ML20081G173

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Seabrook Units 1 & 2 (Phase I)

ML20081G173
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/31/1983
From:	Jensen S, Stickley T EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20081G155	List: ML20081G173
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EGG-HS-6375, NUDOCS 8311040144
Download: ML20081G173 (31)

Text

_ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

--:a.,~

jgm_,_ e

_m. , - w-

, ._~.--

= m. ru 1

?i- .-

'^

EG $* *W:

J _

n_ ._ 2. 2_.-9 _

AUGU Tu '[

' h $?$ " ~ ^ ^ ~ '

! ~ ^~VgCqp0CCF"dEATFL N.h-.40 cW gES]QT' LEAI :C'.qfR,qs"

%, mig;T -

'I'ailWS EA E RCC C UN;TI'f?AND22i( P HAS CII [ .Mr&

~~f-lYd

., ;_ _gM9 N - Nck h . cme-a,l$$ k w. a -.

--TdM: --

___ 3;,rq=

' $22 _ -- m.

~ ~ *-N'a:

d '

a ) ,, 'm \

.:g* imm.

h. _

l l I dh

\ iL= W " W L %s __._:--- - =~ j,  ; m

, $5Whi

' m : 5. S.!A mense p . . ?.

_ -. 44

^

-_Jl% 13 w &p*a. ' ..

mw --

fr,,)

l

-Jfg4,

;hf.'Stickley T

• _, yggg

}

y r- -

fic.v-

.n - ,

.. d

, i

• Jn I

y. g g y _

g. .

HE -

j- 2b-_- a i- _.

E j

~. 1 -

1 a% %Idaha National Enginee=.r.ing^La =. . . boratbr - 1 m

'f'

. .c g. .

4

~"_g g Cga,,eg% ..,

. g fEner ecart

s,

. . <-., nm ... 3 r P. ',}

y.

4 A

Qf '

.3, y,- . -3 1 w

$y l St t i

\

s.n.

-a

-h.I i,

h

,_ _ ~ ~~ n@d

, y ,.

1

w -s;.

2.. ..

l M, ..- .

ykp[lf

=. 3 ,

~

4. ,, - w w. -

i l

X >

i

~

..; .ast m ,

- m .

i i

e.m 4h

m. k ,

i s

g'  % d '.

• w M4F"t**I.**SWMT W.*P""*A T*ai 6' %NE 'W eAShf-49'!*"MN M*f'F'J*% N a4 J* T F i a .-

G a#__, nim...E.f.rE.,S_~2ie'n3?M.a?aW._lo_r@fT_ni4M._ 6r.

, -e.ldjf ~#_W.

i, %. ,'

'!a. . '

i

. ;-g%d.fEtWCc.rZHMMW:-cfr E' 'M V~ .

9311040144 831014 5 , . y@,.

U l

% : TU:S;. NUCLEAR REGUE.ATORY COMMISSION

'3bT:Under ocE.C ntnct NosCE-AC07-76150157CE _

~'

<  ?

h EGnGs N

_W W ??__;h f ~

. .. ..~ - - . - - . . - _ . . .. . - . . - - - -.. - --

EGG-HS-637E CCNTROL GF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SEAERC0K UNITS 1 AND 2 -

(PHASE I)

Oceket Nos. 50-443, 50-444 Author S. A. Jensen Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published August-1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Pre' pared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Under 00E Contract No. DE-AC07-76IC01570 FIN. No. A6457 e

4 e D*"*' - = * * -***"'****T * * ' ' '. t 4 ^ ^ * - " -

--..--e - ,w h.. 3er amme r,* # ,w eww* _.

.. ~ . , , _. . . . .

.. --- .. - - . . - , -.r 4

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory C :nmission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear - ,

plants either c:erating er under c:nstruction submit a response of c:nsistency witn NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the

>. responses of these plants presently under construction. This report c:ntains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Seabrook.

L l

l

+

e '

11 1

~*

, , - __m', .w . ; m , , ,w =w ' - - * * +' *- -

• .b "

g

E'(ECUTIVE SUMVARY Seabrcek is consistent with the guidelines of NU. REG-0612. Mcwever, c:nsistency is depencen: On action in the following area:

i The main reper c:ntains recommendations wnich will aid in making the abcVe items censisten with'tne appropriate guidelines.

l

' l l

1 1 l

l l

I I

J il l

d b

111

-~

~

CnN v i :.N i .c M.=3 t MC. 4 . . ................................... ....................... Ii

X...d..,/.

c. i. c

SUMMARY

.......................... ... ................ .. iii

1. INTRCCUCTION .................................................... 1

) 1.1 Pur;cse of Review ......................................... I 1.2 Ge n e r i c B a c k gro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I t

i 1.3 Plant-Specific Eackground ................................. 3

2. EVALUATION AND RECCMMENCATICNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 O v e rv i e w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Heavy Lead Gverhead Handling Systems ...................... 4 2.3 General Guidelines ........................................ S 4

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

.............................................. 19 3.1 Applicable Lead Handling Systems .......................... 19 3.2 Guiceline Recccmendatiens ................................. 19 4 RE.:ERENCES ...................................................... 20 TABLES .

2.1 Crane / Heist Systems Consicered as Pctential Scurces for Damage of Safety Components ................... 6 3.1 Seabrcok Station NUREG-0612 Compliance Matrix ............. 21 I,

iv

, , a , em. n . +' em

.- 1-. . - . - . . . - . - . -- . -

CCNTROL OF HEAVY LCA05 AT NUCLEAR PCWER p(ANTS SE48RCCK UNITS 1 AND 2 (p4ASE I) .

1. INTRCCUCTICN 1.1 Purcose of Review This technical evaluation recort documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Seabrook This evaluation was performed with t.6.e objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612,

" Control of Heavy Leads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1], Section 5.1.1.

1.2 Generic Backereund Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy-leads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loacs at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of Icad-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

. In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase 1

n .-.

> . ocjective using an accepted acpreach or protection philosophy. The first certion of the cbjective, achieved through a set of general guidelines icentified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is .to ensure that .

all lead-handling systems at nuclear power plants are cesigned and ocerated such that oneir pr bability of failure is uniformly small and acpropriate for the critical tasks in which they a.re employed. The

] second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for lead-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either. (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof crane) er (b) conservative evaluations of Icad-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any lead drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis l

evaluatien criteria.

The approach used to cevelop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a leac drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as fellows:

e provide sufficient operater training, handling system design, lead-handling instructions, and equipment inspection

, to assure reliable operation of the handling system Define safs lead travel paths through precedures and

~

e l cperater training so that, to the extent practical, heavy i

1 cads are net carried over er near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment I-e Provide mechanical stops or. electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy leads over irradiated fuel or in proximity

! to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths. '

l l

l l

l i 2

- . . . _ . . .. . . . . . . . . _ . --- .-.....L - - - - - - - . +

3-

. - _. . - - . - - . . . ~ - - . . - - . -

s --

1

~ ~

Staff guicelines resulting from the foregoing are taculated in Sectica 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3. Plant-Seecific Back rcund On Decemcer 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to the Public

! Service Ccmpany of New Hampshire, the applicant for Seabrook, requesting that the applicant review previsions for handling and centrol of heavy loads at-Seabrook, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guicelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of confermance to these guidelines. In September 1982, the Public -

i Service Cem;any Of New Hampshire provided the initial response [4] to this request. A revised respense [9] was previded by the applicant in May 1933.

s k

I

\

O i .

4

'3

-m

2. EVALUAT!CN AND RECCMMENDATICNS 2.1 Ove rvi ew ,

The following sections su=mari:e the Public Service Company of New Hamoshire's review of heavy lead handling at Seacrook accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612. The Public Service Ccmpany of New Hampshire's review of the facilities does not differentiate between the units, so it is assumed that all units are of identical design. The applicant has-indicated the weignt of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as 2000 lbs.

2.2 Heavy Lead Overhetd Handline Systems This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above-mentioned list.

8 2.2.1 Scene

" Report the results of your review of plant. arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating precedures, or detailad structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from.any load-impact point and any safety-related ccmponent to permit a determination by inspection

~

that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."

4

. _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . . . ~ - . - - - -

A.

. _ - _ .. .~. . . _ . . . - - . - - - - -

s . . _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ . . .. . . _ _ . . . . _ - - - - --

A. Summary of Acclicant's Statements 4

The aoplicant's. review of overhead handling systems

~

icentified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2.1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

The applicant has also identified other cranes that have been excluded fecm satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

3. EG&G Evaluation The applicant appears to have included all applicable handling systems in their tables showing handling systems for which a load drop could damage safety equipment.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EG&G concludes that the applicant has included all of the applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling-systems comply with the gener.al guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1. EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.

1 l

5

_ ---. k

i l

. i

)' TA8tf 2.8 CHANC/ttolST SYSifMS CONSIDfHfD AS P0lfNilAL SOURCf6 TOR DAMACE Of SAFEIY COMPONENIS

- IAG MQ- IIANDLiffG_EY11LM CAfAG11Y I OGMLON_

MM-CR-3 Polar Centry Crane a20 a ton Main Cositainment 50 lon Auxillary I! f il-R E-24 Hadial are Stud 2 Inns Cosit a l nmen t Tensioner lloists (3) fH-RC-1 Spent f ue l Ca sk Stand i lsig 125 Ion Main, fuel S t o rage Crane two Auxillary Building 16oolts at 5 lens facle CS-CR-5 filter Cask Monorail 7.5 Tons Primary Auxi-lloist l ia ry liul ld isig CS-CR-6 Doric Acid Batchisig 4.5 f ons (2.251)* Primary Auxi-Monorail Holst liary Buildisig .

\1

'j, t'

CS-CR-13 CVCS liest E xcleange r Service Monorail lloist 5 Tons Primary Auxi-liary Bielldisig .

l

, CS-CR-14A,148 & 14C Charging Pessup Service 2.5/2.5/6.0 Primary Auxi-Monora i l llois t lens liary Blullding ..

CC-CR-15A 4 158 Component Coollag Water Pump 5 Inses Primary Auxi-Service Monorail Holst liary Building '

j. .

i }i CBS-CR-18A & 188 Radioactivo Pipe Tunnel 2 fons Itadioactivo '

ii Servico Monorell Holst l'ipo lunno t l

MS-CR-25A & 258 Main Stream aswl feedwater 7.5 tons MS and IW Pipo i

! Chase Pipe Cisase Crane l.

li .fW-CR-27 toergency feed Pump . 5 fons imorgency feed-

' Monora i l Mei st water Pimap Ilullding

'DC-CR-28A & 288 Diesel Generator 8 fons Diesel Generator Service Crane pullding l i

• Capacity steown in parentheses is the dorated capacity.

i i

• e f

, .. 3

~ ~

9 9 The NRC has estaclished seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth appecach for the handling of heavy leacs. These guidelines censist of tne follcwing criteria from Section 5.1.1 ef NUREG-0612:

e Guideline 1--Safe Lead Paths I

S Guideline 2--Lead-Handling Precedures 1

e Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training e Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices e Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) e Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) e Guideline 7--Crane Cesign.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.

2.3.1 Safe lead Paths iGuideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(lil

" Safe Icad paths should be defined for the movement of heavy leads to minimi:e the pctential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to.the extent practical, structural ficor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These Icad paths should be defined in procedures, shown en equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be

, handled. Deviations from defined lead paths should require written alternative precedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

7

-r

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements  ;

The apolicant has evaluated lead path locations for the .,

Seabrook Station. '

" Drawings depict the safe travel paths for heavy loads a

which, if dropped, could impact the irradiated fuel or

. componants in the systems required for shutdown or decay heat removal. Also shown on these layout drawings are the locations of the safety-related equipment and spent fuel, where applicable. To the maximum extent practicable, handling of heavy leads over safety-related equipment is avoided in identifying the safe load paths. Also, in defining these load paths consideration has been given to the safety-related equipment located on lower elevations below the operating floor for the lead-handling system in question.

"Ouring the crane operator training program, emphasis will be placed on the need to adhere to these safe load paths.

Heavy loads will be moved by the safest and shortest routes in accordance with the approved load-handling procedures and the safe lead path drawings. The crane operator will be directed by a signal person using standard signals given in ANSI B20.2-1976 and ANSI B20.11-1980. The signal person will ensure that the load is moved along the designated path; any deviations, if required, vill. be handled per procedure AQ 1.002, Station Operating Procedures."

8. E3&G Evaluation The applicant has developed and shown load paths on layout ~

drawings. They have stated that marking load paths on the 8

ficer is not feasible. Hcwever, they have stated that the signal persen will ensure that the load is movec along the safe lead path.

C. EG&G Conclustens and Rec:mmendations EG&G c:ncludes from the applicant's response that safe lead paths fer the Seabrook Station are consistent with the intent of Guideline 1.

2.3.2 Leac-Handit-- Precedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(2)1 "Precedures should be developed to cover lotd-handling operations for heavy leads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, precedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These precedures should include:

identificatien of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria requirac before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A. Summary of Aeolicant's Statements '

The applicant states that procedures will be developed to cover lead-handling operations for the heavy leads carried by the handling systems identified in T.ble 2.1. These precedures will identify the required equipment, the ins:ection and acceptance criteria prior to load movement, the steps and sequence in handling the load, and define the safe lead path and other special precautions. They also state that approved procedures will be in effect prior to use of the lead-handling system.

1 I e w

9 L x

- ..-.- . l

3. EG&G Evaluation The acplicant has stated that load-nandling procedures will ,

be developed which will comply with the requirements of Guideline-2.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Seabrook Station is consistent with Guideline 2 in that procedures will be developed by the applicant to meet the criteria of this guideline. These procedures should be available for possible NRC review prior to use of the lead-handling system.

2.3.3 Crane Ocerator Trainino TGuideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)1

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 230.2-1976,

' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [5]."

J A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements The applicant states that Seabrook Station will be consistent with ANSI 330.2-1976'with respect to operator training, qualification, and ' conduct.

B. EG&G Evaluation The applicant is developing a training and qualification program and appears to be implementing the applicable ANSI 930.2 requirements. No information on conduct was .

t given by the applicant other than their statement that they will be consistent with ANSI B30.2-1976. This consistency s -

, should be complete before fuel loading occurs.

-r

'10

_ - . . .. . . . _. _s.. . . ~ .

2 -;_--.- - a a, - -- ; - =

I s .

C. EG&G Conclusion and Recc=mendations Based on the acpli, cant's statement Seabrook Station,is

~

consistent with Guideline 3.

2.3.1 Scecial Liftine Cevices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(411 "Scecial lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [6]. This standard should apply to all scecial lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accected in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition,- the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

A. Summary of Acclicant's Statements The various lifting devices employed in handling the heavy loads at Seabrook have been identified by the applicant. Of these devices, the following are categorized as special lifting devices:

1. Reactor Vessel Hand Lifting Rig, Lead Cell, and Lead-Cell Linkage Assembly

2. Internals lifting Rig, Lead Cell, and Lead Cell Linkage Assembly .

3. Spent Fuel Cask Lifting Device 11 t _ . - - __ .. r . u :_ . . . _ _ , - -

-. cm

1

4. Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Lifting Device

5. Reactor Cavity Seal Ring Lifting ,0evice ,

6. Equipment Hatch Cover Hanc1ing Device

7. Pressurizer Enclosure Wall Handling Device.

The reactor vessel head and internals lifting rigs and associated load cell and linkage assembites have been evaluated by Westinghouse to verify consistency with the requirements of ANSI N14.6 and NUREG 0612. Conclusions from the Westinghouse evaluation are as follows:

1. The ANSI N14.6 requirements for design, fabrication, and quality assurance are generally in agreement with-those used for_these special lift devices.

2. The ANSI N14.6 criteria for stress limits associated with certain stress design factors for tensile and shear stresses are adequately satisfied.

3. The application of the ANSI N14.6 criteria for stress design factors are only for shear and tensile _ loading conditions. Other leading conditions are to be analyzed to other appropriate criteria, and these criteria are satisfied.

4. These devices are not strictly consistent with the ANSI N14.6 requirements for ac:eptance testing, maintenance and verification of continuing compliance. .

Alternate equivalent and/or adequate tests and inspection program,'as permitted by NUREG 0612, will~be j implemented that should enable these devices to be considered consistent with the intent of ANSI N14.6.

r l

l

12

-- . .... . .. . .a . w.- -- " .- -~ - - - - - - - - -

m-

s . . _ _ _

The design of the spent-fuel cask and lifting device has not yet been finali:ed. A detailed review of tne lifting device will be performed to verify consistency witn ANSI N14.6-1973, ence the cask design has been selected, and tihe results of the analysis will be provided to the NRC prior to any cask-handling operations at the plant site.

The reactor coolant pump motor lifting device, reactor cavity seal ring lifting device, equipment hatch cover handling device, and the pressurizer enclosure wall handling device will be consistent with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG 0612. The results of the evaluation to be performed to determine consistency with these applicable standards will be made available to the NRC for review, prior to use of these devices with their respective loads. The design of these four special lifting devices has not been finalized.

All special lifting devices will be subjected to periodic testing and inspection to verify continued consistency, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following clarifications / exceptions.

1. The tests or inspections as outlined below in (3) will .

be performed prior to use of the lifting. device if it is not used for a period exceeding one year.

2. Where the usage' frequency is more than once a year,-the tests and inspections will be performed annually.

3. A 100% load test using the actual load plus visual examination of critical welds and parts will be conducted as part of the lift. ~A periodic

- nondestructive surface examination of critical welds and/or parts will be performed to ensure continued adequacy.

13

_ _- - 32

a. All special lifting cevices will be visually inspected by maintenance :ersonnel prior to each use instead of every three months (5.3.7) for indications of damage or ,

de fo rmati on .

Alternative lead tests and noncestructive examination frequency proposed above are based upon the following considerations:

1. Lead testing to 150% of tne total weight before each use would require scecial fixtures and is impractical to perform. Therefore, these special lifting devices will be tested at 100% of the load to be carried.

Also, with the use of load cell for the head and internals lift rigs, all lifting and lowering is monitored at all times.

I

2. Access to the welds for surface examination, for most .

of these special lift rigs, is difficult as they are stored in containment or fuel _ storage building and some contamination is present.

3. The items that are welded remain assembled and cannot be used for any other lift other than their intended function. .The devices are stored in protected areas, away from adverse environmental conditions and physical abuse that could have detrimental'effect on the integrity and reliability of these special lifting devices.

4 Dimensional checking is not included since these .

structures are large and the results of dimensional measurements would always be questionable, and will not serve any useful purpose.

14

+ = - e -e -

gg ,

~ . .. - - . _ . - . . . . - - . . . , - . . ...- . -...- - --.. - -. . . m

3. EG&G Evaluation The applicant has identified seven special lifting devices.

In EG&G's jucgment, Westingnouse's evaluation of two of these devices is consistent with the intent of this

~

guideline and the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

The Westinghouse evaluation showed that in some cases, the stress design factors of ANSI N14.6 are not satisfied.

However, the design factors were stated to meet AISC allowables. EG&G feels that for the few cases where ANSI N14.6 stress design factors are not satisfied, a testing and inspection program with special attention to those parts which have a lower safety factor is consistant with the intent of the guideline. Also, procedures to recuce the possibility of impact or dynamic loads should be -

used for these devices. No information on the other special lifting device was presented other than statements that they will comply with the requirements of this guideline with exceptions as noted in the above summary of the applicant's statements. The 150% lead test is not required by ANSI N14.6 except in special cases, although it is an alternate to other nondestructive tests and examinations.

In EG&G's view, the testing proposed by the applicant is consistent with the-intent'of this guideline.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Seabrook Station is consistent with the intent of the requirements of Guideline 4 an'd ANSI N14.6-1978 based on the

~

applicant's statements. However, evaluation of consistency with this guideline should be complete for each special

~

lifting device before it is used to lift a heavy lead near fuel or safety-related equipment.

15

~~

k

2.3.5 Liftine Devices (Noc Scecialiv Cesiened) TGuiceline 5, NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(511

" Lifting devices that are not scecially designed should be installed and usec in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI E30.9-1971, ' Slings' (7]. However, in selecting the proper .

sling, the load used sneuld be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements The applicant states that all standard lifting devices will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971 and Section 5.1.1(5) of NUREG 0612.

8. EG&G Evaluation The applicant indicates that slings used at Seabrook Station will be consistent with the requirements of this guideline.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Seabrook Station is consistent with Guideline 5.

2.3.6 Cranes (Insoection. Testing, and Maintenance) TGuideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)1 "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not-practical to .

meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inscoction and.

test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified t-e 16 g -

~ ~

inspection anc test frequency (e.g., the pelar crane inside a PWR centainment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling coerations, anc is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI 330.2, however, calls for certain

. inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenanca should be performed prior to their use)."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements A program will be developed to ensure that cranes will be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. Frequency of tests and inspections will be consistent with Section 5.1.1(6) of NUREG C612. .

B EG&G Evaluation The applicant states that crane inspection, testing, and maintenance programs will be consistent with_ ANSI B30.2-1976 with exceptions as allowed by Guideline 6.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Seabrook Station is consistent with Guideline 6 on the basis of the applicant's statement.

2.3.7 Crane Desion (Guideline 7. NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)]

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI S30.2-1976, Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may' be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if-the intent of the specification is satisfied."

i l

17 L. . , _ _

.A

A. Summary of Aeolicant's Statements The polar gantry crane and spent fuel cask handling crane .

were designed in accordance with the CMAA-70 and ANSI 530.2-1967. Menorails and unde'rhung cranes are designed to ANSI B30.11 and 330.16.

B. EG&G Evaluation The cranes mentioned by the applicant in their response are consistent with or meet the intent of Guideline 7 based on the apolicant's statements.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Seabrook Station is consistent with Guideline 7 on the basis of the applicant's statements.

e

+

, 18 '

1 l

s . _ _ . . . _ _ . . _ _- .. . . .. . _. - - -. -

\

3. CCNCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Acclicable Load-Handline Svstems The list of cranes and hoists sucplied by the applicant as being subject to the provisions of NUR2G-06'.2 is adequate (see Section 2.2.1).

3.2 Guideline Recommendatiens Consistency with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy lead handling

~

(Section 2.3) is partially satisfied at Seabrook Station. This, conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1. Specific recommendations to aid in consistency with the intent of these guidelines are provideo as follows:

Guideline Recommendation

1. (Section 2.3.1) a. Seabrook is consistent with this guideline.

2. (Secticn 2.3.2) a. Seabrook will be consistent with the guideline after-completion of load-handling procedures.

3. (Section 2.3.3) a. Seabrook is consistent with this guideline.

i

4. (Section 2.3.4) a. Seabrook will be consistent with the intent of the guideline after all lifting devices are evaluated with respect to ANSI N14.6.

, 5. (Section 2.3.5) a. Seabrook is consistent with this l guideline.

. 6. (Section 2.3.6) a. Seabrook is consistent with this guideline.

7. (Section 2.3.7) a. Seabrook is consistent with this

! guideline.

l l

l 19 4

m,

4. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-C612, Control of Heavy Leads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

2. V.'Stello, Jr.'(NRC), Letter to all acplicants.

Subject:

Request for

• Additional Information on Control of Heavy Leads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978.

3. USNRC, Letter to Public Service Company of New Hampshire.

Suoject: NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Leads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 22 Dececcer 1980.

a. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Letter to Of rector of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation. Suoject: Resconse to NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads, September 1982.

5. ANSI B50.2-1976, " Overhead and Gantry Cranes." ,

6. ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."

7. ANSI 330.9-1971, " Slings."

3. CMAA-70, " Specifications fer Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."

9. Public Service Comcany of New Hampshire, Letter to G. W. Knighton (NRC).

Subject:

NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads (Revised Report),

June 1933.

20

1 t

Taut t 3.1. SE ABROOK STATION Ntm[G-0612 CUPFLI ANCE MAIRIC' I l

Weight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Gulaeline 5 Guideline 6 Guidelism /

or Crane Special Crane-lest Equipment Capacity Safe Load Operator Ltiting snu Designation Heavy toads (1bs) Paths Procedures training Devices $ lings p pection trane thrsign C C C C C P11er Gantry Crane heutron Shield 10,000 C C -- -- C -- --

1 MM-CR-3 Panel (81) each t i

420 Ton Main  !

50 lon Auxiliary Reactor Cavity Seal 18,625 C C -- --

C -- --  ;

Whiting Corporation king Reactor Missile Shield 40,000 C C -- --

C -- --

and suppurt (plus CRIM (with +

cooling fans) spreader '

assembly j CHIM Cooling Air Duct -- C C -- --

C -- --  !

and supports Heaviest l Section Reactor Vessel Head 336,218 C C --

C -- -- --

and Attachments (with .

M. lifting i rig) '{

internals Lifting Hig 18,350 C C -- C -- -- --

'l

, Upper Internals 152,000 C C -- C -- -- --

) ~, (with lifting rig)

- i' Lower laternals 340,000 C C -- C -- -- --

(with lifting rig) ,

J1b Crane (including 3,000 C C -- --

C -- --

hoist and trolley) f'j 5tud Tensioners 2,500 C C -- --

C f

lI t

i 6

}' I Aet t 3.1. (coutinued) t Weight Guideline I Guldeline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline le Guideline 7 or Crane Special Crane-fest Equipment Capacity Safe toad operator Ilfting and

_(lyL Paths Procedures Training Devices Slings inspection Cr.sne Desig Designation lleavy toads R.V.16ead Stud, Nut 700 C. C -- -- C -- --

and Washer Assembly NC Pump Motoc 100,260 C C -- -- C -- --

RC Pump Motor Support 9,300 C C -- -- C -- --

RC Pump Internals 44,900 C C -- -- C -- --

RC Pump Assembly - 94,400 C C -- -- C -- --

(includingcasing)

RC Pune Removable Con- 37,000 C C -- -- C -- -- i crete Plugs (Heavlest)

(2 sections) l' RC Pump llamiling Frame 10,000 C C -- -- C -- --

g Plug fi.r In-Core 10,000 C C -- --

C -- --

Detector Drive ,

l 420 Ton Holst load 30,000 C C -- -- C -- --

g Block I

50 Ton iloist load Block - 2,000 C C -- -- -- -- .-

Miscellaneous Equipment -- -- -- -- -- C -- --

in Containment Annulus Area Pressurizer Missile 4,000 C C -- -- C .-- --

i

', Shield (3 Sections) ,

eleaviest Section Equipment Hatch Cover 85.160 C C --

C -- -- --

(including airlock)

. Pressurtrer Enclosure 85,000 C C -- C -- -- --

W il- Two Removable each

, Panels t

I I 9

'l ' ~

ll '

J IA8tE 3.1. (continued)

Weiglet Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Culdeline 4 Guideline b Guideline 6 Guideline 1 l2 or Crane Special Crane-Test I;

[quipment Capacity Safe load Operator Lifting and (

Designation lleavy loads (lbs k Patlis Procedures iratal3_ Devices __ Slings inspection Crane Desty Stud Tensioner HV ilead 2,500 C C -- -- C -- --

, . Radial Arm Stud Tensionerlloists(3) Stud. Nut and WasNer 700 C C -- -- C -- --

j 2 Ton Capacity each Assenhly Guide Studs 650 C C -- -- C -- --

C -- C C Spent fuel Cask Spent-fuel Cask -- C C C Handling Crane llew-fuel Shipping 6,700 C C -- C -- C fil-RE-l C 12h Ton stain Container 5 Ton Aux. (2) {,

Whiting Corporation ,

i leew-fuel Assembly 1.700 C -- -- --

(with handling i

tool)

% 5,900 -- -- -- -- --

,, Crane Load Block C --

', (125lon)

-- -- -- -- I Irradiated Specimen -- C 1 --

Cask Failed-Fuel Container -- C 1 -- . - -

C C -- C C' C filter Cask Monorail filterCask(CVCS -- C

, ' iloist CS-CR-5 system)

Concrete floor Plug 3,000 C -- -- C -- --

1.5 Ton Capacity C C C C C Boric Acid 84tching Hatch Cover 1.300 C C -- ,

leonorail lialst (2 sections)- each C C C CS-CR-6 Pallets of Boric Acid Less C C C --

l 4.5 Ten Capacity than ,

(Derated Capacity-- 4,500 m i '

-2.251) i i

k

i. l!

,i l

!- i i-

TABLC 3.1. (continued)

Weight r.uldeline I Guidell'ne 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 1 or Crane Special Crane-lest Capacity Safe load operator Lifting and Equipment inspection _ Crano Design Designation lleavy loads ( Ibs ) __ Paths Procedures Training _ Devices Slin2s C C C C CVCs lleet Exchanger Removable Concrete 5,000 C C --

Service Monorail Floor Plug each lloist 05-CR-11 (2 sections) 5 Iun Capacity -- C -- --

(thnit #1 only) lleet Exchanger Tube 2.150 C -- --

Bundle (lle avi-est)

C C -- C C C Charging Pump Charging Pug -- C Service Monorail Components lloist ,

4,905 C -- C -- --

CS-CR-14A, 1441 & 14C Charging Pug Motor C --

2.h/2.5/6.0 lon Gear 2,100 Capacity ,

3,600 C C C -- C C C Component Cooling Primary Component y Water Pump Cooling Water Pump Service Monorail C -- --

lioist . PCCW Pump Motor 5,270 C C -- --

l CC-CH-ISA & 159 5 Ion Capacity each ,

5,700 C C -- C C C Emergency Feed Emergency feedwater C Pump Monorail Pump fluist --

FW-CR-27 Emergency feedwater 4,800 C C -- -- C --

5 lon Capacity Paup Motor Emergency feeduater- 3,900 C C -- -- C -- --

Pump Turbine 4,000 C C -- -- C -- --

6 ft-0 in. m 4 ft-6 in. Removable Concrete Floor Plus C -- C C C Diesel Generator Miscellaneous Diesel -- C C Service Crane - Generator Components '

DG-CR-2tsA & 288 '

Turbocharger (heaviest 2,160 C -- -- C -- --

8 fon Capacity each C anticipated lift) .

i.

l l

e

/

" t S

IAstE 3.1. (continued)

Weight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 ' Guideline 4 Guideline S Guideline 6 Guideline 1 or Crane Special Crane-lest Equipment Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting and Designattosi Heavy toads Paths Procedures Training _ Devices Slin25 -Instu t ion frane Design

_ (Ibs)

M5 isolation valve 14,065 C C C -- C C C

, . Main Steam and feed-water Pipe Chase Assembly A-260 Actuator 3,321 C C -- -- C -- --

Cras.e -- l 225 C C -- -- C --

MS-Ot-254 & 258 Llettorque operator

• fW Isolation Valve 5,241 C -- C -- --

1.5 Ton Capacity C --

? each Assembly --

FW Isolation Valve 4,369 C C -- -- C --

Ibl Isolation Valve 812 C C -- -- C --

Operator .

RAnidACilVE PIPE TMetrl ,

1,000 C C C C  !

Radioactive Pipe Encapsulation vessel C C --

Tunnel Service Head l Monorail Holst C 085-CR-18A & 1t18 Encapsulation Vessel 1,200 C C -- -- -- --

2 Ton Capacit) each Skirt ,,

i U Susp Isolation Valve Less C C -- -- C -- --

• Topworks (16 in. CBS- than va and Vie) 2,500

,I J1 C' = Applicant action is consistent with nuitEG-0612 Guideline. ,i HC = Applicant action is not consistent with NultEG-0612 Guideline i  !

R = AppilCant has proposed revisions /modiflCatless designed to be Consistent with NURfG-0612 Guideline.  !

I = Insufficient infonnation providel by the Applicant.

l 8

t i I

I i

i  !

^

l

s - _ _ ... . . _ _ . . . _ _ ___ . _-

1

1. aEPCRT WMEE A usam M

),7 acaw ass y,,, ,y,L,, , ,, , y L,,,,, e,,,, ,,,,,

Sl8UOGRAPHIC OATA SHEET EGG-HS-6375 4 Tifts ANo susTiTts 2. ft.,- e, ens Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants Seabrcok Units 1 and 2 (Phase I) s. aEC:P,ENT s ACCEssieN No.

Docket Nes. 50-443, 50-444

. 7. AUTwCRIS3 ,

5. DATE REPC A1 CCMPLETED

^

i S. A. Jensen, T. H. Stickley "Aug

~$st 1983

s. PERsCRuiNG oRGANIzATien NAuf ANo MAIUNG ACOMESS #.*cNe tia Cm) CATE REPORT ISSUEO wour. lveAa October 1983

. EG&G Idaho, Inc. s. it. - weas Idaho Falls, ID 83415 S. (Leave Omni

12. 0"wN$CRING CRGANIZATICN NAME ANC MAILING ACOMES$ ItacNar 2 a CJort

10. PROACTITASK/wCRK UNIT NO.

Division of Systen:s Integration Office of Nuciear Reacter Regulation ii. mN No.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

Washington, DC 20555 A6457

13. TYPE CP AEPCRT 88 atCC Cove aEO I'actus<ve asest s

15. SUPPLEVENTARY NCTES 14. ILeave er41 i

j 16. AS$TR ACT C00 woras or

• sJ The Nuclear P.egulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a response of consistency with NUREG-0612

" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG8G Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction.

l This repcrt contains EG&ti's evaluation and recommendations for Seabrook.

17. KEY WCRCS AND CCCUMENT ANALY$35 17a CESCRIPTCMS 4

17a. iCENTIPIE aSiCPEN-EN CE D TE AMS IE. Av A4LASILITY STATEVENT 19. SE Cums TV CLASS (74.s gem 21 NO. C8 P AGES Unclassified Make available only as specifically approved. Cu a TY class <Ta,,,,,, 22 ea CE by orcoram office. 20. Unclas si fied s N aC 8 cam 235 **1 eti 3 33 3 ..'-.- . -. .- Q

_