ML20084B159
| ML20084B159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1972 |
| From: | Brian Lee COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Anthony Giambusso US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084B161 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304060156 | |
| Download: ML20084B159 (9) | |
Text
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Commonwealth Edison Company
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ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA
- CHICAGO. ILLINOIS m,..,,,
POST Of f 4 CE SOX 747
- CHICAOO, ILilNOIS 60690 x
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September 1, 1972 s s sf ILN:NO LN 6
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Mr. Angelo Giambusso
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Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
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CO J:E4;0.1 p((Mg Directorate of Licensing l
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission l
Washington, D.C.
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Subject:
Answers to AEC Questions regarding Quad-Cities Condensate Pump Room Flooding -
AEC Dkts 50-254 and 50-265
Dear Mr. Giambusso:
1, The following informa on is submitted in accordance with your letter of August 15, 1972 concerning the interim modifications to the Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 condensate pump rooms.
We have attempted to be responsive to your questions and trust that the answers will allow you to complete your review of our. program.
If any further information is required, please do not hesitate to call on us.
One es2rinal and 39 copies of this report are pro-vided for yo*;,
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very truly yours, l
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.,..s Byron Lee, Jr.
Assistant to the President D[
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QUESTION 1 1.
Scalin0 the door and the ventilation ducts betucen the condenser pump room and the condenser roca for both Unita prevents a ruptured condenser circulating water line from flooding the condenser pump rocra.
If a sirallar rupture were to occur ognin, explalu where the flood water could ultimately flow if the pumps remained in operation for 5 minutca and for 10 minutes. What equipuent and structurcs vould be dataaged?
If no damage occurred in thene periods of time, how long could pucp operation continue without damcgc?
RESPONSE
As reported in our " Interim Report on Condenser Pump Room Modifications" dated July 10, 1972, alarms have been installed in the condenser room of each unit.
The single switches at l'0" and at 3'0" above the floor alarm in the control room.
The two switches installed at 5'0" provide both an alarm indication in the control room and a trip of all circulating water pumps on the affected unit.
Therefore, the pumps will trip should the level rise to 5'0" in the condenser room and no damage to equipment will occur.
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QUESTION 2-2.
Explain how a rupture of the condensate piping in the condenser pump roora can be accommodated to permit RilRSW heat exchanger operation nud DG cooling water supply.
Describe what connections must be made, the sequence of actions, and the consequences of loss of cooling, all with respect to time and assuming minimum availabic manpower and with the reactor operating at 90% rated power due to the postulated rupture.
Could any of thcae councction points be under water as a result of the postulated flood before the connection is ucdc?
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RESPONSE
Our submittal of July 10, 1972 " Interim Report on Condenser Pump Room Modification" and the changes to this report submitted on July 24, 1972, describe actions taken to guarantee availability of the Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger and the diesel generators for safe shutdown of the affected unit given a condensate system rupture during the interim period prior to the time that the water-tight vaults are constructed.
After the vaults have been completed, they will be self-sufficient.
Detailed procedures for implementation of the crosstie and dicsci driven pumps have been prepared and are l
available at the site for inspection.
Two copies were loaned to Mr. Boyce 11. Grier, Director, Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on August 3, 1972 for his review.
No connection points will be under water as a result of the postulated flood.
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QUESTION 3 3.
Describe, including drawings, where the backup diesci powered puraps will be located and hou the hoses vill be run to provide cooling water for the 111111 heat exchangero and the diesel generators.
Explain what protection is afforded the hoses to prevent daange during innta11ation and operation. liha t are the design ratin;;s of the hoses t.nd hose connections, and the spool pieces and pipe sections betvcen heat cr.cnangera? Uhat are the ratings e
of the dicsclu and I.ou ic their reliability to cuerote assured? Ilou are the diecels started cnd uhat period of time is required to start?
RESPONSE
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The locations of the pumps and hoses in both stored and operating modes are shown in Figure 1.
IIoses will be routed within The buildings wherever possible to preclude any possible damage.
design rating of the hoses is 150 psig while the hose connections are rated at 300 psig.
The spool pieces and all piping associated with the heat exchanger crosstic are rated at 600 psig.
The diesel driven pumps have a rated capacity of 2000 gpm at a head of 305 feet.
Trickle chargers have been provided to maintain the 12 volt diesel l
engine starting batteries in a fully charged condition for instantaneous starting.
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- 4 QUESTION 42 i
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4.
Explain how construction for the permanent corrective i
measures will proceed and what provjr. ions are being made j
to assure availability of the dicsc1 generators coolfng water and IU R service water during construction. Explain
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what security and control measures are being taken during i
construction to assure integrity of the en;;ineered safety
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features in the condenser pump room.
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RESPONSE
1 During operation of each unit, availability of the diesel 4
l generator cooling water pumps and RIIR service water pumps will be i
i in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Temporary I
barriers are being provided above the equipment to prevent any 1
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damage from accidentally dropped tools or equipment.
A construction i
l supervisor will be present in the work area whenever craft personnel l
are present and will report any suspected damage to equipment to i
the control room.
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QUESTION 5' 5.
Provide a schedule for the interim corrective nensures j
showing when the major compoucnts will be or were ou site, when they will be installed and tested and the i
sequence of testing. Provide the saac infornation for equipment to be used for the permanent corrective measurcs.
l Describe the surveillance testing to be performed and I
the frequency of these tests for the interim corrective meanures.
RESPONSE
4 All interim eauipment was on site by July 17, 1972.
As further demonstration of ecuipment capability, on July 21, 1972, a functional test of the diesel generator cooling capacity was run and witnessed by Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, i
personnel.
The permanent corrective measures will be completed by November 1, 1972.
Surveillance testing of interim equipment is not planned due to both the short time period of interim operation involved and the redundancy of equipment provided.
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j QUESTION 6
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Each RHR heat exchanger is supplied by t.uo R!!RSW pumps.
One pump cnd one heat exchanger have suf ficient capacity 1
l to cool the torus for accident conditions. Ilowever, to obtain a reactor shutdoun temperatuce reduction rate of 100*F/hr, you have advined us that two heat exchangers and four RHRSW pumps are required.
Each SU pump has a rating of 3500 gem and 760 ft head.
The diesel pumps proposed for tbc interim corrective ueasurca are rated for 2000 cpa. Advise hou the rating of the diesci pump j
was determined, including discharac head, for reactor 1
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RESPONSE
As reported in our " Interim Report on Condenser Pump Room I
Modifications" dated July 10, 1972, and changes to this' report of July 24, 1972, the diesel driven pumps are not intended for reactor decay heat removal.
The RHR service water pumps, if incapacitated by a flood or any other reason before the vaults can be completed, will be functionally replaced by the use of crosstic piping from the service water side of the RHR heat exchanger on the unaffected unit i,
i to the service water side of the RHR heat exchanger of the disabled 4
unit.
This will provide service water to the disabled unit's heat l
exchanger from two RUR service water pumps.
The heat exchanger crosstie will also supply cooling water to the 1/2 diesel generator, i
l As demonstrated previously, one diesel pump will adequately cool one diesel generator.
Therefore, by providing two diesci pumps, one i
pump will be on 100% standby while the other pump provides more than 1
i adequate cooling water flow.
Analyses have been provided in the i
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FSAR for shutdown and accident conditions of the reactor using one RHR heat exchanger and are directly applicable to interim operation.
The equipment at Quad-Cities for interim operation makes the capacity (for one heat exchanger) identical to original plant design with the exception of the installation of spool pieces in the crosstic piping and the diesel driven pump hose connections which have to be installed manually.