ML20083E581
| ML20083E581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1983 |
| From: | Geier J ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 0982-L, 31221, 982-L, U-0685, U-685, NUDOCS 8312290288 | |
| Download: ML20083E581 (3) | |
Text
.
U- 0685 ILLINOfS POWER COMPANY fp g (72_gyy_L 500 SOUTH 27TH STREET, DECATUR. ILLINOIS 62525 Docket No. 50-461 December 21, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. A.
Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Control of Heavy Loads (NUREG-0612)
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
As previously discussed between Terrance Chan, NRC Auxiliary Systems Branch and M. W. Benoit, IP, on NGvember 7, 1983, resolutions to five informally presented questions on IP's July 28, 1983 submittal to Phase I of NUREG-0612 are provided in the attachment to tnis letter.
Items requiring further action by IP will be completed before fuel loading and available for any desired NRC audit.
If you have any questions on the enclosed infcrmation, please contact me.
Sincerely yours, bu J.D. Geier Manager Nuclear Station Engineering MWB/lbm Attachment cc:
G. A. Harrison, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager N. E. Fioravante, NRC ASB T. Stickley, EG&G NRC Resident Office Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety h
8312290288 831221 PDR ADOCK 05000461 1
A PDR I
I i
NRC Ol:
"Concerning the generic safe load areas:
How were these areas-established?
Is a total failure of the floor to be permitted?
If not, was an analysis performed to show what type of impact (load weight combined with drop height) the floor can take; and how will lifts be limited within.these bounds?"
IP A1:
Two generic load path areas were determined for Clinton Power Station Unit I.
The first, shown on drawing M01-1419, covers generic lifts made by the Fuel Building crane main or auxiliary hooks over the equipment hatch and the floor space north and west of the equipment hatch.
No safe shutdown equipment is located below this load path area.
A total failure of the floor is permitted.
The second generic load path area is located on the refueling floor in the Containment as shown on drawing M01-1434, to cover lifts made by the Containment Polar Crane main or auxiliary hooks.
Safe shutdown equipment is located on various elevations below this load path area.
A load drop analysis will be performed to determine safe load weight / drop height combinations for lifts made in this area not handled by single failure proof lifting systems.
Lifts'will be limited within the bounds of these two generic safe load path areas by maintenance or operations procedures.
NRC Q2:
"The drawings provided have safe-load-paths marked on them in pen.
This indicates that the paths were marked for review only.
There are no assurances that properly marked drawings will accompany or be referenced by the lift procedures."
IP A2:
Maintenance procedures will reference the safe load path drawings.
NRC 03:
"Some specific load paths are developed for Polar Crane main hook lifts, but IP has indicated that the list is probably not complete.
Generic paths should be developed for all other loads.
The use of a single-failure-proof (S-F-P) crane does not exempt IP from the load path requirement.
(IP should be cautioned that a S-F-P crane by itself also does not constitute a S-F-P lifting system - see NUREG-0612 section 5.1.6)."
IP A3:
See IP A1.
w-g-
-e y-
,, -7 p.
-p-n,,---
y+--
g-
- - = *
=:-'
g y
wa-+i--
r--
NRC Q4:
"The load drop of the New Fuel Shipping Container is presented here.
Does this drop represent an upper bound for all potential drope in this generic area?"
(See 1st paragraph on this subject.)"
IP A4:
No.
The load drop analysis was done for a New Fuel Shipping Container in the area marked " Safe Load Path Area for New Fuel Shipping Container" on drawing M01-1419 only.
The generic area was not considered (see IP A1).
This analysis was done because there are components of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System located below the area.
NRC 05:
The Dryer / Separator Strongback's load test does not meet the formal requirements of a 150% test.
The 125% load test may be acceptable, however, more information should be provided.
Basically, if the device is S-F-P, a description of the device and the meaning of the load test is needed.
If the device isn't S-F-P, the device description should be accompanied by a discussion of potential load drop consequences.
IP A5:
The strongback will be upgraded to a factor of safety of ten in compliance with section 5.1.6 (la), Single Failure Proof Handling Systems, of NUREG-0612.