ML20082U950

Amend 160 to License DPR-66,revising Tech Specs Re Max power-operated Relief Valve Setpoint for LTOP Sys & Min Enable Temp for Initiation of LTOP Sys

ML20082U950
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/13/1991
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Duquesne Light Co, Ohio Edison Co, Pennsylvania Power & Light Co
Shared Package
ML20082U953	List: ML20082U950 ML20082U957
References
DPR-66-A-160 NUDOCS 9109230047
Download: ML20082U950 (13)

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. J' 1 UNITED STATES k(}@9!i

~2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

!>ff WASHINGTON, D C. 20b55 r,.....s DUQUEst4E LIGil,7,,Cp[,P,A!iY Obl0 ED150N COMPAtlY P E t* S Y L V Afij A,,P OW E,R,,C,0!i,P,Ati,Y DOCKET NO. 50-334 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STAT 10tl,,,,0ft),T,!10,.,1

.AE.E!s,Df,E!4,T,,T,0,,ff,C),LJ,1 Y O P E P ATJ,f t,G_j. l C E ll S E Amendo ent flo.160 License flo. OPR-66 1.

The fluclear Pegulatory Conmission (the Concission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendnent by Duquesne Light Conpany, et al.

(the licensee) dated June 17, 1990, as modified by letters dated April 19, 1991 and July 25, 1991 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Consnission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Congnission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendrent can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Conaission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the concon l

defense and security or to the ht ch and safety of the public; and i

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Connission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisf'ed.

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l 9109230047 910913 l

PDR ADOCK 05000334

_P PDR

-2 2.

Accordingly, the licente is avended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachrent to this license anendt.ent, arid pcragraph P.C.(2) of f acility Operating License l'o. OPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(T) T e,ch,ni c,a l,,Speci f i c a t ions The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised througb Arendnent f;o.160, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The litersee shall operate the facility in dccordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE fluCLEAR RECULATORY COP"

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h'f[

x Johrg F. Stolt, Direct -

Project Directorate 1-4 nhfision of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Cher.ges to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: September 13, 1991 w

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ATT AC Ht4E t4T TO.1. l.C.E.N.S.E..AIA.E.t:D..ti.f.fi.T..fl.0. 160

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[.A.CJ {J,Ty, pf {FMJ !49, {J C E!1,S,E,00 _DQ3d DOCKET 11,0,5p,,3,3,4 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated, The revised pages are identified by attendment obrber at:d cctitair ver tical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove insert 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 4-da 3/4 4-4a 3/4 4-27a 3/4 4-27a 3/4 5.6.

3/4 5.6 3/4 5 7a 3/4 5-7a B 3/4 1-2a B 3/4 1-2a B 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-11 B 3/3 4-11 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 $~2 B 3/3 5-2 iI; I

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BfACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

3, and 4*

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two ch'rging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT S".aNDBY and borated to a

SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1%

k/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two charging pumps _ to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At 1 cast two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying,. on recirculation

flow, that each pump de" ~ ops a discharge pressure greater than or equal to 2402 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4 1.2.4.2 All charging

pumps, except the above required OPERABLE

pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once por 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> whenever the temperature of one or more of the inservice RCS cold legs is the enable temperature set forth in Specification 3.4.9.3 l by verifying that the control switches a<.e placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged.

"A maximum of one centrifuga1 charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is $ the enable temperature settorth in Specification 3.4.9.3.

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i BEAVFR VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 96,119, 100

REACT 9R_C_001ANI SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP START 31E LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.6 If both OPPS PORV's are not OPERABLE, an idle reactor coolant pump in a non-isolated loop shall not be started, unless:

1.

The acgual pressurizer water level is less than 60 percent (840 f t ),

or 2.

The secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 25'F above each of the in-service RCS cold leg temperatures.

APPLICABILITY:

When the temocrature of one or more of the non-isolated loop cold legs is s the enable temperature setforth in Specification 3.4.9

ACTlQ11!

With the pressarizer water level greater than 60 percent or the temperature of the steam generator in the loop associated with the reactor coolant pump being started greater than 25' above the cold leg temperature of the other non-isolated loops, suspend the startup of the reactor coolant pump.

EURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

4.4.1.6.1 The pressurizer water volume or the secondary water temperature of the non-isolated steam generators shall be determined within ten minutes prior to starting a reactor coolant pump.

The secondary water temperature is to be verified by direct measurement of the fluid temperature, or contact temperature L

readings on the steum generator secondary, or blowdown piping l

after purging of stagnant water within the piping.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-4a Amendment No. 96 160 m

REACTOR CopLANT SYSTlM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

-3.4.9.3 At.least one of the following overpress'aro protection i

systems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two power opcrated relief valves (PORVs) with a nominal trip setpoint of 5 440 psig, or l

b.

A reactor coolant system vent of 2 3.14 square inches.

APPLICABILITY:

When the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is 5 an enable temperature of 292*F.

l ACTION:

a.

With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV

.to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent (s) within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.1.6 for further limitations.

b.

With both PORV's inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 sq'aare inch vent (s) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a

vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE BY:

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l BEAVER VALLEY ~ UNIT 1 3/4 4-27a Amendment No. 94,160

a EMERGENCY RPRE_RQQLXNG SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS Tgyg <350'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a

minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be operable a.

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, /

b.

One OPERABLE Low Head Safety Injection Pump, and c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to thf cartainment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

AEEJ,,ICABILITY MODE 4 ACTION:

a.

Wjth no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, b.

In the Ovent the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant

System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All charging pumps except the above required OPERABLE pumps, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> whenever the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is s the enable temperature sedforth in specification 3.4.9.3 by verifying l that the control switches are placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged.

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maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs is 5

the enable temperature setforth in specification 3.4.9.3.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. 96,'r20,160

EMERGENCY IORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4_D_QRON INJECTION SYSTEM 13ORON INJECTION--TANK <350'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4.1.2 The boron injection tank flow path shall be isolated and power removed from the inlet or outlet valves.

APPLICABILITY:

When the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold 1 cgs is s the enable temperature setforth in specification 3.4.9.3.

ACTION With the boron injection tank not isolated, isolate the tank flow path and remove power from the inlet or outlet valvos.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4.1.2 The boron injection tank flow path shall be verified isolated by verifying at least once per 7

days that the Boron Injection Tank inlet or outlet valves are closed and de-energized except for purposes of flow testing.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1-3/4 5-7a Amendment No. 9fr,160

2/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTIER BASES 2/4.1.2 BalHTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The required volume of water in the refueling water storage tank for reactivity considerations while operating is 424,000 gallens.

The associated technical specification limit on the refueling water storage tank has been established at 441,100 gallons to account for reactivity considerations and the NPSH requirements of the ECCS system.

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analysis.

The limitations for a maximum of one contrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging except tie required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable $ the enable l

pumps temperature seqforth-in specification 3.4.9.3 provides assurance that a

mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a

single PORV.

Substituting a Low Head Safety Injection pump for a

charging pump in Modes 5 and 6 will not increase the probability of sincetheshutoffheadoftheLowHeadSafetyl an overpressure event the setpoint of the overpressure protection Injection pumps in 5

system.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2a Amendment No. 9&,160 (Revised by letter dated September 27, 1985)

REACTOR _ COOLANT SYSTE.M BASES Vesse2 inside radfus are essentially identical, the measured transition shift for a sample can be applied with confidence to the adjacent section of the reactor vessel.

The heatup and cocidown curves must be recalculated when the RTg yp determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calculated RT IE NDT the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance w;ch the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance-specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specisers are provided in UFSAR Table 4.5-3 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR 50.

The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design critoria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordhe.ce with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORV's or an RCS vent opening of greater than i

3.14 square incheb

.snsures that the RCS wil) be protected from pressure transients waich could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold 1 cgs are 5 the enable temperature.

The enable terperature is defined in Standard Review Plan Section 5.2.2 Branch technical Position RSb 5-2 as the whter temperature corresponding to a

metal temperature of at least RTNDT

+

90 dog F.

The OPPS setpoint is determined from an assessment of steady-state pressure-temperature limits as described in UFSAR Section 4.2.

Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS trom over-pressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator s 25'F above the RCS cold leg temperature or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2,

and 3

components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant.

These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) (6) (1).

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10 Amendment No. 96,11t,142,160

REACTOR COOLANT __SY!iTEd BASES 11b4.11 RELIEF VALVIJ5 The relief valvoo have.romotely operated block valvos to provido e positive shutoff capability should a relief valve becemo inoperable.

Tho electrical power for both the relief valvos and the block valvos is capable of being supplied from an omorgency power source to ensure thu ability to seal this possible RCS leakago path.

214.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Reactor Coolant System Vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.

Tho OPERABILITY of at least one reactor coolant system vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam

space, ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the reactor coolant system vont paths oorvos to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failurn of a vont valvo, power Pupply or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The

function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the reactor coolant system vent systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737,

" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements-" November 1980.

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11 Aniendment No. 109,160

J/4.5 f:MERGENCY CORE COOL &HG SYATUiSECIE1 BASES 2 / 4. 5. LlLQfdTliULAIQRS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS accumulators ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold logs in the event the RCS 4

pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial sw go of water into the core providos the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipo ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressuro ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the accident analysis are mot.

The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable accumulation minimizos the timo exposure of the plant to a

LOCA ovent occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

The RCS accumulators are isolated when RCS pressure is reduced to 1000 1 100 psig to provent borated water-from-boing injected into the RCS during normal plant cooldown and depressurization conditions and also to provent inadvertent ovorpressurization of the RCS at reduced RCS temperature.

With the accumulator pcousure reduced to lose than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressuro protection sotpoint, the accumulator pressure cannot challenge the cold overperssure protection system or exceed the 10 CFR 50 Appendix G

limits.

Therefore, the accumulator discharge isolation vavlos may be opened to perform the accumulator discharge check valve testing specified in the IST program.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSEETEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient omorgency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failuro consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capsble of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures l

within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended break of the largest RCS cold log pipe downward.

In

addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term coro cooling capability in the recirculation modo during the accident recovery period.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a

minimum, the assumptions us6d in the accident analyson are mot and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable 5 the enable temperature set forth - in specification 3.4.9.3 provides assurance that a

mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

160 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 96,11t,148, Lotter, 9/27/85

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Ef4ERGEf1CY CORE COOLER, SYG.TDiS BASES

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1/_b.i. 4 BQBOff IflJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to limit any positive increas in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown.

RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The boron injection tank is required to be isolated when RCS temperature is s

the enable temperature not'forth in specification 3.4.9.3 to prevent a

potenwial overpressurization due to an inadvertent safety injection signal.

The analysis of a

main steam pipe rupture is performed to demonstrate that the following criteria are satisfied:

1.

Assuming a

stuck rod cluster control

assembly, with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safeguards, there is no consequential damage to the primary system and the core remains in place and intact.

2.

Energy release to containment from the worst steam pipe break does not cause failure of the containment structure.

3.

Radiation doses are not expected to exceed the guidelines of the 10 CFR 100.

The limits on injection tank minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptuions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

Verffication of 120*F in the injection flow path assures an 8-hour margin to the time at which precipitation of a 7700 ppm boric acid solution would occur without benefit of the building heating system.

Verifying the recirculation flow path and stagnant piping temperatures, when the Boron Injection Flow Path temperature is less than-120*F and greater than 65'F, by monitoring the ambient air temperatures in the building areas containing that piping provides assurance that boron precipitation will not occur.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 99,160 l

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