ML20082M773
| ML20082M773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1983 |
| From: | Clayton F ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, NUDOCS 8312060269 | |
| Download: ML20082M773 (7) | |
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Malling Addross Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6081 F. L. Clayton, Jr.
Senior Vice Ptesident Flintridge Building AlabamaPower
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November 30, 1983 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. S. A. Varga Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Ur.its 1 and 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Gentlemen:
By letter dated April 15, 1983, Alabama Power Company submitted its Preliminary Farley ERC Integrated Implementation Plan and Schedule to address the basic provisions and clarifications of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. By letter dated August 5,1983, Alabama Power Company refined this plan and schedule, emphasized the goal of SPDS implementation within three and one-half years, and established a milestone completion date of November 1983 for submittal of an SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan. Attached herein is Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Yours very truly, 1
C F. L. Cl ayton, Ir.
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Attachment cc: Mr. R. A. Thomas Mr. G. F. Trowbridge
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i Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford
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8312060269 831130 PDR ADOCK 05000348 F
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a Attachment Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Safety Analysis The SPDS is define' '"' Alabama Power Company as the minimum parameters necessary tc ~..itor the Westinghouse Owners Group Critical Safety Function (CSF) status trees. The basis for the above definition of SPDS is found in Generic Letter 82-33 which states "the minimum information to be provided [by the SPDS] shall be sufficient to provide infort ation to plant operators about:
- reactivity control
- reactor core cooling and heat removal from the primary system
- reactor coolant system integrity i
- radioactivity control
- containment conditions."
Compliance with this guidance is provided by monitoring the CSF status trees. The CSF status trees were transmitted to the NRC by letters dated November 30,1981, July 21,1982 and January 4,1983. The NRC's evaluation is described in Generic Letter 83-22 dated June 3,1983 which stated that the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines, which utilize the CSF status trees, meet the most significant requirements of NUREG-0737 and that their implementation into plant procedures can begin.
In addition, Generic Letter 83-22 states that the CSF status trees can be very useful in developing the SPDS. The CSF status trees provide monitoring of symptoms and diagnosis of severe accidents and provide for assessment of the following critical safety l
functions:
- maintenance of subcriticality
- maintenance of Reactor Coolant System integrity
- maintenance of core cooling
- control of reactor coolant inventory l
- maintenance of a heat sink
- maintenance of containment integrity.
Alabama Power Company has identified the paraneters required to monitor the CSF status trees (Enclosure). These parameters will provide inputs so that the above requirements will be satisfied by the Farley Nuclear P1 ant SPDS.
I Alabama Power is limiting the SPDS display to post-trip data in accordance with Generic Letter 82-33 which states that pre-trip data is not required on the SPDS to augment existing plant instrumentation and the principal purpose and function of the SPDS is to aid the control room personnel during abnonnal and emergency conditions.
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4 Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Attachment November 30, 1983 Page 2 The Farley Nuclear Plant TSC and E0F are considered to be currently l'
operational with existing data systems. The January 1983 Emergency Response Capability (ERC) NUTAC document, Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation Program, states that the SPDS is not ri' quired to be installed in either the TSC or E0F. Meteorological data input will not be an input to the SPDS per Generic Letter 82-33..
2 Implementation Plan f
As described in the April 15, 1983 Preliminary Farley ERC r
' Integrated Implementation Plan and Schedule, implementation of the SPDS is scheduled for five years. A goal of three and one half years, however, has been established for an operational SPDS. The five year schedule is a more realistic schedule since it will allow an additional i
outage to complete engineering walkdowns necessary to finalize designs and complete installation planning. The three and one-half year goal assumes that engineering walkdowns, installation, software / hardware modifications, and final acceptance testing can be completed within two outages.
4 Following award of contract, Alabama Power Company and the SPDS vendor will establish responsibilities and schedules for design, manufacture, implementation and testing of the SPDS. Every effort will be made to advance the five year schedule and have an operational SPDS within the three and one half year goal (fourth quarter,1986). For the purpose of this presentation, only the three and one half year schedule is discussed herein.
It is anticipated that SPDS implementation will not result in an unreviewed safety question or involve a technical specification change.
Prior to implementation of the SPDS system, a final determination will be made with respect to any unreviewed questions in accordance with current procedures. Alabama Power Company's Plant Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Operations Review Board will review the SPDS safety evaluations in accordance with Farley Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications. Alabama Power Company does not plan to request NRC pre-review of the SPDS design.
The SPDS computer will be data-linked to the plant computer to receive necessary SPDS parameter inputs. The SPDS computer will process the inputs and display the CSF status trees for the control room operators. Preliminary discussions with vendors indicate that hardware for the data-link could be available approximately one year after award of contract. Since the plant computer is utilized to support plant f
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l' Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Attachment November: 30,1983 Page 3 I
operations, data-linking the SPDS to the plant computer is scheduled for the Unit 2 third (01-04-85 to 02-18-85) and Unit i sixth (04-05-85 to 05-20-85) refueling outages. The remainder of the SPDS computer system is expected to be installed by the end of the Unit 2 fourth (04-04-86 to 05-19-86) and Unit 1 seventh (09-12-86 to 10-27-86) q refueling outages with the SPDS being declared operational during the l
fourth quarter of 1986. Alabama Power Company will implement all other portions of the-SPDS, including support equhment such as comput?r room upgrades, at power if this is determined to ist jeopardize plant safety or unit availability. Alabama Power Company will update the NRC as the SPDS implementation schedule is refined.
SPDS implementation has been included in an integrated 4
implementation plan / schedule of all NRC commitments and other
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significant design modifications and maintenance activities. This comprehensive plan / schedule includes implementation of commitments related to IE Bulletins, Generic Letters, CFR provisions such as i
environmental qualification and Appendix R, as well as NUREG-0737, j
Supplement 1.
This plan / schedule was given to the NRC in a resource planning meeting on November 16, 1983.
Implementation of these licensing items must be coordinated with ongoing plant activities including refueling outages. Typical refueling outages at FNP are six
~ weeks in duration with installation of all modifications on a preplanned 1._
.-and packaged basis.
It is the philosophy of Alabama Power Company to l
perform only refueling related work on the outage critical path unless a critical safety issue is involved. This requires that all design reviews be completed, manpower requirements assessed, detail work sequences identified, acceptance testing planned, field procurement j
identified and all material received prior to the start of any work.
Alabama Power Company will utilize the ERC NUTAC verification and validation guidelines as a basis for verification and validation of the SPDS design / installation. Major design items have been identified in the SPDS specification and will be included in the SPDS vendor contract. These items include real time display of parameters on CSF status tree diagrams, overall CSF status during SPDS operability, prompt display changes upon operator demand, and human factors criteria compliance. Acceptance tests will be performed at the SPDS Vendor's factory and at the plant. These tests, which will be approved by Alabama Power Company, will ensure that the design has been properly completed and that the installed SPDS complies with the design requirements.
d Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and' Implementation Plan Attachment November 30, 1983 Page 4 Following incorporation of the SPDS into the Farley Nuclear Plant
- simulator, SPDS validation will be completed. Scenarios similar to those developed for CRDR Task Analysis and E0P Validation will be used for the final ERC system validation. Required modifications as a result of R.G.1.97 compliance and the CRDR will be evaluated to determine changes that need to be included in the final ERC system validation.
The role of the SPDS in emergency operations will be identified and operators trained accordingly. Tasks will be modified for the final ERC system validation process to incorporate the SPDS role. An observation team similar to the team discussed in Alabama Power Company's CRDR Plan dated October 31, 1983 will ensure that the SPDS performs its intended function and is utilized by the operators as predicted. Results of the final ERC system validation will be documented.
Currently four vendors are under consideration by Alabama Power Company for an SPDS system at Farley Nuclear Plant. A bid specification based on the above definition was issued to these vendors on October 14, 1983; all vendor responses were received by November 28, 1983. A detailed evaluation and management review is now being performed with contract award scheduled in the near future.
Due to the differences in methods for implementation of SPDS between the potential vendors, a more detailed system description can not be provided at this time. This system description will be provided after award of contract.
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Enclosure to Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Attachment SPDS Critical Safety Function Parameters Parameter TPNS*
Neutron Flux Power Range N1C55NE0041A and B 42A and B 43A and B 44A and B Intermediate Range.
N1C55NE035 Startup Rate 036 Source Range NIC55NE0031 Startup Rate 00320 Core Exit Thermocouples N1C56G001B to 51B N1C56L001A and B 6 channels / quadrant to be selected with 3 channels in each train.
RCS Subcooling (*F)
NIH11NGTMP2521A and C RCS Pressure-Wide Range N1B21PT402 403 i
i RCS Hot Leg Temperature-Wide Range N1B21TE413 423 433 RCS Cold Leg _ Temperature-Wide Range N1821TE410 420 430 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Q1N23FT3229A (S/G-A) 32298 (S/G-B) 3229C (S/G-C) i' Steamline Pressure Q1N11PT474 Q1N11PT486 475 494 1
476 495 484 496 485 Steam Generator Level-Narrow Range Q1C22LT474 Q1C22LT486 475 494 476 495 484 496 485
- Numbers given are for Unit 1.
The Unit 2 numbers are identical with the exception of the 2nd digit which is a "2" instead of a "1".
e Enclosure to Alabama Power Company's SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan Attachment November 30, 1983 Page 2 Parameter TPNS*
Containment Pressure-Wide Range Q1T14PT950Y and Z
. Containment Sump Level-Wide Range Q1E11LT3594A and B Containment Radiation-Wide Range Q1021RE0027A and B Pressurizer Level Q1831LT459 460 461 RCP Status Primary Coolant Flow Q1B13FT414 (Loop A) 415 416 424 (Loop B) 425 426 434 (Loop C) 435 436 Reactor Vessel Level (Note: To be added at a future date as described in APCo's letter of March 10, 1983)
Steam Dump Available
- Interlock selector switch in "0N" position
- C9 permissive signal available Atmospheric Relief Valves
- Controller in automatic RHR in service
- RHR pump from hot leg isolation valve position:
NIE11ZS8701A and B NIE112A8702A and B
- RHR pump breaker positions:
DF09 DG09
- Numbers given are for Unit 1.
The Unit 2 numbers are identical with the exception of the 2nd digit which is a "2" instead of a "1".
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