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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20216G0881999-09-19019 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing TS 4.18.5.a.9 & Associated Bases for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 for Suppl Use of OTSG Repair Roll Technology ML20216G0721999-09-17017 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Volumetric Integranular Attack ML20212F5851999-09-17017 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing TS by Revising Curie Limits for Radioactive Gas Storage Tanks ML20211P0061999-09-0707 September 1999 Proposed TS in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria ML20211B3291999-08-19019 August 1999 Proposed TS 4.18.3.a.4 Clarification Supporting Tube End Cracking Alternative Repair Criteria ML20211C1701999-08-18018 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising ESAS Low RCS Pressure Setpoint to Ensure That TS Adequately Bounds Safety Analysis ML20211C4101999-08-18018 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Requiremets for Tube Repair (Sleeving) & Clarifying Requirements for Preservice & ISI of Tubes to Facilitate Replacement of Original SGs ML20210K5121999-07-29029 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements Associated with Plant Station Batteries & DC Sources to 125 Vdc Switchyard Distribution Sys ML20210K3571999-07-29029 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising SRs Pertaining to ISI Requirements for SG Tube Circumferential Cracking at top-of-tubesheet During 2P99 Planned mid-cycle Outage ML20209H5811999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising RB Structural Integrity Requirements Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures, Tendons & Anchorages ML20209H8701999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 6.2.2 & 6.2.2.h,replacing Functional Description of Operations Staff Middle Manager with Ref to Functional Description Assistant Operations Manager & Revising TS Table 6.2-1 Item 5 & TS 6.2.2.f ML20209H9721999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes for Elimination of Programmatic Requirements Associated with PASS & Regulatory Relief from PASS Requirements of NUREG-0737 & RG 1.97 ML20195D2371999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Surveillance Requirements & Applicable Bases Relevant to ISI Requirements for Portions of once-through SG (OTSG) Tubes Adjacent to Primary Cladding Region of tube-to Tubesheet Roll ML20206T2651999-05-14014 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising SG Tubing SRs ML20206Q1281999-05-10010 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Page B 2-2,discussing Guidance to Be Used When Applying Later Editions & Addendas of ASME Code to RCS Components ML20205P4081999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes,Revising Reactor Bldg Structural Integrity Requirements ML20205P6291999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes,Revising Battery Requirements ML20205P3731999-04-0909 April 1999 Revised Proposed TS Page 5-1 Re Design Features Conversion ML20205P6931999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Change,Adding Specification 3.0.6 & Associated Bases to ANO-2 ML20207C0631999-02-25025 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Change Revising Action 2 Associated with Table 3.3-1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation. Change Adds Footnote to Action 2 Allowing Startup with Functional Units Associated with Channel D Excore Inoperable ML20207M7561999-02-24024 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Startup & Continued Operation of Plant with Channel D Detector Until New Detector Is Installed During mid-cycle Outage Scheduled for Nov 1999 ML20198K1341998-12-17017 December 1998 Corrected Tech Specs Pages to 980629 Application for Amend to License NPF-6 ML20198A3661998-12-0808 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs B3/4 6-3 & B3/4 6-4,deleting All Requirements Associated with Sodium H Addition Sys & Adding New Requirements for Trisodium Phosphate to Be Stored in Containers Located on Floor of Cb ML20196B4381998-11-24024 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing Administrative Controls Section to Implement Consolidated QA Plan Manual & Clarifying Responsibilities on STA Position on Shift ML20153D8491998-09-17017 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 2.2.1,3.3.1.1 & 3.3.2.1 Re Operating Bypass Setpoint ML20236Y5081998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.3.4.B Re Sodium Hydroxide Tank Limits ML20236Y5251998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.1.3.2,revising Action Requirements for CEA Position Indicator Channels ML20236Y5951998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements Associated W/Units 1 & 2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys ML20236Q2781998-07-13013 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Settings ML20236G6921998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3.4.2 & TS 3.4.12 Re Reactor Coolant Sys Safety Valves & Low Temp Overpressure Protection ML20236G5421998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Surveillance Testing Requirements for Unit 2 Direct Current Electrical Distribution Sys ML20236G4911998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re MSSVs & Pressurizer Safety Valves ML20236G5631998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Table 3.3-4 to Provide Range of Acceptable Values for 4160 Volt Bus Loss of Voltage Values ML20217M2621998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re DG Load Rejection Testing ML20217N6141998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6.1,revising Definition of Quadrant Power Tilt ML20217M4871998-04-28028 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Order of Channel Rotation During Outage for Scheduling Flexibility,While Still Requiring Rotation Schedule to Be Established for Operating Cycle ML20217P8141998-04-0101 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Upper Tubesheet Volumetric Indications to Remain in Svc for Cycle 15 ML20216J7841998-03-17017 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Change Concerning Plant Protection Sys Matrix Logic Testing ML20203D1061998-02-18018 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Surveillance Testing Requirements for Emergency Feedwater Sys ML20202G9771998-02-0909 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Allowing Use of Repair Roll Technology (Reroll) for Upper Tubesheet Region of SGs ML20197A8421997-12-12012 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Establishment of Alternate Repair Criteria for Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Upper Tubesheet of Unit 1 SGs ML20211C6441997-09-23023 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying RPS & ESFAS Trip Setpoint & Allowable Values for SG Low Pressure ML20211C8911997-09-23023 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Reducing Min Required Reactor Coolant Sys Flow Rate Requirements Until ANO-2 SGs Are Replaced ML20151J3371997-07-28028 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Actions Associated W/Ts Table 3.3-1 for Reactor Protective Instrumentation & Table 3.3-3 for Esfa Sys Instrumentation ML20149K0551997-07-21021 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Surveillance Testing Requirements for Facility EFW Sys as Specified in Specification 4.7.1.2 ML20141C5641997-06-18018 June 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Changes Restoring Table 2 to Table II & Revision to One of Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Pages Previously Submitted.Also Includes Amended Pages Modified to Amends Issued Since Change Request Submitted ML20141A8001997-05-0808 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2 Requesting Removal of Reference to CE NPSD-576 ML20138H8521997-05-0202 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Submitting Rev to Original TS Change Request to Reduce Limit Specified in Section 3.1.6.3.b for Leakage Through SG Tubes of Any One Sg,Per SG Tube Insp Surveillance Requirements ML20138D6411997-04-24024 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Requirements for Sample Scope Initial Size & Expansion for Inservice Insp of Steam Generator Tube Sleeves ML20141H2621997-04-18018 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Delay of Scheduled three-yr Inspections of Flywheels on All Four RCPs Until Completion of 2R13 Refueling Outage,Scheduled for Winter of 1998-99 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217N3171999-10-19019 October 1999 Rev 1,change 024-01-0 to OP-1903.011, Emergency Response Notifications ML20217J7641999-10-0505 October 1999 Rev 1 to Unit 1 Technical Requirement Manual, Replacing Index Page ML20216G0881999-09-19019 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing TS 4.18.5.a.9 & Associated Bases for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 for Suppl Use of OTSG Repair Roll Technology ML20212F5851999-09-17017 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing TS by Revising Curie Limits for Radioactive Gas Storage Tanks ML20216G0721999-09-17017 September 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Volumetric Integranular Attack ML20211P0061999-09-0707 September 1999 Proposed TS in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria ML20211B3291999-08-19019 August 1999 Proposed TS 4.18.3.a.4 Clarification Supporting Tube End Cracking Alternative Repair Criteria ML20211C4101999-08-18018 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Requiremets for Tube Repair (Sleeving) & Clarifying Requirements for Preservice & ISI of Tubes to Facilitate Replacement of Original SGs ML20211C1701999-08-18018 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising ESAS Low RCS Pressure Setpoint to Ensure That TS Adequately Bounds Safety Analysis ML20210N5541999-08-0404 August 1999 Rev 28,Permanent Change 4 to OP-1903.061, Communication Equipment Test ML20210N5571999-08-0404 August 1999 Rev 23,Permanent Change 5 to OP-1903.011, Emergency Response/Notifications ML20210K5121999-07-29029 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements Associated with Plant Station Batteries & DC Sources to 125 Vdc Switchyard Distribution Sys ML20210K3571999-07-29029 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising SRs Pertaining to ISI Requirements for SG Tube Circumferential Cracking at top-of-tubesheet During 2P99 Planned mid-cycle Outage ML20209H5811999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising RB Structural Integrity Requirements Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures, Tendons & Anchorages ML20209H8701999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 6.2.2 & 6.2.2.h,replacing Functional Description of Operations Staff Middle Manager with Ref to Functional Description Assistant Operations Manager & Revising TS Table 6.2-1 Item 5 & TS 6.2.2.f ML20209H9721999-07-14014 July 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes for Elimination of Programmatic Requirements Associated with PASS & Regulatory Relief from PASS Requirements of NUREG-0737 & RG 1.97 ML20195D2371999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Surveillance Requirements & Applicable Bases Relevant to ISI Requirements for Portions of once-through SG (OTSG) Tubes Adjacent to Primary Cladding Region of tube-to Tubesheet Roll ML20206T2651999-05-14014 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Revising SG Tubing SRs ML20206Q1281999-05-10010 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Page B 2-2,discussing Guidance to Be Used When Applying Later Editions & Addendas of ASME Code to RCS Components ML20206J8021999-05-0404 May 1999 PC-03 to Procedure/Work Plan 1904-002, Offsite Dose Projections Rdacs Computer Method ML20205P6931999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Change,Adding Specification 3.0.6 & Associated Bases to ANO-2 ML20205P3731999-04-0909 April 1999 Revised Proposed TS Page 5-1 Re Design Features Conversion ML20205P6431999-04-0909 April 1999 Revised Proposed Technical Requirement Manual Pages ML20205P4081999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes,Revising Reactor Bldg Structural Integrity Requirements ML20205P6291999-04-0909 April 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Changes,Revising Battery Requirements ML20207C0631999-02-25025 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Change Revising Action 2 Associated with Table 3.3-1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation. Change Adds Footnote to Action 2 Allowing Startup with Functional Units Associated with Channel D Excore Inoperable ML20207M7561999-02-24024 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Startup & Continued Operation of Plant with Channel D Detector Until New Detector Is Installed During mid-cycle Outage Scheduled for Nov 1999 ML20198K1341998-12-17017 December 1998 Corrected Tech Specs Pages to 980629 Application for Amend to License NPF-6 ML20198A3661998-12-0808 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs B3/4 6-3 & B3/4 6-4,deleting All Requirements Associated with Sodium H Addition Sys & Adding New Requirements for Trisodium Phosphate to Be Stored in Containers Located on Floor of Cb ML20196B4381998-11-24024 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Changing Administrative Controls Section to Implement Consolidated QA Plan Manual & Clarifying Responsibilities on STA Position on Shift ML20196C9761998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 1 to Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual ML20154D6681998-10-0101 October 1998 Rev 28 to Procedure/Work Plan 1904.002, Offsite Dose Projections Rdacs Computer Method ML20153D8491998-09-17017 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 2.2.1,3.3.1.1 & 3.3.2.1 Re Operating Bypass Setpoint ML20153H1651998-08-12012 August 1998 Rev 0 to ANO Units 1 & 2 Technical Requirements Manual ML20236Y5251998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.1.3.2,revising Action Requirements for CEA Position Indicator Channels ML20236Y5081998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.3.4.B Re Sodium Hydroxide Tank Limits ML20236Y5951998-08-0606 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements Associated W/Units 1 & 2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys ML20236Q2781998-07-13013 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Settings ML20236G6921998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3.4.2 & TS 3.4.12 Re Reactor Coolant Sys Safety Valves & Low Temp Overpressure Protection ML20236G5421998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Surveillance Testing Requirements for Unit 2 Direct Current Electrical Distribution Sys ML20236G5631998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Table 3.3-4 to Provide Range of Acceptable Values for 4160 Volt Bus Loss of Voltage Values ML20236G4911998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re MSSVs & Pressurizer Safety Valves ML20199F7211998-05-22022 May 1998 Rev 8 to Simulator Mod Control,Training Desk Guide 6.3 ML20217N6141998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6.1,revising Definition of Quadrant Power Tilt ML20217M2621998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re DG Load Rejection Testing ML20217M4871998-04-28028 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Order of Channel Rotation During Outage for Scheduling Flexibility,While Still Requiring Rotation Schedule to Be Established for Operating Cycle ML20217P8141998-04-0101 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re Upper Tubesheet Volumetric Indications to Remain in Svc for Cycle 15 ML20216J7841998-03-17017 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Change Concerning Plant Protection Sys Matrix Logic Testing ML20203D1061998-02-18018 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Surveillance Testing Requirements for Emergency Feedwater Sys ML20202G9771998-02-0909 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Allowing Use of Repair Roll Technology (Reroll) for Upper Tubesheet Region of SGs 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
. . . . __,
i 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
SAFETY INJECTION TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE l with:
- a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volums of between 1413 and 1539 cubic feet (equivalent to an indicated level between 80.1% and 87.9%,
respectively),
- c. Between 2200 and 3000 ppm of boron, and
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 624 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*
ACTION:
- a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, due to boron concentration not within limits, restore the boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to <700 psia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to inability to verify level or pressure, restore the SIT to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, 4 or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to < 700 psia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- c. With one safety injection tank inoperable for reasons other than ACTION a or b, restore the SIT to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to <700 psia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
- 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
- 2. Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve (2CV-5003, 2CV-5023, 2CV-5043 and 2CV-5063) is open.
P
- With pressurizer pressure 2 700 psia.
9505260245 950519 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P PDR ;
ARXANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. SG, 46G l
l 1
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements," Section 7.4 discusses surveillance requirements for the instrumentation channels used in the measurement of water level and pressure in SITS. It is the recommendation of the NUREG that when one SIT is inoperable due only to the inability to verify water level and pressure, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> be allowed to restore SIT to an OPERABLE status.
If one SIT is inoperable, for a reason other than boron concentration or the inability to verify level or pressure, the SIT must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In this condition, the total contents of the three remaining SITS cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA, contrary to the assumptions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
CEOG " Joint Applications Report for Safety Injection Tank AOT/STI Extension,"
CE NPSD-994, provides a series of deterministic and probabilistic findings that support 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as being either " risk beneficial" or " risk neutral" in comparison to shorter periods for restoring the SIT to OPERABLE status. The report discusses best-estimate analysis that confirmed that, during large-break LOCA scenarios, core melt can be prevented by either operation of one LPSI pump or the operation of one HPSI pump and a single SIT.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance requirements of throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that t assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. The acceptance criteria specified in I the Surveillance Requirements for HPSI single pump flow, HPSI differential pressure, and LPSI differential pressure does not account for instrument error.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)
The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS and CSS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
i ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. &G,444,463
4 e l MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FOR INFO ONLY) l l
1 3/4.5 -EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
SAFETY INJECTION TANKS' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE
'with -
- a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 1413 and 1539 cubic feet (equivalent to an indicated level between 80.1% and 87.9%,
respectively),
- c. Between 2200 and 3000 ppm of boron, and
- d. A nitrogen cover pressure of between 600 and 624 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3r*
ACTION:
- a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, due to boron concentration not within limits, restore the boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to <700 psia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With one safety iniection tank inoperable due to inability to verify level or Dressure, restore the SIT to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce cressurizer pressure to < 700 osia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
bega With one safety injection tank inoperable for reasons other than h:::n ::n :nt :tionACTION a or b, restore the SIT to OPERABLE status within 4_2j_hourg, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to <700 psia within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
- 1. Verifying the contained borsted water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
- 2. Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve (2CV-5003, 2CV-5023, 2CV-5043 and 2CV-5063) is open.
- With pressurizer pressure 2 700 psia.
ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 43, M 4 m
EMERGENCY CORE CCOLING SYSTEMS BASES NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Recuirements," Section 7.4 discusses surveillance recuirements for the instrumentation channels used in the measurement of water level and pressure in SITS. It is the recommendation of the NUREG that when one SIT is inoperable due only to the inability to verify water level and oressure, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> be allowed to restore SIT to an OPERABLE statust If :n: S!T i; insp;; ble, f:: : :::::n :th:: th:n beren
- ncent:stici, the SIT :::t 5: :: turned t: OPEni!LE :t:tu: uithir 1 h:::. Ir thi: ::nditi:n, th ::quir:d ::ntent: ef th::: SIT: ::nn:t bc
- umed t: ::: h th: :::: during : LOCA Ou t th: :: verity of th
- n::qu:n;; h uld : LOCA ::::: in th::: ::nditi:n:, the 1 heu:
- xpleti n tim: t: p;n the v:1v;, ::s v p:u:: to the valv: p:::ter,
- :::t::: p::p : uste: vel =: :: nit::;;n :: :: p::::::= : ::::: th:2 p :;pt :stien uill be tchen t: ::tu r th: in:p:::bl: SIT t: OPERESLE
- tstu:. The ;;;pleti:n ti=: mini:d::: th np::::: Of the pl:nt t: :
LOCA uhil: : SIT i; in:p ::ble.
If one SIT is inoperable, for a reason other than boron concentration or the inability to verify level or pressure, the SIT must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In this condition, the total contents of the three remainino SITS cannot be assumed to reach the core durina a LOCA, contrary to the assumptions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
CEOG ' Joint Applications Report for Safety Iniection Tank AOT/STI Extension,"
CE NPSD-994, provides a series of deterministic and probabilistic findinas that suoDort 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as beina either " risk beneficial" or " risk neutral" in comparison to shorter periods for restorina the SIT to OPERABLE status. The report discusses best-estimate analysis that confirmed that, durina larce-break LOCA scenarios, core melt can be prevented by either operation of one LPSI Dump i or the operation of one HPSI oump and a sinale SII.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In i addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability I in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance requirements of throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. The acceptance criteria specified in the Surveillance Requirements for HPSI single pump flow, HPSI differential pressure, and LPSI differential pressure does not account for instrument error.
ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 64,M8,MG l
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3/4.5.4 REP 11ELING WATER TANK (RWT)
The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a .
sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS and CSS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and
.(2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 43,448,443 l
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