ML20084B415
| ML20084B415 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1972 |
| From: | Ryesland J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084B161 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304060426 | |
| Download: ML20084B415 (4) | |
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMILIlON UNITED STATES O i
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JUL 131972 Files (Docket No. 50-254) j3 Eipmann, Chief, ORB #2, DL TIIRU:
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MEETING ITil C0$p5WEALTil EDISON COMPANY - QUAD-CITIES UNIT 1 FLOODING OF Tile CONDENSATE PUMP ROOM On June 30, 1972, representatives of Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO), the General Electric Company (GE), and Sargent and Lundy (S&L) met with the staf f to discuss the recent flooding of the condensate pump room of Quad-Cities Unit 1 and describe their proposed interin and final corrective measures to assure safety of the public. A list of attendees is enclosed.
CECO presented a brief explanation of the cause and effects of the flooding followed by an explanation of the action taken during and following the incident prior to returning the units to operation.
During the meeting, a number of significant items of information impor-tant to safety were disclosed.
These are itemized and discussed below and apply to both Units 1 and 2:
Interim Corrective Action 1.
Faulty operation of the condenser circulating water valves hydraulic control system could result in a reoccurrence of the circulating water line expansion bellows rupture due to valve slamming.
If equipment important to safety is located where the resulting flood could cause it to become inoperable, as was the case at Quad-Cities, significant degradation of engineered safety features can occur.
In the event of a reoccurrence, flew of water from the condenser room to the condensate pump room is now prevented by steel plates that have been installed over the connecting door and ventilation openings.
Flooding in the condenser room will be alarmed in the control reon by a signal from a single magnetrol switch 6 inches
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above the floor level. Another magnetrol switch 3 feet above the floor will alarm flooding which would indicate rupture of the hotwell.
If the water level reaches a third switch 5 feet above the floor level, the circulating water pumps would be shut down automatically.
CECO advised that water would spill into the radwaste room before reaching the 595-foot c1cvation, where a non-water tight door leads f rom the condenser room to the condensate pump room, if the cir-culating water pipe ruptures and the pumps do not shut down auto-matically. Uc advised that an analysis is required of the licensec for our review to assure that the interim secel barriers over the openings will withstand a seismic event when flooded.
8304060426 720901 PDR ADOCK 05000 S
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Files JUL 131972 '
2.
Class I equipment important to safety is located with non-classified systens in the condensate pump room.
Twenty-inch lines to the condensate pumps could be closed by remote MO valves installed between the pumps and the condenser hotuell and located outside the condensate pump room if a rupture occurred in this line.
Closure of the 8-inch line between the condensate transfer pumps and the condensate storage tank requires manual closure of a valve located near the tank.
It is likely that failure of either of these non-Class I lines would damage the RHRSW and diesel generator cooling water pumps.
The licensee proposes to use tuo 2-inch hose connections f rom the fire water header to the PER heat exchanger to provide suppression pool and shutdown cooling if the above pumps become inoperable. The fire water pumps are diesci driven and independent of external power sources. The fire water system is not a Class I system.
The capability of this system to (1) supply adequate cooling water for shutdown, (2) supply adequate cooling for the suppression chamber in the event of a LOCA, (3) remain f unctional following a selsuic event within the magnitude presented in the PSAR, and (4) have adequate backup with required reliability if the fire water system should f ail muat to be analyzed for our review.
3.
In response to our qt estions, the licensee stated that the location of all other equipment inportant to safety has been checked and that none of this equipment could becouc inoperable due to flooding f rom a non-Class I system rupture.
4.
We have asked the licensee to provide by July 10, 1972, the juscif f-cation for continued station operation based on his analyses of the interim corrective neasures described above.
Ul tinate Corrective Measures The licensee described the proposed changes to the station to provide assurance that equipment important to safety will remain functional when required.
Equip =ent will be reparated by Class 1 walls capable of accommodating combined scismic and water loads.
The two diesel generator cooling water pumps in the Unit 1 condensate pump room will be separated by relocation of one pump into a separate room.
The rearrangement proposes to separate Class I equipment f rom other systems as well as to assure that no single failure will prevent redundaat equipment from performing its intended safety functions.
Marked-up drawings showing rearrangement of equipment and piping and the ocparating walls were presented by Sargent and Lundy representatives.
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Files JUL 131977 Construction is scheduled to begin on Unit 1 the week of July 3, 1972, and for Unit 2 the following week. The licensee has advised that the planned corrective measures will be completed within 4 tionths after work starta, but not later than October 30, 1972.
A report containing analyses, description and details of the station design changes, discussed above, is to be submitted by the licensee on or before July 31, 1972, for our review and evaluation. Expeditious issuance of the report by the licensee and evaluation by the staff is required to prevent delays in completing the corrective action.
In response to A. Gluckmann's request, the licensec will provide details of the existing condensate pu:np room walls design for our review prior to issuing the above report.
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John I. Riesland Operating Reactors Branch #2 Directorate of Licensing
Enclosure:
l List of attendecs cc w/caclosure:
FCicuenson, L LJConnery, L FDAnderson, L ALGluckmann, L DJSkovholt, L DLZiemann, L JIPdesland, L LReid, L JI:cppler, R0 RBoyd, L
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LIST OF ATTENDEES
_ QUAD-CITImS MEETING JUNE 30, 1972 B. Shelton Commonwealth Edison Company
- 11. Iloyt Commonwealth Edison Company F. Palmer Commonwealth Edison Company E. Eenigenburg Commonwealth Edison Company J. Abel Commonwealth Edison Company J. Embley General Electric Company
- 11. Pef fer General Electric Company R. Leasburg General Electric Company W. Flock General Electric Company G. Iloveke Sargent & Lundy E. Weaver Sargent & Lundy W. Bloss Sargent & Lundy E. Jordan RO - Region III F. Cicmenson Licensing L. Connery Licensing
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F. Anderson Licensing e.
A. Cluckmann
. Licensing D. Ziemann Licensing D. Skovholt Licensing J. Riesland Licensing i
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