ML20084E060

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AO 50-219/74/19:on 740309,primary Containment Integrity Not Maintained W/Reactor Water Temp Above 212 F & Fuel in Reactor Vessel.Caused by Equipment Malfunction & Operator Error
ML20084E060
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 03/11/1974
From: Carroll J
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
AO-50-219-74-19, NUDOCS 8304140018
Download: ML20084E060 (5)


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u To: James P. O'Reilly -

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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 From: Jersey Central Power 5 Light Company Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Subj ect: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 19 s

The following is a preliminary report being submitted in compliance with the Technical Specifications paragraph 6.6.2.

. Preliminary Approval: ,

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Initial Telephone Data of

.. Report Date: ' ' 74 Occurrancr'~S 3/9/74

. - yJ Initial Written Time of Rep?rt Date: 3/11/74 Occurrence: 0530

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i OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENEP.YTING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731 Abnormal Occurrence -

' Report No. 50-219/74/19 IDENTIFICATION Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.1, OF OCCURRENCE:

failure to maintain primary containment integrity with reactor water temperature above 212 F and fuel in the reactor vessel.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as de-fined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B .

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Steady State Power Routine Shutdown Hot Standby Operation ,

Cold Shutdown Load Changes During Refueling Shutdown Routine Power Operation Routine Startup Other (Specify)

Operation The plant was shutdown with reactor coolant <212 F.

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.- . .. .v. -e ,.p..o.2v w ...:dy DESCRIPTION At 1000 on Mardi 8,1974, an orderly shutdown of the plant l OF OCCURIENCE:

l commenced to perform maintenance on six of the fourteen torus l to drywell vacuum breaker valves. Although thirteen of the valves were considered to be operable at this time, the plant was shutdown in order to effect more permanent repairs on the valves (see Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 74-16, dated

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, Report No. 50-219/74/19 March 8,1974) . In accordance with the requirements of para-graph 3.5. A.1 of the Technical Specifications, maintenance M on these valves did not begin until reactor coolant temperature was below 212 F.

At approximately 0520 on March 9,1974, a radiation protection technician reported to the Shift Forsan that water vapor appeared to be issuing from a special manometer which had been i

installed for monitoring of the pressure difference between the drywell and reactor vessel. The Shift Foreman's investi-gation revealed that the reactor side of the manometer was hot. .

The recirculation loop temperature recorder, which was being used to monitor reactor water temperature, was immediately re-checked. 'Ihis recorder indicated a temperature of 160 F.

However, the indication jumped to approximately 250 F when the recorder was bumped. At this time (0531 on March 9,1974)

- shutdown cooling system flow was increased to decrease the A- - - ,. . (,. .c. , , reactor water temperature. Reactor water temperature was re- ,

r. . ww n s - .!c.a ...., .duced to less than:212 F within approximately 30 minutes. . ,..q,...

s,g Within approximately 130 minutes, a reactor water temperature of 160 F was established and maintained.

APPARENT CAUSE X Design Precedure OF OCCURRENCE: Manufacture Unusual Service Condition Installation / Inc. Environmental' Construction Component Failure l X Operator Other (Specify) .j I

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Page 3 Rip'or1! No. 50-219/74/19 This abnormal occurrence is attributed to equipment malfunction and operator error. The recirculation loop recorder did stick and give a false indication of reactor coolant temperature.

However, the control room operator failed to react properly to indications that reactor water temperature was increasing.

Specifically, a review of the chart paper from the recorder monitoring shutdown cooling system temperatures showed that the "C" loop heat, exchanger inlet temperature was increasing at a rate of about 10 F/hr during the three hour period prior to 0230 on March 9,1973. At this time, the control room operator secured flow in this loop and thereby contributed to the rise in reactor water temperature.

ANALYSIS OF ' lite primary containment system provides a barrier against OCCURRENCE :

uncontrolled release of fission products to the environs in the event of a break in the reactor coolant systems. Whenever the reactor coclant water temperature is above 212 F, failure

.of the reactor coolant system could cause rapid expulsion of bawri.......< .. s. #r., A athe , coolant from .the, reactor with an associated pressure rise in the primary containment. Primary containment is required, therefore, to contain the thermal energy of the expelled coolant and fission products which would be released from any fuel failures resulting frem the accident.

The safety significance of this event is that primary contain-

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ment integrity was not maintained during the period that the reactor coolant temperature was in excess of 212 F due to the _

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. %J G' Abn6rmal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/19 Page 4 maintenance being performed on the vacuum breaker valves. At the condition that existed, the safety significance is consid-l ered' minimal.

CORRECTIVE ne following remedial actions will be taken prior to the PORC f ACTION: <

evaluation to preclude a recurrence . .of this type event: l r

1. Control room operators will be instructed to " jog" any recorder that is producing a suspiciously straight trace.

This will be accomplished by momentarily turning the re-corder off and then on again.

2. Involved personnel will be reminded to utilize all avail-able indicators when monitoring critical parameters such as reactor water temperature.
3. He shutdown log will be reviewed and modified to require the recording of additional system temperatures which are related to the reactor coolant temperature.

Basic recorder data are as follows:

FAILURE DATA: -

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. 63 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/19 Report Date March 18,1974 Occurrence Date March 9,1974 Identification of Occurrence Violation of the Technical %ecifications, paragraph 3.5. A.1, failure to main-tain primary containment integrity with reactor water temperature above 212*F and fuel in the reactor . vessel. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B. i Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shut down with reactor coolant <212*F.

Description of Occurrence At 1000 on March 8,1974, an orderly shutdown of the plant commenced to perform maintenance on six of the fourteen torus to drywell vacuum breaker valves.

Although thirteen of the valves were considered to be operabic at this time, the plant was shut down in order to effect more permanent repairs on the valves.

(See Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/16' dated March 15, 1974). In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 3.5. A.1 of the Technical Specif-ications, maintenance on these valves did not begin until reactor coolant tem-perature was below 212*F.

At approximately 0500 on March 9,1974, the control room operator noticed that the reactor vessel head metal temperature was increasing at a rate of -10*F/hr after being stable at 231*F for about a 3-hour period. A check of the recirculation loop temperature recorder, which was being used as the primary indication of reactor water temperature, showed the-recorder trace to be constant at 160*F.

While this inconsistency was being investigated, a radiation protection technician reported to the shift foreman that water vapor appeared to be issuing from a j special manometer which had been installed for monitoring of the pressure - j difference between the drywell and reactor vessel. The shift foreman's investi-gation revealed that the reactor side of the manometer was hot. The recirculation loop - temperature recorder was then rechecked 'and again indicated a temperature i of 160*F. However, the indication jumped to approximately 250*F when the recorder was bumped. Since two of the torus to drywell vacuum breaker valves were undergoing maintenance at this time (0531 on March 9,1974), primary -

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containment integrity was not in effect. Shutdown cooling system flow was then increased to decrease the reactor water temperature. Reactor water temperature was reduced to less than 212"F within approximately 30 minutes. Within approxi-mately 130 minutes, a reactor water temperature of 160'F was established and maintained.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence This abnormal occurrence is as ibuted to equipment malfunction and operator error. The recirculation loop 3 corder did stick and give a falso indication of reactor coolant temperature. However, the control room operator failed to react properly to indications that reactor water temperature was increasing.

Specifically, a review of the ch' art paper from the recorder monitoring shutdown cooling system temperatures showed that the "C" loop heat exchanger inlet temperature was increasing at a rate of about 10*F/hr during the 3-hour period prior to 0230 on March 9,1974. At this time, the control room operator secured flow in this loop and thereby contributed to the rise in reactor water temperature.

Analysis of Occurrence The primary containment system provides a barrier against uncontrolled release of fission products to the environs in the event of a break in the reactor coolant sys tems . Whenever the reactor coolant water temperature is above 212 F, failure of the reactor coolant system could cause rapid expulsion of the coolant from the reactor with an associated pressure rise in the primary containment.

Primary containment is required, therefore, to contain the thermal energy of the expelled coolant and fission products which would be released from any fuel j failures resulting from the accident.

d The safety significance of this event is that primary containment integrity was not maintained during the period that the reactor coolant temperature was in excess of 212*F due to the maintenance being performed on the vacuum breaker- -

valves. At the condition that existed, the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action The following corrective actions will be taken:

1. The operator retraining program will emphasize that all available indications are to be used when critical parameters such as reactor water temperature are being monitored. In additon, the operators will be instructed in their retraining to regard extremely straight recorder 2

traces as suspect and to view confirming indications whenever such ~

suspicious recorder ' traces are ' encountered, both while operating and*

shut down.

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Abnormal Occurrence No. 50-219/74/19 Page 3

2. 'Ihe shutdown log will be reviewed and modified to require the recording of additional system temperatures related to the reactor coolcat tem-perature.

Failure Data Basic recorder data are as follows:

F!anufacturer: General Electric Company TyTc : GE/ht\C 531 Span: 4 inches

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.ersey Centra 1su k91 Power & Lig7t Company DO MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD e MORRISTOWN, N.J.07960

  • 201-539-6111 Miarse m 0F THE General no{ Public Utilities Corporation -

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<...k\V Mr. A. Giambusso -

Deputy Director.for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Station ,

Docket No. 50-219 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/19 The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in cortpliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours, pW .

Q-GL Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations es Enclosures cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I q c j t<

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ag>Y SENT REGION M 2,385 /.

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