ML20081D798
| ML20081D798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1983 |
| From: | Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8311010344 | |
| Download: ML20081D798 (48) | |
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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00CHET,ED USNRu l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
'83 0CI 31 All :35 1
BEFORE TME COMMISSIONERS:
g 7 q,; gy g ry, p
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iiY )
Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman JW Victor Gilinsky Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine
[
Frederick M. Bernthal i
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In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket 50-289 SP
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(Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating
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Stiation, Unit 1)
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AAMODT RESPONSE TO COMMISSION ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 1983 CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF MANAGEME!.'T ISSUES TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction and Summary
2 Background
t.
Discussion 9
Prospect of a Full OI Investigation of the Har mar. Matter 17 Commission's Immediate Effectiveness Decision 19 CONCLUSIONS AND MOTION 20 References
..................................................22 Attachments 1 - 7 6
8311010344 831027 PDR ADDCK 05000289 O
PDR fD5
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_2-Introduction and Summary On October 7, 1983, the Commission stayed the hearing of the Hartman allegations, pending comments of the parties concerning a large number of other unresolved matters related to management integrity and competency. The Commission's justification for staying the Hartman hearing was to conserve egency resources. The Commission also stated its intention to review the Appeal Board's decision 6 ALAB-738, which ordered the expeditious hearing of the Hartman matter.
We were surprised and dismayed by the Commission's action, noting that the delays in hearing the Hartman matter over the past four years were due to deliberate deception perpetrated by the NRC Staff.
We oppose any continuance by the Commission of the stay of the Hartman hearing.
It is nct in the public interest of health and safety. A stay until NRC has. completed its investigation, projected as April 1984, will delay any Commission decision concerning the integrity and competency of the management of TMI until late 1984 or into 1985. To allow the two nuclear units at TMI to remain under the management of a licensee whose integrity the Commission knows to be wanting is not in the public interest.
We propose, as an appropriate resolution of all management issues, that the Commission act immediately to deny the licenses at TMI.
There is sufficient evidence in hand. We find any delay in such a decision unduly strnined and places the public health and safety at jeopardy.
However, due process would require a hearing in any event. We propose an expeditious hearing of the Hartman and related matters.
This would be entirely possible with the cooperation of the NRC Staff, which is already in possession of censiderable information concerning the Hartman matter. This procedures would conserve agency resources.
The NRC had, according to their own direct investigator of the Hartman allegations,. verified these allegations in 1980 and nearly completed their investigation prior to transfer of the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation.
We view the projected HRC reinvestigation of the Hartman matter under the secrecy planned by the Office of Investigations as a shielding of the facts of the matter from the view. of the public and the Department of Justice. We find that this NRC plan is further evidence of the agency working as an advocate for the Licensee rather than as regulator in the public interest.
There is no reason, in terms of production of additional evidence, to shield a matter as old and as investigated as the Hartman matter.
A public hearing, with participation by all parties, as ordered by the Appeal Board, will develop any additional evidence which might be needed to resolve the matter.
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A public hearing must be provided.
NRC rules of practice and procedure forbid the resolution of important safety issues, relevant to a proceeding, by the NRC Staff. A sequential scheduling of the NRC investigation, followed by a public hearing, will cnly result in expenditure of agency resources over a more extended period than would result from parallel and cooperative proceedings.
The NRC participates as a party in the TMI-1 restart proceeding and can contribute to that hearing through its investigative efforts.
Although the NRC has resources which far exceed those of'the intervenors, we find that we cannot depend on NRC's investigations to be definitive, nor is the NRC's integrity above reproach.
The other matters, recently raised by the Staff as relevant to the management issues can be considered, in most' cases, within the
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~4-framework of the Hartman hearing. These matters are, in most cases, of lesser significance. However, a separate hearing should be ordered to consider two matters which are highly relevant to the issue of management integrity and were not fully litigated in the restart proceeding. These matters are (1) TMI management's misleading communications with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during the accident and (2) management's withdrawal of the projections of initial high radiation releases over Geldsborough and the related loss of inplant radiation records.
Background
On April 16, 1983, we motioned the Commission to reopen the restart proceeding to consider the allegations made by a former control room operator at Unit 2, Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr.
Hartman alleged that for several months prior to the TMI-2 accident leak rate reports, required by regulation every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, were falsified.
He alleged that reports that computed leakage in excess of that allowed by the technical specifications of the operating license were discarded. He claimed that his shift supervisor and foreman directed this deception.
The existence of the Hartman allegations was first reported in the restart proceeding in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 1 dated November 1980. The Staff briefly noted that Hartman had made allegations concerning falsified leak rate data,
.,oted the pending Department of Justice investigation and asserted that NRC's right to further investigate had ceased.
In a subsequent supplement of March 1981, the Staff acknowlecged the DOJ investigation and diminished the Hartman matter as only of " historical interest".
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During the reopened hearing on cheating by operators on tests at TMI-1, we sought Hartman's appearance as a witness.
Hartman had alleged, in addition, that NRC oral examination of licensed operators had been compromised by the surreptitious recording of the exams by TMI personnel. This matter, as well as the falsification of leak rate data, was clearly relevant to the cheating issues being considered. However our motion was cut short by the objection of Licensee's attorney and disinterest of the judge.
In March 1982, prior to an anticipated Commisslon decision on restart, the Commission invited the parties to the restart proceeding to submit comments, if they wished, concerning information developed in a civil court trial brought by General Public Utilities against the manufacturer of the Unit 2 reactor, Babcok and Wilcox. The Commission had in hand a report by the Staff (the "Stello Report") which concluded that the BCW trial record did not add substantially to what was already known by the Staff about the Hartman allegations.
We elected to examine the court trial record, particularly for information concerning the falsification of leak rate data and the training of licensed operators. Almost at first glance, we appreciated fully the veracity and significance of Hartman's allegations.
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We motioned the Commission for a reopening.
We realized that the
" mind set" (which blinded t'.
operators the day of the accident to indicators of loss of inventory of water covering the core) was created by management who caused the operators to ignore those indicators of excessive leakage by directing them to falsify compu' er t
reports. We found that Babcock and Wilcox,in their defense in-the civil lawsuit brought by General Public Utilities, was fully convinced that TMI management directed the falsification and deception and attributed management's motivation to a desire to avoid the cost of replacement power while Unit I was dova for refueling.
Our motion was received at the Commission's Docketing and Service branch at approximately 11 a. m. on April 18, 1983, the day comments concerning any new information in the GPU v. BSW records were due.
The day following (after the proscribed response deadline), the NRC Staff dramatically changed their position concerning TMI management integrity and the Hartman matter.
The Staff informed the Commission that they intended to revalidate their position on management integrity in light of the Hartman allegations. The Commission, obviously surprised, ordered an immediate explanation.
The Staff proposed to resolve the challenge to management integrity posed by the Hartman allegations through an inspection of procedural adherence at Unit 1.
We objecte'd in writing to the Commission and orally to the Staff. We found the Staff's proposed resolution absurd and a coverup.
Subsequently, after two meetings with the Staff and completion of the " revalidation" 5
inspection, the Commission rejected the Staff's response to the Hartman matter.6
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The NRC Staff spent considerable resources in drafting the proposed revalidation plan, executing it and reporting it.
In addition, production of the "Stello' Report", which had obscured the information about Hartman in the BGW trial materials, had consumed the resources of more than four Staff members for ten weeks. The Commission then ordered the Staff to rereview the GPU v. BGW court trial documents at an estimated expenditure of several man years.
From this review, the Staff published NUREG-1020 which identifies a number of other matters related to management integrity and competency. The full significance of these other matters is hidden from the parties to the proceeding since' large po'rtions of the document are expurgated.
However, none of these matters appear to rise to the significance of the Hartman matter.
Soon after receiving our motion for reopening on the Hartman matter, the Commission placed it with the Appeal Board.
Then, on June 16, 1983, the Appeal Board invited comments from all parties concerning reopening. Three Mile Island Alert had already supported reopening in an omnibus motion of May 23, 1983, which paralleled the NRC Staff's report of May 19, 1983 of four additional open items related to management integrity discovered in the " revalidation inspection".
Other intervenors, Union of Concerned Scientists and the Commonwealth 1
of Pennsylvania, now joined our position.0 The Licensee opposed reopening, and the NRC Staff requested a deferreent of Appeal Board ruling, pending further NRC investigation of the Hartman and related matters.1 1
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. Subsequently, on July 28, 2983, the Appeal Board heard oral arguments of the parties. A month later, on August 31, 1983, the board ordered a reopening on the Hartman matter and remanded the hearing to the Licensing Board. The Licensing Board ordered inte, rested parties to submit their plans for participation by October 11, 1983 and convene for a conferer.ce on October 18, 1983.
However, on October 7 the Commission stayed the hearing.
Near in time to our motion, three engineers involved in the TMI-2 cleanup raised additional concerns about management integrity. They reported to NRC and the media that the cleanup was being expedited by skirting regulatory procedures. When the engineers protested, management harrassed them as well as a secretary, according to the engineers' allegations.
Subsequent to our motion, the NRC Staff raised a number of other matters related to management integrity and competency.
Some of these matters grew out of the Staff's revalidation program and others out of their rereview of the GPU v. B&W court trial documents. These matters include licensee's withholding of two audits cade in the first quarter falsification of. leak rates at Unit 1 ' (a matter withheld by of 1983, NRC since 1980 and sisrepresented ih their Safet? Evaluation Report ~in the restart proceeding), and various other matters of falsification of
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training records, etc., as reported in NUREG-1020.
. Other significant issues were not noted by HRC.
"anagement withheld the "Faegre G Benson" report, prepared in 1980, which verified the Hartman allegations.
Another matter, under investigation by HRC for some tine, is the alleged collusion of management in falsification preemployment screening records, the subject of Board Notification of February 1,1983,17 In addition, the Licensing Board, in its first decision, recognized two issues other than the Hartman matter,to be significant to a conclusion regarding management integrity that were not adequately addressed in the restart proceeding.8 These issues are the matter of misleading information 1
p'rovided by TMI management during the accident and the withdrawn projections of high radiation releases calculated from inplant data,.now allegedly (and conveniently) lost.
Discussion We vigorously oppose the Commission's stay of the Hartman hearing.
The Hartman matter towers above any other matter recently raised by the NRC Staff in its belated effort to uncover instances of lack of management integrity. One reason is the seriousness of the allegations.
These allegations, if demonstrated to be true, would cause the revocation of the license to operate TMI.
They constitute material false witness.
They are causally related to the TMI-2 accident. All other findings i
and conclusions of the reopened proceeding depend on the resolution of-the Hartman allegations.
Second, the Hartman allegations have'been verified.
The direct NRC invgstigator of the Hartman matter, Tim Martin, t
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. stated, without equivocation, that the Hartman allegations so far as they related to the falsification of leak rate data, had been verified by the NRC Staff prior to transfer of the matter to the Department of Justice in March 1980.0 The- "Faegre C Benson report of a scientific 2
study commissioned by Licensee verified that false leak rates'had'been obtained at TMI-2 within the time frame alleged by Hartman and by using 1
procedures alleged by.Hartman The report ccncluded that the operators'
/fS$skfiSkleakratestoNRCandfailuretoreportnumerousotherleak rates measured in excess of technical specifications were deliberate actions in violation of the license to operate TMI-2 and NRC regulations. Other confirmatory evidence of the Hartman allegations were provided by the position of Babcock C Wilcox in.their defense in the GPU lawsuit. B&W considered the Hartman allegations a strong basis for their defense and provided corroborative testimony of another control room operator, Theodore Illjes.22 There is, therefore, no need to postpone the Hartman hearing to await the completion of the OI investigation.
Sufficient evidence is available.
The Appeal Board ruled emphatically that the Hartman matter should be heard expeditiously.23 The Appeal Board noted that too much time had already passed since Hartman first made his allegations.
l Additional delav will exacerbate the problem of thtaining additional reliable evidence.
An ongoing investigation by OI during a hearing of the Hartman l
l matter could be helpful in provid'ing new evidence relative to the' I
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. proceeding.
It would be appropriate that OI be a party to the Hartman hearing. The disposition of OI to proceed in secret to a conclusion prior to the commencement of the hearing is nothing less than a smoke screen designed by the NRC to obscure the culpability of the NRC and the licensee of TMI by withholding from the public view'old a,nd new
, evidence which could be reasonably be expected to so challenge.the -
integrity of licensee as to result in the denial of the operating ^ license.
In addition, for the Commission to now focus on the numerous other matters of lesser significance raised by the Staff following our motion to hear Hartman is purely a diversion. The Hartman allegations have already stood for more than four years without a hearing. All of the other matters are of arguable weight relative.to the Hartman allegations.
There is no reason to prevent some of these other matters from being argued within the framework of the Hartman hearing. As an example, the matter of the licensee's withholding of the Faegre & Benson r'eport for over three years is clearly germane to resolution of the Hartman matter.-
However, other instances of withholding of information (RHR, BETA audits), recently raised, should be considered in another hearing which must examine two matters left inadecuately resolved by the Licensing Board. These two matters are (1) the withholding of information and-misinformation provided to the Commonwealth and Congressman Udall following the Unit 2 accident and (2) the allegedly lost radiation records (inplant) from which allegedly incorrect extrapolations of 10 rem and 40 rem releases over Goldsborough were made.
.The evidence of
v deliberate withholding of information and falsification of records brought into light by information available to us for the first time following the close of the restart proceeding provides the bases for us to dispute the Licensing's Board's resolutior. cf the above two matters.
The members of the Licensing Board who presided over the restart proceeding have disqualified themselves from further participation in that proceeding. The cavalier manner in which this board disposed of the Hartman matter, the issue of misleading information and the Special Master's report on the cheating matters discredits _the Licensing Board's objectivity.
The further hearing of issues related to restart should be held instead before a neutral
' adjudicatory panel beyond the influence of the !!RC.
In point.of fact, the NRC is itself on trial in the Hartman matter.
The ComM ssion states its obiective in stayino the Hartman hearino as a conservation of acency resources. However, the Commission's proposed schedule for litigation
, designed to censerve resources, can. in fact, be expected to achieve the opposite result. The Commission proposes a number of separate investigations ar.d hearings, extending as a minimum into mid-1984. Whereas, the matters, identified for investigation and hearing, could all be considered within the framework ofta.re. opened proceeding.
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TMIA (Three Mile Island Alert), in making a motion for postpone-ment of the Hartman hearing,6did not represent our view.
0ur response 2
to this motion, prepared to be filed on October 6,within the time allowed, asserted the preeminence of the Hartman matter over the steam generator repair issue. The latter is obviously dependent on licensee's i
integrity.
Our response was not filed, however, since the Licensing Board ruled three days prior to the deadline for responses an'd denied 2
the TMIA motica.7 The basis for the TMIA motion, intervenor resources, should, however, be considered by the Commission in their scheduling.
The intervenors participate at the invitation of the Commission.
The dependence of the Licensing Board on the participation of the ir.tervenors was asserted by 28 the Board.
The burden placed on us to raise the Hartman matter in this proceeding was due to the failure of the NRC to do so.
Our burden has now been increased by the Commission's action in staying the Hartman hearing. We had other plans for the latter half of 1964 and forward which may now be affected by the uncertainty created by the Commission and a change in the Appeal Board's order for an expeditious hearing.
In view of the Commission's position throughout the restart proceeding, to have an expeditious hearing of all matters related to restart, the current Commission schedule which would postpone' hearing.of the Hartman matter until after a complete OI investigation, is most unreasonable on all counts including intervenors'_ resources. Over six months have already passed since we motioned to the Commission to 9
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the matter have/Hartman/ heard. Our resources are being depleted by the delay and attendant filings, and that is serious.
TMI-l would, in all likelihood, have been restarted if we had not raised the Hartman matter prior to the Commission's anticipated decision in June 1983. The reduction of our resources for intervening,should the Hartman hearing be stayed un,til next year,is as worthy of consideration as the agency's resources.
Although the Commission stated a single reservation in staying the Hartman hearing (agency resources), we are apprehensive concerning the Commission's decision to " review the Appeal Beard's decision to authorize a hearing at this time on the Hartman allegations."
The Commission declined to act directly on our motion to reopen on the Hartman matter.
The Commission had the opportunity to consider our motion since we made 4
it to the Commission in comments invited by the Commission.
- However, I
i the Commission placed the motion before the Appeal Board.
The Appeal Board considered our motion, comments of all parties, and oral arguments.'
The NRC Staff argued that the board defer ruling, pending an inquiry by OI, However, without dissent.by a single member, the Appeal Board ordered reopening on the Hartman matter. Although the Appeal Board believed that OI would complete their investigation by.
.i December 1983 (as represented by the NRC Staff), a ' delay "to await
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-the outcome of an investigation that should have been' undertaken-and completed at least three years ago" was censidered by the board ~
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" unconscionable".
The -identified ' directive for the Appeal Board's o
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. action was the Commission's expressed desire that "(the restart) proceeding be conducted expeditiously".29 The Appeal Board fully considered and soundly rejected the very basis on which the Commission has, apparently, instituted its review. Although we do n_ot question the Commission's authority, the stay of the Hartman hearir.g raises our concern about due process in this proceeding.
Our concerns are further aggravated by the Commission's implication s
in an earlier order (CLI-83-24) of September 21, 1983 that the NRC believed that the DOJ investigation of Hartman barred NRC investigation until recently.
The Commission stated:
By letter of April 11, 1983, the Commission wrote the Attorney General to inquire about the status of the criminal investigation into Mr. Hartman's allegations.
The Department of Justice responded that there was no bar to the NRC pursuing its own investigation, and by letter of May 27, 1983, the Commission notified the Department of Justice that it intended to pursue its own investigation.
(pages 3-4)
DOJ had already informed HRC in October 1981 that they did not oppose and would not be hindered by parallel investigation in the ongoing reopened hearing on cheating. The Chairman of the Commission 30 acknowledged this letter during an open Commission meeting, the press reported it, and we have independent knowledge of it.
We do not understand how the Commission can now assert that communications
-concerning parallel investigation were " oral" and misunderstood.
(See Footnote 3, page 4 of CLI-83-24) 1 i
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~16-Further, the Commission's assertion that NRC became aware of their right to conduct a parallel investigation as a result of DOJ's advice is completely incredulous.
Whether the NRC had a right to investigate would be based in administrative law and would not be be
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decided by DOJ or/at DOJ's descretion.
The Commission has a lega,l' staff who had already informed the Commission over three years ago that NRC's authority to conduct an investigation under the Atomic Energy Act' does not caase upon referral to Justice.
In an order of 31 May 28, 1980, the Commission based its decision on the very torts which it again cites in the September order (and on which the 32 Appeal Board depended in their decision):
The court in SEC v. Dresser Industries, supra, directly addressed these same arguments. In Dresser, the court upheld parallel civil and criminal investigations by
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the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice, respectively, into the same matter.
The Dresser ~ court stated that the reasoning of LaSalle could not be extended to an agency with a' wide-ranging mandate to make investigations as necessary to protect the public from violations of the security laws. (pages 7-8)
Clearly, the NRC has had its opportunity to complete its investigation of the Hartman matter. In addition,.there is no justification for NRC to linger any longer in an investigation since its direct investigator considered the Hartman allegations verified prior to the transfer of the matter to DOJ.
To linger would not.be.
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in the interest of conserving agency resources.
There would be little, if any, advantage to be gained in completing the investigation in the secrecy afforded by an NRC investigation. Three investigations of the Hartman matter have already preceded OI's.
The single remainin'g justification for an OI investigation to take precedence over a public hearing would be the prospect of developing the involvement of management-
.in the falsification.
. Prospect of a Full OI Investigation of the Hartman Matter We have examined several NRC investigations related to the restart proceeding.
OI's investigation of the Parks-King allegations appears to be thorough and fair for the issues considered thus far.
OI has not, however, considered the most sensitive issue -- whether GPU management exterted pressure on the engineers and a secretary to silenc'e the,m.
According to the schedule provided by the Commission, OI does not anticipate completion until April 1984.
This is precisely the time at which NRC projects that (nearly) all sensitive management integrity 33 investigations will be completed.
We cannot believe that completion of the single matter of management intimidation in the Parks-King investigation can take so long, or that OI can, at this point, know that it will. We therefore contend that the delay in OI's conclus' ion of the Parks-King case is not valid and OI's projected conclusion,at the time
.the statute of limitation of the DOJ investigation of Hartman expires, is not coincidental. We must conclude that OI, by failing to expeditiously conclude the Parks-King case, cannot be relied upon to provide a full investigation of the Hartman matter.
A most vivid example of compromise in NRC investigation was provided by ISE's investigations of the cheating incidents at Unit 1.
The director of ICE allowed plant and corporate management to sit in on interviews of the operators -- despite strong objections by the chief investigator and his assistants.
The investigators subsequently found that the presence of management officials during the interviews affected the flow of information. 6 When these investigators persisted, the director of ICE, Victor Stello, finally excluded management.
According
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to chief investigator, William Ward, Stello claimed that he had not excluded management sooner because he was unaware of NRC's right --
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until he had consulted lawyers.38 Neither Stello nor the NRC disclaimed this preposterous assertion of Stello's naivete.
We must ' conclude that directors NRC is staffed with investigative /who may be either inexcusably ignorant or act deliberately to favor TMI management.
The reopened hearing on cheating provided an example of the relative effectiveness of a public hearing and an agency investigation. The NRC investigation of cheating of operators failed tc uncover a range of matters from cheating on company tests to unqualified ir.structors. These were only brought to light in the public hearing.
Ir. fact, even in the hearing, the NRC Staff failed to find any of these deficiencies although they wer e noted by the parties as well as the Special Masteh'and were then confirmed by the Licensing Board.0 The Board expressed surprise at the. Staff's 4
" disinterest" in matters which should have been evident during their i
investigation and were clearly relevant to their task as regulators.
One outstanding example was the matter of false certification (for licensing) of a manager of the plants.
An OI investigation, even if adequate, cculd not be used to resolve the Hartman matter in the context of the restart proceeding.
NRC rules of practice do not allow important safety-related issues of relevance to a proceeding to be decided by the Staff.
Thus, agency resources will not be conserved by replacing a public hearing with an agency investigation. The hearing must be held.
There fore, it is the OI separate investigation which is optional, and the decision to conduct it apart from the hearing should be reviewed, if the Commission needs to conserve resources.
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. i We contend that the Commission should order OI to participate as a party to the hearing.
OI would add its resources to those of the other parties in a concerted effort to resolve the Hartman matter as well as other issues bearing on management integrity.
In this way, both agency and intervenor resources will be conserved, and the matters under i
consideration will receive a full hearing.
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We object to the secrecy with which OI intends to conduct its investigation.
As stated above, secrecy cannot further the investigation i
of a matter that has been under investigation and discussed in the media as long as the Hartman matter. Secrecy can only serve the purposes of the Licensee and increase public distrust of the NRC.
Commission's Immediate Effectiveness Decision The NRC has played " footsie" long enough. The NRC jeopardizes its 4
position as a regulatory agency.
The NRC does not need more evidence than already exists in the restart proceeding and in its files to make an immediately effective decision to deny the license at Unit 1.
The evidence already deduced on and off the record of the hearing is more than clear to the people of'the TMI area, as you learned from Dauphin County Commissioner John Minnich.
The Commission-knows (as the Special Master concluded) that the entire operations staff at TMI-l is compromised.
It is unfit to legally operate the reactor. -(See Attachment 1).The Commission knows (and OI
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has concluded) that'the three engineers' allegations concerning compromise of the cleanup operations at TMI-2 under the management of GPUN were true.
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(See Attachment 2)
The Commission knows (that Tim Martin confirmed) that' I
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the NRC investigation of the Hartman matter prior to transfer of the case to DOJ verified the validity of Hartman's allegations of falsification f
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. of leak rate data at TMI-2 which is operated by the same licensee as Unit 1.
(See Attachment 3) The Commission knows that Licensee's independent study of the Hartman allegations confirmed the falsification of leak rates at Unit 2 for most of the operating life.
(See Attachment 4) The Commission knows that Herman Dieckamp, president of GPU, vehemently denied the evident conclusions of Licensee's own study concerning deliberate falsification of leak rates.
(See Attachment 5) The Commission knows that the NRC detected (and hid) four instances of falsification of leak rates at Unit 1 from a limited examination of plant records for 1978.
(See ) The Commission knows that Licensee knowingly provided false information to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania concerning the seriousness of the Unit 2 accident.
(See Attachmen't 7)
CONCLUSIONS AND MOTION The Office of Investigations of the NRC (OI) should not be allowed to continue with a secret investigation while the public hearing is stayed. The Hartman matter should be heard expeditiously to place on the record of the restart hearing the evidence that already exists. OI should be ordered to participate in that hearing. Nearly all other matters related to management integrity and competency can be heard in the framework of the Hartman hearing.
Two other matters which rise to the significance of the Hartman matter and.were inadequately resolved by the Licensing Board should be considered in a separate-hearing. These matters are the misleading information provided to i
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- the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and withdrawal of projected high radiation releases at the onset of the TMI-2 accident. An expeditious hearing of all matters is essential. To delay may allow those in I
Licensee's management who have deliberately committed crimes again:st the people of central Pennsylvania to go free. The Statute of, Limitations will expire in March 1984, five years after the accident. The experience of those who participated throughout the management phase of the restart proceeding can be used to assist in the investigation of the Hartman and other management integrity matters with a conservation of agency resources.
However, the Commission need not wait until the completion of the hearing to make a decision concerning the license to operate TMI-Unit 1.
The Commission has enough evidence in hand to deny the operating license.
We move that the Commission make an immediately effective decision to permanently deny GPUN their license at Unit 1.
Respectfully submitted,
! l u<<.t{ ' (.
' Ol.'-f Y{.
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,f &..l;g Norman O. Aamodt A
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Marjorie'}M. Aamodt October 27, 1983 l
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References
' l_/ General Public Utilities Corp. v. The Babcock 6 Wilcox Co., No.
80-CIV-1683 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 25, 1980) 2/
Memorandum, Chairman Palladino, April 22, 1983 3/
Aamodt Comments Concerning NRC Inspection Report No. 50-289-83-10 and Commission Direfing May 24, 1983 (Hartman Matter), May 31, 1983 4/
Comments of Norman O. Aamodt during Staff Meeting with GPU Nuclear Regarding TMI Unit 1, June 20, 1983, Tr. 119-124 5/
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-289/83-10 6,/
c.
.i 2/
Report of the Review of the Babcock and Wilcox - General Public Utilities Lawsuit Trial Court Record, March 28, 1983 8/
Same as 6/ above 9/
Commission Order, May 5, 1983, at 3-4 IE/ Commonwealth, UCS Responses, filed July 1, 1983 g/ Licensee, NRC Responses, filed July 1, 1983 1,2/ Board Order and Memorandum, September 14, 1983 13/ NRC Inspection Report No. 50-289/83-10, at 13.9; Memorandum, William J. Dircks to Commission, May 19, 1983 M/ Board Notification 83-138A, September 2,1983, Memorandum, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Commission, September 2, 1983 and September 23, 1983 (See Attachment 6) 15/ Faegre & Benson Investigation of Allegations by liarold W. Hartman,'Jr.
Concerning Three Mile Island Unit 2, Volumes 1-4, September 17, 1980
,l_G/
See Attachment 4 6
M/ Board Notification 83-08; Faegre G Benson Investigation of Allegations by Thomas Quinn Concerning GPU Nuclear Corporation, September 2, 1983, Volumes 1-6 18/ See Partial Initial Decision,. August 27, 1981, at 257-287, particularly paragraphs 476, 487, 490-493 l
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Id., at-265-6; NUREG-0760, at 31-33; 20/ Commission Meeting, May.24, 1983, Tr. 14-17, See Attachment-3 21/ See 17/ above
/ ALAB-738,,at 18, Footnote 16 23/
Id., at 23 2i/ See PID, August 27, 1983, at 257-287, particularly paragraphs 490-493 25/ Commission Notice to the Partic~, October 7, 1983 26/ TMIA Motion For Postponement of Prehearing Conference, September 21, 1983 27/ Board Order, October 3, 1983 28/ See PID, August 27, 1983, paragraphs 490-493 29/ ALAB-738, at 23 30/ Commission Meeting, May 24, 1983, at 26 31/ Commission Memorandum and Order, May 28, 1980, Docket No. 50-320,
at 7-8 5
32/ ALAB, at'17, Footnote 14 33/ Same as 25/
34/ See Aamodt Findings, March 4,1983, at 45 - 73a, particularly paragraphs 124 - 134, 143 - 152 35/
Id., paragraph 130, Reopened Hearing, Tr. 25,428 - 430; Staff Ex. 27 at 6 36/ See Aamodt Findings, paragraphs 124 - 129; Reopened Hearing, Tr.
25, 274; 25,'333;'25, 430 37/ Reopened Hearing, Staff Ex. 27, at 6; Tr.*25, 429 38/
Id.
39/ PID, July 27, 1982, paragraphs 2333, and at 162 - 169, particularly paragraphs 2386, 2387. 2390, 2391 40/
Id.
41/
Id., paragraph 2308 42/.
Id., paragraph 2308 43/ NRC Rules of Practice and Procedure 4f/- Letter, October 7, 1983 Ben B. Hayes, Director, OI to Ivan W. Smith 45/ Commission Meeting, Per' iodic Meeting with Advisory Panel on TMI-2 Cleanup, September-16, 1983, Tr. 59-64 6-r i
4 6
e
overall erhelusicast tma @ consca rc
(
l 338. There was no evidence that the Licensee's upper managenent encouraged, condoned ' participated in, or knew of the cheating by 0 and W when it occurred. Nor is there any such evidence respecting cheating by any of the i
other individuals named in this report. However, the Licensee failed to meet its obligation to review the answer key to the h7.C exanination in good faith, and that failure showed an unacceptable attitude toward the NRC examination.
The number, and the responsibility, of the persons on the Licensee's u
operations staff who vers compromised by the evidence in this case was such that the overall integrity of the operations staff was shown to be inadequate. Although the Licenses did not encourage or condone the cheating on the NRC examination, it permitted an attitude to develop which caused the The cooperation on the weekly quizzes was caused by the cheating to occur.
conditions under which the quizzes were given, and the Licensee was-responsible for those conditions. The Licensee's response to the cheating on the weekly quizzes was inadequate and its testimony at the hearing on that subject was not credible.
Ne Licensee's response to' the incident involving vv in 1979 was unacceptable because of the Licensee's lack of candor with the The Licensee's training and testing progra= was poorly adninistered, NRC.
ineffective in its nethod of instruction, and not an adeqv. ate weak in content, response to the Comnission's Order of August 9,1979.
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September 1, 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino FROM:
B n B. Hayes, Director.
I ffice of Investigations k
SUBJECT:
THREE MILE ISLAND NGS, UNIT 2 ALLEGATIONS REGARDING SAFETY RELATED MODIFICATIONS AND QA PROCEDURES (H-E3-002)
[
Enclosed is an interim report of investigation en this subject.
Our investigation continues in an open status.
This inv.estigation represents a-un_ique departure f r. m;OI's, normal investigative practice.because it was necessary ic tenduct an inspection and investigation. : simultaneously.
This ac:ommodatien, wnich woulf not have been possible without theexcellent efforts by the IE & RIII inspectors detailed to
~the 01 investigative team, was necessitated by the highly technical nature of f
e the original allegations.
Thus, this report may be read from twa perspectives.
Read as an inspection report, it documents that tr.e procedure control allegations were true.
As an investigation, it acds testimony rega,roing the *
' attitudes and decisions that resulted in the af:rementiened noncom)liance.
Even :nough we have made an attemp: Sc fo:Us the.:'.umin:us factuai data on the identified problem areas, the mass an: comp'.exi y of :nis information may I
' tend to obscure what I feel are the mes: importan: findings and implications cf this investigation.
Consequently, I will high'ight for you what OI believes to be the major issues.
I The aliegations were not only substan iated, but we found them to be 1
l jllustrative rather than exhaustive.' :n general, even nough TMI-2 is still considered to be an operating plant fc ;NRC reggia::ry purposes, many recovery L'
anc clean-up operations by Bech eltwere r.ot being ::nducted in accordance with L,'
3
' ' applicable procedure requirements J(Be:htel North Merican Power Corporation i r. }
formerly Bechtel Northern).
Dissatisfaction with :P.is condition led the l[ ; 3 ellegers to the course of action trat triggered tnis investigation, y 1>
-The licensee made continual efforts to r,evise TMI-? procedures so.that they
!Y ir l
were applicable to the recovery program.
Despite -hese efforts, procedure control difficulties with Bechtel persistently oc:urred.
Relatedly, the evidence shows that the TMI Program Office was generally aware of the TMI-2 procedure centrol difficulties.
However, the TM::C vie ec these difficulties 4
3
- ! I and the TMI-2 efforts to resolve the: as internal ::nfli:d.
TMIPO feit that
/~
involvement in these internal matters.could de:ra:: nc: ten:ribute t: the w
r-e Chairman Palladino 2
September 1, 1983 TMI-2 solution.
In 01's opinion, awareness by senior licensee management of the TM:P0 passive role on administrative centrol ma :ers may. nave contributed to :ne licensee's procedural noncompliar.ce.
Some might consider it reasonable for senior licensee efficials-and Sechtei to want to work around what they considerec cumbers:me recuirements.
- However, such an approach, in addition to eroding NP.C's regula: cry stance, raises questions regarding the safety significance of tne ac hoc mocifications and the' predicament c'onfronting on site TMI-2 superviscrs who have to govern the plant according to established norms.
This situation was aggravated by TMIPO reviewing Bechtel draft procedures that did not naet the licensee's programmatic requirements and approving certain Bei. :el work packages that did not meet TMI-2's procedural requirements.
In additien, TMIPO approved Bechtel work on containment penetration modifications that were not in accordance with a 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, design criterion.
Such modifications would require a license amendment for other facilities.
Bechtel; a non licensee. with limited experience of HRG operating plant requirements, was essentially given operatienal ressensibility for the recovery project.
Senior licensee management was continually advised by TMI Quality Assurance and in house management of Secntel's ncn compliar.ce with applicable procedures and safety misclassifications. Tne failure of senior licensee management to responsibly moni:or Eechtel's work and hcid Bechtel acccuntable is the underlying cause of the TMI-2 procecural problems.
Mr. E. J. Gallagher was detailed to the Office cf Investigations from the Office of Policy Evaluation to review the technical aspects of this investigation.
In Mr. Gallagher's memcrandum ccncerning this rc,iew, he recomends that a Performance Appraisal /Censtruction Assessment type team be assembled to conduct an evaluation of ;iar; modi'i:atiens and regulatory and management controis.
Band on the fincings cr. :nis 'nvestigation, 0: believes the recovery program would certainly benefi: fecm su:n an evaluation.
A copy of Mr. Gallagher's memorandum is enclosed.
In cicsing, once again, I would like tc c:in: cu that this is an interim report issued during a pending investigation. Neitner :his report nor transmittal memorandum may be relea' sed outside :ne N:.C wi.hout the permission of the Director, 01.
Internal NRC disseminatier. anc access snould be on a need and right-to-know basis.
Enclosures:
As stated CcmissionerGilinsky(w(w/ enc.)
cc:
Ccmmissioner Roberts
/ enc.)
Comissioner Asselstine (w/ enc.)
Cc=issioner Bernthal (w/ enc.)
W. J. Dircks, EDO (3 copies w/ene.)
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1 uo to thic point.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
And you have focused on 2
t I
3 TMI-l?
4 MR. MARTIN:
Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let's see, you are trying to deal with it without knowing whether the allegations are ture 6
7 or false?
8 MR. MARTIN:
I car. tell you for a f act that the,,
What caused those records were falsifi_ed,..that_much we. knew.
9
~
10 records to be falsified, what was the motivation for those 11 records to be falsified, that I can' t tell you because I was not allowed to get far enough into it to find out.
12 13 In March of 1980 Phil Clark, the Executive Vice s.,
President of GPU issued a policy memorandum to all his senior 14 l managers.
Can I have the next slide, please?
3 15 2
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16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Maybe that deserves some e
l 17 fclarification.
You said you were not allowed to get into it O
I l
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3 l
I 18 l far enough.
k ll i
19 MR. MARTIN:
We sought frer the Commission subpoena 1
I I
It took us three or four days to get that resolved, and l
33 power.
E 21 before we were able to resolve it, Justice grabbed it.
i I
M CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What?
Z3 MR. MARTIN:
Justice grabbed it.
Justice had it, and 24 wehad to turn over our records to them.
i 25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That was?
l i
1 q:,
1 MR. MARTIN:
In April of 1980.
,i 2
CEAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Not at this time.
3 MR. MARTIN:
That was back in Acril of 1980.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think that is important to 5
clarify.
- I think'it di'ht'be Also clear that 6
MR.THO1PSON:
g 7
Tim at that time was the individual who was responsible for 8
and doing the NRC's investigation.
So, he is personally 9
f amiliar with that information.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I was not questioning his and he background but rather what was meant by that statement, 11 put it in perspective.
12 13 MR. THOMPSON:
I understand.
14
' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me just come back to something else you said which is that the records were in effec 5
15 2o 16 falsified.
17 i
MR. MARTIN:
Yes, sir, they were.
ej I
I l
l 18 i'
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is that a conclusion that
~t l
t 19 4the staff reached at that time?
I.
i 20 MR. 11ARTIN:
That is a conclusion.
We were able to, j
f, l
through analysis of recorcs and looking at the various physical
[
21 l 5 l
22 charts that were available, we were able to demonstrate that l
23 water was added, the computer was not told, there were falsifies 24 leak rates.
We were able to demonstrate that hydrogen was 25 added which caused a change in reference leg level, the-apparenf n
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10 1
proccuro thara which fclsified tha loak rato.
Ma cleo had l
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testimony from operators that they had falsified leak rates.
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3 The other issue was associated with an estimated 4
critical position.
Again, the allegation was f alsification of 5
records.
We were not able to resolve that one'way or the 6
other.
That is the reason we had to turn it over to Justice.
-7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Was that reported to the 8
Commission at the time?
9 MR. MARTIN:
I will have to default to Harold or 10 Vic Stello on that.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do you remember?
12 MR. MARTIN :
I know that we sought subp.oenas from the, 13 Commission and we never got them.
P-14 MR. DENTON:
The case was before the Board.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I must say, I don't remember 2w 16 it and I think I would have.
17 j
MR. DENTON:
But remember, the investigation was e
l i
1 18 worked on by I&E at the time, and their reports then were i
I o
t i, being furnished to the scard.
I am..ot sure the final con-s 19 j
l a
clusions report was ever written because of the decision by l
20 r
the Department of Justice to enter the case.
So, we stopped.
21
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.7 22 MR. MARTIN:
It was not a written report at that 3
I 5
i 23 time.
/
24 MR. DENTON:
And I think back at that time it was i
envisioned that the Department of Custice investigation would be 25 l.
P
0 So, complete by tha tima a restart decision wac' contemplated.
/
1
/
telling the Board that it was under we kind of left the case, 2
3 investigation, and that is where it stood.
And these conclusions were COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
4 never written down?
5 They were not written down in any 6
MR. MARTIN:
The inspection is formal document ready to be transmitted.
'7
-_u not completed, the investigation is not completed.
8 Thank you.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
9 Go ahead.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
10 In March of 1980 Phil Clark, the MR. MARTIN :
11 Executive Vice President of GPU issued a policy memorandum 12 It was on procedures for a nuclear generating station.
/
13 N.
written to the senior managers and the purpose of it was to 14 explain in a very detailed manner what he envisioned were 5
15 and what he 2
the policies and practices to be used in GPU, 16
! expected of the people that were charging with implemen o
1~
j procedures, the supervisors and the managers.
E 18 19 The bottom line of it was a condition of employment, r
1 g
had some " outs" such as,
It this compliance with procedures.
i N
l L
if you find yourself in an emergency condition and you do not 21
[
ii think the procedure applies and you f eel that your tra n ng u
j h
shows you a better way to go, you have ' authorization to ge 2
plant into a-stable condition.
24 The' supervisor also has the authority to override a-25 l
1 I
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+
3 Resu2:e of Feogra & 3 nsen Investire:icn of iller = ticns
'o v.- r ro i c 6.~. nartman, J r. Concernin c '_ nree !.11e.r..c r e Unit 2, Volumes 1-4, Ser:etoer 17, ~960 Chis independent investigation instigeted by GPU cete tc ine following conclusions (psge 36):
1 Ersed on Hartman's statement, their corrobora tion in I&I interviews end upon our review of the effect of the omissions, errors and oscillations, we have little doubt the t leek rate tests were run frequently, producing en unknown number of unidentified leak ra tes in excess of Igpt.
'2 To the extent that " bed" leak rete results occurred, they were ell thrown away because none heve survived in tne regular file.
The deliberateness of the failure to report tests in excess of technical specifications was drewn (page 26):
3 in view of the underlying policy rationale establishing e 1 gpm limit on unidentified leakage, namely, plant sefety, it would be difficult to justify a conclusion thtt when the test is run core frequently then recuired results outside of the 1 gym li=it can te ignored, unless they-are rejected as invalid indications of leakage.
t The extent of the failure to report leak rate calculetions in excess of technical specifications was indicated by notes of I61 interviews provided to the investiga:cre.
It apperrs that fr;: one to five tests were perfer:ed per shif;(:F Fe 10) ever e period exceeding six months.
Chc evidence (
1, 2,
?) fcrees ; conclusien thn.
the fr ilure of the operrtione sisff ic re:Ord bsd" tests, te vrlida te these tests end report Eny valid ' bad" tests to Ine Khc was deliberate End so extensive to involve the entire opera tions steff.
Concerning the matter of " fudging" the celculp tions, the consultrn s were denied eccess to-the bes; s urce of this infer:e tion. -- the opers tors.
leEF1 i$rriers were'prctided L
e
i by i.e tropoliten idicon menefctent to preven; full a ccess to the operetors.
(pe t es 9, 13)
Ho'.:ever, no:ss from :51 intervie's provided cerroboretion of Errttr-n's 711egs icns of edditior cf weter shd hydrogen to Five e low felse resding (pries 10, 1 1 ',.
The consultants also verified that ell :he tethods Esr nen alleged were used to '* fudge" the calculttien were effective.
(pa 6es 37-4 9) 9 r
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4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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'N September 2,1953 Docket No. 50-289 HEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION (BN-83-138 ) TMI-1 RESTART HEARING The NRC Staff is currently looking into the matter of possible incidents of I
falsification of reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate tests at THI-1 prior to the accident at TMI-2. This inspection by Region I is not'yet completed; however, an examination of certain TMI-1 site records reviewed in conjunction with this inspection suggest that a statement previously made by the Staff in the TMI-1 restart proceeding, and believed to be accurate at the time, may prove to be incorrect. The statement in ouestion arises out-of the NRC investigation of the Hartman allegations cf falsification of leak rate test data at TMI-2 and is contained in NUREG-;650, Supo. No. 2 (March 1981).
Specifically, the Staff stated in that deczent that:
"Further, althouoh the NRC investication is r:t c0molete. and the examination of Unit I records was limited, ne indication of practices at Unit I similar to those alleged at Unit 2 ae-e identified."
' By way of background, the basis for the above-quoted statement in NUREG-0680 Supp. 2 was a draft document written by Fr. Keith :hristocher in April 1980 (a copy of which is attached) which was proviceo to Mr. Tim Martin at that time. Mr. Christopher was a Region I investigator assigned to the investigation of Mr. Hartman's allegations and Mr. Martin was the.
Investigation Team Leader. During the course of that investigation, which was not completed because of the referrai of the Har man allegations to the Department of Justice, Mr. Christopher pe-formed a limited review of THI-1 documents relating to leak rate calculations.
He'-eviewed approximately
/
o l
S
. 1200 RCS leak rate test records generated at TMI-1 during the period April 26, 1978 to December 31, 1978.
Four of these records annaarad tn represent results of tests durino which the rnntrn1 annm nn r>+nr (rnn) log incicateo water nad been added tn the RCS and the comnuter test recorcs indicated that this information had not been iocaed into the computer.
Nevertheless, at the time NUREG-0580, Supp. 2, was issued..it was concTuded that there was no indication of practices at Unit 1 similar to those alleged at Unit 2 for the following reasons.
1.
Hartman made no allegation that any of the practices he maintained occurred at THI-2 also occurred at TMI-1; moreover, during his extended examination by NRC investigators, they were left with the distinct impression that the problems identified by Hartman were isolated to Unit 2, because he contrasted the problems at Unit 2 with his positive perceptions of the construction and operations at Unit 1; 2.
The acceptance criteria for TMI-I leak rate tests was lett stringent than for TMI-2. due to the additional consider.ation of a 0.51 GPM evaporative loss factor; 3.
The dates of the four records in question and the personnel involved showed no consistent pattern; 4.
The number of TMI-1 records in question constituted one-third percent (0.33%) error rate, which was not comparable to the seven percent error rate round at TMI-2; and, 5.
The leak rate test records found in question had a number of possible benign explanations; therefore, they were not in themselves inoications of falsified leak rate test records.
Although the ongoing staff inspection has called into question whether the
.four examples cited earlier are valid, the current insoection, which is more extensive than the limited examination of Unit I reccrds that was conducted in 1980, has raised new staff concerns relative to the way leak rate-testing was conducted at TMI-1.
The present staff inspection should be completed in the next several weeks and a referral to the Office of Investigations for aeditional review is i
expected.
However, when the inspection report has been completed, the staff
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will provide the Commission and the Boards with its results.
If appropriate, the staff will utilize the procedures set forth in the tc.mmission's August 5, 1983, Statement of Policy.
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' C kle,'.ft n M.i~u.i s Darrell G. Eisenhut Director Division of Licer. sing, NRR
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
(w/ Encl.)
Dr. John N. Buck, ASLAB Judge Reginald L. Gotchy, ASLAB Christine N. Kohl, Esq., ASLAB Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles, ASLAB Judge Gary L. Edles, ASLAB Ivan W. Smith, ASLB Dr. Linda W. Little, ASLB Dr. Walter H. Jordan, ASLB Parties to Hearing k
e' e
-e f
I f
1
i
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(L. Bradford, Smith - Marc'n 27,1981); Tr. 20,776-82 ( Aamodt, Smith -
April 30. 1981); Tr. 21,011-15 (L. Bradford, Smith - May 1, 1981);
Tr. 22,989-93 (Smith), 22,997-99 (L. Bradford, Smith - July 9,1981). We explained why it was not permissible simply to take official notice, over objections, of other investigations, such as the Udall Report, for tne truth of the matters asserted.
Id.
We furtner explained, however, that the Board is aware of.tne other investigations and reports.
We carefully considered _wh. ether to, pursue the disclosure issue further on our own and decided not to do 50.
M.
W-1 will reiterate our reasons in greater detail here.
471.
In the course of the following discussion, we will in part reference the documents listed above which are not in evidence.
We do so as part of our consideration of why we did not expano the hearing on our own to hear other evidence on the disclosure issue.
We cannot, and do not, find any facts solely on the basis of documents not in evidence.
472.
Tne IE NUREG-0760 investigation concluded that information was not intentionally withheld from the NRC or tne Comonwealth on the day of tne accident, but significant information did not adequately f. low (either on tne site or off the site), and that Licensee was not " fully forthcoming" in appraising the Comonwealth on the first day of the uncertainty of or potential for degradation of plant conditions.
Staff Ex. 5, at 10-11; Staff Ex.13, at 9; Tr.13,025-27 (Moseley).
~.
265 -
a 473.
The specific conclusions reached in NUREG-0760 (at ~10-11) cere:
1.
Tnere was significant information tnat did not adequatel flow either on the site or to the necessary offsite groups on the.
day of tne accident.
ya 2.
On the day of tne accident, an effective system did not exist to ensure adequate information flow; i.e., to provioe significant information for dissemination and evaluation within' the onsite organization or offsite within the Met Ed and GPU organizations as well as the NRC, Connonwealth of Pennsylvania, and other agencies.
3.
Those individuals on site failed to understand the extent and significance of the problems confronting them on the day of the i,
accident; this contributed to the inadequate flow of information.
e i 4.
Met Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979 in that they did not appraise the Commonwealtn of Pennsylvania of either the uncertainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or-the f
potential for degradation of plant conditions.
5.
Information was not intentionally withheld from the State on
}'
3 the day of the accident.
]
6.
Infor11ation was not intentionally withheld from the NRC on tile day of the accident.
7.
The NRC did not have an effective system to ensure that information was properly accumulatec, evalua:ec, and r
disseminateo.
8.
Reporting requirements, both to NRC and to tne State, were not sufficien'.ly specific on March 28, 1979.
I 474.
Without going into details whicn are fully aescribed in WUREG-0760 and the other reports not in evidence which we have listed I
above, the disclosure issue includes the following items of information:
the Licensee calculated projected dose rates for Goldsooro of 10 R/hr and l [
F higher; the elevated temperature indications of the hot-leg and in-core
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e
,m. wu5 acmmHR.T#c ~ Sr hA E'-
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- 266 -
8 tnermocouples; and the containment pressure spike.
Also included, particularly for tne unce'rtainty and potential degradation of reactor conditions which they should have disclosed if properly evaluated, are l
i the times and/or nature of operation of the Hign Pressure Injection (HPI) and let down systems, the reactor coolant pumps, and tne Pilot Operated i
Relief Valve (PORV, also referred to as the EMOV).
The above is not an exhaustive list of all matters.
Tr.13,026 (Moseley).
Staff Ex. 5 (NUREG-0760).
See also, for a correlation of the items discussed, e.g.,the Udall Report and the Rogovin Report and Me:r.orandum, supra.
475.
The comunication or failure thereof by tne Licensee to the Commonwealth incluoes a meeting with Lt. Governor Scranton at his office at or about 2:30 p.m. on March 28. The senior Licensee representatives were the Vice President for Generation, John Herbein, and TMI Station and TMI-2 Unit Manager Gary Miller.
Comonwealth personnel present in adoition to the Lt. Governor included Thomas Gerusky, Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection.
See, e.c., Staff Ex. 5, at 7, 42.
Wnile we do not rely on Mr. Gerusky's interview witn the IE investigators for tne truth of the~ matter asserted since he was not a witness before us subject to questions, we note tnat Mr. Gerusky was l'ater unhappy, based on his perception of tne meeting, that l
Messrs. Herbein and Miller conveyed the view that the accident was over and everything was under control.
Staff Ex. 5 (NUREG-0760), at 42, l
Appenoix B, at 113-1; see also.Udall Report, at 110-116, which includes excerpts from Mr. Gerusky's interview by IE.
u U
7 n
9:
- 267 -
l 4
b I
476.
As appears through'out all of the reports, Mr. William Dornsife, a nuclear engineer with the Pennsylvania Bureau' of Radiation J
~
Protection, was one of the prime state contacts to whom Licensee passed information on the first day.
He was not at the meeting in the Lt.
pp Governor's office.
If further investigation is pursued, wnich we did not deem worthwhile to do, further inquiry could De better focused on the
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extent to which Mr. Dornsife (as compared to Mr. Gerusky) knew or better d
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appreciated information by_the time of the meeting and whether h
Mr. Dornsife would have interpreted comments by Messrs. Herbein and 0
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Miller at_tne meeting different_ly.
We note, however, tnat Mr. Dornsife, y
u like Mr. Gerusky, believed the plant was stable although not in the
[
ti desired mode (Staff Ex. 5, at 41), and that he too did not know of' any' uncertainty as to whether the core had possibly been uncovered for a
' --b-l significant period of time early on the morning of March 28.
Compare Staff Ex. 5, Appendix B, at 104-3 (Dornsife) with M., at 105~-3 and 105-4 (Gerusky).
F (a 477.
Conclusion 4 of NUREG-0760 that tne uicensee was not fully forthcoming on the day of the accident in failing to inform the Comenwealtn of tne uncertainty of or potential for degradation of plant conditions appears to us to be inconsistent witn conclusion 5 tnat information was not intentionally withheld from the Conr.onwealth on the f
day of the accident.
One possible explanation of this is apparently that tne IE investigators Delieve that the predominant factors in the I
information flow problems were their conclusions 1, 2 anc 3, suora. -See
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This is to certify that Aamodt Response to Commission' Order of October 7, 1983 was served on the. following Service List by deposit in U. S. Mail first class October 27{l1983.
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Mu Me lh a duurdA
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Marjorie M. Aamodt Michael McBride Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby G MacRae U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N. W.
l Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20036 Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Douglas Blazey, Chief Counsele t U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Environmental > Resources Washington, D. C.
20555 Executive tiouse Ilarrisburg, PA 17120 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ellyn Weiss, Esq.
[
Washington, D. C. 20555 Harmon & Weiss 1725 Eye St., N. W.,
Suite 506
- Commissioner James K. Asselstine.
Washington, D. C. 20006 U. S. - Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Washington, D. C. 20555 TMIA 315 Peffer Street Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Harrisburg, PA'17102 U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Washington, D. C. 20555 Adminictrative Judge' Gary L. Milhollin Atomic Safety & Licensing Roard' Panel.
1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711-U. S.;Iluclcar Regulatory Comsission Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Panel, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 George F. Trowbridge,_Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M St., N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 1-Docketing.G Service Dranch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Jack Goldberg, ~~ Office of Executive
' Legal-Director,'U..S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C. 20555
.,