire valve to close.
Subsequent corrective action was to return the suppression chamber water level to normal.
A work rsquest has been written to vacuum clean the contactor involved as a step to eliminate dirt accumulation and to prevent further occurrences of this type.
FAILURE DATA:
There have been no previous suppression chamber high water levels caused by a failure of the HPCI minimum flow valve to close.
Following this occurrence, the valve was successfully operated three times.
There are thus no safety implications related to cumulative experience essociated with this occurrence.
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