ML20081G665
| ML20081G665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Cook |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1982 |
| From: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Johnston W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082380477 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-408 NUDOCS 8311070147 | |
| Download: ML20081G665 (2) | |
Text
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E,,n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGT oN, o. C. 20555 Q,
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June 9, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR:
L'1111am V.
ohnston, NRR AD/HQE R.Fraley,I ive Director, ACRS FROM:
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO ACRS QUESTIONS REGARDING TIRE PROTECTION IN NUCLEAR PLAhTS This memo is to confirm our telecon yesterday regarding preparation of answers to ACRS questions raised during the 264th ACRS neeting in connection with Bob FerEuson's presentation.
Dick Vollmer indicated that a written reply would be provided reEarding the following items which were discussed briefly during the necting but not fully answered.
I understand that Frank Nolan is already working on a reply based on discussions with myself and Don Bucci of this office.
1.
How rapidly must a control soom fire be quenched such that remote shutdown remains operable? If the control room burns completely, is remote shutdown still operable?
2.
k' hat is the reliability / integrity of fire dampers juxtaposed with other fire-fighting capability and safety-related equipment in nuclear plants?
3.
k'ha t is the impact of fire protection equipment on critical areas and components particularly with reEard to the impact of water hoses and water sprays on equipment reliability?
4.
k' hat were the Staff's conclusions / recommendations regarding their fire protection inspection of D.C. Cook Nuclear Station?
5.
If a fire damper stops the supply of ventilation to a room (s) as part of its if re-protection function, what is the effect on the operating equipment in the rooms (e.g., will isolation which occurs in the l
HVAC systec cause or exacerbate failure of redundant safety related equipment by cutting off the air supply, for example, to multiple locations)?
6.
If fire and hot Eases are transmitted through IWAC ducts, what is the j
effect on electrical cabinets, switchgear, and other safety related equipment in the plant? If fire dampers operate as desiEned, will they isolate rapidly enough to preclude damage to sensitive equipment?
0311070147 830816 h3-PDR
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9 2.
The other topics you mentioned from your list of "ACRS concerns" are apparently matters that Mike Bender has identified as items to be discussed during a future, as yet unscheduled, subcommittee meeting.
cc: Vollmer, NRR/DE Nolan, NRR/DE Ferguson, NRR/DE 2