ML20084K003
| ML20084K003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1974 |
| From: | Kalivianakis N COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Oleary J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| AO-50-265-74-27, NJK-74-315, NUDOCS 8305190114 | |
| Download: ML20084K003 (3) | |
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a Mr. John F. O' Leary, Director Directorate of Licensing. Regulation U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Washington, D. C.
20545
REFERENCE:
QUAD-CITIESNUCLEARPOWERShATION Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30 Appendix A, Section 3.6.C.4, 6.6.B.l.a.
Dear Mr. O' Leary:
Enclosed please find Abnormal' Occurrence Report No. 50-265/74-27 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Stati.on.
This occurrence was pre viously ceported to Region'III, Directorate of Regulatory Operar tions by telephone on Septc.toer 25, 1974 and to you and Region III, Dirp torate of Rc,qulatory Operations by telecopy on Septem-bor 25, 1974.
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,This' report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements
,of Technical Specification 6.6.B.l.a.
Very truly yours,
,1 s COMMONFEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION W
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Statio.n Superintendent
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Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations J. S. Abel Ob 1044J l
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't REPORT NUMBER:
50-265/74-27 REPORT DATE:
October 4, 1974 OCCURRENCE DATE:
September 25,'1974 FACILITY:
QUAD-CITIES NUCI. EAR POWER STATION
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Cordova, IL 61242 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
High Reactor Water Conductivity in Unit 2 Reactor.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Unit 2 Reactor starting up following a maintenance outage; con-densate system had been in use for processing radwaste floor drain water.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On September 25, 1974, Unit 2 load was increasing at 25 MWe per hour following a maintenance outage.
At 5:15 a.m. on September 25, the load was being held at approximately 110 MWe because of high reactor water conductivity.
Laboratory analysis showed the conductivity to be 13.5 umho/cm; this reading exceeded Technical
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Specification 3.6.C.3.
A load decrease of 5 MWe per hour was ini-tiated.
By approximately 9:50 a.m. on September 25, the conduc-tivity had decreased to within limits.
The unit load increase was resumed while closely monitoring the reactor water conductivity so as not'to exceed the limits.
The conductivity readings during the start-up were as shown below.
The reactor water conductivity was back within normal operating range by approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 26, 1974.
DATE TIME HRS.
CONDUCTIVITY pMHO/CM CHLORIDE PPM' Y 2T 761T
.58
<. 03 9-25 0010 4.6 4.03.
9-25 0200 4.3 4.03 9-25 0410 9.7 4.03 9-25 0600 13.5 4.03 9-25 0800 12.5 4.03 9-25 0900 10.15 4.03 9-25 0950 9.8
<.03-9-25 1100 8.2' 4.03 9-25 1700 3.7 4.03 9-26 1250 1.8
<.03 N
19-26 1615
.62 4.03
, DESIGNATION OF' APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
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Unusual
- Service ~Cendition:
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1The Japparent Lcauce of-this occurrence'is; designated as'.an unusual-i
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service: condition. -The hotwell;and condensate-system >had beeniin '
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- use d ming) draiMrWm-This'
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had been done as relief from problems with discharging waste water j
from the radwaste facility due to constraints imposed by operation with the plant cooling water on the spray canal.
Following this processing, residual high conductivity water which had remained in
. the hotwell was flushed into the condensate and feedwater system and thus into the reactor resulting in high conductivity in the reactor water.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
There were no consequences on the health and safety of the public nor on the safe operation of the plant as a result of this occur-rence.
The cause of the high conductivity had been determined as due to the processing of the radwaste water and thus was not un-known.
Analysis of samples had shown that the chloride concentra-tion was well within limits and thus there was no threat to the pri-mary system components due to high chlorides.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The initial corrective action taken was to stop the load increase and take samples at increased intervals to more closely monitor the conductivity.
Additionally, a second Reactor Water Clean-up System Demineralizer was placed in service to clean up the water.
The resins on both demineralizers were changed as required to maintain high clean up capacity in the system.
These actions resulted in the reactor water conductivity returning to normal by approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 26, 1974.
FAILURE DATA:
This occurrence was the result of actions taken to relieve a critical situation in the plant rad waste system.
There is no record of pre-vious occurrences of this type.
There is thus no failure data re-lated to this occurrence.
There are also no safety implications associated with cumulative experience for this occurrence.
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