ML20082V244
| ML20082V244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1991 |
| From: | Dyer J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082V247 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9109230180 | |
| Download: ML20082V244 (14) | |
Text
..
i
/T.,,, f i*
UNITED STATES
{c JI i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o,
f WAsWNGloN. D C, A&4
,g s,,, j
+...*
P_ACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. Ukli NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-275 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Arendment No. 65 License No. DPR 80 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Connission) has found that:
A.
The application for anendnent by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated Decenber 21, 1990, complies with the standards and requirener's of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter it O.
The f acility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendpent can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this anendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this anendment is in accordance with 10 CFR part 51 of the Connission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license arendment, and paragraph 2.0.(2) of facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby avended to read as follows:
ksb
[
P
~
2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Atendment No. 65, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Pacific Ga & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environnental Prc+"ction Plan, except w:1ere otherwise stated in specific license co; tions.
3.
This license amenacent betones effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,NW O
anes E. Dyer, D'irector Project Directorate V Division of Deactor Projects lil/lV/V Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:
September 5, 1991
, ~.
1
. gm%
f
?c, o* 's UNITED ST ATES i - 1)'y! !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6
((
4 f
WASHINoTON, O C 20166 y.~...f,r
+
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAP. POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2
)
DOCKET NO. 50-323 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY-0EERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 64 License No. DPR-82 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 21, 1990, complies with the standards and requirerents of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended (the Act),
and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The f acility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this anendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimipl to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this anendnent is in accordance witn 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is anended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license anendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of f acility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:
l
-2 (2) hthnicalSpecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environnental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendnent No.
64, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environnental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
This license arendnent becones effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 44k b.
OL Jares E. Dyer, Director Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects 111/IV/V Office of huclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 5, 1991 4
..._.._________.______________m
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 65 AND 64 TACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-80 AND DPR-82 DOCKET NOS. 50-27$ AND 50-323 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.
REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE
'T[IT 6 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6a B 3/4 5 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 5-2a B 3/4 6-1 B 3/4 6-1 B 3/4 6 2 B 3/4 6-2 e
I l
f t
L l
t
, _,., -., _. -.. _ _. _.. -... _..,,. _,. _,. - _,,,........ _ _., _..... -. _... _. -... ~ _,. _ _, _ _ _ _ _.
w 3/4.6 CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containstnt atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses.
This restriction in con;iunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accicent conditions.
3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total contain-ment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the pea t accident pressure, P,.
As an added conservatism, the measured
-overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to O.75 L, or less than or equal to 0.75 L, as applicable, during performance of t
the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate.
Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive c.ie to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.
i 3/a.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRES $tlRE-The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that:
(1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 47 psig-during LOCA conditions.
The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is l
1ess than-47 psig, which is the maximum design pressure of containment. This includes the limit of 1.2 psig for initial positive containment pressure.
The total pressure is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.
01ABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment Nos. 65 and 64 L
l
l e
CONTAINMENT SYSilPS BASES 1
1 3/4.6.i.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overal ontainment average air temperature does not exceed the initial tempet, sre condition assumed in the safety analysis for a LOCA.
_3/4.6.1.6 CONTAlHMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment
-will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility.
Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure in the event of a LOCA.- The visual examination of the concrete liner, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient todemonstratethiscapabi1Ity.
l 3/4.6.1.7 -CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge. lines is restricted to two of the three i
following lines:
(1) a supply line (2) an exhaust line of the purge system, and (3) the vacut;m/ pressure relief Iine to ensure that the SITE BOUNDARY dose i
guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-l coolant accident during containment purging operations.
The vacuum / pressure relief valves must be blocked to open no more than 50' because these valves have not yet been qualified to close under accident conditions.
Operation will be limited to 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> during a calendar year.
The 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> limit shall not bccome effective until after initial criticality.
The i
total time the Containment-Purge (vent) System isolatiun valves may be open during HDDES 1, 2, 3. and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and_ operating experience.
l l
l
-DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment Nos. 65 and 64 l
1 j
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES EfCSSUBSYSTEMS(Continued)
The maximum flow Surveillance Requirement ensures that the minimum injectionlineresistanceassumptionsaremet.
These assumptions are used to calculate maximum flows to the RCS for safety analyses wh!:h are limited by maximum ECCS flow to the RCS, The Surveillance Requirement for the maximum difference between the minimum and maximum individual injection line flows ensures that the minimum individual injection line resistance assumed for the spilling line following a LOCA is met.
The e ximum total pump flow Surveillance Requirements ensure the pump runout limits of 560 gpm for the centrifugal charging pumps and 675 gpm for the safetyinjectionpumpsaremet.
The safety analyses are performed assuming the miniflow recirculation lines for the ECCS subsystems associated with the centrifugal charging and safetyinjectionpumpsareopen.
The flow balancing test is, therefore, performed with these miniflow recirculation lines open.
Some of the flow from the centrifugal charging pumps will go to the RCP l
seals during ECCS operation.
Therefore, the flow balance test is performed l
with a simulated flow from the centrifugal charging pumps to the RCP seals.
The simulated flow rate is consistent with the actual RCP seal resistance and the resistance of the RCP seals assumed in the calculation of ECCS flows for the safety analyses.
3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM The Boron Injection System is only required for Units 1 and 2 Cycle 4.
I TheOPERABILITYoftheBoronInjectionSystemaspartoftheECCSensuresthat sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown.
RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent (;epressurization, a loss-of-oolant accident or a steam line rupture.
l Thelimitsoninjectiontankminimumcontainedvolumeandboronconcentra-l tion ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met, i
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of tne boron solution will be maintained above the solubility limit of 135 F at 21,000 ppm boron, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment Nos, f 5 and 64 i
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the EC;S ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injec-tion by the ECCS in the event of either a LOCA or a steamline break.
The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:
(1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculati m cooling flow to the core; (2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition (68 to 212 degrees-F) following a small break LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, spray additive tank, containment spray systei piping and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted exce,t the most reactive ARI-1); (3) the reactor will remain subcritical in the control rod assembly (ing a large break LOCA (break flow area greater than cold conditior, follow 3 ft ) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, ECCS water and other sources 2
of water that may eventually reside in the sump post-LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO); and (4) long term suberiticality following a steamline break assuming ARl-1 and preclude fuel f ailure.
The maximum allowable vclue for the RWST boron concentration forms the basis for determining the time (post-LOCA) at which operator action is required to switch over the ECCS to hot leg recirculation in order to avoid precipitation of the soluble boron.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
DIABLO CANYOH - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment Nos. 14 and 13
- __JULDJm#
- - - = _ - -
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCtMULAT_0RS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the ACS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.
This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are me t.
The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279 1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional acetmulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
JI a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE where this capability is not required.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sites rangin11 from the double ended break of the i
largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
- n addition, each ECCS subsystem crovides long ters core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is accept-able without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
I S
l DIABLO CANYON UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 5-1 l
l
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
The requirement to maintain the RHR Suction Valves 8701 and 8702 in the locked closed condition in MODES 1, 2 and 3 provides assurance that a fire could not cause inadvertent opening of these valves when the RCS is pressur-ized to near operating pressure.
These valves are not part of an ECCS subsystem.
j The Ifmitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to erify all centrifugal charging pumpsandSafetyInjectionpumpsexcepttherequiredOPERABLEchargiagpumptobe inoperable below 323'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.
For Unit 1 Cycle 5 and Unit 2 Cycle 4:
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a 1.0CA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pres.ure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2)providetheproperflowsplitbetweeninjectionpointsinaccordancewith the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
For Unit 1 Cycle 6 and after, and Unit 2 Cycle 5 and af ter:
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is reintained.
The safety analyses make assumptions with respect to minimum total system res htance minimum and maximum total injection line resistance, and minimum indt dded Injection line resistance.
These resistances in conjunction with the ranges of potential pumn performance are used to calculate the minimum and maximum ECCS flows assumed in the safety analyses.
The minimum flow Surveillance Requirement ensures that the maximum injection line resistance assumptions are met.
These assumptions are used tn calculate minimum flows to the RCS for safety analyses which are limited by minimum ECCS flow to the RCS.
DIABLO CANYON - UF iS 1 & 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendnnt Nos. 65 and 64
e EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SGlEMS i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1 b)
The total flow rate through all four injection lines is less than or equal to 461 gpe, and c)
The difference between the maximum and minimum injection line flow rates is less than or equal to 15.5 gpm, and d)
The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 560 gpm.
2)
Forsafetyinjectionpumps,withasinglepumprunning:
I a)
The sum of the hjection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 427 gpm, and b)
The total flow through all four injection lines is less than or equal to 650 ppm, and c)
Thedifferencebetweenthemaximumandminimuminjection line flow rates is less than or equal to 20.0 gpm, and d)
The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 675 gpm.
i.
By performing a flow test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the RHR system that alter the system flow character-istics, and verifying that with a single pump running, and delivering to all four cold legs, a total flow rate greater than or equal to 3976 gpm, l
E i
F DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-6a Amendment Nos. 65 and 64
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions.
This visual inspection shall be performed:
1)
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2)
Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established, d.
At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.)
show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion; e.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifyir.g that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety injection actuation test signal.
2)
Verifying that each of the following pueps start automatically opon receipt of a Safety injection actuation test signal:
a)
Centrifugal charging pump, b)
Safety injection pump, and c)
Residual Heat Removal pump, f.
By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flov' chen tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1)
Centrifugal charging pump 3 2400 psid, 2)
Safety Injection pump 3 1455 psid, and 3)
Residual Heat Removal pump 3 165 psid.
DIABLO' CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-5
EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCF REQUIREMENTS (Continued) g.
By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
1)
Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve stroking opera-tion or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are re-quired to be OPERABLE, and 2)
At least once per 18 months.
BoronInjection Safety Injection Throttle Valves Throttle Valves BB10A 8822A B810B 88228 8810C 8822C 88100 88220 h.
By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following comple-tion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:
For Unit 1 Cycle 5 and Unit 2 Cycle 4:
1) for centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:
a)
The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 346 gpm, and b)
The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 550 gpm.
2)
For safety injection pump lines, with a single pump running:
a)
The sum of tl injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 463 gpm, and b)
The total pump flow rate is less than or equhl to 650 gpm.
For Unit 1 Cycle 6 and af ter, and Unit 2 Cycle 5 and after:
1)
For centrifugal charging pumps, with a single pump running:
injection line flow rates, excluding the a)
The sur highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 299 gpm, and DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment Hos.
65 and 64 1
_